













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 




FROM CONTRACTUAL SERFDOM  
TO HUMAN RIGHTS LIBERATION: 
DOING JUSTICE TO VIRTUAL LIVES 
 










Ph.D. Degree Submission 
The University of Edinburgh, 2011 
 
  
 I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed 
solely by me and it has not been submitted for any 
other degree or professional qualification. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 have incorporated few short 
extracts from work previously published in 2004, on 









Analysis of relationships between states and 
citizens has almost monopolised the Human 
Rights legal discourse. In my thesis, I start from 
the position that Human Rights is a 
philosophical and historical victory of 
humankind, whose application cannot be limited 
to dictating norms in traditional forms of 
governance; Human Rights primarily define the 
human being as an individual, as a group, as a 
societal entity. Therefore, when we discuss 
Human Rights we do not pursue what governing 
states 'ought' or 'ought not' to do, but how 
human beings 'should' endure their lives in a 
dignified manner; how they should be treated 
independently of who their acting opponent 
might be. 
The Internet, on the other hand, has evolved 
through the years into an uncharted virtual 
structure of uncounted online operations and 
services run by private commercial actors. 
Within this setting, where the online application 
platform performs as a land parallel and the 
private commercial host as the de facto ruler, 
online identity is mirrored into service accounts. 
Hence the human being‘s digital existence 
seems to be depending, to a large degree, on 
the private initiative – and will. 
Whilst exploring various relevant themes, the 
thesis revisits the issue of the application of 
Human Rights in private relationships through 
the lenses of online electronic communications 
and using the example of commercial online 
virtual worlds. According to my conclusions, a 
simple projection of the state/citizen model onto 
ISPs/users relationships does not give sufficient 
ground for contesting Human Rights within that 
context. What we need is to deconstruct 
predominant dogmas in modern Human Rights 
theory and legislation and to readjust our focus 
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Each Chapter is separated into main Parts, 
numbered in Latin. Parts do not necessarily 
follow narrative continuity but are linked within 
the Chapter‘s thematic unity. They are further 
divided into sections (‗1.‘, ‗2.‘ etc), subsections 
(‗1.1‘, ‗1.2‘ etc), paragraphs (‗1.1.1‘, ‗1.1.2‘ etc) 
and sub-paragraphs (‗1.1.1.1‘, ‗1.1.1.2‘ etc).  
Where the structure of the discussion suggests 
so, the numerical values of the divisions abide 
by a secondary mode of representation to show 
internally progressive arrangements of 
descriptions or arguments (therefore ‗1.1.1‘ 
continues with ‗1.1.11‘, followed by ‗1.1.12‘; 
note that this does not preclude subdivisions 
into e.g. ‗1.1.12.1‘, ‗1.1.12.2‘ etc).  
A footnote reference to the main text like e.g. 
4(II)[3.1.21.1] reads as ‘Chapter 4, Part II, 
section 3.1.21.1’.   
Footnote content in angled brackets refers to 
websites (news-reports, press-releases etc.) 
























The following account discusses online virtual worlds from a legal 
point of view. It is, however, not about virtual worlds. It puts forward an 
extensive comment on the human predicament in days of present future, as 
liberal societies, mesmerised by the myths of modernity and convinced of the 
so far successes of their political, technological and economic ventures, 
chase fervently visions of progress, only to cross paths with the phantom of 
liberty.   
Commercial online virtual worlds are used as an example to discuss 
the paradigm of private regulation in closed settings and the applicability of 
human rights. Contemporary legal structures in many areas of life, in order to 
accommodate economic development, are frequently neutralising human 
rights claims in horizontal relationships. Considering the rise of privatisation 
and the allocation of public resources – and thus of vertical exercises of 
power over citizenship – to the private sector, the legal trend raises concerns.   
[2] 
 
 Improving regulatory efficiency requires ―sacrifices‖, such as 
minimising the risk of fundamental rights disrupting the private economic 
sphere. These laws are worrisome not as much for their obvious ideological 
potency (which nonetheless becomes an issue) as for the moral bankruptcy 
they exhibit. It is rational for an efficiency-seeking structure not to involve 
values in its operational schemes: it is irrational, however, for a human 
formation (ethically suicidal) to submit voluntarily to dehumanising 
processes.  
In parallel the thesis examines also an idiosyncratic form of  
privatisation of public spaces. My definition of public space adheres to the 
spatial development of communications exchanges which contextualises 
community formations. From this point of view, public spaces exist as parks, 
town-squares, but also exist in shopping-malls, private clubs, fitness centres 
etc. The ownership of physical space does not expand over the community of 
participants, but certainly determines it: (i) it conditions the coming together 
of persons and (ii) it authorises the application of rules at the owner‘s 
discretion. Personal relationships, modes of co-operation and discussion 
content remain unaffected. This is a public space embedded within space.    
The thesis investigates the realisability but not the reliability of the 
human rights perspective – and this is how it actually stands closer to 
discussing practice rather than crossing into constructing a theory of justice. 
The human rights rhetoric is not a panacea that resolves all social problems; 
there is no intrinsic guarantee within the discourse that it could provide an 
adequate replacement for existing socio-economic regulations that frequently 
resort to human rights.
1
 
1. Digital Issues - It is a plausible question, if the matter at hand is the non-
applicable human rights to the Internet, why not discuss the Digital Divide, 
rather than engage with obsessions of Western consumerist societies, which, 
in the end, trivialise all possible perspectives for articulating human rights 
discourse in the digital era. 
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 Mundlak, G. ‘Human Rights and the Employment Relationship‘ in Friedmann & Barak-Erez 
[eds.] (2001) 313 – 314. 
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1.1 - Generally, the ―developed‖ Western political and economic schema 
performs as a model for countries without resources - not to mention, without 
sufficient entitlements and freedoms. Arguably, online technologies present a 
luxury for peoples with increased rates of disease and death, caused by 
malnutrition, famine, war – the familiar predicaments of humanity that 
international human rights regimes have failed to respond to (and are 
apparently failing to address more with the passing of time). We live in an 
era of increasing expectations that, bleakly, seem more and more 
undelivered. This failure resides in the Western world and it is primarily 
internal; for this is where promises start breaking. How can developed 
countries help nations washed in tragedy when internally they are flooding 
with intense struggles and human debasement? How can they support with 
stability politics of reason - wherever in the worlds this is considered to be 
missing - when their own internal practices are unreasonably opposed to any 
of the principles they politically declare to be championing? These are 
plausible concerns as well. 
Hence, while not underrating attempts to ―bridge‖ the Digital Divide, 
its resolution seems eventually futile if spaces like the Internet are turning 
into fields of human debasement. One may ask whether the latter 
contingency is ever possible. This work intends, if not to prove this point, at 
least to show that such worrisome potentials inhabit our politico -economic 
culture. The inability to realise solidly the democracy project and its 
humanitarian cargo within the daily Western social practices shows the 
difficulty of translating them in other settings. 
1.2 - This takes us to the next query: what has human rights, or democracy 
for that matter, to do with virtual worlds? At first glance, closed online 
entertainment setups lie the furthest possible away from those juridico -
political projects. Virtual worlds, however, facilitate a case study that 
reflects broader trends in the information society. The actual paradigm 
involves the commodification of social participation, the alienation and 
isolation of individuals (the par excellence valued objective of liberal 
democracy) through systematic practices of expanding the economic project. 
[4] 
 
Virtual worlds exemplify partial internal failures within the liberal structure 
that, if we take them seriously, they give us insights into societies‘ 
integrating and treating of upcoming technologies; technologies possibly 
more spectacular and socially permeating.  
1.2.1 – Why should virtual worlds be considered of any relevant 
significance? In October 2010 the worldwide estimated number of registered 
users had reached 1 billion people.
2
  Virtual worlds perform as technical 
facilitators for long-running communal and cultural experiences,
3
 projecting 
other, more socially integrated and expanded projects, such as social 
networks, business intranets and, even, economic structures. The fact that 
these worlds are labelled ‗virtual‘ does not diminish their currency: after all, 
money is also a virtual product.
4
 
1.3 - While VWs are used as a particularly good example, we are not dealing 
with activities that play only a marginal or accidental role in people's life, 
something they dip in and out of like other activities, e.g. going to a football 
match. Rather, we are seeing the emergence of lives lived largely online, 
ranging from playing to sociability in general (again, losing online accounts 
would destroy many people's entire social and professional circle) to , 
increasingly, work (consider the importance one's ebay trust rating has for 
many small businesses, or organisations such as "clickworker" which create 
new forms of potential exploitation at the workplace by making us all 
temporary, self-employed and most importantly non-unionised). 
2. Overview – The discussion follows a step-by-step examination of legal, 
technological, cultural and political themes to gradually build its argument of 
juridico-political critique. The contribution of this thesis emerges from 
bringing human rights into perspective in the online world. 
2.1 - Chapter 2 sets the background for the discussion by explaining the 
approach to human rights that the thesis takes onboard.  
2.1.1 - The analysis opens with the anthropological claim that around the 
globe and through the ages, humans almost everywhere develop identical 
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sensibilities of justice. What I address as a ‗civilizational tradition‘ r efers to 
humanity‘s demonstrated sharing of basic social norms and moral principles. 
This suggestion comes arguably very close to conceding universalism, 
without though subscribing to such notions. More likely, it complies with 
Hart‘s comprehension that rules overlap with morals, and in a manner 
reiterates Walzer‘s concept of thin and thick principles.    
The origins of human rights as a common juridical and ethical ground 
are possibly rooted in this civilizational tradition. I am associating the human 
rights doctrine to a conception of justice that I call ‗humane Justice‘ (or 
simply ‗Justice‘). However, I am not introducing another theory of Justice, 
but underlining the continuing philosophical and institutional project of 
humanity‘s investing in posited laws its defence against suffering and 
injustice.  
Suffering and injustice, in turn, become integral in igniting the 
responding moral components of the human rights tradition: the first appeals 
to humane compassion; the other mobilises vigilance against apparent 
misapplications of law.
5
 Historically, the development of the theoretical 
foundation of Justice involved rearticulating compassion juridically and 
preparing conceptually the postivisation of the moral sensibility of law. This 
overall process, that picked on naturalistic interpretations of justice and 
brought them gradually into ontological compatibility with modern law, is 
analytically presented in Part I, with the aim to highlight the deep integration 
of human rights in contemporary juridico-political structures. 
In its conclusion, this retrospective sketches out the juridical device of 
the ‗human subject‘, i.e. the subject in the theory and procedure of humane 
Justice. Subjectivity plays a decisive role in the administration of justice; 
hence, early in the thesis the subject of human rights is put within 
perspective. 
2.1.2 - Part II follows the formal dimensions of national and international 
human rights law; the structures and legislative expressions in which it is 
manifested; the main expressions of content; and, finally, the modern 
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 Douzinas & Gearey (2005) 28 – 29 (on recognising justice via its opposite). 
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problematic of application under statist constitutionalism (i.e. horizontality 
and exceptionalism).  
Here are outlined the breadth and furthest limits of the existing 
posited orders, as the thesis generalises over the Inte rnet‘s global expansion.  
The purpose is to establish a human rights perspective that may equally claim 
strong roots in the doctrinal tradition and practical regulatory resonance.  
2.1.3 - The Chapter closes with exposing problems of human rights in 
relation to those concerns raised in the beginning of the present discussion. 
My locating of a multilayered ‗crisis‘ involves the silent – yet seemingly 
effective - ostracising of the human rights grammar from contemporary legal 
practice. The dehumanisation of law unfolds in three ways: (i) the systemic 
shrinking of the human rights rhetoric; (ii) its undermining by economic 
liberalism; and (iii) its vanquishing under positivistic extremisms in law.  
2.2 - Jumping from the legal and philosophical treatment of humanity, over 
to technological reconstructions of reality, Chapter 3 starts by installing a 
preliminary task: the onto-logical renegotiation of the concept of the subject.  
2.2.1 - The capacity of law to understand and interpret the actual human 
being (i.e. a complex personality synthesis of identities and self) predisposes 
its affordances to channelling into legal subjectivity the probable multiplicity 
in which humanity is externalised in society. Hence, where otherwise the 
Chapter explores participation in Internet contexts, Part I commits to the 
unexpected endeavour of tracing the abstract blueprint of personhood, 
seeking to show that the ‗human subject‘ of Chapter 2, this cognitive 
intersection of experienced truth and posited law, remains, for the purposes  
of Justice, open to genuine reincarnations of humanity; reincarnations like 
those emerging from online contexts. Towards these ends, the person concept 
is explored under an interdisciplinary perspective, on the basis of the triptych 
‗subject‘, ‗identity‘ and ‗self‘. 
This is a first step in building the paradigm of ‗simulation‘; that is, a 
virtualisation of life that we ought not to restrict only in understandings of 
virtual worlds. The virtual is in essence the symbolic, and the symbolic is 
any process/statement that intellectualises the experience of life into orders 
[7] 
 
of signs. Therefore, language, culture,
6
 religion, law and economy are 
equally considered to be virtual environments. This over-absorbing of reality 
by different virtualities exposes essentially as misinformed any discourse 
that claims exclusivity in defining meanings according solely to its resident 
reference field. Law appears possessive, exactly in this fashion, over notions 
of personality. Personality, though, like humanity, is broader than  the 
limitations, which the legal instance contests to apply over its conceptual 
breadth and praxis. 
2.2.2 - The second Part continues rather conventionally, presenting a brief 
historical account of the Internet experience. Then, though, it moves on with 
providing some alternative interpretations of the structural premises of online 
participation. A point of significance in the narrative of the thesis is raised 
by projecting relationships between online service providers and users on an 
analytical government and governed metaphor; the argument reaches full 
circle later, in the final two chapters. This Part wraps up with defining the 
premises of virtuality in full perspective of online relations and agency 
deployments. 
2.2.3 - The discussion continues directly from there, with configuring the 
online aspect of the identity concept and then taking it a step further, into 
virtual domains. The purpose is to understand online participation from the 
experienced viewpoint of users, in its social and psychological dimensions. 
Virtual identities evolve into personality vessels/vehicles that we may simply 
call ‗online personae‘. This transfer from the offline to the online, from the 
‗concrete actual‘ to the ‗idealised virtual‘, reserves a parallel tale about 
digitised personalities and the second coming of humanity. The image of the 
Internet as a modern urban environment and an extensive reference to Hardt 
& Negri‘s work suggest two alternative understandings into the structural 
development of online virtuality; these representations converge in 
discovering a lively multicultural social hub, but also in underscoring 
substantial fears of inequality and societal suppression, delivered ultimately 
in the form of exclusion mechanisms.  
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2.3 - Chapter 4 might estrange the legal reader even more, as it launches an 
expedition into strange lands: an empirical account of digitised utopias.  
Etymologically the prefix u- in utopia means ―non‖ (ουτοπία). Virtual 
worlds (VWs) are ―non-lands‖, in the sense that physically these false images 
of territorial vastness exist nowhere else but on computer screens; and yet, 
they exist sufficiently to invade and alter the common perception of life for 
the millions of participants in those settings.
7
 It is more accurate to speak of 
heterotopias, ‗real spaces in which the ordinary rules of behaviour are, in 
different ways, suspended to permit the enactment of a variety of processes 
and rituals that do not occur in ordinary spaces.‘
8
 
My method for representing a setting of representations follows 
collected news reports and data on VWs‘ to monitor the trend‘s evolution 
within the past decade, focusing on two selected virtual landscapes. The first 
is the Massively Multiplayer Online Roleplaying Game (MMORPG) World 
of Warcraft (WoW) released by Blizard/Vivendi; the second is Second Life 
(SL), a socialising three-dimensional world that is ran by Linden Lab. My 
reasons for examining the particular two VWs have mainly to do with their 
popularity status; how this popularity factor has affected and is affecting 
common user/consumer psychology; how it is being projected in the relations 
between users and OSPs; and, finally, how it is predicted to interact in a 
culturally market-dominated society. 
The examination of the two VWs includes analysis of particular 
contractual agreements and terms of use, which are integrally attached to the 
online software and regulate participation in such services: End-User License 
Agreements (EULAs) and Terms of Service/Use (ToS/ToU).  
2.4 - The question which runs through Chapter 5 asks how did law 
understand and approach humanity‘s migration to online settings; and what 
was law ultimately aiming at for getting where it is now.  
                                                 
7
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8
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2.4.1 - Part I enumerates the general development of Internet-related 
legislation in the US and the EU at the regional level. The reason behind 
picking these two particular geo-political formations is their infrastructural 
and jurisprudential influence in shaping the Internet as it is today. Moreover, 
they equally declare their serving of contemporary liberal democracy‘s 
maxims, ―competing friendly‖ with each other as global models in promoting 
and establishing human freedom and humanist values. It is interesting to 
measure how close to these assertions the incoming waves of Internet laws 
have come. They arguably construct the next stage of our society‘s cultural 
and economic evolution. Thus is briefly addressed the realisation of human 
rights values through this legislation.  
2.4.2 - Part II looks into the laws which apply specifically to VWs – or 
‗should apply‘, where legal practice has not yet confirmed them. Following 
the general trends which frame online legality, the juridico-political reality 
reaches participants of the information society through mass-distributed 
consumer contracts – the EULAs and ToS. 
 However, these virtual heterotopias generate their own, distinctive 
issues. The trade and various other appropriations of virtual items have 
raised controversy amongst OSPs and users and, at the same time, have 
fascinated lawyers and the media. Furthermore, involvement with VWs tends 
to cross the functional borders of such online services and to be externalised 
across the Internet (even off-line) in various forms of cultural re-
appropriation; service providers frequently object, claiming infringements of 
their relevant intellectual property rights.   
2.4.3 – In the final Part of the Chapter the first conclusions are drawn 
regarding the examined framework and its compliance with Justice – with 
legal practices that respond to the juridical human rights ideal.  
The Internet by design revitalised public communications space, 
expanding to all possible directions the potentials for social progress and 
information-based human development.
9
 Internet-related laws and legal 
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practices demonstrate signs of working against these prospects. Firstly, they 
reinforce attentively the economic hold of private actors on artefacts that 
crucially chill the performance of social spaces; in parallel, they appear as a 
whole to be withdrawing from responding directly to those human rights 
concerns, which online participation has in general raised. In these laws, the 
human being is being replaced with the ―consumer‖.    
2.5 Human Justice, Virtual Humanity, the example of Virtual Worlds and the 
laws of virtual present and future: these are the four steps examined so far, 
building a spiral of critique that leads directly into Chapter 6 and attacking 
on the expanding systemisations of intellectual property (IP) laws and the 
conditioning of social participation by the utility of standard form con tracts.  
Online personae exist both as pure data or information and as nets of 
relations to other users and OSPs (―I am because I am befriended on 
facebook"). Unlike the off-line human with its physical substratum, online 
personae, in a radical sense, are information and relations. 
This corresponds to the legal instruments of contract and IP: contract 
law governs the relational aspect and IP law the information part. As a result, 
we see a concept of "person" emerging that is nothing else but a result of the  
interaction of these two legal concepts: to the extent that they embody an 
ideology of free markets, we find the most complete form of 
commodification of the self imaginable. While in the traditional Marxist 
analysis of the labour contract similar issues are raised, ‗being employed‘ 
was only ever one aspect in a person‘s existence, even where being the most 
important to dominate all others. In the online context, we face a much more 
radical reduction of the self to a market object, understood through the t erms 
of property rights and contractual obligations: we are nowhere more "owned" 
than online. 
Part I reviews analyses in scholarship that have already confronted 
directly the legitimacy of the monopoly of power, which OSPs exercise 
under the pretext of IP rights and through EULAs/ToS. These practices 
                                                                                                                                          
and allows us to grow faster than we ever could when we were fettered by the hierarchical 
classification systems into which we bound ourselves;‘ Tambini et al. (2008) 2. 
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follow a larger campaign aimed at maximising the hold of market forces over 
information and its various social, political and cultural uses.  
Part II deploys three conceptualisations, under which formal law could 
build a possible connection between personality and virtual personae and, 
furthermore, the human subject could legitimately access onl ine virtuality.  
Part III examines the dimensions of the malleable, made of software 
code digitised nature and the online limits between private and public. The 
conceptualisation of the ‗virtual public‘ practically ―digitises‖ the previous 
reference to the multitude, assessing briefly its juridical responsiveness to 
VWs. 
2.6 – The final Chapter remarks briefly on the practices of the free market 
and on virtual humanity. It foresees the need to negotiate the contractual 
methods which regulate entrance to private spaces of apparent public 
function. The prospect is ambitious. This is why technologies and spaces that 
do not directly infringe our physical existence in their daily application offer 
the best chance we have for reviewing our daily practices.  
After the Internet, after VWs, other technologies and other virtual 
spaces will follow, possibly closer to enveloping our existences. Before we 
reach to the extreme of not being able to adjust the machine to prevent 
dehumanisation, we can still adjust the other machine, law, to treat us 
humanly.  
3. Motivation and Methodology - The inspiration for the main idea behind 
the topic was the work of mathematician Norbert Wiener; his warning that 
his revolutionary discoveries about machines and humans being equally 
communicative organisms
10
 should not be taken uncritically; without 
sufficient human values background to guide our treating of humanity‘s 
merging with technology.
11
 Humanity melding into online transmissions is 
little different to humanity melding into law. Actually, the second instance 
demonstrates deeper integration of human life into technical systemisations.  
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On this basis, Douzinas‘ critical study of law under the scope of 
human rights jurisprudence
12
 and Drahos‘ philosophical examination of IP
13
 
formed an ideal starting point, for addressing structural developments in law 
that succumb to radically technocratic attitudes, and, moreover, realise 
dispositions that are anything but politically innocuous. Passing through 
cultural studies, the thesis‘ other two major streams relate to Hardt and 
Negri‘s multitude
14
 the terms of the online polity‘s socio-cultural production 
and Radin‘s work on property and personality. 
3.1 - The reading of the thesis evolves over two substrata. The first is my 
extensive account of Justice. The second is the interdisciplinary examination 
of personality and existence in Chapter 3. Once the discussion reaches the 
case studies they both seem disappearing into the background. However, 
Justice forms the platform juridical perspective which permeates the entire 
critique developing in Chapters 5 and 6; therefore, its human rights take 
forms the yardstick against which legal structures and decision-making are 
being constantly measured. In a similar manner, the ―person‖ analysis 
attempts from the shadows to reconnect subtly the most formulaic 
subjectivity understandings of law with materialising aspects of humanit y. 
3.2 – The treatment of laws was inevitably selective, on the basis of VW-
related jurisprudence and, mainly, in view of the argument on economico-
politically influential legal structures. Federal US and EU legislation 
demonstrate the mainstream understandings and perspectives which social 
policies and macroeconomics generally promote. On the contrary, the 
examination of human rights laws focuses more on the local level for 
comparing constitutional origins.  
3.3 - The approach to VWs borrowed methodological principles from 
sociology and anthropology - specifically from symbolic interactionism.
15
 It 








 Blumer (1964) 2, analyses symbolic interactionism on three premises: 1 – ‗human beings 
act towards things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them‘; 2 – ‗the 
meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has 
with one‘s fellows‘; 3- ‗these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an 
interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters‘.  
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is mainly informed by numerous conversations which took place during my 
short term field work in both WoW and SL as an active participant,
16
 upon 
empirical inquiry and studying ‗through firsthand observation what is 
actually happening in a given area of social life‘.
17
 News reports, statistics 
and commentary from online sources like weblogs played also major part, 
where, precisely due to the infancy of the field, the lack of research 
bibliography is self-evident. 
Where cited, the EULAs and ToS of WoW and SL (as included for 
comparison in the appendix section) refer to their status up until mid-2009. 
Later updates are mentioned, where relevant to the thesis‘ objectives . 
Plausibly, such texts tend to change during the lifespan of a virtual world, 
following frequent policy adjustments. 
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Moreover, where indicated, my discussions with other participants pertained to having 
common conversations on the shared virtual experience as this occurred, instead of 
―interviewing‖ or ―surveying‖, which would have taken the research scope to a different 
direction.  
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  Blumer (1964). 38, fnt; Boellstorff (2008) 71 – 72, refers to this anthropological research 
model as ―participant observation‖, deploying short arguments on its advantages. 
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2. The Foundation of Human Rights 
 
‗The idea of human rights consists of two parts. According to the 
first part, each and every human being is sacred – each and every 
human being is ‗inviolable‘, has ‗inherent dignity and worth‘, is ‗an 
end in himself‘, or the like. According to the second part of the idea, 
because every human being is sacred (and given all other relevant 
information), certain choices should be made and certain other choices 
rejected; in particular, certain things ought not to be done to any 











We need to understand Human Rights.  
If anything else, this sounds like a plea, a call made in the defence of 
a discourse that claims of having been misunderstood; in a way, this is 
precisely the case. Since their initial celebrated insertion into the 
international language of law something profoundly has changed and, 
gradually, the hold of human rights notions over the systematisation of 
contemporary laws is waning; the connecting link between the two appearing 
more and more insignificant, almost irrelevant for lawyers to bother with.  
At first glance, this assertion seems counterfactual. Aren't we living in 
an ―age of rights‖, with recent high profile attempts to establish universal 
jurisdiction for certain human rights abuses but the latest in a long line of 
significant developments?  The claim, obviously, has to mean something 
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else. Rights, including human rights, so we will argue, have become a 
technocratic means of control, just a further trope in the positivistic legal 
vocabulary. This has made them efficient, but also sterile, removed from the 
context that gave birth of the idea – they are human rights forgetful of the 
human. 
As we begin to become at home in cyberspace, and live our lives 
through our digital selves, we need to recover some of the old meaning of 
human rights, because we need its heuristic value. In situations where it is 
not any longer straightforward to decide where the human actor is - if 
anywhere at all - a much more rigorous reflection on the meaning of human 
rights is needed. This Chapter then is an exercise in the archaeology of 
human rights, to reconnect it to a notion of the human as sacred, and to give 
voice to the ―dangerous complements‖ of human rights that got lost in their 
transformation to juridified rules of adjudication. What this will also 
achieve, crucial for any attempt to evoke them for the regulation of 
cyberspace, is to rescue them from an overly western-centric expression. It 
has been argued that the very concept of right is so embedded in parochial 
and contingent developments that affected solely the West that the ir utility 
for a global medium like the Internet is severely limited. We will show 
instead that while the specific form of right is at least partly western-centric, 
by retrieving their substance, their spirit of a cross-cultural recognition of 
what it means to be human, we can revitalise the concept of as yet 
unresolved issues of governance in cyberspace, and rebalance the overly 
contractarian model that dominates current discourse.  
From an iconoclast‘s point of view, human rights do not and never did 
exist: for what else are human rights but a condensed expression, in which 
the rather abstract pairing of moral justice and procedural justice acquires 
meaning? Looking back at humanity‘s societal (and, in response, legal) 
evolution so far, the most persisting and agonising of all concerns has been 
ever since antiquity the transformation of the unattained ideal of Justice into 
the regulatory apparatus for applying normative order – i.e. justice. This long 
journey is carved in contemporary human rights expositions. Human rights 
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are juristic statements, which communicate the practical applicability of 
Justice, perceived through the eyes of man conscious of his humanity to the 
broader system of societal organisations. This also explains the variations in 
form and terminology of the human rights ideal across different legal 
systems; its blending with pre-existing linguistic arrangements in law marks 
an experience of such tremendous longing that it welcomed political 
compromises in ―systemic destinations‖ such as ―fundamental rights‖, ―civil 
liberties‖, ―social rights‖ and so on.  
As the weighty image of Justice rises tall in the background, its 
shadow cast over all human rights discussion, it makes profound the deep 
relationship of origin between the two. Justice‘s own tale speaks of an 
unending odyssey towards reaching a definite conceptual expression: moving 
from appeals to substantive morality, to the avoidance of suffering and the 
pursuit of pleasure, to economics-guided calculation and to interpretative 
judicial balancing, Justice appears omnipresent and yet ghostly at the same 
time. Even drawing an ideal Justice conception at the point where all such as 
the above mentioned approaches converge, would again have denied the 
benefit of a finite determination by giving in to unstable over-inclusiveness. 
This Chapter reflects on the journey of humanity, through its struggles 
to pinpoint Justice and its achievements in the always developing justice 
project. There is good reason for choosing ―humanity‖ over ―law‖ as the 
traveller in this tale. For one thing, contemporary jurisprudence has longer 
than necessary been preoccupied with the technical evolution of law, with 
rationalising internal rules of recognition or interpretation perspectives; this 
has had negative ramifications, escalating in the dehumanisation of justice. 
Second, law is the vehicle, the means, not the valued cargo and end; the 
moment the importance of law is overstated when compared to the regulated 
body of living, breathing human entities, legal fetishism takes control in its 
most unwelcome expressions; the outcome will resemble nothing of a human 
society, and although not impossible we have to ponder whether that is 
eventually desirable.  
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Such contemplations may be read as a parable, informed by the 
involvement of human users in virtual worlds that are built on artificial 
conceptions and made of software code. Humanity is trying to define itself in 
digitised environments by infusing the code with principles of justice. 
Human rights mirror in the regulatory construction of justice the aspiration 
of humanity‘s aims and principles: the aspiration of Justice.  
Human rights have not been devised randomly. They do not just 
discuss morality of natural law and rights. They most of all theorise a socio -
political normative thesis. On their juridical materialisation is projected the 
composite picture that human Justice really is, a picture that touches upon 
several other conceptions of Justice and, in addition, it transmits 
ideologically clear social expectations and poli tical requirements. Therefore, 
‗respect of life‘ (a moral assertion) is sitting next to ‗freedom of speech‘ (a 
democratic imperative). 
This is the form of an established Justice, of a celebrated Justice, 
which cannot be surgically removed from our legal vocabulary unless we are 
prepared to erase most of the fundamental normative principles which 
together have institutionally formed the modern Rule of Law. In this section 
we are directing attention to the development of Justice and human rights, 
historically and through the - less than obvious - institutional connections 
which have granted the human rights argument integral part in the structure 
of contemporary (posited) law. The aim of this Chapter is to rescue human 
rights from the narrow ethos of formal legality and review them as 
institutionalising a continuing dynamic of societal consciousness and 
progress.  
I. A Civilisation of Human Justice  
Attitudes, behaviours and biases that stem from the discussion over 
virtual worlds and which in following chapters I will relate to human rights 
reasoning, are primarily products of a predominant civilisational tradition.  
Despite converging in modernity over Western, humanitarian legal 
doctrines and models of democratic governance, the component parts of this 
[18] 
 
tradition consist of dynamic cross-cultural dialectics with universally felt 
impacts. The driving force behind the shaping of our civilisation is not a 
parochial Western ideal or practice but the human spirit: its needs and 
interests just happen to be best served by the philosophical and political 
triumphs of the West; hence, for this reason the human spirit fought (as it is 
still fighting) globally for achieving political attachment to them. In this 
respect, the human rights discourse‘s importance as a political tool is 
increasing and expanding territorially.  
Modern legal expressions of the human rights doctrine are the result 
of philosophical explorations and socio-political struggles over the content 
and exercise of rights. While the term ―natural rights‖ may be rooted in the 
Western philosophical tradition, the demand for having a right recognised 
derives from human reasoning obeying the psyche‘s self-preservation 
instincts: when forming communities, rights are arguments articulated by 
rational beings who are striving to survive the struggles of their everyday 
lives; whether the contested entitlement is claimed against a ruler, a group of 
people or a neighbour, it aims at expanding temporally the human being‘s 
balanced existence. By being logical expectations, rights become 
characteristic properties of a civilisation of the intellect, of a human 
civilisation. Thus, in its essence the ―invention‖ of rights cannot be 
territorially or historically attributed to a single part of this civilisation but to 
its entirety; arguably, to its human nature. 
  The development of this civilisational tradition was imbued with 
overlapping moral principles which gradually determined its core values.  The 
humanitarian drive, which first in philosophy and later in law declared 
―rights‖ that define and at the same time are defined by a ―humane‖ quality, 
did not arrive as the result of parthenogenesis, but as a genuine product of 
that very civilisation. Apart from the general capacity to reason, ―humane‖ 
defines also an ability to reason with emotions, thus transforming them into 
principles: kindness, honour and compassion have not coincidentally become 
universal themes. In this sense, it appears plausible that over time strong 
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confirmations were sought for these themes also in the Justice discourse, 
even when this latter was forced to move along rather technical pathways.
19
 
 In short, the global village is small indeed, but not because of the 
communications revolution of the 20
th
 century, or the more recent 
innovations in the field of digital technologies, but because its different parts 
are intrinsically interconnected within its human soul. From that 
civilisational tradition we can first extract a basis of principles in raw form, 
then move up to the level where these are formally granted with normative 
contents and regulatory functions.    
1. A Shared Moral Ground - Outside the formalities of law and the relevant 
contemporary doctrine, the human rights idea is old,
20
 based on broadly 
adopted principles of morality that since ancient times have penetrated the 
fabrics of cultural identities of human collectives and towards securing 
necessary community standards for peaceful and functional co-existence.
21
 
1.1 - In the bosoms of religion are traced the first scrapings of the long and 
strong relationship between morality and law. Long before formal legal 
recognitions in human rights, religious beliefs had already incorporated a 
kernel of principles that enshrined the human being. More importantly, 
religion developed them into normative constructions,  first by establishing 
itself as the connecting element and force within early social formations and 
later through the ―religion-centric‖ historical evolution of nations.
22
 It 
provided for a code of basic ethics by which social participants abided, 
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imposing the sanctification of such notions as ―life‖, ―brotherhood‖, 
―respect‖ and so on.
23
  
1.2 - There is evidence of both diachronically present and territorially spread 
values, which took shape independent of much younger humanist Western 
modules. My argument here, though, does not follow a universalists‘ claim 
of an underlying common humanity.
24
 Instead of proving of an early 
apparition of human rights, such moral qualities evidence a widespread 
―human sensibility‖ of Justice, since, despite the tremendous variations from 
society to society, their involvement with political institutions has been 
direct and deep. Human life was not protected because it was necessarily 
considered sacred, but rather because otherwise people would 
catastrophically eliminate each other;
25
 or, to rephrase, human life became 
sacred exactly for averting societal collapse. The justice of law appeals to the 
Justice of the reasoned and sensible human; it was created in Justice‘s 
rational image, like man was in the image of his perfect God. One end of this 
parable on faith speaks of fidelity to law, a notion now restated in explaining 
law as rising both efficient and righteous - that is virtuous due to its origins 
in humane reasoning. 
Conversely, however, the same ethical basis of religious doctrines 
would usually also reinforce and prolong subordination to the authoritative 
governmental orders, which were in turn justified upon the presupposition of 
moral correctness. Hence, humanity‘s civilisational tradition did not evolve 
inside a persistent natural law matrix of divine morality and humane 
goodness. Even despotic authorities could perpetuate their position in power 
effectively, by annexing an elementary moral stand within the laws of the 
King; if different, life for governed subjects would have been completely 
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unreasonable and unbearable and have demanded its immediate structural 
reorganising. Effective exercises of justice necessitate the reasoning of 
Justice. 
2. From Nature‟s Ethics to the Rule of Rationality – Despite being 
ubiquitous, the moral foundation alone did not suffice to achieve 
transformation nor received formal recognition into institutions everywhere. 
For that, the right circumstances were formed mainly within the Western 
heritage and were further developed with the coming of Christianity. In his 
landmark work ‗the End of Human Rights‘, Douzinas analyses in depth the 
history of natural law and natural rights recognising there humanity‘s long 
struggle and meditation towards embracing true Justice, in meaning and 
practice alike. 
2.1 - Historically, understandings that pointed to something closer to a 
―human rights‖ conception arrived last in a long line of partial answers to the 
morally fundamental problem of Justice, which the natural law tradition had 
originally raised in search for virtue and ―goodness‖ in laws. In this sense, 
Justice explanations and natural law reflections frequently overlapped in 
their parallel disputing of the morality of posited rules and promoting of 
demands for alternative solutions for the application of justice. The actual 
human ideal became gradually intrinsic part of this reflective process, it was 
explored and later on re-imagined according to what needs drove the West‘s 
distinctive political and economic evolution.
26
 In the long run, morality was 
separated from theocratic imperatives
27
 and reinvented as ―rationality‖ in the 
creation of civil, social and political rights. 
2.2 Civil Foundations and Civil Rationality – Of those notable explorations 
in the juridical and philosophical tradition of natural rights we may underline 
here two specifically, for their long lasting – arguably pre-emptive – 
influence upon both the development and reasoning of modern law.  
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 When cultural relativism is brought into the human rights discourse, it becomes apparent 
that the majority of expressions of rights, and especially of freedoms have derived from the 
Western approach to democratic political identity, mainly back to the historical fomenting of 
the American and French declarations.  
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 For example, in Grotius influential works legal order was established as independent from 
religion and, at the same time, it realised a humanitarian argument within the moral 
mechanisms of law and society, Haakonssen (1996) 27. 
[22] 
 
2.2.1 - Therefore, we find in Hobbes the concept of justice being for the first 
time fully replaced by the idea of rights.
28
 The dramatic significance of this 
exchange being incorporated in law is explained in the next section.  
2.2.2 – Second, the premise of self-preservation was related by Locke to 
property‘s becoming the conceptual means and ends for securing 
individuality.
29
 Upon the pragmatic merit of this pronunciation of 
individualism, property was established as a powerful meaning, which 
dominated the modern rights construction. Later Chapters of the thesis 
confront the not so clear normative convictions and juridico-political 
implications which these conceptualisations eventually proliferated, namely 
the ontological development of law being instructed upon proprietary 
comprehensions (for example, as being argued later, legal subjectivity is 
understood on the basis of whether someone has certain capacities and not on 
whether someone is essentially acting out subjectivity) and the facilitation of 
the private sphere‘s supremacy. 
3. Landing Humanity and Justice in Law - Justice being that social ethical 
value by which the ‗conduct of reasonable beings may be measured and 
judged,‘
30
 the gradual developments in natural law and rights theories 
responded to the compelling call for chaining society‘s regulatory restraints 
to human reasoning and sensibility. Whereat anthropological insights and the 
progressive jurisprudential project came spinning faster together, we come 
closer to witnessing the construction of the modern human rights argument. 
Either transformed into stricto sensu international human rights law 
rationality or contesting civil liberties in national regulatory frameworks, the 
argument translates its primary sources (i.e. a celebrated common moral 
tradition and shared conceptions of justice) into the operational logic of law.  
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Here a different question of justice is posed, which leaves aside all 
inquiries into what is just, to investigate how modernity‘s legal thought 
envisioned law‘s systematisations so that delivering just decisions can be 
anticipated. From this angle, we may approach and comprehend the key 
components in determining a legal system‘s structural coherence with the 
potential of human rights justice. 
3.1 On Human(e) Justice - Whether understood as ―righteousness‖ or as 
―fairness‖, Justice remained through the years an elusive and cont roversial 
idea . For once, Justice in its primal manifestation appears emotional and 
wild: it represents untamed feelings aroused by and in reaction to acts of 
injustice, its origin similar to that communal instinct which prescribes the 
affirmation of natural law values across a society.  
3.1.1 Justice‘s Fall from Grace - Classical dike captured the notion of 
Justice, within whose multiple facets the ancient polis and its citizens 
mirrored their ideal of an ultimate virtue. Justice was overwhelmed by 
Christian morality during the Middle Ages; for the dominant juridical 
understandings, earth law derived from divine law and thus carried within 
God‘s wisdom. Later, modern thought endorsed its over -zealously 
pronounced worship of reason exactly for casting off those predominant 
theological dogmas. However, whereas virtue and morality had come 
together under the principle of Justice and then religion had arrived to place 
a claim over them both, modernity, employing conventionalist notions of 
procedure that it took from general jurisprudence, expelled the moral 
substratum which the Classics had sought to merge with nomos, with the 
Law.  
At that time Justice was reborn as justice, yet ―unjust‖, being empty of 
the ethical ―right‖; missing this ―right‖ it rediscovered ―right‖ as order, and, 
consequently, ―rights‖ as entitlements that submitted their judicial 
performance to principles of economic function. Property was reinstated as 
the ground for liberty, and, strangely for an age of victories in intellectual 
emancipation, the social value of ―property‖ was thereupon increased.  
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3.1.2 Kant‘s Inhumane Humanity - The major apologist for the fall and 
resurrection of Justice turned out to be (without his knowledge) none other 
than Immanuel Kant, a point worth examining here briefly, both on the merit 
of Kant‘s decisive influence over Western juridical and moral thinking  and 
as a platform explanation for the effects of reason on the moral component of 
Justice.  
Kant‘s ―moral self‖ was a product of pure reason; he modified 
humanism to ‗satisfy the authority of Newtonian physics‘ and he separated 
reason from desire.
31
 The cold look of Kant‘s rationality into the human 
being envisaged the maxims of action and will (as standing in the centre of 
his categorical imperative) in terms of instrumentality. And yet, born to a 
poor pietist family, Kant resented detaching his thinking from values that had 
deeply affected him during his upbringing. Instead, he deconstructed 
Christian ethics to reformulate its fundamental morality into a functional 
logical methodology of societal contact.  
This is where Kant‘s works resulted into a convincing excuse for the 
dispassionate human and the instrumental operation of those institutions that 
regulate its life. Reason (a fierce weapon into the hands of Rousseau against 
preceding despotisms and their supporting theocracies)
32
 acquired in Kant 
compatibility with Christian humanism. Therefore, along with the 
―Christian‖ element, any ―humanitarian‖ interest in the human condition was 
declared equally redundant, displaced in favour of anthropological 
awareness. Kant‘s argument was so impressive in combining both pure 
ordered logic and a sincere caring attitude towards the rational being that his 
descendants in scholarship - either proponents or critics - willingly abided 
their meditations by the Kantian universe and its language.  
Hence, Justice needed neither nothing like compassions nor emotion 
to be set forth. Legal systems submitted to a notion of justice which 
compelled strict obedience to rules, not however in confirmation of the 
superiority of values which compelled creation of those rules in the first 
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place, rather than for the calculated societal benefit in the perfect order 
which they nominally pursued; superiority was now claimed by the rules 
(means) that compelled the universal maxim of the human state (end). 
Understandably, it was under these (positivistic) presuppositions that natural 
law and natural rights disappeared from comprehensions of the operation of 
justice. While Nietzsche‘s ―Death of God‖ summarised the obsessions of an 
era with rejecting entire sets of values due to these values‘ historical ties 
with religious doctrines, the abolishment of goodness from justice would 
slowly necessitate the return of the natural law dialectic, yet under an 
improved guise.  
3.1.3 - Jurisprudence entrusted rationality with securing decisive, swift and 
efficient administration of justice. Thus, modern justice adhered to 
impartially applying law‘s prescriptions; it tended the morality of law, which 
comprised of the ‗correct following of formal procedures,‘
33
 rather than 
appealing to the realm of ethics.  
Under this conception, rights and freedoms in laws represent agreed 
societal standards; a ―right‖ is a procedural convention, aiming at 
harmonising and improving daily life. However, there are qualities which 
rational justice legislated as ―rights‖ or ―freedoms‖, yet they were born 
within human civilisation‘s moral conscience – called variously ―natural 
law‖, ―religious identity‖, compassion etc - and definitely did not grow out 
from procedural customary practices, the likes of sale and lease.  
Therefore, we reach a critical point of contention: if ―rights‖ are 
conditioned in the legal context on terms of a pan-societal contractual 
relationship, they are compromised every time political and economical 
circumstances demand optimisation of justice‘s mechanics. It thus follows 
that the rational – substantively technical - understanding of virtues in 
legalisation must eventually deprive them of their protected value and the 
effects that were originally pursued in establishing them by laws. This sort of 
justice, precisely for the reason that it over-relies on its administrative 
performance, is alienated from the human being, similar to Kafkian 
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bureaucracies that, absorbed in the order of rules and formalities, get off the 
track from retaining the citizens‘ interests and are transformed into tyrannies.  
‗By pretending that the law is innately rational, by immersing 
ourselves in the myths of jurisprudence, of the ―science of law‖,  we are 
abrogating our deeper responsibilities to individual justice.‘
34
 Summarising 
Heidegger‘s frustration with the dehumanisation of law, this comment also 
mirrors the post-WWII crisis in political philosophy and jurisprudence. 
Rationality had apparently failed the promises of Enlightenment as well as 
the expectations which had elevated justice to become the universal cradle of 
humanitarian virtue. 
3.1.4 - The introduction of international human rights law refuelled the 
morality dialogue, which had dried out within nation-state approaches to 
liberties. In its new incarnation, justice questioned its purposes and 
scrutinised its capacities to confer respect towards the human being, as well 
as to enforce resulting responsibilities. Morality was resurrected inside the 
milder and more socially considerate positivistic assertions of Hart; it made 
its peace with the distributive justice of economic liberalism in the works of 
Rawls; and was reinstated in judicial practice within the hermeneutics of 
Dworkin.  
However, who qualifies for benefiting from this humane justice? 
Law‘s needs demonstrate remarkable prowess in dividing human existence, 
weakening it, fragmenting it, recomposing it; for example, personal legal 
incapacities perform even within trivial practices of private law to reflect in 
procedures both passing and persisting social, economic and political 
dispositions. The question we should have asked is ―how does one qualify to 
be human‖, given that in the now positivised human rights the ideological 
premise of the sanctified human has been limitingly redefined towards 
complying with binary regulatory orders.  
3.2 The Human Subject – Subjectivity within contemporary legal mechanics 
accrues really in reference to active objectification in law, i.e. the subject 
becomes a class of socio-economic power that has contested successfully 
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claims to entitlements. At the same time, behavioural rules defer to 
systematised logical schemes; the more societies dwell in abstractions that 
rationalise norms within generalised systemic orders, the more of human 
activity is deconstructed and transformed into algorithmic configurations. In 
fact, our laws have become so logical, that the task of sculpturing the 
―original‖ human being from them, as if they were raw material, appears 
precarious. (Note that the subject matter of the thesis poses an extreme by 
questioning the ordinary dimensions of both legal and human subjectivities 
of agents in artificial online contexts.)  
3.2.1 Subjectivity: a Logical Exercise – Observing posited law‘s central 
ontological scheme, subjects and rights exist in a dependence relationship: 
subjects depend in their existence on rights and rights exist only because 
subjects exercise them; being a carrier of rights defines in the letter of the 
law a subject and, vice versa, capacity of rights derives from allocated 
subjectivities, i.e. the various categories of personhood.  
3.2.1.1 - A different account sees  the pair‘s internal relation as asymmetrical 
existential dependence: subjects can exist without rights, no rights can exist 
without subjects to exercise them. Executed in the form of ―subjects can exist 
without thinking, no thinking can exist without subjects to think,‖ this line of 
logic moves the focus from rights per se as conceptual objects to the actual 
capacity for exercising them. We may speak of such ―capacity‖, only once a 
right (or ―rights‖ as a class) has been (i) defined, (ii) ratified by the regime 
in power and (iii) has its operational connections with the agents/persons, 
who may activate it, established. 
Regardless, both symmetrical and asymmetrical accounts 
problematically check with the legal positivists‘ trademark thesis that no 
rights exist unless founded in laws. However, our concern here is rather 
subject-oriented and less about rights.  
3.2.1.2 – We may also revert to another logical representation of a more 
―active‖ legal subject. Hence, generation of subjectivity in law coincides 
with the systematisation of claims: subjects exist formally for providing the 
capacity to make claims, while claims incarnate the will of subjects. This 
[28] 
 
subjectivity is impliedly born out of the (co)relational normative 
arrangement of associations between entities; such a reasoning blueprint was 
provided by Hohfeld‘s Fundamental Legal Conceptions .
35
 Although 
originally expressing relationships between individual persons, the 
propositions which form his two schemes of Jural opposites and correlatives, 
capture the entire paradigm of how regulatory frameworks - regardless of  
their public, private, local or international character - structure behavioural 
expectations. Around the four properties distinguished (right, privilege, 
power and immunity), develop archetypical patterns of vertical and 
horizontal interaction. Along these lines and in accordance with the 
Hohfeldian formulae, any opportunity to communicate to another entity one‘s 
entitlement to the core properties activates legal subjectivity.  
3.2.2 Subjectivity: a Human Condition – The jurisprudential ideal of human 
rights rejects such technical logic for constructing subjects. Although a 
latecomer in the area of posited laws, it had first claimed the human 
condition as the foundation of all forms of legitimacy. Therefore, the subject 
of that relevant discourse is not made through regulatory devices and 
techniques, or with objectives of balancing conflicting interests in mind: it is 
born human, an attribute that self-evidently reserves for its carrier an 
inalienable set of (sanctified) values. These values negotiate forcefully their 
externalisation within conventional legal formalities. 
From this point of view, the power of human rights emerges as neither 
a ―correlative‖ nor an ―opposite‖, but as inherent; far beyond classes of 
norms that were invented to essentially serve both historical and social 
conventions and convictions. It is established by virtue of the truest and most 
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In fact, the truly misleading aspect is the exercising of human values 
through the formality of ―rights‖ instead of  ―subjectivity‖; for the latter 
tackles effectively most binary representations of law, managing even to 
enclose the four properties of Hohfeld‘s schema. Showing preference to –
established ―rights‖ formality, though, was not a conscious choice, but rather 
the result of limited historical and jurisprudential capacities: the 
development of the juridical conceptualisation of the subject failed,
 
simply, 
to catch up with the human being as conceived by philosophy. As previously 
explained, even the process of asserting, eventually, human values via the 
most practical context of rights was extremely slow and eventful.  
One should not be blinded to this arguably unfortunate trajectory; at 
the same time, though, we ought to acknowledge  that, first, our juridico -
political reality renders it pragmatically irreversible and, second, within it 
has been sealed one of the greatest conquests of humanity (historical, 
intellectual, societal and legal). For such reasons, it is hardly my intention to 
challenge the conventional status of human rights in law. However, I am 
invoking the silenced human subjectivity for unlocking the potential of 
human rights to overcome the strictly procedural discourse of rights. Such an 
ambitious project is not taking place within the safe sphere of morality but, 
instead, on the actual ontological level which applied legal grammars and 
syntaxes confer. 
The above logical exercise of subjectivity assisted with the task‘s first 
step, of pinpointing the onto-logical boundaries, which the shaping of legal 
subjectivity may reach. The second step into exploring the prospects for 
fleshing out a sustainable human subject conception appears now less like a 
leap of faith: having recharged the meaning of the human condition and 
pulled it closer to systemic readings of law, we may realistically discuss 
humanity as agency on juridical terms. 
3.2.3 Three Concepts of Subject - Here we come across one variation of 
subject in law, one in compliance with the human rights ideal and one in the 
composite ―humanist‖ law.  
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3.2.3.1 - The first subject is an invented concept within and by the 
systematisation of rules; it performs as the point of reference for the organic 
distribution of rules – mainly, of entitlements and duties. The legal subject 
represents a posited variable.  Its social weight changes due to the attribution 
and loss of rights. Subjects and rights in this construction are connected to 
each other in a ―hen or the egg‖ loop.
37
 
3.2.3.2 - We could argue that the second subject is very much real - if not for 
the confusingly abstract parameters that have been recruited in philosophy 
for defining ―humanity‖ and its values.
38
 With the latter reservation in mind, 
hypostasis of this subject is assumed as real. It precedes rights in time; 
substantially, rights follow it by mirroring in their meaning its activities. In 
its natural status, though, it is legally weak: unless conditioned first, it bears 
no reflection in laws. The human subject, pre-existing law is 
uncompromised; otherwise it would lose humanity, its defining and most 
valued attribute. 
3.2.3.3 - Considering the inherent ties which bind together the human rights 
ideology with the naturalistic tradition, the distinction between human and 
legal subjects objectifies partly the theoretical debate between Natural Law 
and (hardcore) Legal Positivism. Therefore, at a first glance the third subject 
might be suggesting a rather uneasy settlement, since by being pulled 
towards two diametrically opposed directions at the same time it must either 
adapt with remarkable flexibility or be torn apart.  
3.2.31 - The human legal subject (from now on ―the human subject‖) is truer 
to the politics of modernity than many other notions that were born out of the 
humanist argument. Historically we may attach it to late modernity‘s 
democratic reforms and the gradual development of market economies. Non-
political values of old, however, animate it as well; they give it purpose and 
justify its continuing course on a morality basis as self-evident, even though 
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recourse to morality is not any longer directly shaping the law.
39
 There does 
not necessarily derive an ―ought to‖ to inform legal agency, yet, at the same 
time, the terms of this subjectivity integrate a kind of moral imperative for 
guidance. 
Several difficulties seem to be haunting this conceptual hybrid. First, 
both components in this unity remain interchangeable and adjustable. The 
legal part is subject to changes in societal circumstances, where 
understandings of what is essentially human are ultimately affected by the 
beliefs of the time.
40
 On the other hand, ―humanity‖ has since early drawn 
criticism for being rationalised through theoretical abstractions of excessive 
―speculatism‖.
41
  Moreover, the two determinants come into direct conflict 
with each other, thus externalising the agony of the subject for acceptance by 
its parent contexts; the lack of conceptual purity invites rejection by both. 
What happens eventually, though, is a constructive combination of forces: 
the legal feature distributes trace expressions of the humanitarian spirit into 
the field of law, while the demands of inherent humanity force immediate 
reconciliation of the subject‘s more extreme legal juridification.  
3.2.4 The Human Subject through Human Rights  - If in the primordial stasis 
of things (i.e. similar to Platonic concepts) rights do not exist without 
subjects, from there and on, the subject may seek to validate the right within 
a taxonomy of already ratified values. Yet, once such a right has been 
defined in content and is posited, it requires the existence of the human 
element in those entities which pursue to exercise it.  
3.2.4.1 - The term ―human right‖ denotes exactly this prescriptive attribute 
that registers entitlements under the humanist scope and aims. To this extent 
is also hints at an alternative nexus to rights in common law. Therefore, 
while rights in law are generally created with instrumental purposes in mind, 
many descend from and directly respond to their human foundation. Rights, 
being products of social and political struggles, deliver strong stat ements 
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against degraded humanity and identify intuitively with challenging 
principles of freedom and aspirations for a dignified living. Looking at law 
as a whole from the outside, we realise that human rights claim a high degree 
of infiltration of the majority of the various areas of practice.  
Regardless of how bold it sounds, this latter statement does not 
propose ―stealing‖ rules from one field of law and subscribing them to the 
defence sphere of human rights. It rather builds a conceptual link, which 
enables us appealing to human rights protection reasoning in those instances 
where the applied judicial rhetoric, pre-empted by the formal character of the 
legal dispute (e.g. contract law), fails completely to address the particular 
ground. From this perspective, we discern the human subject in every aspect 
of humanly experienced life that laws lean upon, be it family, work, 
education, politics, entertainment and so on.  
Note, though, that the conceptual device of the human subject was 
thus defined to perform ontologically within formal law. Therefore, its 
activation follows ordinary acquisition of personality; distinctions between 
natural and artificial persons, restrictions over the exercise of particular 
rights, as well as legal incapacities in domestic frameworks, all apply 
normally.  
3.2.4.2 – This requirement of legality indicates also that a natural person can 
activate the inherent human subject, when able to challenge his/her human 
rights within the corresponding legal technicalities. On the other han d, 
artificial persons resemble frequently natural persons on the procedural level; 
however, the mere systematised representation of personality as agency does 
not suffice for supporting a convincing analogy. The artificial person may 
sustain a genuine instance of the human subject, if it manages to expand the 
personality simulation to the level where a self-evident apparition of human 
nature can be equally demonstrated.
42
 Whether that argument can come up to 
the challenge will be thoroughly analysed in later chapters; nevertheless, 
judicial practice offers countless examples where legal persons contested 
successfully human rights.  
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3.3 Where Subject is Rights - The human subject, as constructed here, 
answers to the question of human Justice by reminding us of readings of 
procedural law, which have been residing within justice‘s apparatus for a 
long time: the bulk of jurisprudential explorations into Justice that modernity 
supposedly realised into laws. It appears paradoxical, then, how 
contemporary law, despite gaining its rationality from such a background, 
may frequently lack rational responses to the constant demands for Justice; it 
can demonstrate shocking cruelty, delivered under the guise of procedural 
neutrality. The human subject provides for a tool to investigate the concealed 
humanity within the procedural activities of subjectivity. Humanity is not 
morality: it constitutes the normative foundation of modern legality; it 
speaks fluently both languages, of ethics and rules. 
At the end of the day, the human subject is (a bundle of) human rights. 
On the one hand its presence signifies the potential for exercising them. In 
reverse, by conceptualising human rights and bringing them together, 
modernity managed to give shape to juridico-politically sustainable subjects. 
Hence, the next logical step towards sketching out in tangible terms the 
unfolding subjectification parameter should be the applied legal protection of 
human rights.  
 
II. The Human Rights Law 
It feels unnecessary to repeat here the trail of historical instances that 
triggered world-wide humanitarian awareness, or of how the official 
recognition of human rights underscores a political event. In spite of 
speaking of ―rights‖ and seemingly playing within the field of law, talk of 
legal mechanisms makes better sense under the light of political 
institutionalism. First of all, a human right can be found in a broad variety of 
terminological guises: we speak of ―liberties‖, ―freedoms‖ and ―rights‖ that 
can be ―civil‖, ―basic‖, ―fundamental‖ or (simply) ―human‖. Each such 
expression (or combination of expressions) bears the distinctive mark of 
political choice over the practised character of human rights within a given 
[34] 
 
regulatory setting; that is the range and depth of applied legal effects. After 
all, as previously noted, even adhering to the term ―rights‖, for developing 
and establishing the connection between humanity and legality, reflects a 
choice of significant consequence in the legal and political present.  
With the issue of political choice having entered the legal stage, 
another significant question emerges: which values qualify for being 
considered as human rights in a legal system? I believe that the answer is 
partly given in the previous part, with regards to the development of the 
human rights doctrine and the human Justice analysis. The problematic of 
political choice, though (i.e. how choice selectively awards one value with 
entrenchment and excludes another), is not so easily overcome; or, how it 
recognises the existence of a human right in principle, yet deactivates its 
exercise in practice. Some of these concerns are addressed in this part, only 
to the degree that they do not encroach on the discussion over applied law.  
The paradigm of the intersection is well illustrated by the manner in 
which the human rights doctrine was released into practical legal reality. 
Human rights were first embedded into national laws as civil rights (the 
rights of citizens); positivised, either inside constitutional frameworks and 
ordinary legislation or through court activities.
43
 Then national structures 
appreciated them as fundamental rights or basic freedoms. And, of course, 
the major breakthrough was achieved when the ―human rights‖ term entered 
officially the international language of law with the adoption of  the 
Universal Declaration by the United Nations in 1948.  
We may argue that human rights law exists in those forms which a 
social setting can politically afford. Affordance is not defined by the bulk of 
daily political interference with the law, e.g. decisions or activities that 
circumvent and seemingly neutralise for a brief while the procedural legal 
apparatus; governmental legislative activities; political affiliations and 
inclinations of judges. Such instances of political praxis have only short -
lived effects that – as a rule - leave unscathed the values which underscore 
the indicated legal system and the political vision that this materialises.  
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Political affordance here rather denotes the allowed boundaries for asserting 
substantially human rights through the in effect posited laws structure.  
1. The Form of Law – Hence, all laws that are grounded in human rights 
claims turn into the focal point, not just those narrowly called ‗human rights 
laws‘. The question is set over which laws facilitate and confer  in reality the 
human rights argument; over the extent to which human rights have been 
integrated and implemented within institutional frameworks and, thus, their 
content and breadth has been determined to apply in practice.  
 From what has already been indicated, the socio-political feedback is 
valuable when interpreting and measuring the combined purposive, structural 
and functional standing of laws, and when identifying their institutional 
origins. In this investigation, though, one thing is to trace mean ings and 
theoretical models that have been consciously rejected with the passing of 




1.1 National Settings - Responses to calls for protection of positivised 
human rights were far easier pursued within state entities as ‗basic rights‘. 
Not only was internationalisation probably unthinkable in early days, but 
also, the underlying understanding of how human rights were to function was 
primarily conceived within narrow ―state and society‖ contexts. Freedom 
against suffering and degradation reflected mainly the political experience 
within the national locus. Hence, the struggle for freedoms initially involved 
rising economic and social forces that disputed the absolute power of the 
sovereign; at a later stage, the passing through the modern bourgeois/civil 
state and the ensuing competition between individualistic liberalism and 
socialism, resulted in the ascension of welfare rights.  
1.1.1 Constitutional Law – In the majority of settings, the human rights 
doctrine was entrenched in national constitutional texts, under the politically 
functional description of fundamental rights. Establishing the individual 
subject and legitimising the natural rights of man, fundamental rights become 
‗emanation of and, at the same time, invocation to the modern liberal, 
                                                 
44
 Infra 2(II)[1.1.1.2] and footnotes. 
[36] 
 
constitutional and individualistic regime.‘
45
 Thus emerging forms of 
government (i.e. democracy) cannot be conceived without guarantees of 
elementary freedoms of personal, ethical, social and economic development. 




The gradual, qualitative enrichment of constitutions in the area of 
freedoms and rights objectified the flow of ideological clashes in Western 
politics. First came the validation of fundamental individualistic concepts, 
such as liberties (political and social), equality and property; then followed 
the recognition of collective freedoms and social rights, with the parallel 
restriction of classical rights.
47
  
1.1.1.1 - In constitutions, principles and rights are vitally reinforced over 
domestic legal systems as becoming parts of the state‘s supreme law. When 
protected, values are generally prescribed as such in the text explicitly.
48
 
Contemporary constitutions pursue protection of the person in reference to 
humanity,
49
 and not as mere political facilitator of individuality; moreover, 
the ―group‖ emerges as equally empowered to the single person in 
ascertaining subjectivity to most of the basic rights. ‗Fundamental‘ 
entrenchments are broadly divided into individual, political and social; 
depending on their reach and character they require the positive or negative 
protective action of the state.
50
 At the same time, constitutions do not omit 
appointing fundamental duties as a means towards serving the public interest 
(a term referring to the well-being of both the state entity and society).  
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1.1.1.2 - Additionally, amongst contemporary constitutions pragmatism 
becomes the most visible common feature: they all attain to ideological 
neutrality that allows for constitutional interpretations to shift flexibly and 
favourably towards any possible direction across the spectrum of balancing 
political, economic and social forces.
51
 
1.1.1.3 – On the other hand, there are several differences to spot, appearing 
almost critical on occasion. First of all, constitutional traditions vary 
distinctively, even across the philosophically homogeneous Western 
democracies. Some layouts are rigorously underlining the political 
organisation aspect, e.g. the French Constitution. Others reflect more vividly 
the contemporary human rights imprint, e.g. the South African Constitution 
(CRSA). Elsewhere human rights are represented closer to the ‗fundamental 
rights‘ model. As a result, we find identical humanist values being enshrined 
by principles varying tremendously in political decisiveness and, 
consequently, in legal accuracy.  
 In short, we may speak of three characteristic constitutional structures 
of interest here: the German; the US; and the British. Each one develops 
different juridico-political channels and expressions for conferring the 
human rights argument. Later in this part, we will address how they come 
into play (and even into conflict) within practice; the solutions and problems 
they suggest; and, more importantly, their compatibility with the presumed 
requirements of the as analysed human rights doctrine.  
1.1.2 Lower Legislation – Compatibility is also the key for discussing 
common domestic laws, from the viewpoint, though, that subordinate 
legislation should be in agreement with the constitution‘s affordance for 
human rights, i.e. with the values that are pursued and protected in there.  
1.1.2.1 - There is, of course, the question of whether lower laws depend 
exclusively on domestic constitutions for spelling out human rights claims; 
whether the pre-existing ambit of constitutional entrenchments limits their 
evocating of human rights. We could summon again Hart‘s reasoning to 
explain the potential overlapping of minor public and private law rules with 
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the countless scattered visages of (humane) Justice that the overarching 
constitutional order might not have explicitly or otherwise covered.  
1.1.2.11 - To demonstrate the most obvious example, the disapproval of 
violations against life, bodily integrity and property in penal laws has existed 
long before these values were moulded in constitutional texts.  
1.1.2.12 – At the other end of the legal spectrum, private law always aspired 
for smooth societal and economic ―cohabitation‖. In all respects, the desired 
normative objective would never have become possible without having first 
prioritised the application of plausible standards that earned the public‘s trust 
in the established legal order, allowed for unhindered activity between 




In such regulatory settlements the social participant achieves legal 
dignity, which translates into the fulfilment of individual human dignity 
within a stable, non-declining order of justice. The point is characteristically 
exemplified in the general concepts of ‗good faith‘, ‗reasonableness‘ and 
‗public policy‘
53
 and in regulations prescribing excuses from liability (e.g. 
―duress‖), protection of juristic personality,
54
 equality in raising civil action 
and, finally, restrictions to excessive exercises of rights.
55
 
1.1.2.13 – The palpable value of daily-life convenience which these 
subordinate laws bestow, brings us even closer to perceiving how the 
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argument of human rights overlapping with rules denotes more the practice 
of reasonable (as in ‗humane‘) living, than an abstract deontology.  
1.1.2.2 – Yet the matter of how human rights principles manage to survive 
the narrow procedural interpretations of lower courts and be identified in the 
judicial process for what they essentially are remains open.  
1.1.2.21 - For one thing, one may rightfully question whether courts would 
recognise a human right in subordinate legislation under circumstances 
where the right itself has not been ratified by the domestic juridical order. 
The answer is, plausibly, hypothetical, yet not unrealistic: the judge can 
always identify comparatively a human right, previously addressed in foreign 
jurisprudence, international instruments etc.  
1.1.2.22 – In one scenario, the  right that is evoked is coherent with the 
presiding order of principles and thus not being rejected by the ―recipient‖ 
municipal system; judicial mechanisms may even empower it with 
precedence over future cases; eventually, the human right can be fully 
integrated and acquire greater weight. While this can be impressive, we need 
to bear in mind that a court decision could expressively confirm a given 
right, yet not immediately implement it domestically. Nonetheless, the 
rhetorical importance of such recognition must not be underestimated.  
1.2 Inter-national Settings – When domestic human rights protection fails, 
appeals can be  made to trans-national justice mechanisms, provided that the 
necessary formalities are effectively set out for legitimising intervention with 
local affairs. 
1.2.1 Regional Settings – Organised on the basis of trans-national treaties, 
regional monitoring and action frameworks rely on political pressure for 
guaranteeing that member states across a specific geographical formation 
will comply with thus established judicial institutions. Non-compliance with 
decisions entails various possible sanctions for the member state (e.g. 
monetary, trade, in the most farfetched scenario even military), the severity 




1.2.1.1 - Most such settings attach continent-wide systematisations to a 
rights declaration treaty;
56
 another alternative has been presented in the form 
of culturally defined inter-state schemes and systems.
57
 The treaty is in the 
heart of the model; compliance is overseen by an inter-state Court. Where 
individuals have no locus standi before the Court, violations are usually 
reported to a Commission.
58
 
 Regional frameworks are understandably plagued by various 
impediments, others experienced on the internal political level,
59
 others 
found within the intended human rights outline.
60
  
1.2.1.2 - So far, only the European ―regional experiment‖ may confidently 
claim a significant degree of success,
61
 with the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) producing vast case law through the years and interacting 
consistently with national laws.
62
 Moreover, in the ECHR framework 
individuals have the right to bring cases before the Court.  
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 Three main regional instruments exist, the ECHR, the American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR) and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (AfCHPR). 
57
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Jayawickrama (2002) 71.  
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60
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 Janis (2000); Moravcsik (2000) 218; Lindholt & Lindsnaes ‗On Human Rights‘ in Andersen 
& Lindsnaes [eds.] (2007) 60. 
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 The ECHR model, however, is not without problems, e.g. excessive numbers of pending 
litigation; Wolfrum & Deutsch (2007).  
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1.2.1.21 - As of recently, the upgrading of the EU framework under the 2007 
Treaty of Lisbon
63
 has pushed  the permeating effects of the ECHR on the 
politics of European law production and on law‘s operation. Primarily, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (ChFR) of the ΕU aims at lining up European 
legislation with the ECHR and at harmonising ECJ and ECtHR case law.
64
 
Considering that so far EU laws included only vague references to   
respecting human rights,
65
 the Charter‘s impact should soon turn highly 
influential: the ChFR measures EU legislation‘s legality upon compliance 
with human rights. 
1.2.2 ‗Universal‘ Implementation - The United Nations setting provides 
protection formulas at a higher level in the hierarchy, yet is several steps  
further away from the individual complainant and the infringement incident; 
the responding proceedings appeal rather to international relations and 
custom, turning less legal and more political in practice.  
1.2.2.1 – Set upon article 55 of the UN Charter, the UN regime displays a 
network of treaties
66
 and of a large number of functional commissions and 
monitoring bodies. Either Charter-based or treaty-based, those multi-
nationally composed bodies investigate progress in the promotion and 
harmonisation of domestic and international human rights legislation; they 
may even receive petitions from individuals. Gaps in the international 
legislative setting due to partial ratifications and signing ups are often 
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 Preamble of the ChFR. 
65
 The EU structure had generally committed to universal human rights but not acceded to 
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covered by customary law;
67
 under this scope, relevant regional and national 
laws may be consulted. 
The results of UN-sponsored procedures are spread horizontally across 
participating States; persuasion is typically opted for instead of coercion,
68
 
since UN human rights operations subscribe to good-willed cooperation and 
not to tighter schemata of direct coordination or common policies. Therefore, 
in praxis, political pressure is exercised discreetly; only exceptional and 
extreme circumstances will legitimise enforcement measures.  
1.2.2.11 - The predicament of internationalised human rights implementation 
lies in its susceptibility to the familiar weaknesses of international law 
enforceability.
69
 Whereas regional formations have failed to reach a 
minimum ideal standard for cooperation, in the culturally and politi cally 
heterogeneous UN, difficulties with acceding to instruments and institutions 
get multiplied. In general, the effectiveness of global schemes and treaties 
can be hindered by subsequent layers of states‘ reservations and other well -
known problems with international consensus, which are extensively covered 
in relevant literature and political commentaries and do not require deeper 
analysis here. 
1.2.2.12 – Eventually, one may argue against the case of human rights law 
activity at this level, noting only loose and inconsequential political 
communications between states. Note, though, that such attacks usually focus 
on not the inevitably conventional character of international law, but the lack 
of either practical global human rights enforceability or consi stent legal 




1.2.2.2 – Whilst political obstacles overshadow ambitious expectations for 
concrete global human rights legality, the UN project has been successfull y 
influencing progress in national laws and producing model documentation, 
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with the gradual elaboration of the International Bill of Human Rights
71
 
marking its greatest achievement.  
1.2.2.21 – Forming the base of the Bill, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) of 1948
72
 stands out as a ―gene pool‖ of rights 
conceptualisations and expressions. Most of the listed statements of principle 
were initially drawn in comparison to national contexts and then distilled 
into ―universalised‖ forms that can be injected in the technical language of 
law of any regulatory framework, national or regional.
73
  
By discarding the weight of political and intellectual locality, these 
expressions manage to bring conceptually together as close as possible the 
human rights doctrine and formal law. With the UDHR, for the first time 
human rights were projected in legal form as independent of the political 
instruments which generated them (i.e. constitutions, the Declarations of the 
Great Revolutions etc); at the same time, legal  cognition proceeded with 
reverse readings, of civil life through the lens of human rights; the utterances 
of Human Justice matched those idealised by formal justice.  
1.2.2.22 – National systems recognise dualistically the functional value of 
these normative statements: they accommodate the juridical appropriation of 
principles and, at the same time, they universalise the identification marks 
which symbolically qualify states into reliable juridico-political shareholders 
of the international community.
74
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 The Bill of Human Rights consists of the UDHR, the International Covenant on Economic, 
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The language of human rights treaties installs a morally and 
politically acceptable shared platform. Ratifications invite the universalised 
norms into national settings. Eventually, the prescriptions of UN human 
rights law are found pervading a multitude of  jurisdictions; we need to repeat 
and emphasise that, although they may be associated to particular political 
expressions and in parallel fulfil specific political functions, they standardise 
internationally the human rights doctrine in formal expressions for 
exclusively legal usage. 
1.3 The Range of Law – Concluding with the forms that human rights take in 
law we should return briefly to the recurring semantic issue of the term 
human rights and to some observations regarding a misconception between 
values and rights. 
1.3.1 The Semantics of Rights - Understandably, the term ―rights‖ is accepted 
as a linguistic convention, within which political thought enabled the legal 
recognition of ―humanity‖; rights formed the only conceptual means that law 
could offer at that time. Today, and several centuries later, the use of human 
rights in applied law denotes a broader range of freedoms, liberties and per 
se rights that are exercised mainly through constitutionalities. On several 
levels the reasoning, which I partly identify as the human rights argument, is 
delivered well through these established forms; yet at the same time the 
meaning of humanity is also consolidated in the formality of rights and its 
limits. There are a few notable ramifications that should be accounted: 
1.3.1.1 – First, our legal grammar constraints expression. The intent to 
discuss human values in law is pre-empted by assumptions that only through 
preset modalities we may elaborate the topic of humanity. As a result, the 
applied meaning of human rights that the form imposes places barriers over 
the further negotiating of values in law; and in reverse, examinations of 
human values often overreach, devaluating the legal currency of human 
rights laws by trying to ‗derive rights which they cannot derive;‘ Raz 
remarks in one of his criticisms that ‗scant attention is paid to the difference 
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between something being valuable, and having a right to it.‘
75
 The issue 
invokes a clearly institutional problematic.  
1.3.1.2 – Second, the political enticed us to overrate human rights‘ 
qualitative weight. Human rights served modernity‘s civic constitutionality 
as ‗citizens‘ rights‘, forming the main legal weapon against the government 
of the emerging nation state. Their long-standing performance seems to have 
estranged them from their origins in reasoning and, most profoundly, their 
naming: several legal systems appropriate human rights exclusively in the 
traditional political sense as counterbalance opposite to governmental 
activity. Today, in this sense, citizens‘ rights serve as ‗human rights‘; the 
roles have been reversed and humanity is informed by state theory.  
1.3.1.3 – Ultimately, positivistic feedbacks promote further linguistic 
confusion and disarray, where legally informed discussions make frequent 
references to ‗human rights values‘. This latter expression clearly differs 
from ‗human values‘: it raises the established regime of human rights to the 
conceptual source of human values in general. Therefore, a search into the 
values of humanity will return with increased technical input of legal rights 
that limits the hermeneutical perspective on ―humanity‖. Similarly, 
understandings of human values pick up the political performance of 
contemporary human rights to identify humanity with particular, contingent 
societal setups.  
1.3.2 – All this gives the impression of a paradox; talking of ‗human rights 
laws‘ and ‗human rights values‘ prefigures nothing less surprising than the 
eventual coining of ‗human rights rights‘! Law‘s current systemic 
appropriations of ―humanity‖ are widening the gap between human values 
and the positivised human rights regime, making the latter look as if 
following a path of its own into regulatory mechanisms and political realism. 
Admittedly, such contingency is steered by the form and what normative 
demands this raises in turn; however, the form has constituted the means for 
law to reach out to human values and Justice. Hence, a pseudo-dilemma is 
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taking shape, since the absence of alternative legal tools to human rights 
institutionalised this way eliminates all other possible options.  
1.3.3 – The noted contextual shortcomings of the form do not render its 
operations unnecessary. Certainly, application gaps are expected, but not 
more than what the general phenomenon of law - with all its small and larger 
imperfections - is expected to show. Otherwise, the constitutionalisation of 
human rights increases their effectiveness, at least from a purely functional 
viewpoint; for there are ideological factors at work which may shrink the 
aspired net potential (these are analysed further below, in Part III).  
 As noted, overall efficiency is constrained by structural limits that 
reside in the form. For example, domestic human rights law obligates action, 
whereas international law can only initiate pressure;  the first ‗legalises‘ 
while the second ‗legitimises‘. The existing forms of law, then, may 
supplement each other, or be assisted by international custom and political 
activity, towards a more complete framework. Thus, most jurisdictions hold 
that once an international treaty has been ratified, it automatically becomes 
part of the domestic law; national laws may cover for trans-national 
indecisiveness; nations will appear taking treaties seriously to defend 
themselves against accusations of non-compliance.
76
 One way or the other, 
form in its functional aspect will seek out cohesion.  
1.3.4 – The true weaknesses appear to stem from the substantive content of 
human rights statements and the intervention of arbitrary political will. 
Despite the broader agreement over what general principles should be 
included in a human rights framework, disputes surface regarding particular 
aspects. In the end, the vision of Justice which human rights engulf in the 
described forms is not less feasible than any other conception of  justice 
which laws otherwise pursue. Certainly, noted ‗imperfections‘ (e.g. 
procedural obstacles, ambivalent semantics) register with common hardness 
and inadequacies in the administration of justice; they should not be 
overlooked, though, nor their significance be underrated.  
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The form is subject to the uses it receives as a conveyor of meanings. 
Most certainly, several laws that do not on the surface relate to human rights 
configurations are carrying across the same message; and others, classified 
as such, are - not that rarely - observed subverting their human rights charge. 
To paraphrase Marxist language, the functional operation of the form is in 
the last instance determined by the content and, of course, by its purposed 
placement on the canvas of interacting regulatory tools. 
2. Content of Human Rights – The humanistic belief‘s dynamic is realised 
in this national and international scattering of laws, where the content of 
human rights appears in continuous development. The question of content is 
met equally with reductionist and expansive perspectives: there exists a basic 
core of human values to be protected; yet where their expressions become 
almost indiscernible within specialised contexts, proving of the relevant 
hidden connections is called for.  
2.1 – Political affordance prescribes limits to the creativity with which 
content may be approached. Therefore, the content of human rights should be 
exercised as it is contained in formal law and accordingly be defined. 
However this does not imply that readings of human rights are handed over 
exclusively to posited laws; instead, the human rights argument should 
always explore humanity by testing formal law to its furthest limits with 
imaginative prowess. Content-wise, the form of law figures the – however 
demanding – means, definitely not the end. 
2.1.1 – The discussion in the previous section exhibited nodal points and 
circumstances in the legal experience of human rights that bear implications 
for the approximation of their content.  
2.1.11 - The UDHR provided the complete diagram of modernity‘s thesis on 
fundamental freedoms and rights in one compact codification form. Along 
with the ICESCR and the ICCPR they generalised over the most popularised 
understandings on human rights content, as these had already been tested 
through national laws. Hence, the concretising of notions of humanism and 
Justice into human rights was preconditioned by equally local and 
internationally comparative political experiences; the law alone, without 
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being measured against the tapestry of occurring political clashes, would 
have never reached beyond verbalising  moral imperatives.  
2.1.12 - Furthermore, procedural prerequisites and juridical expressions of 
values continuously mutate, since they primarily refer to the crude reality of 
changing social circumstances, i.e. the manner in which infringing conduct 
may be perceived. Despite the wide utility which a kernel of principles (like 
the UDHR) has to offer, content in practice is being constantly rewritten in 
more detail and broken down into an impassable infinity of mushrooming 
manifestations; e.g. one thing is to recognise freedom of speech, a very 
different are its countless aspects which courts will face on a case by case 
basis. Understandably, extreme specificities impede the bui lding of an 
analogy from the main general idea.   
2.1.13 - As they were previously discussed, the semantics of rights 
introduces relevant contingency. Human rights law marked an attempt to 
objectify the multiplicity of constituents, which define the ideal of a 
dignified human, into an ontologically operational whole of trans -culturally 
comprehensible - yet globally instrumental - normative conceptualisations. 
Considering that per se rights in law signify positive and negative systemic 
limits in the exercise of entitlements, one may marvel over the qualitative 
and quantitative breadth of the human rights doctrine which is permitted to 
reach out, and the breadth of ideals which survived the typecast enumerations 
of legal codification. The simplified instances of law are sitting on a far 
broader range of co-impacting philosophical and religious meanings, a 
―hidden‖ knowledge layer that is definitely neither subservient nor identical 
to the one which legal rights as tools of practice will eventually deliver.  
2.1.2 – The needs of practical normativity pre-empt the palpability which 
human rights seek to achieve in legality; the structural burdens they place 
reaching down to impose a qualitative quota on the flow of humanist 
articulations.  
One could plausibly object that such concerns are unfounded; human 
rights theorise well-described states of affairs; not only the coupling of 
‗quality‘ with ‗quota‘ (a quantitative signifier) seems paradoxical, but also 
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the figuration of human rights content cannot comply with notions of 
enumerations: there is no such question as of how many of these values will 
qualify for protection.  
However, this is exactly the point which a ‗qualitative quota‘ confers. 
At issue is how much of the human rights doctrine the structural harnessing 
of the law will allow to spread. The more limited, the more difficult their 
extrapolation to new and changing circumstances – such as the ―Internet 
lives‖ at the centre of this thesis.  
2.1.3 – Hence, a valid examination of the content of human rights registers 
the following parameters: 
2.1.31 - the main dictates of the human rights doctrine, i.e. the undisputed 
imperatives that reasoned humanity by rationalising morality; and  
2.1.32 - the institutional entrenchments and affirmations of values under 
local and international human rights regimes.  
2.1.4 – The introductory Chapter stated the thesis‘ take on human rights to be 
examining the experience of online virtual worlds. While from this 
standpoint one would expect the discussion over human rights content to  
propose bold online transformations of rights, that path holds credible 
dangers in store, e.g. the diffraction of potent human rights laws and their 
thinning into numerous specialised legal assertions.
77
 Thus, the case at hand 
hardly calls for a radically creative content review, but instead requires to  
think creatively about already applied legal modules, when facing the 
diversities of ―externalised humanity‖; online activities constitute one of 
these external expressions of identity and humane existence.  
2.2 - The present account posits human rights content on the expanded 
breadth across which it is seemingly allowed to potentially spread, in 
reference not only to the international declaratory documents but also to the 
more specialised domestic expressions.  
2.2.1 - The UDHR adopts a rounded look over the philosophically sanctified 
human, promoting the ideal of compassionate justice. The first article lays 
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down the unsurpassed guideline that ‗[a]ll human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience 
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.‘ The 
obligation to protect this dignity and everyone‘s free development of 
personality is set forth through the realisation of economic, social and  
cultural rights;
78
 the premise of community, where such ends are possible to 
thrive is laid out;
79
 freedom of association and assembly is provided.
80
 From 
the universal human vision any form of discrimination and on any ground is 
abolished;
81
 everyone has a right to life, liberty and security,
82
 while 
degrading, inhuman treatments, like slavery, torture and cruel punishment, 
are prohibited;
83
 free thought, conscience, beliefs and religion are enshrined
84
 




Before the law every human being is recognised as a person amongst equals, 
entitled to remedies against infringing action.
86
 As Article 12 sets it straight, 
‗[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, fami ly, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference 
or attacks.‘  
 Property claims its historical role in the development of human rights, 
with the recognition of its positive and negative protection;
87
 moreover is 
established the foundation of protected intellectual property, with the 
expressed mentioning of the author‘s moral and material rights.
88
 
Participation in cultural life is equally sought.
89
 Furthermore, everyone has a 
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 and to leisure.
92
 The importance of family is 
emphasised as constituting the basis of all social institutions.
93
 
 The Declaration pictures a model of state organisations, where the 
requirements of good government respond to the fulfilment of the prospected 
ideal framework; it thus sets democracy as its primary political guarantee.
94
 
Furthermore, it underlines the right to nationality as the means of personal 
civic empowerment, as well the related concept of ―cosmopolitan 




Finally, as the foundation for realising the Declaration‘s objectives are 
prescribed specific limitations to the exercise of rights
96
 and, most important, 
its humanity-wide (universal) breadth of application: ‗[n]othing in this 
Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.‘
97
 
2.2.1.1 - Both the ISESCR and ICCPR, on the other hand, make sure from 
their opening articles to establish rights of social, political and cultural self -
determination
98




2.2.2 - What the International Bill of Rights‘ pronouncements achieved was 
to refer directly preceding entrenchment activity to the ideological 
substratum of human rights that animate it. Yet, they only sketched out a 
―principle nucleus‖: in reality, concretisations involve rights and freedoms 
being practised within institutional and social hierarchies. Therefore, the 
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development of content follows understandings of the core human rights 
principles, and mixing them organically with the regional and domestic 
procedural experiences. 
2.2.21 - For example, although the same generalising tone is pertained in the 
ECHR, abstractions accommodate the framework sense of legal and political 
realism of the signatory states. The article referring to freedom of expression 
exemplifies means of conduct (Art. 10(1)) for its purposes and pinpoints to 
important limitations on the bases of e.g. national security and health or 
morals (Art. 10(2)),
100
 differing thus significantly from  the corresponding 
UDHR provision. 
2.2.22 - Moving down to national constitutions and from there to even lower 
relevant legislation (the likes of journalistic ethics for television broadcasters 
or special penal laws against Holocaust denial
101
) we observe the effect 
becoming even more strong and tangible. Content becomes more susceptible 
to reflective redefinitions - the closer the exercise of rights gets to mundane 
social circumstances. The specialising process evolves via applying 
limitations to a freedom, on top of limitations already imposed at a higher 
legislative level;
102
 in parallel, particular spheres of immunity are created 
within the setting through statutory and judicial reviews.  
2.2.23 - Also, the symbiotic connection of constitutionalism and human 
rights might create deceptive impressions in terms of content. Rights 
terminologies, differing across jurisdictions, have converged developing 
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knowledge of human rights and institutional setups. To some degree they 
may breed confusion, where both constituent elements are being identif ied by 
one general term. Therefore, rights to resistance or to keep and bear arms are 
motivated by aspirations to political integrity rather than realising directly 
protection of human dignity.  
2.3 - The human rights ideal at its most basic identifies with  the relief of 
suffering.
103
 The call for Justice craves primarily for the suffering to stop, the 
identity of the cause being in this sense of lesser concern. Hence, the pure 
demand which a human right expresses is acknowledged outside the 
facilitating juridico-political structures, on the basis of the human subject 
and his experienced circumstances. We may then speak of the political 
autonomy of the content of human rights, more profoundly stretched out in 
the universally declaratory character of the UDHR statements and in 
compliance with the humanist foundations of the original doctrine.  
2.3.1 – Arguably, the distinction between objective and subjective (or 
psychological) suffering raises controversy over the response which the law 
is capable of delivering and its pragmatic delineation in practice. The 
subjective dimension in particular, dealing with the emotional and personal 
senses of pain, subscribes to indeterminate cultural variations and 
interpretations.
104
 The articulation of specific human rights, though, and the 
application of dignity as a general concept perform towards overcoming the 
noted pitfalls of subjectivity.
105
  
2.3.11 - Nevertheless, a genuine appreciation of suffering mobilises the legal 
process into a more conscious state of human rights conveyance, where 
typological distinctions between constitutional and lesser laws become 
irrelevant and where, moreover, invocations to Justice, in the face of the 
human subject‘s ordeals, instantiate the human rights content in lesser laws. 
Thus takes shape a jurisprudence of non-denial of humanity and of 
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reasonable affirmation of relevant content development within the broader 
body of laws (i.e. not determined by external to law approximations).  
2.3.2 – In the sense of absorbing our comprehensions of suffering, dignity 
transforms into a powerful concept. The unity of the individual and his 
dignity grounds the appreciation of human rights as inherent and potentially 
erga omnes liberties.
106
 At the same time, though, it may similarly restate 
relativistic articulations that preclude it from developing the static quality 
which legal practice demands. Thus, perceptions of dignity have been 
hardcoded in distinguishing a matter of ‗how one ―legitimately feels‖‘ from a 
‗matter of how one ―feels when confronted by a particular law",‘
107
 




2.3.2.1 - Respect to the inherent human dignity was connected in the post -
war constitutional paradigm
109
 with giving legal priority to equal citizenship. 
Where dignity signifies active disapproval towards cruelty and 
dehumanisation, in systemic terms it also identifies with access to the rights 
of citizenship – encapsulating in the latter the means against human 
degradation. In this sense, the traditionally moral stance of dignity acquires 
systemic substance and volume: dignity provides the source for other 
freedoms and rights (thus, other human rights justify their content upon tight 
conceptual connections with it) and serves as the balancing benchmark 
within the order of interoperating rights and legal activities.  
2.3.2.11 - Hence, dignity may appear as either supporting or constraining 
autonomy; in reality, though, it systemically serves both directions in setting 
up man and his laws as a whole. The alternatively manifested dignity strands 
become important in signifying how a legal system understands and applies 
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its own meanings of dignity; for the adopted and followed content of dignity 
determines the character and reach of all other rights: it justifies why certain 
empowerments are allowed and why certain limitations to freedom for action 
take place.   
2.3.2.2 – At the same time, a legal order‘s conception of dignity is 
ideologically susceptible to the political understandings, which the 
underlying constitutional preferences have been embedded with. 
Understandably, content is framed by the scope of the right which is 
appointed to a value and by the afforded level of protection. However, these 
parameters of scope and protection level are, eventually, tightly de termined 
by the domestically championed dignity narrative, which forms the heart of 
the human rights construction. Under this light, further content shaping, 
breadth of liberties and boundaries in the exercise of rights, all derive like 
ripples from the fundamental interpretation of moral and political intent 
which the resident conception of dignity materialises.  
2.3.3 – The positive aspects of classical rights contribute in justifying their 
conceptual extensions; for example, it might be found inconsisten t to 
actively pursue freedom of speech and ignore access to media.
110
 Under such 
mode of liberal thinking that Nino addresses as ‗egalitarian liberalism‘,
111
 
instead of their expansion, classical rights may undergo restrictions to 
‗prevent the autonomy of some from being subordinated to that of others;‘ 




2.4 - The public goods rhetoric offers a different angle for approaching 
content and human rights in general. There is undoubtedly an interconnection 
between the two, as social impressions of global public goods are constructed 
in response to the needs of humanity. While human rights involve access to 
material or abstract (i.e. within the polity) resources, it has been noted that 
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this coupling of discourses lacks symmetry. Global public goods frequently 
identify with rights or freedoms; while, however, some concepts of public 
goods will qualify directly (e.g. health, information and education) or 
indirectly (access to land and water), others will not be wholly recognised 
(good governance, information technology, even the rule of law)
113
 and many 
lie completely outside the scope of human rights reasoning (for example, 
traffic lights, air traffic regulation).
114
 Additionally, the discussion over 
public goods does not reach the institutional integration which human rights 
have attained. 
However, endorsed notions of public goods implement the matching 
of juridico-political will against its contemporary socio-economic conditions. 
On this account, they set up a valuable platform upon which human rights 
content can be discussed in check with its social and political dimensions 
that legal formalities filter.  
2.5 - At the last instance, private law and sub-constitution public laws fill in 
relevant gaps (for example, through interpretation of public policy or good 
faith principles), expanding domestically the institutionalised essence of 
human rights content. Such legislative and judicial inferences effectively 
realise the diffusion of the hard core of human rights values into matters of 
daily regulatory routine. Crucially, however, they (i) remain attached to their 
systemic roots in constitutionalism to thus (ii) disclaim all justificatory 
references of their practice to the human rights doctrine directly. 
3. Application of Law – The subsumption of human rights under the notion 
of  constitutionalism results in the practical problem of giving domestic 
ideological influences considerable impact on the manner in which legal 
systems process human rights. As both content and application meld into the 
ideological orientations of local orders, the human rights discourse becomes 
contained; that is, adjusted to the resident systemic idiom. In comparative 
law terms, the generated discrepancy across jurisdictions implies 
fragmentation of the Justice discussion on the operational level.   
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3.1 – The variety of national constitutions is first marked by tremendous 
diversities in political approaches to freedoms and entitlements, best seen on 
the way in which some still promote religion to be their source.
115
 
Everywhere, though, constitutional assimilation entails freedoms are induced 
into the general mechanisms of justice, where they enjoy the highest degree 
of protection through continuing constitutionality reviews. Courts may 
scrutinise governmental and legislative activity, whereas individuals or 
groups are enabled to appeal against attacks on thus validated human rights.  
 The list of constitutions which redefined their national legal order 
under the influence of the Universal Declaration and other international 
human rights treaties is quite long. While the purposes behind global 
constitutionalisations of rights are vividly debated in scholarship, we may 
distinguish an argument of practical value for our main concern here. 
Regardless of what political and legal agendas found shelter under this 
‗normative universalism‘,
116
 a common standard of human rights expressions 
has openly penetrated the basis of state laws.  
3.1.1 - Amongst the most influential ―codified‖ structures in the international 
scene is counted the United States Bill of Rights,
117
 one of the first and most 
enduring frameworks that legitimised protection of (until then) natural rights. 
It sets limits to the powers of the federal government;  it protects the rights of 
all citizens, residents and visitors on US territory; the freedoms of speech, 
press, religion and assembly; the rights to fair trial, bear arms, be free of 
unreasonable search and seizure; it prohibits cruel and unusual punishment 
and compelled self-incrimination. The Bill of Rights also restricts the 
Congress from making any law respecting an establishment of religion, and 
the federal government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. Finally, it states that ‗the enumeration in the 
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Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.‘
118
 
 Faithful to its common law background, the American Constitution 
opted for only a basic enumeration in its text, setting the interpretation of 
freedoms as a task for courts to proliferate. Frugality was, in true liberal 
fashion, considered necessary for submitting the attributes and amplitude of 
freedoms and rights to continuing competitive discussion between states and 
the judiciary.  
3.1.2 - Opposite, the Franco-Germanic constitutional tradition represents a 
historically and organically different institutional approach.
119
 The German 
constitution model sets an example that has been literally transplanted in 
many other jurisdictions. Citizens‘ rights and freedoms are vividly described, 




The burden of their protection falls upon the state in its unity; for that 
reason the separation of powers is prescribed in a rather analytical manner. 
In this respect, the complex constitutional structure provides instructions for 
the way in which, for example, the legislature will harmonise running 
measures with the prime obligation to preserve the principal core of 
constitutional rights. On similar premises are restrictions to rights by laws 
(Gezetzesvorbehalt) and restrictions to restrictions (Schranken-Schranken) 
prescribed.  In short, this constitutional reasoning keeps a closer look on the 
organisational implementation of rights and freedoms, declaring increased 
decree of protectionism, which it counterbalances with thorough control 
mechanisms.  
3.1.3 - The uncodified United Kingdom Constitution, on the other hand, 
extracted originally the sense of universal ideals not with declaratory 
statements but from the bulk of gradually added (statutory) sources and 
through granting rights. The Magna Charta, the 1689 English Bill of Rights 
and Scottish Claim of Rights launched a continuing dialogue over liberties 
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inside the political and legal arenas. Thus, human rights principles have 
progressively been cropped in scattered Parliamentary enactments and 
expanded in courtrooms, becoming the object of constant political 
negotiation; in a sense, this practice combines continental and American 
approaches to the nature and exercise of rights with the acute flexibility in 
case law.  
The introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 marked an important 
change in this tradition. The U.K. Constitution engulfed a descriptive 
catalogue of rights by incorporating elements of the ECHR. For the first time 
in the constitutional order explicit definitions of negative rights were 
included. 
3.1.4 - For the purposes of the present research, these three main models will 
suffice for building a cohesive understanding of the  implications of choice 
of form, as noted in the beginning of the section.  
 A good example of core differences between the US and Germanic 
constitutional perspectives over application is given by Rosenfeld & Sajo 
regarding freedom of speech.
121
 The US expression is absolutist regarding the 
state abstaining from placing restrictions and the adopted liberal stance sees 
to issues of e.g. hate speech being resolved through public exposure and 
debate. By contrast, the German Basic Law provides for speech limitations in 
protecting youth and a right to personal honour and does not tolerate racial 
(anti-Semitic) speech. Mainly, opposite to the ample liberal idealism of the 
US Constitution, the Basic Law sets a hierarchy of values,
122
 under which 
rights are interpreted and harmonised, placing dignity on top.
123
 In essence 
this antithesis underlies a deeper political and cultural dichotomy, between 
an ethos of dignified liberalism and liberalised dignity. 
3.2 Horizontality - State constitutionalism has begotten one of the most 
essential problems in civil applications of human rights, that of horizontality.  
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3.2.1 - Human rights initially provided the response of justice to suffering. 
Tighter social institutionalisation reformed this premise, and ‗suffering‘ was 
rewritten into ‗injustice‘, an antithetically correlative notion to the civic 
resolution mechanisms that by its very nature carries institutional 
expectations. From there, the monopoly of governments in the exercise of 
power and administration of justice ascribed to states the dual responsibility 
of striking down and, at the same time, refraining from acts of injustice. As 
modern constitutions reflected the human in the political unit of the cit izen, 
human rights functioned in opposition to the state.  
3.2.1.1 - We find, however, two different structural understandings of the 
state. The first gives republican meanings
124
 in viewing the state as the self-
governing society,
125
 while the second distinguishes the agency of 
governmental power from the political body.
126
 Both conceptions have 
developed into cornerstones of Western constitutionalism, the former 
dominating the continental tradition, the latter practised prominently in the 
US. 
3.2.1.11 – The allusion of the state formation to the Roman civitas in the first 
understanding allows protection of basic rights to unfold into a demand 
directed against the entire politically organised society, reaching beyond the 
government, to other individuals and groups. This strand brings basic rights 
closer to the politically autonomous human rights, as these were idealised in 
Justice‘s humane response to suffering in general. At the same time, though, 
it complicates the mechanisms of regulatory praxis, if in modern legal 
systems constitutional imperatives apply directly to private relationships.
127
  
3.2.1.12 – Redefining the state not as the political body, but as synonymous 
with the government, gave birth to the state action doctrine, which, in short, 
finds constitutional rights violations only in governmental action.  
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3.2.1.2 – Horizontality subscribes to a political interpretation of the human 
rights capital in the system of law, on the basis of two normative issues: (i) 
the nature of the human rights and (ii) the role of the state. As Bamfort 
summarises, the first concerns whether human rights exist to defend against 
the power of the state or to guard so fundamental interests that they must be 
protected erga omnes; according to the second, the state has either a moral  
obligation to refrain from infringing citizens‘ freedoms through its own 
actions or the more proactive duty to provide mechanisms for redress where 
private entities have violated liberties.
128
  
3.2.2 - Barak observes that the majority of constitutions remain silent or 
rather ambiguous regarding horizontal application,
129
 leaving discretion to 
the juridico-political process. 
3.2.2.1 – The third-party effect doctrine (‗Drittwirkung‘in German 
constitutional law) holds that constitutional rights bind states but also apply 
directly to private law and thus indirectly affect private actors. The 
Drittwirkung focus of protection is set on the victims, on suffering, the 
source of oppression being immaterial.
130
  
3.2.2.2 - Refusal to grant horizontal application does not derive from the 
common law tradition:
131
 the English Somersett case of 1772,
132
 which led to 
the abolishment of slavery, advocates triumphantly against such notions; it is 
thus attributed to the juridical effects of constitutionalisation.
133
 Common 
law courts‘ views against direct horizontality have nonetheless sustained 
several degrees of indirect application.
134
 Hence, where private action is 
conducted in a manner that violates in principle constitutionalised human 
rights, courts have found the state‘s affirming of  enforcement to be 
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 Of course, this currently presents one application route of 
many. 
3.2.3 – Notably, civil liberties have entered relationship spheres which were 
traditionally understood to be private - for example, employment - where ‗the 
managerial right of ownership and freedom of contract‘ have been balanced 




3.2.31 - If we are to discuss technically the human rights cargo that private 
laws carry, the constitution‘s radiating of influential authority
137
 and content 
through the legal system forms the basis for elaborating accordingly all 
subordinate public and private laws.
138
 In reverse, lesser laws and their 
application should abide by constitutional values. 
3.2.32 - The development of indirect application has enshrined the centrality 
of the basic rights ideology without degrading the role of private law, 
validating limitations to private power relationships (again, the example of 
employment) by either relying upon existing private law tools or in direct 
reference to institutional connections with constitutional freedoms.
139
 
3.2.4 – On the other hand, modern law reiterates expressions of human rights 
reasoning independently from structural reliance on constitutionalism. In this 
sense private law provides limits to rights and brings them into balance. For 
example, the claim that a contract is contrary to public policy, pre-existed 
constitutionalisations of human rights and, yet, performs efficien tly.
140
 
Therefore, one may argue that horizontality becomes an issue the moment 
that structural burdens are intentionally emphasised or even devised.
141
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3.3 Exceptionalism – The last observation leads directly to the second 
manner, in which state constitutionalism pre-empts human rights in the 
conflation of the political and the law. 
Human rights discussion is confined within debates over domestic 
constitutional integrity. The global migration of human rights norms (which 
eventually become Justice precepts) is being resisted by jurisdictions that 
label it as foreign constitutional invasions. This form of opposition affects 
applied reasoning by enclosing it into the formalist dimensions of law, 
filtering out considerations over the substance of human rights content. 
Therefore, comparative analyses of human rights are opposed on the basis of 
undermining procedurally the domestic juridical tradition and the embedded 
political process. Apparently, the citizen/human equivocation here performs 
as a barrier against examining each of the two components separately.  
3.3.1 - Most prominently the debate has surfaced in the US.
142
 The growing 
influx of human rights norms from other jurisdictions is seen as a Trojan 
horse that may influence negatively the constitutional order,
143
 by 




3.3. 11 – It has been argued that this kind of systemic reluctance (Weinrib 
coins it ‗exceptionalism‘)
145
 links indirectly to the development of 
conservative jurisprudence in the human rights area. Practically, the systemic 
order refuses to engage in comparisons with the progressive juridical re -
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3.3.12 - On the other hand, the US has not expressively aligned its 
constitution with the international human rights positive law, neither  
participates in regional integration and harmonisation processes, nor has 
submitted to a regime with an international human rights court (like the 
ECtHR) authorised to issue binding decisions.
147
 
3.3.13 - Frequently the interpretations of US courts return to the intention of 
the Constitution framers. Over this point, anti-exceptionalists emphasise how 
the Declaration of Independence prompted the nation to respect the ‗opinions 
of mankind‘, and called for the domestic rule to seek out compatibility with 
the international system and principles.
148
 Moreover, they observe that where 
most modern constitutions and covenants, including the UDHR, owe 
inspiration and normative form to the US constitution, the US demonstrate 
tendencies of judicial isolation.   
3.3.2 - Understandably, contemporary common liberal democratic 
constitutionalism
149
 locks the capacity to deliberate human rights principles 
within its internal institutional modalities, hence succumbing to difficulties 
(or reluctance) in disuniting humanity from its domestic political dimensions. 
In effect, the authority of constitutionalised human rights over subordinate 
laws requests attentiveness to the values of the constitutional order.
150
 
Sometimes, the structural differences are manifested to justify divergence in 
practised approaches to constitutional interpretation.
151
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3.3.3 - On a second level, the juxtaposition of human rights and liberal norms 
turns highly problematic, in the sense of undermining the purity of values 
that each strand brings into the mix, and, further on, when liberalism 
undergoes similar difficulties in relation to Justice: its theoretical broadening 
transcends a fixed definition, finding frequently the liberal position reverting 




3.3.4 - While, as noted, the prospects for developing the scope of human 
rights differ e.g. between egalitarian and other directions of liberalism, all 
liberal theories converge over a core of free speech imperatives.
153
  
However, the systemic language of law which is replicated in liberal 
constitutionalism reproduces again and again the same ontological structures 
and that particular conceptualisation of regulation, which is conditioned by 
the western design of law. There, the premise of principles pursues the 
preservation of the legal system‘s logical unity;
154
 hence, the qualitative 
orientation of implicated value schemata is ultimately determined by the 
relation to a single method of positivistic implementation, one realised 
technically in the ontological project comprised by ‗constitutions‘, ‗statutes‘, 
‗private laws‘ and ‗court hierarchies/degrees‘. The domination of a single 
systemic understanding of the law phenomenon‘s incarnation and formal 
deployment, finds domestic and international orders (which were historically 
installed or suggested by the west) sharing the same foundation of organising 
principles. The values integrated into the domestic principles of law can thus 
leak – more easily than admitted - from one order into the other through the 
common ontological bedrock of positivist perception.  
Thus, similar to the anthropologically observed geographical 
expansion of the moral precepts which framed the civilizational tradition of 
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humanity, posited legal systemisation (combined with liberal 
constitutionalism) circulates a core of values attached to the basic structural 
norms of law. 
3.4 – We may pause over present discontent in applied law and with regards 
to human rights.  
3.4.1 - Not all jurisdictions share the same conceptions of rights (Raz, for 
example, discusses education in this respect).
155
 Disagreements on the exact 
content, hierarchy and social range of human rights in practice have been 
attributed to the ‗absence of an agreed upon philosophical justification for 
human rights,‘ so much for their posited expressions.
156
 We could add that 
such absence should not necessarily pass for ‗non-existence‘; it arguably 
marks inability and unwillingness towards cooperating over human rights, 




3.4.2 - In substance the issue of horizontality involves the diffusion of 
human rights from the public to the private sphere; or, conversely, such 
diffusions into private power spheres are gaining more and more intense 
support by law as their range and social penetration expand.
158
 Essentially, 
human rights are about ‗society‘s failure to respond to suffering wherever it 
may be discerned,‘ not only about ‗countering governmental disrespect;‘
159
 
they provide a ‗means to engage the social discourse in providing a shape 
and context to society.‘
160
 Again, systemic reservations in the face of 
suffering can at first glance be nowhere else ascribed but to unwillingness.  
3.4.3 - Such moral, philosophical and political insights and concerns test 
critically modern law‘s exhibited affordances and tastes.  
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III. The Dehumanisation of Law 
The crisis of human right has been recycled now and then in legal 
literature to emphasise painfully feelings of defeat in the face of systemic 
inefficiencies. The passion of the human rights rhetoric generated such 
expectations that have not been met by contemporary legal settings, on many 
occasions they are rather being brought down spectacularly enough to justify 
talk of substantial crisis. Therefore, crisis regards the many different levels 
of the ideological and practical projects in law which have internalised and 
deliberated the human rights argument, either domestically, internationally, 
on the surface of common process or in their deepest structures.  
Such discussions will not pre-empt the  perspective examined here but 
rather alert us to failings incorporated in law; for, certainly, there are several 
kinds of crises taking hold of the legal experience, some more profound and 
devastating, others subtle and downplayed yet powerfully establishing the 
background for tangible and more ringing hardships. These latter 
demonstrate the paradigm of the departure of justice from Justice as 
discussed in part I: the concept of Justice within a legal order refers to 
posited laws as a whole, pursuing the realisation of the human rights 
argument and individually serving or at least respecting its values. In what 
Ward defines as the modern condition - that is the prominence of ‗the cold 
calculation of the market and the brutal unsentimentality of the law‘ - the 
idea of law, ‗of rules and regulations and rights‘ has replaced the idea of 
Justice in legal and political thought.
161
 This premise encompasses the 
following problems at present: 
1. – It seems like the greatest threat to human rights is human rights itself. It 
is a powerful rhetoric that its appeal to humanity permeates all sectors of 
activity
162
 and attains enormously flexible capacities. Thus attempts to tame 
human rights have been fierce, on both the ideological and the structural 
front; relativism reflects the first, the inclination to lock human rights in 
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state action modules alludes to the second.
163
 The indefinite scope for 
extending the outward reach of human rights in practice has triggered 
conservative mechanisms in the systemic arrangement and interoperability of 
laws. As a consequence, otherwise realisable potentials in the applicat ion of 
law have been considerably phased down. 
1.11 – The almost non-existent enforceability within international and most 
regional regimes and the reluctance of nation states to fully abide by 
international obligations mark this problematic at top level. Even states that 




1.12 – From there, the part of international human rights instruments is 
constrained domestically to assist in the interpretation of constitut ional 
rights. Hence, some jurisdictions recognise in treaties only a weak, 
persuasive reference point equal to the use of foreign court decisions,
165
 thus 
secluding locally the receptivity towards meanings discussed in international 
fora.
166
 Others engage closely with international laws,
167
 while under tighter 
regimes, like the European, references to treaties become direct and stronger. 
Regardless of the approach, within these exercises law loses ontological 
focus on substantive human rights and turns to constitutionality in 
recognition of function. 
1.13 – Eventually, in national settings procedural mechanisms replace the 
human rights discourse when arguing the administration of legal activity. 
The term human right is neutralised, taken for a supplementary synonym to 
constitutionality or exiled to the sphere of moral dogmatism.  
1.14 – Overall, the plausibility of structural limitations nourished the 
plausibility for devaluating humanity in practised juridical decisions making.  
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1.2 – Systemic ―compression‖, of course, cannot be solely explained by the 
internally developed dynamics of distrust; nor is it the full narrative of crisis, 
which requires demonstration of a significant turning point. Hence, the crisis 
in discussion exhibits, apart from a phenomenon of shrinkage, a situation of 
comparison and collision between human rights and other advancing trends 
in law.  
1.2.1 - In human rights we recognise the first phenomenon of globalised law; 
that is law moving, from national, to international arrangements and finall y 
to global presence. The process which describes the human rights‘ rise to 
prominence in the last global stage builds a parallel tale to the civilizational 
tradition, centred on the circulation of constitutional jurisprudence and 
norms. Here the liberal constitution forms the common denominator, first 
modelling the shaping of international human rights treaties (‗national to 
international‘); then, meanings in constitutional practice expand globally due 
to the influence of international human rights law on contemporary 
constitutional drafting and adjudication
168
 (‗international to global‘).  
However, in recent years human rights appears withdrawing where 
subsequent waves of globalised law have expediently advanced. Hence, the 
development of international public security laws, following the call against 
terrorism, has on many levels countered human rights.
169
 In parallel, global 
market-oriented legal regimes, backed by transnational mobilisations within 
bodies and agencies like the WTO and WIPO, have subsumed large  areas of 
social life, fusing the rules of private economic activity and traditional public 
law meanings. The efficient performance of these rising orders naturally 
depends on human rights being on the one hand neutralised, on the other 
excluded from assumed spheres of private regulation. As a consequence, 
human rights are withdrawn even deeper into the sphere of constitutional 
practice, as noted above.
170
  
1.2.2 - The thinning of human rights describes the danger of their 
transforming from norm to exception, waiting in the queue until other 
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interests have been conciliated.
171
 Hesitation in the face of sometimes vague 
contingencies and politically indeterminate conditions
172
 creates fragile 
entrenchments – easily subverted. 
2. – The pressures exercised on human rights are straining. They certainly do 
not characterise an intended project, but rather a cluster of interoperating 
processes that, combined, induce collateral effects of cumulative gravity. We 
may discern ideological undercurrents which are consistently in terfering with 
the character, scope and exercise of human rights, as well as with their 
structural deployment. However radical, such repercussions are carried out 
internally, and their depth escapes the critique of the juridico -political 
instance.  
2.1 The Case of Economic Liberalism  - Classic liberalism, promoted 
modernity‘s enshrining of human rights in the face of despotism. The current 
advance of liberalism (neo-liberalism, in that sense that it gives even more 
weight to market economy on a global scale as a matter of political 
deontology and juridico-social structure) pushes individual autonomy to its 
furthest end, outside the sphere of state influence. Private property rights and 
contractual freedom are envisaged as the ultimate means for economical and 
thus political self-determination.
173
 On this platform neo-liberalism professes 
an ideal, thrusting policies and regulatory solutions away from welfare and 
moral utilitarianism economics and all attached normative arrangements.  
The neoliberal positions leak easily into and blend in naturally with 
the classical liberal roots of civil society and modern constitutionalism. 
However, championing a pure-matter economic vantage point and delivering 
a political outset of ‗state regulation that best facilitates the  global 
movements and profit of capital,‘
174
 they bring into conflict the basis of 
incorporated social and moral justice principles; even more so when their 
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implementation deviates from its own ideal destination. The following points 
attempt to round up critically the overall perspective:  
2.1.1 - The increased reliance on free speech and its infusion with economic 
meanings poses a major characteristic of the neo-liberal scope of liberty. 
Even in classical liberalism, freedom of speech acquires prominent place as 
counterweighing the ‗power hungry executive‘ with criticism and public 
debate and promoting democracy (the guarantor of autonomy) through the 
exchange of ideas.
175
 Yet, the economic-political changes in the US context 
during the 1980‘s, that favoured the prominence of the market society and 
privatisation, pushed the judicial broadening of the First Amendment far 
beyond classical comprehensions, to encompass ‗commercial advertising and 
campaign contributions.‘
176
 In this widening of speech, monetary 
expediencies came on a par with the values of humanity, in a qualitative 
rupture with the initially envisaged political utility in the democratic 
institutional setup.  
2.1.2 - Individual autonomy requires not only freedom from external 
constraints but also, after egalitarian liberalism, ‗access to economic 
opportunities and resources‘ for realizing ‗non-demeaning, self-fulfilling life 
choices;‘
177
 in several contexts, the combination of lack of choices and 
unilateral contractual regimes threatens to lock economicall y weaker groups 
in unending power relationships.
178
 Since liberal autonomy holds to the ideal 
that private decision making lies outside public scrutiny,
179
 such relations 
tend to be isolated from the critique of values.  
It is thus that the liberal perspective blocks horizontality, contributing 
to the shrinking of constitutional reach regarding human rights; or, at least, 
its difficulty to overcome in practice the ideological barrier of state action, 
blurs its insights into potentials for horizontal application.
180
 At the same 
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time, we could equally argue that judiciaries are pre-empted against being 
comfortable with recognising general human rights effects in legal 
relationships that are defined upon economic exchanges.  
2.1.21 - We may also argue about aberrations of autonomy under the 
contemporary fashion of liberalism, through the latter‘s advertised 
contributions in the post-modern rights discourse. For example, privacy 
promotes autonomy as a social value, where we may consider it as a 
practiced ‗system of nuanced social norms‘
181
 that facilitates unhindered 
association with people. However, the current trend finds privacy being 
preconceived under rights schemata that are framed by the antinomy between 
the state and the individual; the autonomy input of privacy transforms into an 
individualised sense of disengagement from others,
182
 which blends more 
conveniently with the economic liberal vogue in political power. This, in 
turn, pushes commonly practised conceptions of privacy deeper into this 
repetitive recycling of isolation meanings.  
2.1.3 – On the other hand, the narrower economic scope of neo-liberalism, 
projected onto domestic juridico-political realities has managed to bring 
dignity at odds with liberty, creating cracks in the global discussion of 
human rights.
183
 Traditional liberalism perceived dignity in essence as the 
freedom to form opinions, which needs to be respected. Now, the 
contradiction between dignity as empowerment and dignity as constraint has 
been amplified in several jurisdictions, to picture protection of dignity as the 
means to state interference. 
2.1.4 – One may find that neutrality, liberalism‘s security against the 
exercises of arbitrary power, is coming eventually at odds with the rule of 
law in systemic terms.
184
 Nevertheless, modern orders are constitutionally 
biased in favour of economical neutral positions, presupposing these as part 
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of their systemic nature.
185
 The negative practical impact of neutrality on the 
exercise of rights under market liberalism becomes palpable in their 
subscribing to economic power: speech is free and easily distributed for 
those who can afford to; access to judicial defence all the same. In this sense, 
the judicial system is in practice posited against the economically 
disadvantaged.  
2.1.5 - The economic paradigm believes in the increase of general welfare 
through the system of exchanges, where parties‘ preferences are amplified; 
however, in essence it is not backed by any concrete theory or criteria on 
either the formation or the measurement for individual welfare  success of 
those preferences.
186
 Eventually, as indeterminate aims clash within the 
economic sphere ‗there is no fraternity between liberty and equality.‘
187
 
2.1.51 - Efficiency in the sense of overcoming market failures is the mantra 
of the economic perspective. The market fails for whom, though? In the 
liberal rhetoric we find the market being a beneficiary platform towards 
common development aligned to utilitarian aspirations; in contemporary 
consumer markets, though, of concentrated production and distribu tion 
(monopolies/cartels), market efficiency, and thus most regulatory projects 
attached to it, end up identifying with the interests of the few main players. 
Reversely, assessing market failures on the gross revenues of the few and for 
the purpose of regulating, results in misconceptions about the market and 
society.  
Reasonably someone would object that even under monopolies the 
exchange practice between producer and consumer performs well; however, 
modern liberal economists recognise that – apart from resulting to economic 
failure – monopolies constitute tyranny.
188
  
2.1.52 - Market society, as the argument goes, works against human 
flourishing, for it values people and relationships for their monetary worth, 
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rather than for their ‗intellectual, emotional and social strengths and 
contributions.‘
189
 Instead, the universal market rhetoric commodifies these 
latter, turning them into tradable objects. Commodification means that 
personal attributes are viewed as private properties and may turn into 
fungible objects, i.e. alienable goods:
190
 ‗replaceable with money‘ and 
passing ‗in and out of the person's possession without effect on the person.‘ 
In this respect, Radin poignantly contests that freely commodified social 
interaction out-values its non-commodified analogues, first in market terms 
and from there in practical understandings where market value pre-empts 
general understandings over quality.
191
  
2.1.6 - If there is no demand in the market, a property has no value. Human 
contact should not be intimidated by this market logic, since the two are 
seemingly irrelevant to each other. However, in market -oriented legal 
systems what fate awaits human rights values without value?  
2.2 The Case of Positivistic Fixations  - Enlightenment and classical 
liberalism pursued reason, sense and sensibility in law;
192
 but were soon 
betrayed by their own proclivities of rationality and epistemic abstraction: 
justice and humanity were sacrificed to the ‗surety of law‘, leading to today‘s 
fetishist obsession with rules, procedure and, more apparent, unreasonably 
excessive court action.
193
 The argument does not turn against the particular 
theoretical stream. It rather indicates two derivative trends, one being the 
bureaucratising of legal thinking and the second the glorification of isolated 
systemic treatment of knowledge.  
2.2.1 – The issue of horizontality raises fewer questions over its origins and 
more over the persistent denial it receives. The rise of positivism has been 
accredited as contributing historically to the gap opening between d iscussing 
private relationships and the general discussion on civil rights and 
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 However, as fundamental rights evolved alongside with the 
human rights rhetoric, they were soon enriched with the social and economic 
perspectives; it was then that the rights of humanity, suggesting a distinctive 
discourse basis of showing respect towards human beings, contested partial 
detachment of their juridical understanding from the politicised antinomy 
between state and individuals. 
Nevertheless, no few jurisdictions simply refuse in legal practice to 
deliberate the circumstances of human disquiet, their adherence to state 
action doctrines taken for fidelity to posited law.  
2.2.11 – Despite appearances, the sway of the positivistic position in 
neutralising the horizontal human rights scope is not genuine.  We ought to 
remember that legal positivism endorses the thesis that legal orders depend 
on factual circumstances and not on evaluative considerations;
195
 thus has 
been refused access to rights that have not been constitutionalised or that 
could not be reasonably extracted from private law arrangements (e.g. 
notions of public policy). However, the existence of a recognised human 
right constitutes a factual circumstance. It could be thus contested that such 
evocative interpretations that consistently permit exercises only against state 
authorities, realise more than anything else ‗evaluative considerations‘ about 
the nature and performance of human rights.  
2.2.12 – We may instead observe that in such circumstances it is the per se 
fact of positivisation which distracts practice from engaging with the 
substance of matters at hand. The background feature of the entrenchment by 
the state authority draws attention from the content and character of the right 
or freedom under question, turning eventually into the fact undergoing legal 
examination.
196
 Courtroom debates seem incapable of perceiving the human 
rights argument as an overarching theme outside the cage of constitutional 
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formulism, to the degree that lawyers cannot accept that legal discourse not 
subscribing to detailed systematicity and to particular typological modes 
might ever exist. In this sense, the existence of horizontality, as an issue, 
could be partly attributed to the intense sensibility of given legal soc ieties to 
their positivistic insecurities. 
2.2.2 – We ought to consider the positivist position not as inimical towards 
human rights, especially where the above propounded account of humane 
Justice was shown to accept it as an essential practical component . Instead, it 
appears as if certain treatments of positivism in the legal profession magnify 
the self-serving aspect of the technical process, stripping off from it all 
cognition of contextual development. The observation that state action 
deliberations might be frequently ―missing the forest for the trees‖ deals with 
a mild only symptomatic instance: the contemporary legal experience is 
largely populated by procedural ―distractions‖ that subvert the consciousness 
of Justice, as the means become an end in themselves. 
2.2.21 - Growing in complexity, modern societies require increased 
sophistication and organisation in regulatory modes – a need allegedly 
motivated by the powerful dialectic of efficiency and the rising modes of 
economic organisation, which circulate it.
197
 We observe the technical 
development of law enrolling managerial rationales for its internal 
administration, for attuning complicated deployments of rules and for 
classifying and organising systemic subdivisions. The levels of skill 
demanded for deciphering such intricate layouts and securing their 
effectiveness, necessitate, in turn, the services of studious attendants of the 
legal process. The transformation of law into a strenuously self -absorbed 
process finds lawyers performing as managers and, in the long run, refining 
their awareness of the systemic setup within a bureaucratic modus operandi.  
For the purposes of this particular enterprise, positivistic rationalism, 
with its attention to facts, inspires and permeates structurally the underlyi ng 
comprehensions of the legal profession. Bureaucratic appreciations of law 
are foremost expressed in the preoccupation with procedural modes and 
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furthermore externalised by misplacing the annotated separation thesis as 
between facts and values. Blind subscription to posited representations, 
without developing parallel critical understanding of the values platform, 
fails to distinguish the symbol from the signified, the decorum and sound of 
language from the meanings it projects. This masking of the connection 




2.2.22 – Without needing here to go deeper into its Marxist basis, legal 
fetishism refers broadly to lawyers valuing ‗the importance and necessity of 
law‘ over social order.
199
 Fetishism is manifested in attitudes of reverence 
towards the form and, also, in presumptions about law becoming the basis of 
social life, precisely due to the fact that several social relationships are 
generally understood only within legal frameworks.
200
  
2.2.23 - Legal fictions become facts that supersede all other experienced 
accounts of life and reasoning; even more as such appropriations count 
heavily within internal interpretations of legal meanings. Hence, law is 
meticulously divided into discrete areas and branches (e.g. Contract Law, 
European Law, Family Law etc) that are primarily embedded in legal 
scholarship and education to then determine procedure, behaviour and 
decision making in legal practice. Such specialisations methodise the further 
discussion of meanings under the weight of a merely descriptive taxonomy!  
 This becomes brutally subversive in the treatment of human rights by 
practitioners. Reference to human rights transmits understanding of either 
Human Rights Law in the international context or assertions within 
Constitutional Law procedures. Practice in most occasions – e.g. during civil 
law disputes - disregards invocations to the human rights argument as 
inappropriate and completely out of context.  
2.2.3 – Under these conditions the project of Justice is being further undercut 
symptomatically and on multiple levels.  
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2.2.3.1 - The same positivistic perceptions can preset the inefficiency of 
judiciaries opposite to defective legislative choices. Plausibly, partisan 
administration of justice is neither desirable – an argument used fairly to an 
extent by exceptionalists.
201
 However, a judiciary, satisfied with procedural 
validity that blatantly disregards fundamental principles and overlooks actual 
disturbances in the body of established values, procures socio-political 
debasement and juridical destabilisation - at least to that part that we 
understand the rule of law being shaped in interdependence with specific 
principles.  
2.2.3.2 – At the end of the day, even human rights practice itself realises a 
fetishist fixation. Frameworks of institutional protection have ritualised 
human rights in endless expansion and proliferation of content, which 
inevitably draws intense criticism. Rights in the socio-political arena are 
subject to negotiation; constant dispute and transformation within procedural 
modules affect the embedded humanity discourse by tuning it to desire, the 
forwards-pushing force behind the expansion of rights.
202
 In these terms, the 
content expansion issue can be attributed to positivist fetishism, its 
juridically powerful structures and the obsession with textualising all legal 
modes in detail, since contemporary legal orders decline reasoning with 
questions over expanded human rights content unless the authority of  text is 
within sight.  
2.2.4 – My submission here goes that far to deny the existence of anything 
called Human Rights Law. Awareness of Justice, in the beginning of the 21
st
 
century, suffices for contesting that there is only one law which enshrines 
human values and their deriving principles. By constructing something 
separate as such, we mock, on the one hand, human rights and, on the other, 
we degrade law as if it did not abide in general by humanity; like it belonged 
to another, alien sphere of process. This is precisely what we mean when 
speaking of the dehumanisation of law.  
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2.3 – Combined together, the excesses of neoliberalism and positivism are 
amplifying the intensity and inevitability of certain modes of thought. For 
example, on the basis of neutrality, a court will not distinguish between poor 
defendants and rich plaintiffs; it will examine whether the prescribed 
procedural objectives are well served. Here, injustice is presented as a 
rational solution; concerns about those suffering or found unequal within the 
equality of process are dismissed as threatening moral precepts.  
3. - Considerations of the weak and unfortunate do not lie outside the 
positivist stream which was adopted in Justice. On the contrary, where 
process contemplates over maximum and minimum penalties, or where an 
option for exceptions and exemptions is unambiguously prescribed in the 
letter of law, there is clearly no doubt of a requested assessment of 
circumstances, ordained by humane sensibility.  
 The crisis of human rights is, then, fully revealed as ideologically 
dominated choices in legal decision making undermine Justice. The crisis 
unfolds further, where legal systems fail to prevent direct subordination of 
human rights to ideological interferences.   
3.1 – Endemic inconsistencies in issues like horizontality and exceptionalism 
emerge clearly as contextually consequential rather than fundamental. At the 
same time, globalisation in law locks out human rights comparative thinking, 
while regulatory solutions to economic and security risks are fervently 
exchanged. The crisis expands and its symptoms spread. Regarding the 
ongoing inquiry in law, though, we ought to be more perceptive of their legal 
dimensions; that is, identifying instances which concretise legal 
shortcomings rather than direct political will or praxis.   
 Therefore, the fact that slavery has not been fully eliminated globally 
does not really tell anything insightful about law and human rights. On the 
contrary, the presence of slavery in the human condition under d ifferent 
guises of servitude, as it has been legitimised internally and internationally 
across different orders that precisely enshrine human and freedom values, 
brings to the fore genuine legal failures. Generally, scarcity in resources and 
its exploitation within power relationships simulate serfdom; legally, this 
[80] 
 
becomes an issue when the law structure facilitates and retains such regimes 
in private relations. 
 This problematic forms the platform, on which human rights will be 
investigated in the following Chapters.   
4. – To recapitulate this long examination of the human rights argument and 
its fate, human sense and experience was reflected in moral beliefs to 
generalise upon an (assumed) primordial principle of Justice. The latter, by 
opposing dominant exercises of authority, inspired the long evolving Natural 
Law and Rights discourse. Alongside such political and legal meditations a 
humanitarian rhetoric was formed, having gradually its demands rationalised 
by institutionalised justice and established through modern formulations of 
the human subject. 
Both the ideological legacy of the universal ideal and the outlook of 
Justice that it envisages are set in contrast to practices, which (post)modern 
law utilises for containing human properties in its formulaic subjectivities. 
We may assess the logic, which was employed for allocating human rights to 
legal subjects, upon its contemporary results: it wavers between, first, a 
fetishist viewpoint over the social role which posited laws play, where the 
human element surfaces via obsession with inhumane procedural 
apparatuses; and, second, a materialistic attitude when treating the 
supporting ideological nexus, as objectifying access to rights by following 
sterilised managerial techniques. Therefore, to what degree are the human 
dimensions and their dynamic being reduced in size within such 
systematisations? 
The lesson of history is that there is nothing sacred or conclusive 
about humanity‘s definitions, neither its scope is eternal.
203
 The various 
expressions of legal humanism today reflect subjective political discourses 
and, in this sense of political adversity, they confer incompatibility and 
disunity. This prospect feels uncomforting, whereas humanity is embarking 
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upon identity-challenging journeys, into unchartered societal experiences, 




3. Virtuality and the Online Human  
 
„A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and 
organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of 
fiction.[…] [T]he boundary between science fiction and social reality is 
an optical illusion. 
[…] In a sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the Western 
sense - a 'final' irony since the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic 
telos of the 'West's' escalating dominations of abstract indiv iduation, an 










In the previous Chapter, special attention was given to constructing a 
clear conception of the real, human subject, as being integrated within  and 
constituted by law. In essence, the entire thesis revolves around subjects: 
subjects of law, subjects of online actions (or reactions) and their unification, 
with ―humanity‖ forming the connecting conceptual bond between the two 
categories. However, beyond the humanity link, the legal and the online 
subjects share a striking feature: fundamentally, they are equally artificial; 
they both come ―alive‖ in somehow virtual structures that promote and 
support communal life, the one regulating it, the other providing it with a 
communications facilitator. 
Note how the cyborg acquires prominence where boundaries blur. The 
legal and the online subjects blend together nature and artificiality, social 
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reality and fiction, humanity and one or the other form of technology. 
Online, the human becomes one with the network machine, with the 
computer code and the representations that this builds. In law, the human 
fuses with personhood, is being reconstructed in logic and symbolic 
language, and then she becomes part of the regulatory apparatus.  
Pessimist visions of the future depict nightmarish worlds run by 
automata, warning us against the dehumanising effects that technology is 
gradually imparting.
205
 At this point, we might summon the rather bemusing 
thought of the legal subject as a cyborg life-form that loses its soul and turns 
into a robot, once the human element has been removed from the mechanisms 
of rules. The ‗human element‘ here signifies the material and intellectual 
interests of a humanly organised society, such as ‗the pursuit of happiness‘ 
or the ‗avoidance of pain‘. Without its direct and indirect connections to 
humanity, the legal subject becomes a hollow non-entity, performing 
pointlessly without any other ends in the horizon apart from the effectiveness 
of its own performance.  
The merging of humanity with the technology of law generates 
interesting discussion potentials, which unfortunately cannot be fully 
pursued here. However, this last image of a legal subject without humanity 
connoted largely the dehumanisation of law, which the final part of Chapter 
2 alerted us to; in addition, it allows parallels to be drawn over the critical 
part played by humanity in such manifestations of the cyborg paradigm. Law 
is a contingent machine that will easily turn into an empty robotic shell, 
unless humanity manages to keep constantly its presence active within the 
symbiotic unity of practical life and regulation.  
Fusion with technological contexts can acquire other imagery that may 
again be projected on law. We cannot overlook the conceptual resemblances 
between the structure of law and online life: both artificial; modelled upon a 
subjective representation of living; both becoming alive by hosting a 
thriving, socially coherent humanity. The linking element is their capacity to 
create a virtual space where interaction acquires meaning. We may call 
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virtuality the experiential depth which determines humanity‘s immersion 
within the given context. Law is a virtual normative construction to which 
we ascribe similar importance to the natural physical reality.  
Working implicitly with these parallelisms and connections, this 
Chapter utilises an unorthodox manner for dealing with the thesis‘s 
underlying technical problematic: new contexts of human activity emerge; 
forms of human subjectivity appear that, inconveniently, law finds to be 
technically incompatible with those which it already facilitates in its 
systemic practice; therefore, if humanity  i where  that is . Following on from 
the analysis of a (postmodern?) human rights perspective, a second thematic 
pillar is built upon comprehending involvement with virtual environments; 
but this is an even more straining task, requiring first to observe the 
structures of online relationships, where societal, psychological and political 
metamorphoses circumstantially occur. 
 Part I investigates in general the formalisation of human subjectivity 
under the systemic knowledge of sciences and humanities – the original 
virtualities which humanity has created to reason with existence and 
willingly submitted itself to. Here the individual and her complex personal 
and social composures are taken apart and then put back together , as trans-
disciplinary elaborations try to fit the mystery of existence in terminologies 
and logical schemata of universal appeal.  Part II makes an apparently 
inconsistent brief jump to the Internet‘s communal evolution. The broken 
narrative comes together in Part III, where persons and identities described 
in  Part I and  seemingly left behind in Part II , are discovering their online 
reflections; the meaning of virtuality makes (unexpectedly) a full circle.  
  
I. Of Subjects and Persons 
In Chapter 2 I insisted on the conceptual melding of personal 
experience in law that human rights chased in the legal subject; on bringing 
the real person and its passions into compatibility with the abstract ontology 
of law. Such a project, besides its political and theoretical dimensions, was 
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heavily informed by the procedural problem of switching between contexts, 
i.e. of moving from the natural experience to posited laws. Transfer of an 
item/entity from one domain to another field of cognition struggles with 
confusion of tongues and limitations in receptivity (not to mention extreme 
dysfunction in reciprocity, if that should ever be called for). Note that as 
such we identified the circumstances regarding the physically self-evident 
human; hence, for his distant, almost phantasmal online aspect and whatever 
claims this could bring before law, the problem will be even more strenuous; 
the case weaker. 
The problem is, certainly, one of conversion. The calculus of law 
requires the analysis of perceptions of life accumulated at first -hand into 
recognisable and almost elementary logical components; only then it can 
reset, rebuild and finally be able to embrace them into its functional 
ontology. Thus, facing the challenge of linking Internet contexts with the 
human subject, we need to methodically re-synthesise the Net users‘ 
experiential understandings of online humanity within basic, symbolic 
structural patterns. The task at hand looks beyond law, resting upon a trans-
disciplinary review of three main constituent properties (subject, identity and 
the self) to construct a conception of personality that should equally 
encompass online projections of the human being and facilitate their 
translation into technical legal conventions.  
1. On Subjects – The subject, as the par excellence conceptual header of 
activity schemas, constitutes the key element in the formulation of 
(onto)logical correlations; this particular notion was exemplified in the previous 
Chapter while outlining the subject‘s operative importance within law.  
We need neither restate the subject‘s artificial character as a convention, the 
product of a thinking process, nor examine in relation how the attribution of 
subjectivity depends on societal contexts.
206
 Where law, though, opposes 
linking subjectivity to-and-fro general manifestations of human activity on 
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grounds of fundamental logical impossibility, we turn to arguing for the 
ultimately basic idea of a conceptual subject that logical thinking imprints 
universally in all perceived (thus conventionally) subjectivities.
207
 
1.1 - Precisely due to its central position in the formal logical process, the 
abstract and ontologically instrumental subject transcends the multiplic ity of 
its incarnations. Its operation is replicated across a long line of domains and 
contexts (like language, science, social institutions and even the law or 
culture)
208
 where the logical form schemata have been utilised for 
deciphering human thinking and activity on the basis of a common logical – 
and in thus structural - denominator.
209
   
1.1.1 – For example, the involvement of the subjects of law and of grammar 
with their respective systemic surroundings exhibits similar patterns: the 
subject is in a position to do; such an action can be either reflexive (as 
declarative of subject‘s features or attributes) or transitive; many actions 
may be linked together in conditional dependence upon each other, in 
confluence with each other etc.  
1.1.2 - The example relates to how separate spheres of representation tune on 
well with each other. Agreed, the two demonstrated contexts differ greatly in 
content; moreover, it may be easily contested that signs and propositions of 
law borrow a great deal from linguistic arrangements, thus justifying 
similarities. However, the point made here is the simulated dynamics of life, 
distilled in logical forms to be then recreated in a structured manner. In the 
rules of logic a specific cognition model is systematised and distributed that 
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permeates our experiences with receiving and analysing knowledge to thus 
render the subject a universal agency signifier for reasoning with. 
1.1.3 – Therefore, subject-hoods entering territory new or foreign to their 
own contexts should not encounter compatibility problems, at least on that 
basic level where the subject exists in its bare archetypical form to indicate 
an action qualifier. Equally to a dot on a blueprint, the minimal subject 
merely pinpoints the logically summarised capacities for interaction internal 
and external to itself; we may safely assume that as such the subject is 




1.2 – Plausibly, however, as the subject engages with particular contextual 
surroundings, complexity layers are added onto the minimal representational 
schema, impeding of the transfer from one setting to the next. The 
contextualised subject becomes qualitatively distinctive; its attributes 
inevitably more content-related.  
We may take onboard the subject‘s standing as an autonomous entity 
that is defined through the relationships it develops in space and time with 
other objects. The previous Chapter‘s discussion, on the shaping of subjects 
and rights in law, gives us a taste of how subjectivity and contextuality are 
formalised through the relational module: access to rights instates an entity 
as a legal subject and, vice versa, the subject holds entitlements that appeal 
to its distinctive (subjective) character.  The subject‘s placement in the 
grammar rules of language provides an even more iconic illustration for the 
general paradigm. 
1.3 Crouching Tiger, Hidden Subject – Moreover, empirical observations of 
subjectivity may reach conclusions of no lesser value. The spatial and 
temporal development of subjects may be understood with the assistance of 
comparatively tangible terms.  
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1.3.1 - Thus, A is the subject of an action since externalising observable 
behaviour. A tiger, in its natural habitat, follows instincts and develops skills 
according to the overarching ecosystem blueprint. From there we extract the 
subject ‗hunter‘, existing due to its relation with another object ‗prey‘.  
This leads to a new question: what happens when the tiger is captured 
and moved to an artificial environment (such as a zoo)? Does it stop being a 
hunter? The answer is that it remains the subject ‗tiger‘: despite the 
domesticating programming it might undergo, it is still carnivorous and if the 
opportunity arises it will hunt down other animals – although, not as skilfully 
as in the jungle. 
1.3.2 - The same problem of interpretation reappears in the problem with 
online participants and law. Does what we call online self lose its legal 
identity – in terms of subjectivity - as a human? Indeed, there appears to be 
actual subject that is involved in interaction, but does it exist as a legal 
subject?  
Similar questions continue on the same line: to what degree is the 
notional construction of a ‗hunter‘ applied to a tiger moving from its 
designated habitat to e.g. a circus? The tiger may kill either to feed or 
because of instinct but it does not – and possibly cannot anymore - behave in 
hunting patterns that identify it in its original habitat. On reflection, one may 
ask to what degree the conception of the human individual - the citizen, 
under state law – is being protected, when the person enters closed structures 
that escape conventional regulations. The online manifestation of the self 
enters a setting dominated by digitised apparitions of the offline reality; the 
letter of law may not find there stable ground for stepping in.  
1.3.3 – Hence, assuming that such performative intervention of law is 
requested in recognition of online subjects, formal subjectivity 
compatibilities alone do not suffice for building a solid transitory mechanism 
towards the legal subject. The online subject in question has raised the stakes 
from the start. 
2. On Identity - The position and performance of subjects in relation to other 
entities is determined by characteristics that separate them as acting entities 
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and sharpen their specific existences in context. Therefore, subjectivity stems 
from the apprehension of differentiating meanings that operate within the 
given order of things to become recognisable as such – what we might call 
identification factors. For the subject the meaning of identity lies in the 
process of distinguishing its features by virtue of matching them with 
attributable qualities (identification), to thus signify how it becomes more or 
less unique (identity).  
Identity distributes roles that, once granted, objectify in our eyes the 
abstract rules that control the given setting. To offer a crude example, a 
generalised conceptualisation of nature, where the mightier species survive 
upon preying on others, acquires substance for the observer the moment a 
yellow-furred carnivorous feline in black stripes enters the picture to claim 
the part of the hunter.  
Moreover, the contextually significant identity of the subject precedes 
further categorisations that, in this respect, follow in direct  definitional 
dependence.  Continuing with the same example, before analysing our 
creature‘s hunting behaviour (the identity ‗hunter‘ being contextually 
significant here) we first need to identify it as being a tiger; even beyond, the 
tiger is a feline, a mammal, an animal and so on. We realise here that 
identities attain to additional compositional depths, usually through implied 
ontological substrata.  
2.1 Conceptualisation – Thus, the concept of identity presents substantive 
and semantic complexities that, depending on the circumstances which call 
upon our each time analysis of identity, increase proportionally the difficulty 
in pinning it down accurately, since usually they coalesce. The subjectivity 
setup we have been developing here interrelates logically structured settings 
(law) with experiential breeding grounds of identities (i.e. humanity, online 
life). In this manner, our endeavours towards framing an identity constant to 
further elaborate on are foreordained to look into multiple faculties and, to 
start with, notable parameters which define not only the meaning but also the 
creation of identity. 
[90] 
 
2.1.1 Identity Relations – The most basic readings of identity look on a 
relation of equality. For logicians, identity describes a relation that ‗each 
thing bears to itself and to no other thing.‘
211
 In mathematics it represents the 
equality between two expressions that holds regardless of all permissible sets 
of values that the included variables will manifest
212
 (therefore, where x=x 
and additionally x=a+b+y and x=z*c, then a+b+y=z*c). Under such terms, 
identity relations surface as symmetric (x=y  y=x), transitive (x=y and y=z 
 x=z) and, more than anything, reflexive.
213
 One (conclusive) logical 
investigation expands the above module of equalities between different 
qualities: although different in sense, both the Morning Star and the Evening 
Star refer to the same object, planet Venus.
214
 
2.1.2 Temporo-spatial identity - Logic also questions whether changes (e.g. 
with the passing of time) remove the underlying character of sameness.
215
 
The riddle of identity change has been also preoccupying philosophy since 
the beginning of modernity.
216
 After Locke, consciousness is the underlying 
feature of personal identity, surpassing substance and notions of soul;
217
 
memory serves as the connecting factor between the past and the present of 
the conscious human being.
218
 
2.1.3 Identity in Society – The sociological discourse translated identity and 
individuality into socio-political self-awareness, in terms of group-
belonging.
219
 Social studies, especially in the second half of the 20
th
 century, 
scrutinised thoroughly the shaping of identities in relation to the contexts of 
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culture, nationality, race and gender; they confronted the societal creation of 
subjectivities and its burdening of social identity (as noted above in 
passing);
220
 and ventured even deeper into psychoanalytical explanations of 
the societal structure, in an ongoing response to the works of Freud and 
Lacan. These analyses have reached as far as to challenge the inherent or 
‗fixed‘ (e.g. by biological and psychological predispositions) character of 
identity.
221
 Modernity‘s project of re-anchoring humanity was seen 
collapsing in the face of an uncertain future:
222
 identity appeared fractured,
223
 
fluid, ‗multidimensional and amorphous.‘
224
 This post-modern radicalising of 
politico-social critique pursued in addition its own reality checks with 
identity. In this respect, Castells perceives identity as the internalised 
cultural reflection of the network society.
225
 Discerning ‗legitimising‘, 
‗resistance‘ and ‗project‘ identities ,
226
 he also defines ‗footloose identities‘, 
an understanding of globalised ‗information labour‘ that contemporary 
cosmopolitanism has facilitated on a large scale.
227
  
2.1.4 Framing Identity – Specific aspects from this quick interdisciplinary 
examination can turn into necessary elements in our relevant conceptualising 
of identity.   
2.1.4.1 - The fundamental logical understandings of identity are filling in 
where the previous discussion on subjectivity failed to respond fully to the 
persisting question of transferability. One needs to think of two entities  
different in sense, the online and the offline, looking at each other through a 
computer screen: both of them refer to the same heavenly body - not planet 
Venus in this case but a very distinctive human self. Therefore, if under law 
online subjectivities provide for a weak case to comprehend, legal 
subjectivity, in a transitive deployment of relations, identifies with the 
human entity to identify, in turn, with the latter‘s online activities that 
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constitute the online subject; symmetrically, the online subject identifies 
with the subject in law.  
2.1.4.2 – The circle of relational readings closes with the reflexive 
perspective contributing in outlining the continuity of identity. There the 
various stages in an entity‘s temporo-spatial progress - the relation to past 
positions - are compared: the capacity to dismiss a relation between two 
seemingly different entities as symmetrical and to prove that they instead 
stand in a reflexive association, establishes sameness. However, without the  
Identity here reaches at an impasse when explaining continuity. It 
appears incomplete without the self‘s internal performance to reflect on the 
subject‘s memory narrative and to connect transfers between contexts, which 
is analysed in the next section. 
Continuity, on the other hand, refers also to a qualitative reading of 
that record of characteristics which identify and thus separate an entity from 
its environment; or, in the same sense, which allow that entity to be absorbed 
by its surrounding setting. 
2.1.4.3 – In such qualitative terms speak the socio-cultural inputs and 
feedbacks about the determination of identity, acknowledging the shattering 
impact of contemporary reality on it: overcrowded societies, commercially 
commodifying and, at the same time, commodified, burdened with galloping 
technological evolution, bombarded with information and symbols, 
politically and ethically outracing the expectations of modernity. Social 
studies traced and proved connections between late modernity‘s lifestyles 
and the shaping of individual and group identities, the point being that, in 




2.2 Digitalisation – Our destination, the construction of digital identity, 
responds to this kind of realisation within representational electronic 
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structures and environments. Depending on the hosting communications 
conduit‘s interface and representation breadth, sets of information data 
(meaning both forwarded natural language understandings and the actual 
computer code) are attributed with describing individual subjects or entities 
and ‗their relationships to other entities.‘
229
 Thus, digital identity refers to 
the signifier component
230
 as well as to the construction process of 
experience ‗in digitally mediated ways.‘
231
 
The notion of online identities takes the same concept one step 
further. Topping the evident technological artificiality of digital settings, 
social networks emerge, pretending to be intellectual ecologies that lie 
outside of, yet evolve in parallel to the offline world. Online identities 
formed in them reflect offline personal and social identity motifs, 
additionally invoking a distinctive element (missing from ―pure‖ digital 
identities) of second level social consciousness: representations are 
constructed for human users, exclusively in the meta-narrative (virtual) of 
the given social networking interactivities. The manner in which all these 
come to pass is explained in the next parts of this Chapter and in more 
contextual detail in the case studies of Chapter 4.
232
 
2.3 From Identity to Personification – This brief outline of digital and 
online identities mirrors sharply the elements which highlighted our 
conceptualisation basis.  
Within online contexts, the use of the term persons (or, alternatively, 
personae) is commonly preferred to ‗identity‘; that happens neither 
accidentally nor due to linguistic confusion: the ‗person‘ marks out the 
created impression of autonomous individual existence on the Internet; or at 
least, if not ―autonomous‖, experienced as a separate , parallel ―incarnation‖. 
This reconfiguration of language has the perceived dimensions of online 
participation being reassessed, as we make the passage from the ontological 
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component ‗identity‘ to internalised imitations of life that aim higher, at the 
composite and complex sense of ‗personality‘.  
Analyses of identities involve as above relational appreciations of unit 
entities and groups. On the other hand, discussing the ‗person‘ summons 
much wider and multi-layered arrangements of meanings. At the end of the 
day, an identity may be understood as the shell of a person: once endowed 
with consciousness it turns into a self-aware entity. Hence, the ‗person‘ 
approach includes, evidently, the narrower ‗identity‘ scope‘s examinations 
into symbolic properties and relationships across social formations, but also 
deploys further looks into the internal intellectual and emotional 
mechanisms, which animate the entity in question.
233
  
3. Person of Self – The online personality metaphors that we are focusing on, 
simulate the unsettling complexity which characterises human beings - the 
real persons:
234
 they are externalised through infinite combinations of those 
traits and behavioural patterns that synthesise personality. Needless to repeat 
here, the descriptive grammar that was utilised in view of online identities 
may not suffice for explaining these ontologically enhanced and concrete 
subjectivities.  
The ontological significance of separating the symbolic human person 
from the per se (biological) human being frequently dominates discussions 
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amongst scholars. For us,  the question whether the former (i.e. the symbolic) 
is depending and shaped by the latter, opens relevant ethical questions: in 
transferring personhood from the anthropological level to practised 
knowledge systems (e.g. the normative, religion etc), the separation often 
results in instrumentalists accounts of personality; however, dynamics of this 
kind may have problematic social repercussions, as for example in racially 
biased readings of political personality,
235
 or in designations of life that 
relate to the existence or not of cognition capacities.
236
  
However, the conceptual human person, which the various 
subjectivities attempt to recreate (and sometimes replace), transcends such 
challenges with ideological neutrality; for a core of essentially abstract 
faculties define it, with the aim of picturing the human entity in being and 
nothing more or less than that. Therefore, apart from featuring identity and 
self-consciousness, the human person is also capable of reasoning and, 
finally, persists through time. Overall, persons become perceivable upon the 
coherent interdependence of these characteristics; the concept of the self 
plays pivotal role in animating the factual externalisation of this unity, i.e. 
the individual human being  
3.1 Two Views of Self - Hence, the idea of a ‗self‘ is projected in two main 
expressions – the second apparently adopting a stronger identity-related 
perspective: (i) the self reflects an internal and enduring unity of thoughts 
into one consciousness; and (ii) the self signifies perception of individuality 
in relational counter-reference (difference) to the surrounding settings. 
Otherwise, we could also crudely describe the self as one‘s own experience 
of existence through his reflective cognition of being.  
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3.1.1 - In the first of the two approaches, the self‘s properties and operations 
transcend the human mind‘s descriptive capacities to that point where they 
become inconceivable in physical terms. In modern thought, perception of 
the self has been extracted from its ontological interaction with the world of 
ideas and material things, rather than from an assumed spiritual nature.
237
 We 
may refer to Descartes‘ earlier finding of the self in the ‗immediate 
conscious experience of thinking‘;
238
 or, on the other hand, to the Lockean 
perspective that the person ‗can consider itself as itself, the same thinking 
thing in different times and places.‘
239
 This latter evolved to understanding 
self as a logical construction defined in terms of memory
240
 and to 
explanations of psychological continuity.
241
 In other discussions the self is 
considered to be a fusion of identities.
242
 
3.1.2 – The second formulation adheres more to the sociological vantage 
point - and fundamentally to Mead‘s works - for defining the self as a 
product of social interaction that develops ‗in the process of social 
experience and activity;‘ the self‘s reflexivity ‗distinguishes it from other 
objects and from the body.‘
243
 For Mead this experience evolves in relation to 
the ‗me‘, ‗the organised set of attitudes of others which one himself 
assumes,‘ and the ‗I‘, ‗the response of the organism to the attitudes of the 
others‘.
244
 The main idea that surfaces here is that the self receives its own 
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 Although within the sociological and psychological fields of inquiry, 
analyses of the self become inevitably labyrinthine,
246
 we are aiming here at 
a very specific theme. The self is organised upon the gathering of multiple 
identities
247
 that each ‗is tied to aspects of the social structure.‘
248
 While the 
self, in the sense of the whole person, commits to ‗psychological 
centrality,‘
249
 interaction is being conducted between its separate identities 
(roles and memberships) and their responding groups or organizations in 
society;
250
 thus, as several and diverse interaction modalities operate 
simultaneously, the self reflects upon ‗it self‘ this multiplicity as one 




3.1.3 – This dualistic explanation of the self provides a schematic ground, a 
conceptual understanding of the development and function of the self, from 
where we may start figuring out a rounded depiction of personality.  
3.2 The Selfless Person of the Selfless Law – We may assume the presence 
of some kind of perceptive self inside all conscious beings that determines 
behavioural reactions.
252
 As interaction settings, however, move to higher 
levels of abstract representation, the process of placing the self into context 
becomes correspondingly more complex: the margins for describing ‗being‘ 
and ‗activity‘ submit to the symbolic limits of the available technical 
language.  
Hence, in the case of legal systemic (re)construction, law seems to be 
lacking genuine insights for conceiving the meaning of self.
253
 Due to innate 
explanatory limitations, law can reduce the concept of person in its internal 
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developments of meaning. Note here the significance of preserving rich and 
untampered meanings that Castells associates with healthily performing 
social identities.
254
   
Broadly speaking, the rational person becomes apparent by 
externalising his innate decision making capabilities. Can these 
externalisations, though, affect our comprehension of the concept of person 
and even mistakenly replace it? For law, personality is a signifier for 
exercises of individuality – the fixation of modernity par excellence. 
However, law perceives the person from what the person does rather than 
from what this otherwise is: law itemises individuality empirically through 
systemically translatable behaviour, i.e. the socially functional result of the 
decision making process. In this respect, personhood is granted to selected 
subjectivities (e.g. corporations, associations) that reproduce adequately the 
condition of individuality in rules, as this has already been experienced in 
civil and economic life. 
Our insofar discussion – including the examination of the human 
subject in the previous Chapter - suggests that individuality stems from the 
internal capacity of entities to decide and direct their own actions with 
cognition. This capacity is represented precisely by the idea of the self. 
Hence, while a reasonable negotiation of personality in future law-making 
discussions should certainly rely on the empirical input for drawing its 
inferences, it ought not to reject outrightly the argument of the self. 
4. The Personhood Trap – This Part of the Chapter opened with the 
question whether our aspirations to project online humanity on the technical 
apparatus of law are realistic. We assumed the person becoming an 
ontological device that would bridge the two contexts. The above cross-
disciplinary overview of ongoing subjectivity, identity and self scholarly 
projects lead to rather broad, over-inviting categorisations. Here, we are 
facing one last obstacle in our task, for these categorisations might render the 
as necessitated stable definition of personhood inconveniently unattainable: 
whereas within the historical continuity of societies, personhood means 
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ultimately empowerment, strong disagreements, over where should limits 
apply to the inclusion of entities under the ―personhood‖ concept, are bound 
to surface. In essence, the riddle of what constitutes personality involves 
more than resolving technical and ontological incompatibilities. 
4.1 - Attention is drawn again to the use of language, where the semantic 
construction of the person takes place. From what has been explained so far, 
such expressions should extract their meanings of purpose from the applied 
reasoning in normative frameworks and, ideally, filter theoretical as well as 
moral endeavours – especially where the axiological concern of humanity in 
personality is involved. 
In general, the condition of being a person is described as either 
personality or personhood. The difference between the two words appears 
linguistically insignificant, while most dictionaries usually do not draw a 
clear line between the two. The distinction does not, though, simply satisfy a 
grammatical caprice: ‗personality‘ shows relevant capacity to perform as a 
person; ‗personhood‘ indicates the existence of an order of things, within 
which the person is formally established as such. Therefore, when a pet 
simulates human characteristics or behavioural patterns we may say that ‗this 
dog has personality,‘ avoiding soundly, though, any references to such a 
thing as personhood.  
Law has embraced various instances of legal persons. The 
terminological difference between personality and personhood gains more 
weight in the purely legal argument. Entities may be naturally able to exhibit 
in action the behavioural characteristics that prescribe subjectivity without, 
though, attaining personhood. Therefore, despite bearing the maximum of 
qualifying personality traits - even dwarfing in their showing of humanity 
those artificial creations that we call ‗legal persons‘ - they are barred from 
entering law‘s personhood circle. These are well-known facts and appeal to 
law‘s standard systemic setup.  
4.2 - Coming back to the notion of online persons, for its detractors it is built 
on a double illusion, made up of, first, the experiential mistake of mixing 
virtuality with reality and, second, the intellectual misconception that casual 
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social involvement opens automatically the door to personal entitlements in 
law (an almost similar argument to the one used by positivism against natural 
rights). These viewpoints hold that there do not exist separate online entities 
as such, and, even if they indeed had, their nature and the socio -economic 
contexts where they are developing
255
 cannot justify granting them with 
legitimate personality; with legal subjectivity.  
Opposite to this form of legal orthodoxy and conservatism, one could 
argue that law has already inserted fictions under the umbrella term 
‗personality‘ that might appear shocking to those unfamiliar with the 
circumstances and motives which reasoned their legal personification in the  
first place; therefore, qualifying now one more candidate in law seems to be 
a trivial matter. What I am contesting here to be a paradox of convention can 
be stressed out via a crude example: a child is as much a person as her 
parents; similarly, an 18
th
 century slave bore every natural aspect of a person 
as his owner. Yet, law bestowed on neither of the two complete personality: 
while both the child and the slave are in practice permitted to proceed as 
agents with actions which the letter of law reserves for ‗persons‘, the former 
(child) is considered of limited legal capacity, whereas the slave as of 
virtually none at all. On the contrary, maritime laws elevate ships to the 
status of legal persons, as carriers of duties and entitlements; estates (i.e. 
gatherings of assets and funds) become independent bodies in the form of 
foundations; and corporations are protected under human rights laws.
256
  
Elements like self-awareness, that naturally accompany in our 
common comprehension the person entity, are evidently missing from such 
de jure creations, unless we are to identify them with, e.g. in the case of 
boats, the ship-owners‘ personal interest in maintaining the sailing property‘s 
financial integrity. Arguably, this reasoning takes as many liberties as the 
proposal for offering personhood (or some other lesser degree of legal 
subjectivity) to online identities. By cross-examining the given examples of 
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children, slaves and ships, we come eventually to realising that personhood 
articulates the reinvention of the intuitively  understood concept of the 
person, in realisation of specific social, political, economic and even 
ideological interests. Personhood is mainly a convention, serving the needs 
and values that come to pass as priorities of the societal instance.  
4.3 – Legal scarcity not being the real issue, the establishing of the 
―personhood qualifier‖ is loaded  with motivation that appears to a degree 
biased; in the case of slavery, we could talk of ‗injustice‘ within mechanisms 
of law that conspicuously ignored humanity and were instead wilfully 
personifying trade interests. When discussing online subjects, whereas the 
urgency of humanity is not at full sight yet and, more importantly, the 
argument of injustice is still incomplete, the role played by political  will and 
power in framing and prioritising legal preferences emerges decisive.  
In law, the given definition of personhood as ‗empowerment‘ 
translates into ‗legitimacy‘. All things considered, legitimisation in legal 
praxis marks a purely political decision.  
5 - Our present endeavours to fix a connection between online existence and 
personhood, follow inevitably the broader understanding of the latter being 
the instrumental gateway to legitimacy. Regardless of the interpretative 
breadth it might receive under philosophical enquiries, the person performs 
substantively as an institution of political intent, social function and legal 
formalisation.  
Even if that is the case, though, questions such as ―is identity 
persistent,‖ ―is the self reflexively influential,‖ and ―what are the depths of 
the self‘s vulnerability‖ transform overall into a realistic assessment o f 
personhood, to reveal there the value of the triptych of subject, identity and 
self for its pragmatic dimensions and scope. In this sense, the insofar 
suggested solution to the riddle of the person lands closer than expected to 
law‘s comparatively finite thesis: by building step by step correspondence 
with personhood on the points of subjectivity, identity and self, the 
conceptual device of personality, which we analysed throughout this Part, 
primarily provides argumentative access to legitimacy (the same way the 
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human rights argument performed in the previous Chapter, regarding legal 
subjectivity). It might be retaining an ample theoretical perspective and 
receptiveness, and addressing all potential personality models with flexibility 
and tolerance, yet it adopts strong practical disposition (and sense) to sort 
out its most problematic - from the combined viewpoint of social reality and 
practised law - findings.  
The relevant perspective of potentially applied law comes into closer 
focus later, in Part II of Chapter 6, to juxtapose the online projections of 
users with legal personalities. Here, the discussion will instead proceed with 
justifying legitimate interests for the argument of personality in view of 
online settings. The following Part explains the nature of general 
participatory interests that emerge from Internet structures, where Part III 
reviews personality in precise association with those interests. 
 
II. The Internet Experience 
The online human, like other conceptualisations of products of the 
post-modern global political, economic and cultural order, has challenged 
empowerment in law. On the outside, it is rather easy to dispute that what it 
stands for is nothing but a passing voguish trend, which will, eventually, 
cool down and vanish; will be absorbed by the mundanity of continuously 
enriching offline lives with technological phantasmagorias.     
The cyberspace
257
 ideal – defined, in brief, by information infinities 
and humanity‘s metamorphosis in motifs of digital metaphysics - acquired 
popularity across the pioneers of the early computer networks, back in the 
days when the TCP/IP protocol was first introduced to realise the global 
―Internet‖. It envisaged a lifestyle alternative, carrying enthusiastic hopes 
that the next step into the evolution of human cognitive morality was now 
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reachable with the aid of technology.
258
 Users pertained to deploy personality 
traits within communications modules, imagining bodies of transferred data 
hosting their now expanded intellects across the ―living‖ network. The 
reason behind that impression was possibly the onscreen ―emptiness‖, the 
visual silence of words and unrealistic, pixelised images that were hanging 
heavily over monochrome backgrounds. In substance, the Internet experience 
was nothing more than received information causing changes on the users‘ 
monitors; however, the mesmerising simulation of space that those frugal 
displays build (in conjunction with the unprecedented sensation that the 
physical self perceived, when, with the touch of a key, his conscience would 
cover long distances at the speed of light) created the impression that virtual 
bodies were taking shape, travelling like digitised cosmonauts between 
computer systems.  
 The virtual body awareness changed radically with the arrival of the 
World Wide Web (‗WWW‘ or ‗the Web‘). The real world colonised and 
finally took control over the ―vision‖, making it more approachable to the 
increasingly incoming masses of users that were seeking to simulate offline 
practicalities rather than conforming to charming science fiction apparitions. 
Yet the virtual body concept did not die, it simply adapted; its close 
connection with the mind and the emotional world of the user retained its 
important role in formations of active international technosociality.
259
 Before 
expanding upon this communications aspect I will deliver a concise historical 
and structural account of the evolving computer network.  
1. A Short History of the Net - Information lies in the heart of every 
communications network. Information, as in ―content‖, holds at face value 
the primary role, that of a knowledge end; seen, though, as module of 
constant activity, i.e. the flux of intelligence between actors who share 
similar interests, it turns equally valuable. The organised circulation of 
messages promotes further purposes and gathers together groups of similar or 
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neighbouring interests. Intriguingly, what had been perceived as the ―means‖ 
may easily become the ―ends‖.  
This is, precisely, the meaning of the information revolution, which 
the Internet‘s inception entailed: the Net‘s general worth resides not in the 
qualitative breadth of exchanged knowledge but in the capacity to store and 
– either directly or indirectly - retrieve that knowledge. Moreover, the 
Internet hosts access to thematically distinguished activities and areas of 
knowledge. The ongoing fascination with the Internet derives from the 
expanding networking power of digitised information. For this reasons, it 
quickly emerged as a good in itself, shadowing the actual services it carried 
out at the time. 
1.1 - The early public Internet was developed on the two basic axes of 
education and small scale commercial access. Universities al lowed 
connection and hosted the majority of information conduits. The private 
sector offered regional data exchange structures and links to the until then 
offline channels. Online operations included exchange of e-mails, 
newsgroups and elementary entertainment platforms, like chat lines and 
Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs).  
During this ―primordial‖ period one can locate cyberculture in its 
purest formalistic expression, that of profound awareness of electronic 
citizenship becoming an alternative state to living in the real world. Self-
regulated online communities were set up to facilitate virtualities, where the 
cyberspace ideal found fertile ground for application. For its inhabitants 
these online premises resembled more or less Locke‘s state of nature, life as 
a digitised ―paradise‖. Exactly as in Locke‘s theory, these circumstances 
would later change once proprietary rights were secured on the Internet.  
1.2 - The introduction of the user friendly Web acquired landmark 
significance. It established a radical new online mentality that, apart from 
apparent technological improvements such as easy browsing interfaces and 
attractive graphical representations, it installed new structural and 
operational communications experiences. Perception of the Internet, its 
mechanisms and regulatory potentials, adapted at large to the visual, iconic 
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system of the Web; most notably, ICANN
260
 would be later on assigned with 
administering URL addresses and Internet domain names, emphasising 
indirectly an online metaphor of land that was projected on the spatial 
virtuality of webpages.
261
 Back at that time, the Net renounced any pretences 
of the preceding digital elitism and opened wide its doors to the public; 
business naturally followed if not leading this new wave.
262
 Commercial 
exploitation of the new frontier was divided into traditional access providing, 
real-world markets that stationed posts on the Web and, finally, exclusively 
online setups.  
1.2.1 - The latter exposed the Net‘s innovative character and wild prospects. 
Particularly successful within this line of commerce were services that were 
offering free content access (similar to aerial television channels) and 
profiting from hosting advertisements. Search engines (valuable tools for 
investigating the enormity of online information), Web portals and free email 
providers maximised the Internet‘s utility and pointed both users and the 
market alike to new directions.  
1.3 - However, with the Internet‘s galloping popularity and expanding 
usefulness, typical offline conflicts found alternative battlegrounds. Lacking 
any central monitoring authority or censoring control, the network‘s wealth 
consisted mainly of material freely uploaded at the users‘ taste and 
discretion. Unedited opinions, pornography and representations of 
commercially owned icons were travelling across the sea of data. Soon, 
issues such as info-terrorism and the unauthorised use of protected 
trademarks or copyrighted material invited the lawyers in.
263
  
1.3.1 - The attention of states was drawn to practices which would either 
threaten or infringe national regulations and policies. The intervention of 
state law was received with mixed reactions, where the attempts to forestall 
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elusive – due to the medium‘s nature - substantiations of unwelcome 
activities were found to be indirectly overriding civil liberties. The wave of 
Net ‗fundamentalism‘
264
 was particularly felt in the US, as users joined 
forces with business to stand against compromises in online freedoms. Since 
the first clashes in courts,
265
 the two sides have been entangled in a war, 
governments seeking to promote offline control, the opposite camp fighting 
back on grounds of privacy and freedom of speech.  
Arguably, the distinctive language of defence of  liberties under 
American law, combined with the Net‘s factual birth and evolution due to US 
initiatives, helped spreading across the network‘s global population the 
impression that rights were to be sought out and guaranteed mainly opposite 
to government intervention. This spirit of libertarianism, heavily influenced 
by the ideals of economic liberalism, motivated the gradual erection of the 




1.4 - With the passing of time, the Internet was transformed into a gigantic 
bazaar and entertainment venue. On the one hand, inter-seas marketplaces, 
like amazon, made their first bold steps, while news providers, streaming 
media and – not surprisingly – the sex industry stormed the scene; on the 
other, black markets came on the rise. In parallel, peer-to-peer (P2P) 
networks became the new controversial fashion for exchanging music files, 
to the intellectual property rights owners‘ great dismay; the much discussed 
case of Napster
267
 and its mushroom-like spawning successors (e.g. Kazaa, 
Grokster etc) underlined a different aspect of the Internet culture, which 
initiated intense legal reactions.    
 With the burst of the dot-com bubble
268
 the Net‘s commercial orgasm 
reached a balance; it became obvious that even cyberspace had certain limits. 
Online exchange markets and auction sites rolled into the picture, filling 
                                                 
264
 Ibid. 457. 
265
 Infra 5(I)[2.1.2]. 
266
 Infra 6(III)[1.] comment on the conditioning of the online meta-nature. 
267
 Infra 5(I)[2.1.4.3]. 
268
 The rapid rise of stock-market investments in Internet sites and IT during the late 1990‘s 
ended in the sudden decline of prices in 2000, which hit most upstart tech companies and 
led the relevant market to mild recession, at least until the advance of Web 2.0.   
[107] 
 
demand gaps and relaxing at the same time the preceding supersaturating 
commercial phenomenon.  
1.5 - The Internet of the early 21
st
 century explored what might be addressed 
as owned freedom: free online services or hosting facilities that require small 
fees provide users with access to a large number of applications oriented to 
entertainment. A new boost has been given to promoting individual audio, 
visual and text creativity on extensive networking platforms. The Web also 
hosts evolving knowledge projects (wikis) that are developed with the written 
contributions of participating users. This overall phenomenon, marked also 
by the omnipresence of web-based social networking platforms, was 
popularised under the term Web 2.0, to signal  the socio-cultural overturning 
of established methods of service providing and using. Internet -based 
‗collaboration and content creation‘ has pointed towards a dynamic 
reinterpretation of online social participation and awareness.
269
 Web 2.0 
enhances the productive input of the society of users in common information 
flows and technologically it integrates societies in advanced shared 
experiences of content manipulation.
270
  
2. The Internet Participation Paradigm – The Web facilitates best the 
online mass-participation paradigm. In essence, for most people the Web is 
the Internet, concentrating most aspects of daily networking activity and 
breeding the culture of the information society. Therefore, this section 
analyses the paradigm by following, mainly, a representation of the Web, for 
the sake of simplicity and common understanding. However, several 
indicated instances of Net functionality are not web-based and run as 
independent applications (like Microsoft‘s Live Messenger and, most 
notably, Virtual Worlds). 
2.1 – Users may purchase access to the Internet from a commercial Internet 
services provider (ISP); otherwise, access can be granted under employment 
relationships, participation in an educational institution etc. From there 
                                                 
269
 Burri-Nenova (2007) 1691. 
270
 Zittrain (2008) 123. 
[108] 
 
though, access to the Web is fundamentally free and open for everyone, 
requiring nothing more than basic browsing software (―browser‖).  
2.1.1 - The Internet is often acknowledged to be a gigantic information 
conduit. All operations are practically based on the manipulation, storage and 
transfer of information. Hence, viewing a website includes (i) an original 
author having uploaded content on a webpage via (ii) storing the information 
in electronic form, either on a supporting online service‘s storage hardware 
or on the abstract network of computer systems (―cloud‖); (iii) a user 
locating the information and reading it. This last part is a bit more 
complicated than what it seems; technically, the user‘s browser requests 
permission from the service for transmitting data to the user‘s computer, 
where the information is reconstructed in its original form as displayable 
content.  
2.1.11 - As service we may understand any systematic storage, transfer and 
manipulation resource arrangement, offered to the public. Our entire Internet 
experience is based on such services:  
2.1.11.1 - communications methods (emailing, message boards, Web forums 
and real-time chat and video conferencing, e.g. Skype);  
2.1.11.2 - content hosting services, from blogging platforms (e.g. livejournal 
or blogger) to file-sharing sites for textual, musical, photographic and 
audiovisual material;  
2.1.11.3 – content display platforms, as in news services, knowledge banks 
and archives (The Internet Archive, Project Guttenberg, Wikipedia,), and 
music and audiovisual streaming (online radio, television etc.);  
2.1.11.4 – online retailers and e-commerce facilitators, including stores like 
amazon.com and iTunes, auction platforms (notably eBay), and payment 
intermediaries (e.g. PayPal, RBS WorldPay etc.); 
2.1.11.5 - social networking services (Twitter); 
2.1.11.6 – search engines, performing general information retrieval (in the 
vein of Google Search and Yahoo!), focussing on narrower research and 
business sectors (Lexis Nexis), or tracing other services as part of professing 
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a specific project (e.g. expedia.com contacts comparative searches on airline 
websites to present and sell travel packages).  
2.1.11.7 – online game platforms, many of which offer Massive Multiplayer 
Online Gaming (MMOG) interfaces and large capacities for simultaneous, 
real-time playing. 
2.1.12 - Service use can be free for everyone (e.g. the BBC website); 
conditional upon registration (for example, hotmail accounts); or requiring 
both registration and fee payment. 
 If incorrect log-in details are entered, or the service website diagnoses 
any kind of incompatibility with the user‘s Internet address,
271
 then access to 
the online platform and hosted content is denied; or, at least, several 
operations cannot be performed, where the existence of a personal account 
conditions the capacity to manipulate information.    
2.1.13 – Through the service, information can be (re)created and exchanged 
between users, either internally (e.g. comments sections of web-forums, 
messaging between facebook accounts) or externally (messages sent between 
different email providers, news feeds etc). Hyper-linking falls under the 
external exchange mode, as connections to other sites and sometimes the 
actual communicated content are allowed to be embodied in transmissions or 
web-pages (e.g. videos from the YouTube service being embedded on 
facebook profiles).  
2.1.2 – Overall, the Web performs along the logic of establishing a public 
space which expands by being allocated to private operators (online  services 
providers or OSPs). Essentially, it forms a cluster of services, where each 
single web-page may be holding the function of a gateway to further 
interoperating subservices, or simply serve as rented space for a static 
content setup.  
2.1.21 - With the overwhelming majority of websites offering access free of 
charge and generally minimum - if not at all - interference with user activity, 
one may alternative address the Web as manifesting either a communal 
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 or an expanded marketplace. The arguments backing either 
depiction are equally sound.  
2.1.21.1 - The marketplace position picks services as the departure point for 
understanding the Internet. Note that online services require maintenance 
expenses. Where in most cases their engagement with the online public is not 
built on traditional commercial exchanges, revenue derives from advertising 
and, rarely, donations. This sponsorship model follows loosely traditional 
mass media economic solutions, websites resembling to an extent privately  
owned public broadcasting networks (e.g. ITV in the UK).  
2.1.21.2 – While the online public does not participate directly in this 
economic schema, websites capitalise on the flow of visitors. In this sense, 
the communal deployments of the public develop in parallel to the market 
structure and kind of intertwine with it.  
2.1.21.3 – On the other hand, the behavioural patterns that the public follows 
in communicating may be interpreted as constructing an alternative market 
order. In this understanding, information forms the main capital and is being 
valued in the communications contexts and the artefacts built around it (e.g. 
sociability, culture, education, economic life). This economic reading does 
not replace the basic communal understanding of the online public, but rather 
melds into it, providing a supplemental analysis of internal mechanisms of 
trust and reputation.   
2.1.3 – Most online enterprises concentrate more than just a few of the 
previously noted and other functions into versatile operation plat forms. For 
example, personalised Google accounts provide electronic mailing, chat, 
voice conferencing, news and blog feeds, storage space, document 
processing, photo and video sharing. In combination with fully integrating 
dynamic Web 2.0 tools, the utility significance of such activity centres 
increases, where, gradually, personal development and daily life tasks 
emigrate from offline to online contexts. 
2.1.31 – To the point, Benkler identifies a networked information economy, 
referring to the ‗decentralised individual action‘ which cheap technological 
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means have allowed to evolve in large scale cooperation and coordination 
projects of information and cultural production.
273
 In this schema, not only 
productive community processes claim influence over the off line society by 
flooding it with the multiple alternative capitals they create; also, the 
individual‘s positive personal reflection of his active involvement in these 
phenomena and their impacts enhances all previously established 
understandings of the information society, and the socio-political 
development dependent upon it.   
2.2 A Structural Appreciation of the Web  – In these descriptions of the 
Internet, the development of relationships is defined by information (as both 
a circulated item and a communications flow) first on the level of service 
providing; second, in terms of content management, as producers release 
information on the network or content hosts will make storage and 
distribution possible through their services; third, in the traditional sense of 
communications exchanges between agents.  
2.2.1 - Structured upon practices of exchange and distribution, this web of 
relationships is manifested in vertical and horizontal patterns.  
2.2.11 - From the viewpoint of the service model‘s structural primacy, 
verticality is built from the dependence of users (or subservices) on access 
gateways and distribution points. The arrangements between distribution 
points and between users create structural horizontality.  
2.2.12 - On the other hand, if we use content management as a guide, most 
relationships are conceived as horizontal, apart from those where proprietary 
claims over deployed content create power effects.  
2.2.1.1 - Crucial, then, appear the alternative meanings of information. If 
communication takes the stage, then on top are found those who enable 
participation in the Net, by providing access, and those who do not inhibit 
participation in their trafficking of communications. By contrast, 
acknowledging information as an object reiterates the premise of verticality 
starting from those who provide content and moving down to the receiving 
public. 
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2.2.2 - At a first glance, the absence of traditional physical bonds with state 
entities incarnates in Web relationships the perfect market arrangement. The 
entire setting is defined by the proliferation of exchanges, it enshrines 
personal autonomy and, where concerns are raised over its effectiveness, it 
seems capable of regulatory self-adjustment through market mechanisms of 
competition and the utilisation of preferences. 
2.2.3 - Power relationships are not taken off the digitised map. Economic 
theory considers them necessary and markets competent for preventing cases 
of over-growth to dominance that would upset the setting‘s balance. If, 
however, we put into perspective both of the above approaches to verticality, 
we understand that structurally the digitised market of ideas is not that free 
and that it submits to actual power centres. Therefore, access providers 
within the digitised setting condition the variety of modes of exchange, since 
they may at will manipulate them; they may become stronger the closer they 
encompass additionally content production and management. OSPs may exert 
considerable control over the online setting, their position as masters of the  
digitised land bringing them on par with territorial states inside the Web 
context. This metaphor and its practical consequences are analysed below.  
2.3 On Communities - The network‘s global character and those innovations 
which advertised the online model were the proximal cause behind the 
upright popularity of groups residing exclusively on the Internet. Users of 
personal computers would either join already existing communities or create 
their own, encouraged by offered or foreseen developments in 
communications interfaces. The online commercial infrastructure and the 
cultural diversities, which the Internet concentrates, have reached such 
enormity in numbers and sizes that are rendering practically impossible any 
attempt to map the variant online geographies.    
2.31 - However, we may distinguish two norms governing the formation of 
―virtual communities‖.
274
 The first one draws its character from a shared 
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intellectual interest of online participants.
275
 Thus we may refer to 
intellectual virtual communities in the cases of informal online political 
organisations and fandom focused on generic trends or particular artistic 
works, e.g. a Harry Potter books fan club. Group identity is acquired through 
expressed personal inclinations.  
2.32 - In functional virtual communities, on the other hand, membership 
derives from participation through a single application platform. Exercised 
by registering with the selected online software setup, this type of 
association is exemplified by the social networking Facebook and the video 
sharing YouTube websites. 
2.33 Online States / Online Nations - Fundamental differences in the 
exhibited formation bases may generate in practice operational conflict 
between the two models. To understand this potential one might draw upon a 
contrast between nations and states.  Where states constitute regionally 
restricted legal formations, nations are broader in their geographical 
expansion and dependent on deeper cultural bonds that their participants 
share to distinctively separate them as ethnical groups.
276
 Functional 
communities resemble states: pinpointing their online locus at specific 
servers or IP addresses, they submit to fundamental operational rules, set in 
the launching software‘s computer code.
277
 Similarly, intellectual 
communities resemble nations.  Although group members rely upon a 
functional community as a means of gaining network access (citizenship), 
they adhere to collective basic characteristics, tastes and intellectual qualities 
that define their shared bond (nationality) beyond the procedural mechanisms 
of online localities. 
Such an online metaphor of intersecting citizenships and nationalities 
is sketched out that, in reflection of the context from where it draws its 
inspiration, it may further replicate relevant patterns of antagonisms and 
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clashes. Hence, restrictions that apply within a country to citizens of specific 
ethnical origins, oppressions against groups of diverging ideological or 
sexual orientations and, finally, withdrawal of citizenship (the most extreme 
and grievous measure that a state can impose) may be manifested within 
online structures. This viewpoint stands out as quite bold, thus requiring 
clarifications on the meaning of state which we try to establish here as a 
valid parallel.  
2.3.1 A Treatment of the State - Tsatsos pinpoints to common confusion over 
terminological semantics. There is a clear distinction between state as power 
(in German, Staat) and state as an organised entity (from the Greek polis and 
the Roman civitas). The first direction presents the ‗institutionalised and 
systematised production and enforcement of the will of those with power 
over a social group‘; historically, with the development of traditional 
monarchy, the state starkly contrasted from society, elaborating the definitive 
paradigm of relationships between governing and governed. The other 
approach to the term ―state‖ is more expressive of an ‗on the whole 
experiential phenomenon of one order, a system of societal cohabitation,‘ 
best mirrored in the ideal of civil society. We may conclude, following 
Tsatsos‘ line of thought, that what we perceive as a state is a combination of 




2.3.1.1 - Classic legal theory has expounded various definitional elements of 
the state; three have repeatedly surfaced as the most prominent:
279
 
2.3.1.11 Population - The manner, in which the people are conceptualised as 
part of the state, depends predominantly on the regime‘s character; this may 
be exemplified simply in the difference between addressing them as either 
‗citizens‘ or ‗subjects‘ and the political outcomes that this entails in practice. 
The principal interests and focus of public law follow accordingly, as well as 
the breadth and potency of rights and duties.   
The economic point of view offers an alternative basis for a 
definition, by  which the people of the state are connected through the total 
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of ‗economic activities and procedures that aim to satisfy human needs and 
are thus associated with the pursuit of shared or competing objectives.‘
280
 
The creation of relationships of dependence and power on this premise leads 
to a significant shift, denoted by the replacement of the term ‗people‘ – 
traditionally associated with understandings of the state through the au thority 
which sovereigns exercise over the masses – with the broader ‗society‘, 
precisely for delineating populations as exchange-focusing concentrations of 
individuals and thus arranging states into market conceptions.
 
 
2.3.1.12 Territory - This is the country (land) over which the state does not 
exercise a proprietary right (dominium) but its sovereignty (imperium). It is 
the physical space wherein relationships between governments and governed 
are developed. The term jurisdiction, on the other hand, intellectualises the 
meaning of space by expanding enforcement of sovereignty‘s will beyond the 
geographical limits of the territory, in relation to other sovereign entities.  
2.3.1.13 Effective government - The concept indicates compliance with 
particular standards that needs to be exhibited on various levels. One main 
axis involves attaining internally legal coherence, as in establishing an 
authority for issuing laws and regulating activity; moreover, its performance 
should be effective, laws should be reliable and binding with the passing of 
time.
281
 In relation to external actors (e.g. other states), an effective 
government is one which represents competently its primary interests and the 
people. 
2.3.1.2 - Another element that is usually added to the list of main 
constituents, is the ‗primordial constitutive power,‘ or, in other words, the 
self-empowered sovereignty: the state is by definition the sole governing 
subject authorised with exercising power (and monopoly of coercion) over its 
own affairs.  
The aspect of exclusiveness in power has found equal justification in 
both the old monarchic dicta that God bestows the king with authority and 
social contract rationales alike, where people empower their leaders; at the 
same time, its convincingness might be justifiably curtailed by these 
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presumptions of conditioned legitimacy. Furthermore, in the modern political 
reality, states that voluntarily submit to norms and rules of international laws 
are, as a consequence, obliged to abide by particular deontology charters  and 
standards when dealing with their citizens (or subjects).  
2.3.2 The Online Functional State - Despite the number of similarities the 
metaphor may openly converse, a direct re-pronunciation of functional online 
communities as states would blatantly overlook other fundamental 
conceptions separating the two contexts. Nevertheless, the point raised here 
is that both cases illustrate de facto power structures, operationally 
autonomous and internally governed, that, additionally, maintain recognition 
of their independence against unjustified external interferences - where they 
are part of broader regulatory orders.   
2.3.21 - At first glance, whereas functional communities are by definition 
restricted to the limits of their software platforms, they fail to fully realise 
the idea of a state territory equivalent to the principle of a ‗well -defined 
physical locus.‘
282
 We could distinguish between hard-core centralised 
―states‖ that are based on servers, and other models that use software clients 
to spread their processes across interconnected computers with greater 
fluidity, yet less concrete character (P2P networks provide a fairly graphic 
example for the latter);  by doing so they do not present structural stability. 
It may be argued that the potential for an actor to exercise control over such 
vague machineries depends highly on the existence of nodal points, where 
concentrations of information activity are constantly passing through and 
which could be treated as locality references; whoever owns access to these 
traffic points is automatically granted with power over the community‘s 
underlying functional processes.
283
  Obviously, centralised server-ran setups, 
on the other hand, maximise controlling and monitoring potentials.  
2.3.22 - This distinction amongst functional communities uses technical 
grounds, as explained, but also the organisational models that each time 
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apply. Hence, on a second level, we speak in different terms when referring 
to online services (e.g. e-mail providers), where the owner/administrator 
acquires status equal to a sovereign, than when addressing Net -based 
cooperation modules (like P2P networks). Although it is not rare for 
exercises of power and control to emerge in the latter, in the first case we 
encounter full administrative subjection of the functional community‘s 
activities to its ex natura undisputed leader, comparable to traditional 
monarchy.  
2.3.23 - It seems fitting for a functional community to constantly seek the 
preservation of its operational integrity as a means for sustaining smooth and 
enduring performance. Moreover, regardless the degree it appears isolated 
from the real world due to its focus, the more users it attracts into its circle 
of activities the higher becomes its impact on real-world economy and its 
commercial value is increasing.
284
 Therefore, calls for policies or other 
assurances for protection acquire substantial weight. In this light and in 
respect of the state metaphor, relationships between owners and users 
replicate the premise of internal affairs management,  while online ―foreign 
affairs‖ and ―international politics‖ are manifested in relation to 
communications and intervening practices from external entities, such as 
other services or individuals. Various means are at the online service‘s 
disposal towards protecting its interests, where informal communications 
channels recreate diplomatic conduits between states or technical measures 
against the flux of incoming and outgoing information resemble embargos or 
fortifications. In addition, though, actual legal proceedings may be erected to 
contest rights against real-world infringements; those regulations which the 
legal system reserves activate online an International Law metaphor.  
2.3.23.1 - Along these lines the citizenship analogue takes shape, where for 
every internal violation against the service‘s terms of use participants are 
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penalised accordingly – for example, account suspensions or restricted access 
to service features. The ultimate (and most ―repugnant‖) form  of penalty is 
exclusion from the service, which, again, equates to removal of citizenship 
and deportation. 
2.3.24 – The online sovereign‘s authority derives from the proprietary right 
over the service;
285
 and, resembling in spirit social contract theories, it 
governs online participants by right granted in the agreement of their 
participation. As far as relationships between providers and users are 
developed, the functional community‘s government might be anything 
between laid back and strict or ―good‖ and ―bad‖ – the latter measured in 
terms of effectiveness. What bad ruling leads to is waves of digitised refuges 
immigrating to another land in search of satisfying their online needs; 
translating thus framed virtualised politics in commercial terms, moving to a 
competitor‘s online service.    
2.3.3 - Our virtual citizenships and nationalities, despite referring to offline 
conceptualisations, are built on the structural realism of the Internet. 
Between functional and intellectual, like their real-world counterparts, one 
refers to a posited establishment and to individuals‘ imposed registering with 
an organised entity, the other to an identity element that its carrier bears 
inherently and may express at any time at his will (for example, like one 
following his nation‘s traditions).  Moreover, though, citizenship expresses a 
strong bond of jurisdictional dependence installed by the formalities of law, 
while nationality describes a cultural and anthropological institution (which, 
however, law does not disregard and may reform by protectively seeking its 
distinction from citizenship).  
3. The Virtual – By observing most human activity contexts286 including 
Internet relationships, we may conclude that the effective delivering of the 
virtual does not rely on convincing visual representations but rather on the 
systematic treatment of symbols and traits as constituent meanings of reality.  
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3.1 - Anything that can be used to ‗intervene in the world to affect something 
else, or what the world can use to affect us,‘ feels real.
287
 That much can also 
be said in relation to the flowing feedback we receive from our interactions 
with online agents and settings. The cyberspace metaphor (or ‗fallacy‘ for 
lawyers)
288
 jumped out of the spatialisation of such real relationships. 
Generally, spatiality imports ‗a metaphoric characterisat ion of spheres of 
activity, opportunity structures and agendas, which have the effect of 
creating boundaries analogous to those of ―real‖ physical spaces.‘
289
 Besides 
cyberspace impressions, these ideas delineate virtuality within the broader 
common experience of Internet communications; that is, framing a sense of 
personal placement within the organisation of information as space.
290
 
3.1.1 - For the purposes of semantics, the virtual denotes what is almost 
real.
291
 However, virtualities affect our lives in a very real manner: culture, 
law or money, they all become real in essence. Therefore, the virtual has 
been contrasted with the tangible ‗concrete‘ and, further on, the ‗actual real‘, 
being, though, differentiated to the abstract.
292
 In this respect, virtuality gets 
to signifying real spaces that do not exist within the physical reality.
293
 
 3.1.2 – The experienced online spatiality is ‗constituted via the interactions 
between and among practice, conceptualisation, and representation,‘
294
 
shaping a space of spaces and experiences. As such count the social, the 
political, the economic and the cultural – to name the strongest online motifs 
– in the manner that they are embodied in interactive symbols across 
dynamic successions of screen displays. We are entering the virtual space by 
anchoring our personal embodiment in the signifiers of interactivity. As the 
virtual becomes a daily process, it is through mundane activities that 
virtuality becomes reality and through our willingness to rely on its 
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effectiveness for doing so;
295
 the lack of stability from our daily lives is 
sought out in digital virtuality, realising another instance of what we broadly 
define as  ‗postmodern condition‘.
296
   
3.1.3 – At the same time, though, nothing implies that these contexts are not 
human. On the contrary, the use of the digital virtual reveals our most 
representative characteristics as humans – the same way that the uses of 
culture or law do so;
297
 even more, if we are to consider involvement with 
online settings marking the attempt to digitally reinvent representations of 
the self, at one‘s own personal discretion.  Online communities, with users 
investing in participation, give evidence of that, their compressing of the 
socialising process intensifying virtual reconfigurations of self meanings.   
3.2 - In reference to digital technologies contexts, virtuality has become 
synonym to ‗simulation‘.
298
  This tautology often misconceives virtuality for 
artificiality: the two notions, despite similar and frequently overlapping, are 
not identical. The virtual is set up on artificial structures, but it mainly 
denotes the enactive modalities where reality expands parallel to physical 
space; artificiality simply imitates reality and indicates what is created.  
  To that extent, electronic virtuality and artificiality communicate two 
different ideas. There is hardly anything unreal in the social experience 





virtual settings have a very real hold on users. The means for gaining control 
over or for disrupting another‘s online presence, to the point of affecting her 
offline existence, are so pervasive and persistent, that stimulated feelings of 
fear are genuine and lasting. Thus, simulation denotes the facilitation of 
spaces that invite real human experience (for either good or bad).  
3.3 – In virtuality humanity comes to terms with its capacity to transcend 
physical reality and to actualise the conceptual parameters of experience 
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within practice. Therefore, when entering digitised settings, bodies become 
virtual by organising themselves into subjects,
301
 space turns into a 
framework of links between entities, and so on. In many ways, the virtual 
sets a template for understanding life.
302
  
3.31 – For such reasons, a successful virtual interface is one aiming at 
stimulating human perception, not at reconstructing physical reality to the 
fullest potential of available technologies.
303
  
3.32 - At the same time, with regards to online settings, it becomes clear that 
whoever controls the communications interfaces has increased hold over the 
framing and circulating of virtual meanings. These notions of control and 
power to exclude evoke a virtuality parallel to law: humanity relies on the 
conceptual subjectivity tool for contesting its affairs within the legal context; 
if, for any reason, subjectivity is intercepted or denied, humanity is radically 
prevented from surfacing. 
3.4 – ‗Communication‘, ‗control‘ and ‗socio-technological hybridity‘, they 
are all thematic aspects of a particular analytical strand that points  back to 
the use of the ―cyber‖ prefix. The online virtual brings forth a representation 
of cyberspace in close contextual attachment to the heuristics of 
cybernetics
304
 and to socio-cultural insights into cyborg entities. The Internet 
is not the cyberspace; the latter, though, dispensed at last with the legal 
fastidiousnesses and over-enthusiastic technocultural tenets, is understood as 
the former‘s innate virtual space of communications between persons. It may 
be considered as ‗the collective consciousness of the information society‘ 
and, for that reason, a new public sphere.
305
 
 Summarising, online participation is permeated by two subsequent 
layers of power structures, the first being, obviously, the technical Internet 
infrastructure, the second the ground of interconnected online services of 
which the virtual stems. It is in this sense that modules of the traditional 
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cybernetics analyses but also descendant accounts on the union between new 
technologies and societies – we should mention Castells‘ and Haraway‘s as 
relevant – project a strong hold over experiences of interaction with(in) 
virtual spaces.  
Between the shared sense of public sphere and the underlying power 
frameworks, we may start examining the idea of personality‘s online 
development.  
  
III. The Virtual Human 
There should be no confusion. The true value of the Internet lies not 
in the mere providing of access to knowledge but in relationships clusters 
evolving on and through the broader information structure. Thus the element 
of online participation outshines interactivity.
306
 
From its inception, the ‗Internet community‘ concept was apprehended 
by two contrasting visions, one optimistically celebrating ‗new places of 
assembly that will generate opportunities for employment, political 
participation, social contact, and entertainment‘, the other predicting 
individuals being ‗trapped and ensnared in a ―net‖ that predominantly offers 
new opportunities for surveillance and social control‘ and ‗new forms of 
social obfuscation and domination.‘
307
 
As humanity‘s habitats transform, the technical terms of social 
engagement are being rewritten, inviting us to contemplate the human person 
in its responding developmental trajectories of self and identity.  
1. The Self Online - There have been described two – arguably 
complementary – notions of self: the self as an experiential dimension and as 
a narrative construction.
308
 It is not difficult to imagine either manifesting on 
online spaces. The Net appears to its participants as a non-stop experience of 
confluent communications events. Moreover, we may detect a metaphor 
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where online, in settings defined by sequences of text and imagery, the 
conception of self as a narrative becomes literal: the authorship of the self is 
taking place as being written in software code and displayed onscreen. 
1.1 - Self-consciousness as a starting point preconditions one‘s objectifying 
of herself in virtue to her social relations to others.
309
  
1.1.1 - With regards to social relations, whereas technologies throughout 
history have shaped and interrelated forms of selfhood and community,
310
 
computer technologies come frequently under attack as projecting social 
images of physical isolation. At the same time, though, we find them evoking 
‗intense interaction with other people;‘
311
 the expanding clusters of 
functional and intellectual communities on the Web provide sufficient 
evidence for that part.  
On the other hand, in Bourdieu‘s works, group priorities and values 
are understood as symbolic and cultural capitals that individuals accrue; 
beyond that, the subject‘s range of possible behaviour is produced by its 
political context.
312
 The open-ended Web construction, as well as closed 
application networks, performs exactly in this manner: the resident political 
setting is built upon the online public‘s collec tive treatments of virtual 
symbolic space and circulations of cultural artefacts. Self-consciousness 
reflects the thus set flow of values and responds by further appropriating it 
accordingly.   
1.1.2 - The objectification of the self draws from these processes, by 
contrasting one‘s own general plan of action against her impressions of the 
surrounding setting. Its conclusion, however, may present a few novel 
outcomes when compared to offline standards. For example, the online 
capacity to creating multiple pseudonymous profiles for one user, scatters the 
subject; it encumbers her collecting of consistent social input, not to mention 
her subsequent using of this latter towards objectifying herself in return.   
                                                 
309
 Ibid. 216, citing Mead. 
310
 Boellstorff (2008) 32, offering the invention examples of the wheel and the book. 
311
 Turkle (1995) 60. 
312
 Mansfield (2000) 124. 
[124] 
 
1.2 – Images of the online self being spread across numerous online accounts 
and diverse information channels, reflect ideally the paradigm of the post -
modern perplexity of the self. Formerly individuality was defined in relation 
to groups whose parts cannot be separated; now it designates ‗a person 
whose parts cannot be separated.‘ As conceived, the particular transition 
heralds a significant ‗cultural and political event.‘
313
 
2. Online Identity – Usually, identity online is presented as a non-fixed, 
‗ephemeral, fluid entity‘ that is ‗open to constant negotiation, change and 
manipulation‘.
314
 Such traits confer equally advantageous and 
disadvantageous performances, enabling on the one hand freedom and 
liberation, bearing also, though, fraudulent and malicious behaviours.  
These impressions, however, appear to idealise the generally 
transgressive faculties of online identity, overlooking mainstream common 
experiences. Hence, younger generations of users perceive online spaces as 
regular parts of their habitat and pursue in there recognition for their 
achievements, as they do offline. Second, the mental baggage of ‗real -world‘ 
power relations slips online, inhabiting ideas about identity formation.
315
 
Finally, within the contextually given, identity construction is pre -empted by 
resident empirical referents that appeal to common online practices and by 
hardware restraints.
316
 To make a point, identity does not necessarily involve 
open-ended or abstract potentialities.  
In this respect, identities are built and rather fixed in the interplay 
between communities; or in lasting choices made by users. Although 
preceding offline ideas about the multiplicity of identities may seem now to 
be reinvented and expanded (mainly due to more personal options being 
available to users), the online information structure breeds additional power 
relations that impose further, distinctive to the context, functional burdens. 
Moreover, the fact that online services are institutionalised, either at origin 
or by performance in a setting (e.g. university email accounts, profiles with 
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well-known market services), affects decisively the processes of both 
constructing and communicating agency, making them far less elusive.
317
  
2.1 - Identity management invites inferences from ‗information projected in 
conduct, activities, possessions and property;‘ perception of identity and its 
frequently changing characteristics depend on the memory of the observer.
318
 
Memories, though, are ‗by definition virtual‘, in the sense of procuring real 
ideations about the past.
319
 The actualisation of the memory virtual in the 
present of the digital virtual refers largely to the art and process of 
simulation.
320
 In consideration of the social spatiality of online networked 
spaces, the simulation aims at integrating reality in interactivity; it picks 
fixed nods to recreate the process of experienced contact from the viewer‘s 
point. To that extent the simulation invests in incomplete virtual 
representations, leaving gaps to be filled by the viewer‘s personal 
experiences. 
2.2 - In its virtual dimension, the networked space is not abstract. Moreover, 
it is produced and experienced by beings embodied under the same 
representation methods and modes that make it apparent onscreen.
321
 The 
embodied self emerges from the same virtual universe of services, accounts 
and communities; it is imprinted in the user‘s creations, cues and self-
presentation styles - like emails, signatures, self-descriptions and digital 
depictions.
322
 Identity flows between those spaces, across which the 
networked - and networking, at the same time - self is manifested. In this 
sense, online identity turns mainly into a creation of available resources, i.e. 
the characteristic online indicators and the capability to manipulate them via 
software interfaces during exchange of communication.  
2.2.1 - The way we project online our digital bodies (‗body image‘) is 
considered derivative of our apprehension of the self – the same way the 
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physical body is mobilised into postures.
323
 The body image is communicated 
through personal expression, either deliberate or subtle and unintended;
324
 
either way, our online communicated contributions create impressions of how 
we are, and indirectly of who we are.  
2.2.11 - Radin insisted on personality depending both ‗on the ability to 
embed in contexts and on the ability to break out of contexts,‘ a schema  she 
subscribes to the capacity of persons to change their surroundings and 
commitments through the things which surround them and define them as 
persons.
325
 According to her theory of self, the person resembles an 
arrangement of two concentric circles, the inner taking the self‘s 
endowments and attributes, the outer its products and possessions.
326
  
The ―inside‖ and ―outside‖ properties of personality are not always 
kept on a perfect disjunction.
327
 In view of online personality, the outside 
elements function as identification but at the same time, due to the 
peculiarities of the setting, they are properties in the narrow sense – i.e. 
objects. This schema intensifies Radin‘s point of contexts‘ capacity to 
alienate the person from the self where the lines separating subject from 
object blur.
328
   
2.2.12 - A basic component of online identity is its ‗elastic connection‘ with 
the offline identity. Certainly, the communicated forms of the former do not 
identify with the latter, although their effective management of onl ine 
resources stretch out a space for identity to ―manoeuvre‖ and work around its 
self-representation.
329
 The nature, however, of online resources which allow 
that kind of liberty and to construct multiple online variations of the person, 
means, more than anything else, that we can embrace - or be trapped by - 
online symbolic contexts as a way of life.
330
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2.3 – In consideration of the further development and externalisation of the 
self, online identity is ‗a group project‘.
331
 Under social identity theory, 
individuals define their identities by membership in various groups or 
through the idiosyncratic attributes that distinguish them from others;
332
 thus 
they develop in terms of group membership a sense of social and personal, 
respectively, cognition. From the latter derive all subsequent processes of 
identity ‗construction, maintenance, and change‘ as reflections of knowledge, 
causality, responsibility etc.
333
 Collective identities are perceived as 
providing social and psychological compensations for ‗subordinate statuses 
that sustain systems of inequality.‘
334
 Thus users pursue in the vastness of 
online communities to counter the marginalising, suppressions and 
exclusions which physical space imposes on their lives.
335
 
2.3.1 - On a different level, participation appears to be a long exercise in 
symbolic interactionism: users ‗attach symbolic meaning to objects, 
behaviours, themselves, and other people, and they develop and transmit 
these meanings through interaction;‘
336
 information objects are perceived and 
treated in meaning, not in their actual properties; identities ‗locate a person 
in social space by virtue of the relationships‘ that they imply, forming 
‗strategic social constructions.‘
337
 Most important within this perspective, 
emerge electronic icons, links, and, generally, digital representations, to 
which online communities apply the function of language for circulating 
specific meanings.  
2.3.1.1 – Expanding the authorship of the self idea, these practices, as 
melding within the streams of information, reveal the structural role of 
language.  Language is now reconfiguring reality, not simply representing 
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 Constitution of subjectivity takes place with the use of the online 
language by the participants of the community themselves.
339
 The lingual 
artefacts of the virtual space become evidently the means of 
communicational and social production.  
2.3.2 - Identity equals reputation, where it constitutes the community‘s 
reflection of one‘s personal life course;
340
 in this sense, community life 
shapes identities. In the end, where an offline person maintains several 
online personae, this multiplicity of identities is further determined through 
the total self experience of interaction with each of the various online setups. 
But, to return to the previous comment, the individual persona develops 
primarily through identity shaping mechanisms that reside within the 
particular setting.
341
 In a said setting, and maybe more intensively in a closed 
functional one, virtual reputation turns into a significant form of capital, 
which is returned with recognisability within the community and all the 
benefits or disadvantages going with that.
342
  
2.3.3 - Intriguingly, within online communities, the under offline terms 
considered anonymity poses the reinvention of the self into virtual eponymy; 
aliases or anonymous but characteristic behaviours make someone 
recognisable.
343
 Anonymous and pseudonymous conduct is a hallmark online 
feature, pursuing privacy, considerably free expression and speech, and 
preventing unwelcome backlashes from the virtual into the offline 
existence.
344




2.3.3.1 - Neither anonymity nor pseudonymity guarantee concealment the 
way they make it sound. Anonymous action can still be located, and any 
insofar disclosed information, e.g. a specific trail of online activities, may be 
easily traced to a specific anonymous ―dot‖ on the virtual map. Moreover, 
                                                 
338
 Lyon, supra 316, 27 (on Mark Poster‘s ‗second media age‘). 
339
 Ibid. 28. 
340
 Boellstorff (2008) 122. 
341
 Crawford, supra 331, 201. 
342
 Castronova (2005) 116. 
343
 Jordan (1999) 75. 
344
 Donnath, supra 322, 51; Jewkes & Sharp, supra 221, 2. 
345
 Turkle (1995) 12. 
[129] 
 
typical online norms will compromise the veil of pseudonymity, the Net 
layout stretching across cross-referring, partial or full identity verification 
points;
346
 thus, off-line jurisdictions seem not discouraged from scrutinising 
issues of real-world defence against intangible virtual infringers.
347
  
2.4 – The Internet evolves, where, generally,  mass media have supplanted 
tradition in showing life possibilities and in providing the cultural matrix 
wherein contemporary societies are nurtured.
348
  
The actual and the virtual selves are mutually constituted; users 
perceive their virtual bodies as parts of their personali ty, regardless their 
separating the virtual setting from their offline actuality.
349
 Virtual identities 
are gradually becoming inseparable to ‗real‘, in the same sense that e -
commerse passes as ‗indistinguishable to commerce‘.
350
 The experiences, 
accomplishments and failures of the online personality have the same effects 
on the psyche as any offline engagement,
351
 arguably deriving from the 
combination of group integration and effort.  
For participants it is the sharing of information, not the transmission 
of content per se, which binds ritualistically communities together.
352
 
Various elements of identity shaping, and personae to a great extent, may be 
considered parts of that ritual.  
3. Persona – The online persona projects the virtual body of the user 
participating in virtual communities. Broadly it comprises of (i) the 
functional body image, i.e. the allocated or created external appearance, 
through the interface of the each time access service‘s computer code; (ii) 
the social body image, that is the behavioural interaction which the self 
constructs in response to the virtual status of the single persona within the 
community it belongs to; (iii) the self consciousness, the psyche of the user 
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that collects feedback from the offline experience and from communications 
he is engaging in through other online personae he might have developed.  
3.1 - The safest approach to comprehending the digital body is the service 
account; a profile created within a functional community. Therefore, in this 
category fall e.g. msn or online game accounts, and the operating digital 
―body‖ is perceived either as an onscreen textual indicator, like names and 
descriptions, or as a graphical representation. The user makes the persona 
body unique, decides on name, appearance, distinctive features and 
thereinafter activates the cyborg‘s online presence.  
3.1.1 - From its Sanskrit roots, the term ‗avatar‘ indicates an entity 
incarnated within a different to its primary field of existence setting.
353
 On 
the Internet we refer to avatars in view of depictions that users employ to 
‗concretise‘ their presence in given communications channels; on the Web 
these representations are usually two dimensional icons, while in three -
dimensional setups the visage of self is constructed accordingly. An avatar, 




3.1.1.1 - Avatars, as modalities for experiencing virtual selfhood,
355
 play an 
important role in user psychology. On the one hand, the user may become 
bound to the avatar, as Radin indicated in reference to Hegel (i.e. placing 
one‘s will in an object, actualises the abstract personality).
356
 Then we may 




3.1.1.2 - Psychological impacts (even traumas) considering the treatment of 
avatars are reportedly very real.
358
 
3.2 - Electronic personae become detached from the real world, not only due 
to the use of nicknames: within the boundaries of private services a persona 
does not mark the straightforward digitised representation of its user but a 
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provisionally supplied contact line. Although the connections with the user 
remain explicit during the performance of interactive tasks, terms of service 
(ToS) as provided by OSPs in online access agreements convey strongly a 
self-regulated regime, which pronounces uncontested ownership over both 
space and internally performed activity.  
3.21 - Closed functional communities in the vein of MUDs and MMOGs 
(examined in the next chapter), which are oriented to fictional make-believe 
interactive environments, place an additional reclusive layer between their 
conception and off-site
359
 influences.  
3.2.1 - A single user can create and maintain multiple personae, on the same 
or several different platforms; or he may opt for adopting an identity of the 
opposite gender. Questions over such instances, that are becoming common 
online, are usually raised from the external observer‘s perspective, seeking to 
set the account straight for virtual settings and in compliance with standards 
of offline agency.  
However, as long as the intellectual element is continuously and 
vividly represented through the EP‘s dealings, the user feels personally 
entitled to utilise the as developed persona‘s uniqueness, and - provided that 
such practices are technically feasible- to express it beyond the access server 
for the purposes of participating in off-platform developed groups; in other 
words, to utilise reputations acquired within functional communities across 
intellectual communities.  
3.3 – The connection between persona and selfhood is well-epitomised in the 
psychological research and conclusions of Turkle. For Turkle, participation 
in online communities forms an identity reconstruction work in progress.
360
 
The post-modern fragmented self is attempting to retribalise in front of 
computer screens and users are trying to ‗build a self by cycling through 
many selves.‘
361
 There, the unitary self, through virtual manifestations of 
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multiplicity, maintains in terms of a continuum ‗its oneness by repressing all 
that does not fit.‘
362
 
 Screen personae provide opportunities for self-expression that evolves 
into becoming behavioural vehicle for working on actual life issues. 
Specifically, pseudonymous virtual personae usually perform as means 
toward the self‘s psychological projection and reflection.
363
 The virtual body 
signifies a distinct public face, no more than the physical body can be 
separated from our human sense of self. As we immerse in worlds of 
‗graphical representations and words,‘
364
 the gathering of associations which 
e.g. a personal web-page involves, becomes the truest representation of the 
inner self.
365
 Hence, upon the persona are fulfilled potent online personality 
agencies. 
4. - While technologies shape individual and community identities, we  are 
reminded that they are not neutral constants
366
 in the social process 
(technological determinism); neither, though, fully subject to ‗social or 
cultural forces‘ (socio-cultural constructivism).
367
 
Virtual space is understood as individualist; yet online communities 
are built ‗from individuals confronting their individuality‘,
368
 whose feelings 
of commitment towards their communities can eventually transcend their 
identity autonomy.
369
 The significance of online communities lies in their 
capacity to deny exclusivity to local discourses in the understanding of 
identities and constructing of moral critiques; especially intellectual 
communities are justified via confirming further ‗the positions already taken 
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4.1 - Social space is constructed through and across clusters of relations; in 
doing so, though, it also internalises myriad levels of background activity 
behind each of those relations. Thus the online virtual reproduces economic , 
political, cultural spaces, which at first glance seem unrelated to its 
development.
371
   
If we look mainly into functional communities, not all are on the same 
level; some are more popular, others receive better financial backing, others, 
finally, happen to be on better terms with infrastructure providers. Moreover, 
communities develop internal inequalities between participants, in terms of 
e.g. experience, fame, interface skill etc.  
The full weight of this techno-social structure falls upon and is at the 
same time filtered through the single participant‘s virtual experience, 
deciding further involvement and action taking.  
4.2 - The development of power online draws from the same co-calculation 
between the determinants of technology and humanity.
372
  
4.2.1 - To review previous depictions of power relations, the Net is by 
construction layered.
373
 Theoretically, the ultimate power resides in 
controlling the backbone physical space of computers and servers.  
Viewing the means used for creating the personae representations of 
identity, one may plausibly reflect that online governance is ‗essentially 
bound up with the creation, maintenance and contestability of the metaphors, 
icons, symbols and mores which influence the conduct of computer -mediated 
communication.‘
374
 Under more pragmatic terms, whoever holds power over 
individual and social identity construction tools (texts, images, interfaces 
etc), either by providing them or by owning them, is automatically in a 
superior position of social control (for example, operators of content services 
and information gateways that are not necessarily server-based, i.e. cloud-
computing). 
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4.2.2 - Practices of users in virtual space constitute forms of production, 
since the manipulating of information that takes place for purposes of 
communication is in essence a work of transformation.
375
 Participation in 
knowledge communities sets the ground for various forms of communal 
production that have been contested to form a collaborative power existing 




Antecedent mass communication systems (e.g. cinema, television etc.) 
were strictly hierarchical; cultural information was propertised and immersed 
into one-way mechanisms of production and consumption.
377
 The 
decentralised communicative structures of the Internet challenged that 
mainstream, and, by providing means for easy manipulation of information, 
they summoned behaviours across communities that are frequently paralleled 
to the ‗grassroots‘ temperament, due to their folklore-like free dissemination, 
appropriation and creative reproduction of information. From this context 
emerged a widespread information commons phenomenon.
378
 
4.3 – The following paragraphs examine two different illustrations, where the 
discussed virtual developmental frameworks and power structures might be 
placed within cohesive explanatory configurations.  
4.3.1 The Net as a City – The first arrangement interprets broadly virtual 
space through the metaphor of modern urban environments.  
4.3.11 - Conventional appreciations of the city depict a ‗site of determinacy‘, 
‗the iron cage where human behaviour is programmed, where the mass of 
humanity is channelled and pummelled through the urban grid of suburbs, 
downtown, offices, factories, shopping zones and leisure facilities.‘
379
 
4.3.12 - Contrasting these notions, emerged the idea of the city as an arena of 
choice, ‗a labyrinth of potential social interactions, an encyclopaedia of 
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subculture and style,‘ where ‗a multiplicity of roles can be played.‘
380
 The 
urban setting is perceived in genuine post-modernist sense as a fertile matrix, 
which delivers immediacy, a rich variety of subcultures and styles, and, more 




4.3.13 - The city metaphor has already been employed by cybercultural 
studies and fiction, primarily to dilate on themes of urban social polarisation. 
These perspectives address openly the problematic of creating online 
zones,
382
 the exclusion of online populations from virtual ‗city centres‘ and 
their marginalisation in digital suburbias.  
The downtown parallel here plays the most significant of roles: the 
Internet is a city whose centre is increasingly privatised ‗as capital 
encroaches […] into what was previously public space;‘
383
 at the same time, 
access pathways are carefully arranged (i.e. interoperability connections 
between leading online services), tightly secured and monitored. This ‗mall -
ification‘ of the public squares and streets of  the Internet demands further the 
exclusion of the ‗homeless‘ into peripheral, ‗collapsed‘ communities, or into 
small scale but isolated copies of the central model (the noted suburbias).
384
 
However, the marginalised populations still perform within the main  
economy, as ‗flexible‘ workforce and mainly as consuming masses.
385
 
 4.3.1.1 - All these interpretations of the city emit images of emancipation as 
well as of exclusion. Persons are trapped in the urban architecture and their 
lifestyles follow sometimes unwillingly its shifts. At the same time they are 
offered infinite cultural opportunities for designating their identity imprint. 
As it has been suggested, though, such forms of urban multiculturalism are 
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4.3.2 Multitude - Another look into the online experience suggests the 
concept of the multitude as reinvented by Negri and Hardt, in reflection of 
late modernity‘s globalised community; Internet life is largely considered 
both a component and a manifestation of the latter.  
4.3.2.1 - While not defined directly, the multitude designates an active social 
subject, which internalises various multiplicities in being articulated 
globally, under a connective topology and topography of the multicultural, 
political and economic (i.e. labour) dynamics of the collective of common 
populaces.
387
 Understanding of the concept is incomplete without its 
correlative opposite of the Empire, the global imperialistic phenomenon of 
biopolitical power exercise that has dominated late modernity.  
4.3.2.11 - The term Empire posits an over-encompassing constitutional order, 
non-centralised in apparent structure, yet consolidating its incentives; it 
implements a flexible, horizontal systemic structure which transcends 
national borders. The Empire confers an ethico-political dynamic, primarily 
expressed as a unitary power, which maintains social peace through the 
construction of norms and the far-reaching production of legitimacy.
388
 The 
neo-liberal economic perspective is profoundly integrated within the 
economic-political trajectory of the Empire; by pushing onwards the project 
of global capitalism it contributes to structurally enforcing the foundations of 
the Empire. Along these lines, are also incorporated vague notions of 
politically antagonistic appearances that cultivate constant calculating of 
threats and thus recycle prolonged states of crisis management (e.g. ongoing 
generic appreciations of ―global terrorism‖).  
4.3.2.12 - The multitude projects a similarly post-modern understanding of 
contemporary humanity as a whole, which is presented conscious of and 
defined by – in terms of identity – its expanded internal pluralities of 
nations, races, cultures etc; such differences become feature of it s internal 
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composition. Anthropologically, the organisation of the multitude is 
therefore conceived as ‗a multiplicity of singular forms of life‘ who ‗at the 
same time share a common global existence.‘
389
  
4.3.2.13 – What the multitude produces is common, and becomes the basis 
for further future, expansive production.
390
 Communication sets the 
characteristic example towards comprehending this production meaning: we 
communicate on the basis of languages, symbols, and commonly shared 
relationships, all which, in return, we transform as a result of our actual 
communications processes; ‗the common is produced and it is also 
productive.‘
391
 Habits reflect another main productive relation course within 
the same paradigm, produced and reproduced in common interaction. To  
recap, the multitude conception meditates upon the production of social 
organisation by almost exclusively the populace agency itself.
392
  
4.3.2.2 - In this part of the discussion, the ontological arrangement of the 
multitude is of particular interest. Our analysis so far misses an explanatory 
platform for the online public: a ―community of communities‖ backdrop for 
the identity-shaping mechanisms, which spread across the interrelated 
functional and intellectual online social associations. The Internet struc ture 
is declined outright that role, not forming itself a community of shared 
values but rather a common enterprise.
393
 
4.3.2.21 - The multitude - or at least the online representation of the 
multitude - provides a fitting discourse basis for interpreting the online 
public. It outlines the global dimensions of the online commonalty of users; 
it addresses the consciousness of this commons‘ social, national and cultural 
multiplicities; it grounds online participation as a circular, productive and 
developmentally reflexive process. Finally, the idea of production in the 
multitude responds well to the overall perspective of communally created 
virtual spaces. 
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4.3.2.22 - Especially in online contexts, the example of communication turns 
genuinely into the main productive force of the common. Users‘ online living 
is defined and created through the shared manipulation of the online 
language of symbolic artefacts and software code.  
4.3.2.3 – Principally, the multitude is a class concept; within a defining 
juxtaposition of otherness, it brings forward the globally ―ruled‖ as the 
Empire‘s correlative opposite. The Marxist undertones might mislead into 
perceiving the multitude in a tautology with the proletariat. The two should 
not be confused: the multitude replaces the traditional working-class, and its 
claims over the means of production, with those oppressed by the Empire and 
its supranational economic-political side-projects.
394
 In the conceptualisation 
of Hardt & Negri, the information era is constructed upon appreciations of 
immaterial labour that transform this latter into a massively exploitable 
resource and deprive the multitude of a decent living via systematic 
appropriating of its common production.  
4.3.2.4 – In these contexts, the economic representation of language as a 
performative and collaborative device indicates automatically a form of 
immaterial labour. Language also connecting and realising the immaterial 
production of the common,
395
 the exploitation potentials increase 
conspicuously regarding the language-based online public, threatening to cut 
it off from its sole means towards self-affirmation and development. These 
matters are demonstrated in the next Chapter, and analysed in conceptual 
relevance later, in Chapter 6. 
5. – Reviewing humanity‘s adventurous transformations in virtuality, they all 
synopsise symptoms of a ‗culture of simulation‘ where people are 
‗comfortable with substituting representations of reality for real.‘
396
 At the 
same time, though, our virtual masks mean steps toward ‗reaching a deeper 
truth about the real.‘
397
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We ought to be aware that cyberspace does not mean freedom; left to 
itself it can become a ‗perfect tool of control.‘
 398
 
Finally, the same settings relate to alternate comprehensions that may 
generate confusion and, eventually, conflict. For example, the facebook 
community sees different functions and identity shaping potentials in a 
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4. Case Studies: Virtual Worlds 
 
„In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such 
Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety 
of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In 
time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the 
Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was 













In the following parts of this thesis, we build a mosaic of reported 
excesses from the relevant online diversity of settings, where the shifts in the 
social and cultural fabrics of our era are mirrored across the online tapestry 
representing them. This might remind us of one of Baudrillard‘s observations 
on the cartographers of the Empire allegory,
400
 that the simulation absorbs 
the territory covered by the map.  Online participation in communities fills in 
for gaps left in the physical experience, by adding more options to existing 
offline potential for participation. In the end, the question whether the virtual 
is parallel to or expands the real gives rise to aporia: the various virtual 
reflections of humanity speak of the constant, real human need for social 
identity. This has to be seen in context with the spawning phenomena of loss 
and alienation across the socio-economic architectures of physical existence, 
                                                 
399
 Borges ‗On Exactitude in Science‘ (1999) 156. 
400
 Baudrillard (1994) 1 – 3. 
[141] 
 




The chapter presents exemplars of online activities. The experience of 
digitised realms we are interested in balances the real and the virtual; or, 
following Shields, the concrete and the virtual. It is important to highlight 
this terminological difference: we may argue that essentially the virtual is in 
no sense unreal, since it is happening and has the power to affect at least that 
part of the individual participant which we address as the ‗self‘. However,  its 
impact is felt beyond the sphere of individual psychology and perception, 
giving rise to broader commercial, public life
402
 and thus regulatory interests. 
I. Virtual Worlds 
1. Worlds in Virtual Space - Users enter virtual worlds (VW) for 
entertainment purposes, taking advantage of a range of available options to 
engage in leisure activities. The most popular forms of these artificial 
environments allow multiple users to interact both with each other and with 
computer generated entities.  
1.1 - The representations of imagined physical landscapes that VWs aim to 
impress on users require the use of various techniques, through which the 
illusion of space is created. Natural language was the first means to be 
employed; words transmitted descriptions of items, persons and settings in a 
manner similar to literature that at that time sufficed to deliver basic 
semblances. As technology was advancing, graphical images were soon 
added on computer screens and representational models upgraded from 2D to 
3D, from static illustrations to movement-enabling interfaces. Development 
entails that there exist margins for further improvements. For example, the 
use of sounds enhances the sense of spatial ‗depth‘; the distance of supposed 
events from the user‘s virtualised point of view is indicated through 
increases and decreases in volume. Cubitt
403
 summarised the character of VW 
simulations in four elements: (i) the primacy of navigation and movement; 
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(ii) smoothness or unity of the digital environment, including computer-
generated representations of users; (iii) a single point of view over the VW, 
reserved for the user and representing subjectivity in the digitised scene;
404
 
(iv) implied off-screen places, seemingly extending space, ‗though it can 
neither be seen nor accessed.‘
405
 In other words, VW follow technical and 
representational progresses in the broader field of video games, sharing with 
them the goal of maximising contextual ―realism‖.  
Similarly, another important feature of these landscapes is their 
persistency. VWs pertain to continuity through time: the world continues to 
exist with or without the individual participant being logged in. Things that 
happen in the setting are bound to produce normally irreversible changes that 
users will find there when entering again, unless something else occurred 
during their absence and produces additional changes. Participants are part of 
a living environment, which they assist in reshaping through their actions.  
In his definition of VWs, Castronova adds interactivity to physicality 
and persistence, to be used as glue:
406
 the artificial setting can be accessed 
simultaneously by large numbers of users; one‘s command inputs (actions) 
affect the command results of others
407
 – virtually ―felt‖ by them in either the 
short or the long run. 
Therefore, VWs are developing as both spatial and temporal 
representations.  
1.1.2 - The contemporary form
408
 of VW has also been labelled ‗avatar 
space‘, due to the widespread dominance of interface styles where users can 
control their characters ‗on the screen in real time.‘
409
 The concept of online 
avatars has already been explained; today‘s VWs, however, have developed 
highly sophisticated avatar models through the use of a wide variety of 
software tools. Users may create step-by-step the appearance of their graphic 
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representations; they are either allowed to combine facial and bodily 
features, retrieved from in-world libraries, or change at will the parameters 
of replicated characteristics. In the very same sense they may opt for gender, 
skin colour and age different from their real one. Avatars, though, may 
recreate humanity via more complex software operations and functions, 
performing on the conceptual level as carriers and in practice as transmitters 
of emotions. In order to simulate through digitised mimicry (i.e. meanings 
and codes of conduct that have been imported from the physical context) it 
followed that avatar designs in their majority had to remain faithful to 
anthropomorphic models. The initial absence of actual body language and 
facial expressions in cyberspace led to the wide use of emoticons; advanced 
VWs have developed further by enabling a broad range of gestures to be 
recreated by avatars. Avatars can express cheerful or sad moods to another, 
they may smile, hug, send kisses, wave, bow, dance and taunt; and these are 
only a sample, as more behaviour representations are being constantly added 
to the already existing ranges. 
1.1.3 – Returning to the point of spatiality and temporality, we need to  
mention the networking effects of activity being imprinted upon the VW 
setting and how they impact on other participants. Unless a specific attribute 
is communicated in effect between all human agents, such a world cannot be 
considered as ‗persistent‘; in order to circulate this communication, a 
common reference frame is required, that of the shared participation 
experience. Experience as a framework denotes both the knowledge and 
understanding of the distinctive setting (its peculiarities and ongoing changes 
that take place within) as well the organic collective of participants, between 
whom that information may be meaningfully exchanged.  
 The virtual representation facilitates the community and, in turn, the 
latter enlivens the former. Structurally, the symbiotic relationship  between 
the human and the machine is now transcending the individualised 
visualisation of the avatar/cyborg,
410
 in this melding of two collectives: one 
of a concentration of users and one of a systematised cluster of virtual 
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entities (landscapes, items, monsters etc.) that are embedded within 
interoperating software functions. Hence VWs are developing as spatial and 
temporal habitations.  
Of course, VWs and similar notions of representation include 
ontologically human participation: for a representational performance, to be 
perceived as such, it needs to be stimulated across human receivers. Within 
simulations of landscapes, formed and breathing communities will constantly 
create and, in continuation, will carry on their internal histories, parallel to 
the setting‘s temporal persistence. The inbuilt social continuities (for 
example, which user did what, along with whom else and in which part of the 
VW etc) do not simply build internal circles of fame; mainly, they make the 
virtual world go round as much as computer software does by their 
circulating of narratives and meanings. Hence, these settings evolve into 
virtualised cyber ecologies. 
1.2 Game Mechanics - Down to its basics, running a VW comprises system 
software and a mainframe computer. The software is written with the sole 
purpose of supporting the particular setting. The ideas and internal narratives 
of the virtual creation are first integrated in a world blueprint, a digital map. 
The software takes over, putting into motion all such arrangements, like the 
spatial placement of entities, the ―physical laws‖ that apply to the 
representation (for example, gravity, entities‘ ―physical‖ density etc), as well 
as patterns of automated sequences that users are expected to activate (e.g. 
throwing a stone to a sleeping lion will wake it up and the lion will attack).  
The sum of these operations is taking place on powerful computers 
owned by the OSP. The combination of system software and computer 
mainframe is called game server. Game servers are ―open‖ to network 
connectivity, receiving simultaneously input from the bulk of the online 
participants‘ computers.  
In order to participate, the individual user must run on her computer a 
software component (‗game client‘), which is compatible with the game 
server‘s system software: the client reads the server‘s complex processes and 
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translates them for the user on her screen according to her virtual point of 
view.  
Any sort of world or individual change is being tracked by and stored 
on the game server. The fluxes and alterations of information are accessible 
by and transmitted to the interconnected participants‘ systems at any given 
moment, upon request through the user‘s virtual activity.  
1.2.1 Market Mechanics - The OSP maintains the game server, making sure 
that the service performs smoothly, continuously and free of both software 
and hardware implications. VW services take the form of online applications, 
where participation is either free or subscription-based (usually monthly). 
Users in most commercial MMORPGs will need to have purchased the game 
client before joining the online service. Currently most subscription-based 
VWs offer a 10-day free trial; after that period, the user must renew game 
time by making a payment. 
Bandwidth issues and bottlenecks, created by large numbers of game 
clients simultaneously connecting to the game, have been resolved through 
the use of multiple game servers. In essence, the OSP duplicates the original 
digital map package of the VW across several servers (therefore, basic game 
storylines will be exactly the same on every server). The commercial utility 
of the online service is thus maximised. 
Developing and, even more, running a VW constitutes a rather costly 
enterprise.
411
 Understandably, the available means for financially supporting 
online VW operations vary accordingly. Therefore, the circumstances appear 
self-evident in subscription-based VWs and where the game client is 
distributed on the market. During the account creation stage, users send their 
credit card numbers and thus create a monthly transaction. Where client 
downloading and participation are free, though, VWs follow alternative 
methods for securing revenue: other online settings have adopted the 
advertising method which is most commonly used by websites, i.e. hosting 
real-world commercial messages;
412
 others have introduced voluntary 
                                                 
411
 Castronova (2005) 132 – 133. 
412
 Book (2004) 11 – 26, observes that a VW may even be ‗created for the sole purpose of 
extending brand awareness to a target audience.‘ 
[146] 
 
revenues, income from users in return of providing extra virtual features, e.g. 
personal virtual items; and there also exist mixed perspectives, also inspired 
by social networking websites, which allow for separate premium 
participation accounts on subscription basis.
413
 
A final aspect refers to the legal costs of getting involved in large, 
possibly international markets. The global appeal of a game service can be 
analysed in countless possible legal disputes with individuals residing in 
different states - each of a different legal system. Suing and getting sued on a 
variety of more or less significant reasons belongs to the daily work of any 
online service. OSPs can turn against misuses of their games or contractual 
breaches (both areas are explained below). Conversely, games are finding 
themselves on the defence not only on similar or anticipated grounds but also 
for any imaginable tort claim.
414
   
1.2.2 Legal Mechanics- End Users Licence Agreements (EULAs) form the 
contractual basis for the use of software and, further on, for access to game 
content servers (participation in the online service). Mainly, EULAs define 
the off-game relationship between users/consumers and OSPs, while an 
additional list of Terms of Service (ToS) regulate in-game behaviour, as well 
as certain trans-contextualising appropriations of game content.  
In VW research, the EULA/ToS package has been frequently 
addressed as a metaphor for the VWs‘ constitution;
415
 not without good 
reason: fundamentally, EULAs reconstruct an entire normative order that 
springs from the relationship with the distinguished virtual environment. 
They condense the pivotal principles of virtual existence, that is the values 
and rules that could not be transferred into software code and require the 
participants‘ active consent.  
When users enter virtual spaces they are required to read the EULA 
and ToS texts. By clicking on an onscreen ―I Agree‖ button indication at the 
bottom of the page, they give full, unreserved consent to the terms presented 
                                                 
413
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and are allowed to proceed with joining the VW. Through a phantasmal 
choreography that simulates Social Contract theories, the online citizen 
enters the virtual society.  
The EULA at present though, hardly lives up to aspirat ions of creating 
a modern constitutional equivalent: it constitutes a standard-terms mass 
consumer contract. Hence, as conceptually not negotiated, it rather resembles 
an imposed sovereignty declaration, by which all denizens of VWs abide.  
Indeed, most online communities will express the idea that  software licence 
agreements are single-handedly building power structures across the Net: the 
enduring practice of the contractual format grants software licensors absolute 
control. At the end of the day, software is the means to digital existence and 
its authorising feels like lending living time. For such reasons, software 
licences, in general, have been fiercely criticised
416
 for the allegedly 
excessive manner, in which they pursue to guarantee the viability of mass 
market distribution.  
1.3 – Activities within functional communities interrelate to the growth of 
cultural phenomena that ultimately become apparent through the creation and 
networked proliferation of intellectual communities, as seen in the previous 
Chapter. VWs radiate with developments of behavioural trends along these 
lines and have reinvigorated the playing field for psychology research, social 
theories and cultural studies.
417
 However, beyond what seems like another 
instance of late modernity‘s preoccupation with the cyborg, we quickly find 
the reproduction of the mundane and socially familiar ‗situated being‘
418
 
inside a far from otherworldly virtuality that descends into the sphere of the 
pragmatic and the concrete.  
The interoperating technical, social and economic structures which 
shape VWs, designate initially the kind of behavioural patterns that are 
positively expected between participants and computer-generated entities; for 
example, a virtual sword will be used to kill a digital monster; VW-
                                                 
416
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participants should engage in idle chatting. Aberrations from what is 
expected can be neither accurately predicted nor avoided, yet may be 
reasonably anticipated: a player will cheat by enhancing with the use of 
unauthorised computer code the digital might of the sword he yields; 
participants will verbally abuse each other.
419
 
In light of this, constant reflective changes in EULAs and ToS texts 
can be easily understood.
420
  The aptly coined neologism ‗EULAw‘ expresses 
the idea of a new philosophy of regulation: a ‗centralized process of 
lawmaking, through a form of nonnegotiated, infinitely modifiable, 
proprietor-friendly regulation.‘
421
 Measured against the OSPs‘ expected, 
―regular‖ behavioural standards, conduct in VWs is checked first exclusively 
within the boundaries of the functional community and then against the 
interchange between functional and intellectual communities. EULAw in 
general has been dutifully following these instances in shaping rules, to the 
extent of attempting on occasions to transgress the ‗magic circle‘
422
 that 
supposedly separates virtual settings from real world‘s mundanity. In these 
contexts, the factual regulatory breaking of the magic circle is of particular 
interest to law. Again, the empirical inputs of social studies and cultural 
research lead legal understanding where the ‗boundaries between our world 
and the synthetic worlds of cyberspace‘ are critically fading.
423
  
1.3.1 On VWs as Functional Communities – The common thread which ties 
together all VWs – regardless of the setting being a game or purely a social 
venue - is found in the feature of persistence. Persistence stimulates 
occupation with the VW, makes it sedulous and thus interesting; otherwise, a 
stagnant VW sinks into indifference. Perception of persistence is at first 
glance achieved through changes in the artificial environment; however, the 
primary expression of continuity lies in the personal progress of the 
individual participant. Following the pen-and-paper role-playing games 
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tradition, experience scores form the basic progress indicator in MMORPGs. 
Thus, game characters become stronger, develop skills or superhuman 
abilities etc, the more the user plays them and achieves setting-related 
objectives.  
However, MMORPGs are also treasure-oriented and accumulation of 
virtual assets constitutes a core game element. Game prizes manifest as 
either game equipment (battle gear), which enhances game character power, 
or as virtual gold, which will be, again, used for purchasing better 
equipment.
424
 Social worlds are also accustomed to the virtual items‘ 
importance. Items are used as either ornaments for building more impressive 
avatar appearances
425
 or as stimuli for the simulation experience, e.g. a 
beautifully decorated virtual room where one can play Billy Holiday songs 
on a virtual gramophone. 
Therefore, inside the VWs‘ magic circle, participation evolves around 
maximising the social currency of avatars, either within competitive game 
contexts or in view of social interaction (which, in any case, carries along an 
undertone of competition). Improvement, reputation, attractiveness and 
similar other factors, confer in-world advancement, and are realised with the 
help or through the effective appropriation of virtual assets. Hence, in -world 




1.3.1.1 Functional Sociability – Permeated by interactivity, VWs push 
participants towards developing social channels. We may define as 
functional any form of in-world sociability which is organised at avatar 
level; Avatars in a social setting may loosely get together for the sake of 
forming a circle of virtual friends;
427
 they may even form groups under these 
conditions, e.g. friends of the Lambada Cocktail Bar – a virtual hangout; 
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groups of interests develop in reference to virtual existence. On the other 
hand, in MMORPGs game characters usually band together under the banner 
of a guild, which denotes either a shared profession (e.g. blacksmiths, 
smugglers, leatherworkers etc) or, more simply, a team offering 
companionship and assistance to its members; understandably, by joining a 
guild the game character enters an in-world brotherhood metaphor, through 
which most of the underlined personal goals become easier to attain on the 
premises of constant teamwork.
428
  
1.3.1.11 – Note that intimate interactions occur between individuals in due 
course; personal discussions unfold involving actual world lives, meanings 
and identities.
429
 At a basic communications level, the actual flows into the 
virtual. 
1.3.1.2 – Functionally delineated purposes and socialising, since the early 
MUD days, put practices of property exchange between participants of 
virtual platforms on the map.
430
 Advanced social interaction necessitated the 
gradual evolution of property systems, factually facilitated b y OSPs with the 
installation of in-world play-money currencies. Thus, the arrival of virtual 
markets was just a matter-of-course. 
 These patterns of social interaction and accumulation/exchange of 
property show actual economic superstructures taking shape within VWs. 
Avatars price and sell items or even their services (for example, help with a 
task) on a supply and demand basis. Once VWs started becoming more 
conscious of the inherent economic dynamics, official market-places, bazaars 
and auction houses emerged to facilitate trading between avatars.  
These in-world systems are as fallible and vulnerable as any real-
world economy: inflation phenomena can simply disarray the interwoven 
social balances. From a point of view internal to the VW, random exploits of  
which participants can take advantage, i.e. design mistakes or software bugs, 
may produce unwelcome disruptions in the circulation of virtual 
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 But that only tells half the story about interference with VW 
economies. 
1.3.2 On Intellectual Communities beyond VWs – Virtual life does not stay 
contained within the premises of VWs. It is discussed and narrated between 
human actors like any other form of (identity) experience. Similarly, it may 
even be exploited commercially. 
 Online intellectual communities, in a world highly mediated by its 
own cultural phenomena and communication technologies, are gathered  
around areas of shared interest. By mere existence, a VW needs to launch an 
official discussion forum, which we sometimes may and sometimes may not 
accept as part of the functional community: it is indeed ran by the OSP, on 
the official game website, full participation is conditioned by logging in with 
a game account, yet it is also accessible to regular Internet users; thus, it 
interacts with people interested in the VW but who are not part of the current 
membership. Additionally, on this kind of forums players are interacting 
from different servers of the same game, i.e. in the strictest sense, from 
different functional communities. 
 Unofficial discussion groups expand even further the parameters of 
formal disaffiliation with the functional community, since anyone motivated 
by the shared interest may register with them. They may spawn everywhere, 
on any online venue; hence, broader communities, not being restrained by 
functional operations, stretch between several online sites of meeting (e.g. 
social networking platforms, random forums etc). We may safely claim that 
the Internet is practically running on the huge diversity of 
intellectual/cultural affiliations, which determine centres of attraction for the 
sum of interconnected users.
432
 User-created content, inspired by specific 
VW settings,
433
 is spread across the multiplicity of hosting online services. 
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These forms of user expression linger close to creativity broadly called 
fanfiction, yet should be also understood in reference to the available 
interface modules and tools, which are widely distributed to online users. 
1.3.2.1 Fanfiction & Fanart – Fan fiction (or ‗fanfic‘) is born from ‗fandom‘ , 
the world of aficionados and enthusiasts.
434
 Tushnet‘s definition of fanfic 
speaks of written creativity in any form that ‗is based on an identifiable 
segment of popular culture, such as a television show, and is not produced as 
―professional‖ writing.‘
435
 In other words, fanfic stands for amateurish 
approaches of the ―what if‖ nature to dramatic or literary work.  
The ―what if‖ question does not only play with narratives that the 
original authors of books, movies and other popular fictional creations did 
not explore, but also with the form of published works. Therefore, next to 
short stories of fanfic stand art (‗fanart‘), songs and parodies based on the 
original material of interest. As a rule, fanfic and fanart do not involve 
commercial aspirations, aiming only at the pleasure of friends of the original 
cultural material. 
The term fandom, on the other hand, was often used for marginalising 
fanatic friends of science fiction and fantasy.
436
 VW-centred intellectual 
communities do not stand far away from those earlier  subcultural 
stereotypes. The difference, however, lies in today‘s socially pervading 
presence of the fandom: consumerism and new technologies emancipated the 
participatory fandom in all its forms, from the sci -fi geek to the avid 
follower of a football team. Postmodernity has prompted cultural 
consumption ‗as an active use‘ and consumption is always a form of 
production where people continually re-appropriate, through cultural 
practices, the signification of meanings and mediated objects ;
437
 so much 
more, when these are circulated globally.  
Technologies offered the means to make the cultural answer 
straightforward. Whereas communication lies in the core of intellectual 
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communities, expression is the means around which these develop; and 
expression itself varies. From that point of view, steps beyond the narrow 
boundaries of fanfic and fanart lies the Net, and more accurately Web 2.0, 
which enables communication in aesthetically diverse forms.  
1.3.2.2 Interface – Web 2.0 entailed tool-oriented participation, in the sense 
that communities started discovering their focus through their capacity to get 
involved with next generation interfaces, rather than the actual thematic 
content. Traditionally fans would be so inspired by socially distributed 
meanings – be that politics, culture etc - that they would be nevertheless 
motivated to create; now, users are offered such a diversity of exciting tools 
that in order to utilise them they retrace their themes of interest, first 
individually then by connecting with like-minded persons. The recent growth 
of intellectual communities stands firmly upon the discovery and wide 
distribution of, easy to use and imaginative in the offered potentials, 
expression means.  
 The most popular web services of this kind provide an idea of the  
construction, circulation and expansion of expression. Visual and audio 
forms are disrupting the monopoly of the text
438
 and may deliver equally 
strong statements of opinion and cultural attachment (and belonging). From 
mere computer icons representing popular culture figures (which users adopt 
as identity signifiers on forums) to remixed soundtracks and videos, 
intellectual communities mark thus their presence across the web. In that 
sense, any online facilitator (i.e. services like forums, video or picture  
exchange platforms) carries inherently the dynamic of performing similarly 
to public message boards: a collage of announcements and pictures of diverse 
origins that each one appeals to particularly interested groups within the 
broader community. In this new age of the prevalence of artefact culture, 
communities reach out through the appropriation of recognisable symbols as 
cultural production, which they redistribute into their main language form.  
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 VW intellectual communities will often record their in-world 
experience on video format and distribute it on services like YouTube; or 
will use game software to produce short films (―machinima‖),
439
 of usually 
humorous content. Importantly, through such services activities that once 
might have taken place on the fringes of cultural (re)production and 
consumption ‗are increasingly normalised‘
440
 and cultural/community 
association is becoming widely visible.  
The role of Web 2.0 in providing tools and accessibility has been 





 and image reworking, with the help of software like Photoshop,
443
 
have empowered indirect political expression where this was not possible 
and where it would otherwise have remained isolated.
444
 Ultimately, 
intellectual communities, by utilising the language of remixed cultural nods 
and symbols
445
 (mainly deriving from in-world content) formulate their 
online identity and active presence.  
1.3.2.3 Extrovert Economies - Utility and commodity are notions which 
permeate involvement with VWs, since the purposes and practices of real 
commercial life are simulated in virtual marketplaces. Moreover, without 
distinct win or lose scenarios, VWs are designed to promote the avatars‘ 
building up in-world skills and social value - enduring goals which are 
attainable through the acquisition and use of virtual items and currencies.
446
  
At the same time, from an external point of view this entire 
conception is nevertheless placed within the common social and cultural 
setting, where utility and commodity dominate the shaping of our 
behaviours. Not only exchange practices come naturally along with social 
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interaction, but, also, our liberal politico-economical education tends to 
sharpen our awareness to opportunities.  
Thus it should not be surprising that soon, utility-oriented intellectual 
communities started spreading online. ―Utility‖ here draws meanings from 
multiple situations: first, where users do not desire to spend more time in 
advancing game characters and hire people to play for them;
447
 second, where 
gamers quitting the VW, do not want nonetheless to relinquish their in-game 
achievements without receiving some form of compensation; and third, 
where the prospect of profiting by either initiating or mediating exchanges as 
such lies within reach.  
Game items and characters flooded online auction sites, to that point 
where they even attracted the attention of traditional media: the revenues 
from sales of virtual properties reached such heights that it was difficult to 
believe the actual nature of the transactions‘ objects. Users with active 
virtual lifestyles organised their in-game productivity to make off-game 
monetary earnings. In analogy to the persistency with which they engaged 
into serious profit-making, some of these operations would become more 
organised than the rest, evolving the harvesting of virtual assets (‗farming‘) 
to professional occupation.
448
 The selling of virtual currencies for real-world 
money crowned this niche market;
449
 currency exchange websites have 





Most interestingly, this intersection of functional with intellectual 
communities re-articulates cultural sharing into commercial phenomena. VW 
economies communicate openly with external dynamics; they invite broad 
outside interferences from the ―real‖ which they in turn affect .
452
 On 
realising the inherent potentials of such ―cross -worlds‖ flows, scholarly 
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research began in the fields of economics, anthropology and sociology, 
stirring legal curiosity. They mainly bypass, though, the essentially 
overarching paradigm of tomorrow‘s social construction, which the Net , 
being a mirror of trends, strongly hints. Our future acquires flesh and bones 
in the commercialisation of the intersection of community modes.   
2. Worlds in (Legal) Conflict - Now we turn to instances which exemplify 
best how the general setting that was described in the previous section has 
interacted with ―real-world‖ law. The cases I am referring to here have 
frequently been used in VW studies, each manifesting a characteristic 
paradigm of law‘s involvement with VWs, raising questions where legal 
practice in viewpoints and language was challenged and tantalised alike by 
virtual experience. 
2.1.1 - From their start, online markets external to VWs where game 
characters and virtual property were sold or auctioned, attracted negative 
responses from OSPs. Back in April 2000, Sony Online Entertainment (SOE), 
the online publisher of EverQuest (at that time, probably the most popular 
MMORPG of the western hemisphere) was the first to request the assistance 
of leading online-auctioneers eBay in banning the sale of game goods on 
their website.
453
 Ever since, OSPs have acted against online auctions. Game 
developers uniformly identified as  justification  for such actions the 
potentially damaged integrity of their games:
454
 when virtual material is 
being reserved for off-site auctions, players are prevented from participating 
in the in-game mechanisms of property acquisition.
455
 Another reason, cited 
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by SOE, was the prevention of fraudulent sales, which were expected to lead 
defrauded users to turn against the OSP.
456
 
   Online auction houses were one way or the other forced to comply, 
despite recognising the circumstances as unclear, from the substantive law‘s 
viewpoint, and not particularly convincing.
457
 Nevertheless, the topic of 
auctions of virtual items and game accounts has dominated the discussion , 
not so much the proprietary core of the OSPs‘ claims , but the extents of 
exclusivity with which property is aggressively contested by OSPs across the 
broader spectrum of online activities. Moreover, it has turned into a frequent 
(and rather fashionable) news feature of techno-social flavour. 
 The impact of news reports cannot be downplayed. On one hand, the 
fact that major news agencies report what is transpiring about VWs indicates 
recognition of actual large scale socio-economic appeal and practice. On the 
other, it has arguably invited more friction: users discovered additional real-
monetary value, whereas OSPs are facing growing public unease about their 
role and power over an apparently flourishing side-market. Therefore, 
exclusions of auctions from eBay and other similar venues did little towards 
dampening these online markets, whilst game publishers intensified the hunt 
of unauthorised sales. As a result - and most online game discussion boards 
bear evidence of it - OSPs proceed with disciplinary measures against users 
once they have perceived the slightest indication of their games being used 
as profit making devices.  
2.1.2 - In 2002, Blacksnow Interactive, an auction clearinghouse,
458
 adopted 
a rather questionable model for setting up serious business. They organised a 
small round-the-clock ―farming‖ operation, hiring low-paid unskilled 
Mexican labourers to play Mythic Entertainment‘s
459
 Dark Age of Camelot
 
(DAoC) in rotational shifts, and selling later any acquired virtual assets for 
real world money. When Mythic claimed infringements on copyright and 
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attempted to terminate Blacksnow‘s activities, the latter fought back with a 
lawsuit. They complained against unfair business practices and interference 
‗with ―prospective economic advantage‖ to the plaintiffs.‘
460
 The Blacksnow 
case was not destined to set the first legal precedent on MMORPG assets, as 
it was settled in favour of Mythic. During the proceedings, though, the 
California District Court had the chance to examine an arbitration clause 
included in the EULA and affirmed its validity.
461
 In the aftermath of the 
conflict at court, thereupon alterations in DAoC‘s EULA were to the point:  
‗Joint or shared ownership or use of an account by more than one 
individual natural person is prohibited. Playing the game is 
intended for the entertainment, enjoyment and recreation of 
individual natural persons, and not as corporate, business, 
commercial, or income-seeking activities. Except as expressly 
permitted by the current EUALA, accessing the system and/or 
playing the game for commercial, business, or income-seeking 
purposes is strictly prohibited.  
The buying, selling, or auctioning of characters, character 
attributes, items, currency, or objects whether through online 
auctions (for example eBay), newsgroups or postings on message 
boards, and/or any offer or attempt to do so, constitutes a vio lation 
of this EUALA as well as the Dark Age of Camelot™ rules of 
conduct.‘ 
Apart from reflecting the disputed issue, the structural development in 
the EULA phrasing reinstated robustly the entertainment corporations‘ 
standing viewpoint on universal ownership over online/in-game content, 
against the practices of acquisition and distribution, which had initially 
allowed the unauthorised online trading market of game assets to flourish. 
Here we observe the de facto authority of the EULA attempting to exceed the 
boundaries of the functional community as advertising of selling in-game 
property is banned even from other, external online settings.  
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2.1.3 - In 2000 an EverQuest gamer, inspired by the setting of the online 
world of Norrath, posted to an unofficial and non-commercial fan-site a short 
story based on her character, developed in-game. SOE proceeded to 
terminate her account, arguing negative impact on the gaming community 
due to relating disturbing descriptions of violence to the game. On later 
occasions, though, SOE representatives commented on the matter at hand and 
referred to the use of intellectual property protection in pursuing their rights 




EULAs have consequently made steps forward regarding issues of 
fan-fiction and fan-art. The current standard phrasing attempts to capture 
with blanket terms the entire online variety of derivative works, going as far 
as to prohibit several user practices which are very unlikely to infringe 
commercial interests, as undisputable instances of breach:  
‗You may not copy, distribute, rent, lease, loan,  modify or create 
derivative works, adapt, translate, perform, display, sublicense or 
transfer any information accessible through the system […] Any 
attempt to engage in any of these prohibited activities, whether 
successful or not, shall constitute a material breach of the EUALA 
and will result in sanctions...‘
463
 (emphasis added) 
Accordingly, the EULAs of MMORPGs prescribe absolute ownership 
on fan-fiction that has been sent in good faith to any Internet sites operated 
by the game owner, under standards proliferated widely across the industry 
for dealing with user-created content:
464
  
‗We may take any action with respect to your content if we believe 
it may create liability for us or may cause us to lose (in whole or in 
part) the services of our ISPs or other suppliers. You hereby grant 
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to us a worldwide, perpetual, irrevocable, royalty-free, 
sublicenseable (through multiple tiers) right to exercise all 
intellectual property rights, in any media now known or not 
currently known, associated with your content.‘  
2.1.4 - In December 2003, the Beijing Second Intermediate Court was the 
first in the world to rule that a game owner shou ld restore a player‘s lost 
virtual property  (game weapons),
465
 finding the Arctic Ice company ‗liable 
because of loopholes in the server programmes that made it easy for hackers 
to break in.‘
466
 Despite the substantive differences in the diversity of national  
regimes and legal systems, the Li Hongchen v. Beijing Arctic Ice Technology 
Development Co. case introduced an international precedent, on rationales of 
consumer protection and identifying ‗player controlled game resources as 
private virtual property.‘
467
 The Chinese court recognised limited user 
entitlements both to unhindered participation (which the game company 
couldn‘t safeguard) and to game content, in accordance with the provisions 
of the agreed EULA. It concluded that where substantive financial damage 
occurs it‘s for both parties‘ future interest to preserve game balance.  
As it might have been expected, the Arctic Ice decision initiated in 
China a growing number of similar lawsuits against game companies.
468
 
2.2 – These challenges, in more than one ways, have pre-empted the 
parameters of later VW-related legal conflict. It is difficult not to see the 
general interests and concerns they touched upon - the persistent polemics of 
the entertainment industry in the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries ringing 
louder. All this also raises questions of Internet participation, its breadth and 
limits, more or less informed by the culture of online experience and the 
practised theories of personality‘s ‗cyber‘ reconfiguration. Finally, it 
becomes worth examining the legal apparatus that is used, the proposed and 
practised interpretations of the rule of law.  
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 However, these issues are best understood as projections. VWs contest 
to be something new and may be possibly changing the way of life for the 
Web 2.0-conscious generations. Reconstructed under law‘s dogmatic 
reasoning though, they reiterate familiar discourses of (intellectual) property 
and expanded contractual regimes. As VWs rebuild dominant societal 
schemata in small scale and discard the bulk of contextual detail, they also 
generate a miniature of the legal problems, which now look sharper and in 
focus due to the setting‘s reduced complexity.  
 
II. Two Virtual Experiences 
 This part examines in detail two different VWs regarding (i) their 
offered participation experience, (ii) the canvas of societal modes they host 
and (iii) their legal language of choice. Attention is required where these 
three areas blend with each other and with structurally predetermining off -
world actualities. 
1. A World of Warcraft - The setting of Blizzard‘s MMORPG  World of 
Warcraft (WoW) exemplifies the tradition of the fantasy genre, adapting into 
3D avatar space the successful Warcraft franchise. Players enter under one of 
two warring factions that claim territories across the VW‘s map; they create 
male/female characters according to familiar archetypes within the genre, 
such as warriors, holy knights, wizards etc. The game itself uses most 
notable features of pen-and-paper role-playing games, such as adventuring, 
exploring and undertaking treasure-hunting or monster-killing quests - either 
individually or along with other players. Additionally, WoW has 
incorporated arenas where the opposing factions compete against each other. 
The results of clashes in those battlegrounds are reflected on game-character 
advancement. 
Socialising turns into a prominent game element. The most rewarding game 
quests demand team effort, which requires co-ordination of different in-game 
professions and specialisations.
469
 Moreover, game progress mechanisms 
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maximise social integration through auction markets, where players sell 
game rewards for virtual gold or purchase enhanced equipment (e.g. swords, 
armours etc) for upgrading their characters‘ combat and survival skills. 
Finally, players may join guilds, to receive help with tasks (like killing 
monsters and completing quests) and to share virtual resources or knowledge. 
In other words, personal achievements rely heavily on interacting with the 
VW‘s social setting. 
1.1 - Questions over what is ―legitimate‖ or ―legal‖ may emerge at first 
contact with a VW, as this participant observer account of WoW reflects. 
Having downloaded the game from the www.worldofwarcraft.com website 
for a 10 days‘ free trial, when I first ran WoW, subsequent EULA and Terms 
of Use (ToU) texts greeted me, asking me to agree to the onscreen 
contractual content before entering the VW. After a quick reading through 
standard online legalese, and without having spotted anything conspicuously 
outside the typical EULA grammar in either texts, I entered the game. 
 1.1.1 Love‘s Labour Lost - For an entire week I played dedicatedly, halfway 
trying to ―level up‖
470
 the game character I had created and halfway caught 
under the spell of the game.
471
 With the expiration of the free-trial period, I 
rushed into ordering the standard game CD-ROM from a UK-based online 
retailer. To my great frustration, once I had received the product, the 
included game client authentication key would not reactivate the account I 
had opened. It transpired that I had been playing on a US server – following 
my logical reliance on the popularisation of ‗.com‘ websites and not 
downloading initially the game from a corresponding ‗.eu‘ site; on the 
contrary, the game copy I had purchased provided compatibility only with 
servers based in Europe. Note that I might have been aware of regional 
zoning if I had thoroughly read the full EULA and ToS texts (where, 
actually, explicit mentioning of regional markets does not exist and is only 
indirectly implied).  
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I had already spent a good many hours building up progress with my game-
character to the allowed maximum.
472
 There was no problem with returning 
the purchased copy to the retailer and receiving a refund; the issue was one 
of transferring the fruits of my labours to my region‘s servers. I contac ted 
the game company in the US (since the developed account was registered 
there) via both email and phone communications. The delayed written reply I 
received offered a rather unsatisfactorily compact explanation.
473
 On the 
phone, despite not fulfilling my expectations, customer services experience 
excelled in convenience and sincerity: the discussion was casual; the 
responding Blizzard‘s customer advisor reasoned cultural and legal 
incompatibilities between different regions.
474
 Being himself a WoW player, 
he showed sufficient understanding of my issues and concerns with the 
game-character progress so far, to the extent of suggesting that I should 
purchase the US version of the game from low-pricing retailers. I found his 
comment quite impressive: not only came it into conflict with the company‘s 
- apparently strict – policy of regional divisions but, additionally, our 
conversation was taking place on the customer services telephone lines, 
which Blizzard was presumably monitoring!  Regarding my query, I was 
informed that the company does not delete characters and keeps all relevant 
data stored for whenever the user decides to (re)activate the game account. 
Thus, under normal circumstances, my in-game achievements were 
indefinitely safe. 
1.1.2 - WoW constitutes possibly the largest online entertainment enterprise 
of its kind in the world, with over 10 million subscribing customers. 
Understandably, the bulk of communications with the latter exceeds 
proportionately the manageable ideal for either a software developer or a 
game-service operator.
475
 Brought into a position combining both these roles, 
such a company requires a well-structured and effective operational system 
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Regarding game issues, communication is conducted through (i) the official 
game‘s discussion forums (where gamers and in-game administrators alike 
are represented via their game characters‘ identities); (ii) emails; and (iii) 
phone customer care contact centres. Blizzard‘s advisors, when interpreting 
the company‘s policies to users, are in most instances de facto assigned with 
decision-making duties, as it will become clearer further below, where 
reported incidents of account banning are examined.  
1.1.2.1 - My first direct communication with the OSP was answered in 
writing and applied an indirect, yet genuine, normative decision; albeit an 
unsatisfying one, not for responding negatively to my request, but due to its 
exclusive forwarding of  generalising policy notification statements.  
 Reasoning legitimises a decision before others, appealing to common 
rationality standards that are drawn in reference to a shared social sense. At 
the same time, however, a decision marks an act of legitimacy in itself: 
where authority is ad hoc summoned for resolving a pending matter 
(‗authority‘ here meaning both an entity invested with power and 
institutionally established knowledge resources), the decision is 
automatically legitimised by virtue of process . 
In relations between socially active entities, the manner, in which a decision 
is being delivered, mirrors whether two parties are conversing horizontally or 
whether the one delivers his/her unquestionable will over the other. When a 
course of reasoning does not require anterior meeting of minds for 
validation, but is in advance taken to be absolutely true, then the underlined 
relationship between the two actors involved transforms into a power 
relationship – delineated either by one‘s expressed dependency on another‘s 
decision or by the will with which the decision will be enforced, indifferent 
whether there are still conflicting understandings over the decided facts or 
not. Picturing a bipolar schema, the more a decision moves away from ratio - 
from reason as ‗patterns of ideas whose strength to bind and convince […] 
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comes from their logical persuasiveness […] or rational coherence‘
477
 - it 
shifts closer to expressions of voluntas, i.e. to the unchallengeable statements 
of a sovereign coercive will.   
1.1.2.2 - Customer services are a costly and tricky business. Limitations on 
the extents communications may become over-personalised reduces firstly 
costs for the OSP (which are reflected on the customer‘s monthly 
subscription) and, second, reduces exposure to various misinformation 
risks.
478
 In analogy with the number of subscribers, each incoming issue and 
request needs to be seriously addressed and decided over, the soonest 
possible; and most of the times, emerging matters between users and OSPs 
evolve into threads of consequentially exchanged debating messages. Thus, 
brief emailed answers, seemingly standardised, help in keeping the system 
going on. Practically, it is almost impossible to keep everybody completely 
satisfied.   
 However, beyond these complications, representing the relationship 
provider/customer as a horizontal deployment proves to be ontologically 
deficient. The necessary growth of voluntas over ratio in individualised 
decision-making mechanisms marks a turn to hierarchical communications 
modules, which place accordingly parties opposite to each other. 
1.1.3 – The game‘s phenomenal success
479
 has financially assisted Blizzard 
in implementing an organisational model and expanding its human resources: 
continuous technical support, specialised help-lines and large numbers of in-
game administrators (who also participate in the game‘s official discussions 
forums and deal with individual matters). It is, of course, to their best 
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We may link the positive customer experience with the positive VW 
denizen/citizen experience. Good administration in a VW does not differ at 
all to good administration in the actual world. One may draw parallels of the 
political development of socio-economic relations, government and, finally, 
the human use of human beings. However, planning and aspirations for good 
administration often end up in bad exercises in governance. Hence, particular 
faults in e.g. Blizzard‘s overall decision making performance are not 
endemic to the relevant setting but rather instances that signify general 
societal and juridico-political crises, which are structurally determining, 
have been transferred to and are organically embedded in the smaller scale 
context. 
1.1.4 Community – The more than 10 million subscribers worldwide
481
 (a 
number which equals e.g. the population of Greece) should not be considered 
as all being gathered simultaneously on one huge online platform. As 
previously explained, players are allocated to game servers (called ―realms‖ 
in WoW) that each may host a maximum of players between 25,000 and 
35,000.
482
 A realm constitutes an exact duplicate of the original game 
conceptualisation (i.e. the combination of game mechanics, virtual geography 
and storylines). Pre-empted by its format, the functional community takes 
shape within and is attached to only one of those realms. On the contrary, 
intellectual communities follow WoW in its broader ―cultural phenomenon‖ 
sense, spanning between realms.  
1.1.4.1 – Social interaction aims at supporting the objectives of the goal-
directed focus of the game and at satisfying the participants‘ communitarian 
needs within the vastness of virtual activities and landscapes. These are the 
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main axes on which we can understand WoW functionality that is how the 
community works within the closed platform.  
 Game characters in individual realms, while pursuing experience 
scores and the accumulation of treasure, temporarily form small adventuring 
bands and in the long run join the larger and more persistent guilds. Wi thin 
such virtual and social localities, identifiability turns into an important 
signifier for the game personas: the virtual society will reflect a player‘s 
demeanours back at him. In other words, as virtual microcosms recreate 
mechanisms of social exclusion and inclusion, game characters‘ reputations 




The value which projects a character‘s social existence as a rumour, as a 
legend, or as a playground bully becomes eventually apparent when the 
player contacts Blizzard, or when Blizzard contacts her. Mainly the ToU, and 
additionally common ethical sensibility, require particular in-game 
behavioural restraints. Suspected violations are usually reported to the in-
game administrators by other players, or the former will act as appointed 
referees while monitoring the game.  
When an issue emerges, the functional communities are activated outwards; 
that is mainly on Blizzard‘s official game forums or other online paths. 
Players from other realms join in discussions over pending or already taken 
decisions. In most cases, administrators do not show reluctance over 
explaining the opinions they hold. They will not indulge into endless 
disputes, but will still shed as much light as possible over thorny questions. 
Incidentally, this meeting of different realms on Blizzard‘s forums marks the 
first stage of the intellectual community‘s activation.   
1.1.4.11 – Of course, perceptions, apprehensions and definitions of violations 
indicate a further problematic where the merging of real life and virtuality 
again dominates. Undesirable activity is divided in game cheating and 
behavioural derivations. The first category refers to gaining in-game 
advantages by interfering with the game‘s software; the second are particular 
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practices and expressions which are deemed harmful for the gaming 
experience and other players. In-game advantages are discussed further 
below;
484
 they regard, in general, the development of game skills and the 
accumulation of WoW gold and enhanced virtual items. Any gaining that 
does not abide by the normal gaming procedure is considered to be unfair.  
 Behavioural trends, on the other hand, are broadly extracted from the 
tradition of the modern Western socio-cultural vocabulary. Offensive, 
‗unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, defamatory, vulgar, 
obscene, hateful, sexually explicit, or racially, ethnically or otherwise 
objectionable‘
485
 language is not acceptable when chatting and when naming 
characters; or, at least, it falls within the absolute discretion of Blizzard to 
decide. Similarly, players may not ‗harass, threaten, stalk, embarrass or 
cause distress, unwanted attention or discomfort to any user of the game‘.
486
 
Practically, these behavioural stipulations abide by the common formula 
upon which the content of codes of internal practices and conduct is drafted. 
Note that, game code includes text filters, which means that, at the user‘s 
discretion, inappropriate words will appear as gibberish on game chatting 
modes. 
  Here we see the absolute monopoly which the OSP reserves in 
determining on occasion the ethical criteria against which deviant behaviours 
are judged. Moreover, ―jurisdictional‖ borders may extend beyond the VW, 
in that sense where users may proceed outside the game with any of the 
above aberrational activities against other users, e.g. via email. It seems 
plausible that where such harassing communication is based on and aims at 
in-game relationships, the OSP may warn or take action within the game 
against reported perpetrators. Such issues raise crucial  legal questions, yet 
are largely mitigated by the OSP‘s societal (and economic) accountability: 
by the will to preserve a positive image to the consumer public through 
decision making. 
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1.2 EULA – Without doubt, such issues draw heavily upon the presence and 
function of a law, i.e. the effective performance of a regulatory measure 
upon which are practically balanced the forwarded ideas of administration. 
When users enter WoW for the first time, and, from there on, whenever 
Blizzard updates the VW setting or upgrades the game servers, they are 
requested, before playing, to read and approve the subsequently onscreen-
presented EULA and ToU texts. Note that the software does not  allow 
clicking on the ―I agree‖ button unless the user has scrolled down the textual 
representation window to its bottom; thus is assumed evidence of the 
player‘s reading of both texts to their full length.  
1.2.1 General - The WoW EULA begins with clarifications in capital letters 
and warding off the legal danger of users not having been prompted to read 
the entire text. Not long ago, a statement was added to previous agreement 
versions for reminding users that they are only licensed to run software: they 
do not own it.
487
  
Placing the US next to the European EULA we begin seeing structural legal 
differences between two diverging politico-economic regimes. The US 
language gets straight to the point, soundly regulative and pragmatic; its 
terms are delivered in repetitive staccatos of commanding legalese that waste 
no breath in laying down the situation for what it is: ―if you do not agree, 
you are not permitted to install the game.‖ The ornate style of the European 
version, by contrast, allows at some point even pleasantries to infiltrate the 
flux of the OSP‘s bold restrictions, pretending on occasion to be mildly 
―suggestive‖; it appears reserved and more interested in exhibiting a casual, 
less rigid, face. As I will explain in more detail shortly, the (striking) 
difference in attitudes
 
serves purposes discovered in the proliferation of 
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 In general, the software programme and its subsequently incorporated 
updates, relevant printed materials and online or electronic documentation, 
as well as ‗any and all copies and derivative works of such software program 
and materials‘ are defined to be ‗copyrighted works‘ (which means that 
software and mentioned material are all protected as original author‘s work). 
The online role-playing game service is subject of the separate ToU 
agreement.
489
 Finally, ‗[a]ny use, reproduction, modification or distribution 
of the Game not expressly authorized by the terms […] is expressly 
prohibited‘ (emphasis added). 
1.2.2 Licensing - With regards to running the game software on their 
computers, users concede to ‗a limited, non-exclusive license and right to 
install.‘ That speaks of use only according to the agreed dictates of the OSP, 
which are then deployed in detail: users will not ‗in whole or in part, copy, 
photocopy, reproduce, translate, reverse engineer, derive source code from, 
modify, disassemble, decompile, or create derivative works based on the 
Game;‘ they are allowed to make one copy of the Game and electronic users‘ 
manuals ‗for archival purposes only‘;
490
 they will not run cheats, such as 
hacks and automation software (―bots‖), to undermine software performance 
for gaining in-game advantages, and they will not use scanning software that 
intercepts ‗or otherwise collects information from or through the Game or the 
Service, including without limitation any software that reads areas of RAM 
used by the Game to store information about a character or the game 
environment‘;
491
 generally, users should not ‗modify or cause to be modified 
any files that are a part of the Game Client‘ (emphasis added).
492
 
 The majority of these limitations defer to technical interference with 
the software. Additionally, though, are also provided against economic 
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exploitations of the software through the game. Users will not ‗exploit the 
Game or any of its parts‘ […] ‗for any commercial purpose, including‘ […] 
‗for gathering in-game currency, items or resources for sale outside the 




1.2.3 Property and Ownership - Past experience of the MMORPG industry is 
built on the dualistic approach to ownership, both physical and intellectual, 
which the EULA and the ToU set up between them. 
1.2.3.1 - It may be argued that at first glance the writing of the EULA 
implies that a permitted physical transfer of the original software copy 
results also in transferring of the game-account;
494
 note, however, that the 
latter transfer checks with unauthorised commercial practices, which the 
gaming industry usually chases down and are, anyway, covered by other 
parts of the agreement. 
 The concession to transferring is delivered within a very particularly 
framed general statement of software licensing;
495
 a powerful articulation 
that, expressly repeated, guarantees that OSP rights precede any 
subsequently granted freedom to user activity. Understandably, the 
importance which OSPs have unearthed in describing their relationship with 
consumers/users as different from selling software appears crucially 
defining. Therefore: 
‗All title, ownership rights and intellectual property rights  in and to the 
Game and all copies thereof (including without limitation any titles, 
computer code, themes, objects, characters, character names, stories, 
dialogue, catch phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, character inventories, 
structural or landscape designs, animations, sounds, musical compositions 
and recordings, audio-visual effects, storylines, character likenesses, 
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methods of operation, moral rights, and any related documentation) are 
owned or licensed by Blizzard;‘
496
 (emphases added). 
 The combination of licensing software operations with declarations of 
absolute ownership over the software application platform, its elements and 
activities, creates an over-protective cluster which performs outwardly: in 
order to ensure the integrity of the described online service object, which in 
addition evolves along both incoming and outgoing communications between 
the game and the world, its surrounding exteriors need to be neutralised – in 
legal terms. That also necessitates the partial relinquishment of user‘s 
otherwise general rights, handed over to the OSP‘s discretion.  
 In any case, if not made lucid via the EULA blanket clause, the ToU 
go to a greater extent for setting – literally – the account straight: 
‗You may not purchase, sell, gift or trade any Account, or offer to purchase, 
sell, gift or trade any Account, and any such attempt shall be null and void. 
Blizzard owns, has licensed, or otherwise has rights to all of the content that 
appears in the Game.‘
497
 
 Actually, the ToU repeat, now enriched, the ownership clause as 
found in the EULA, adding ‗user accounts‘, ‗transcripts of the chat rooms‘,
498
 
‗character profile information‘ and ‗recordings of games played‘ that use the 
game.
499
 The abandoning on the user‘s part of all such possible claims is 
completed in an overarching and very strong acceptance statement of the 
OSP‘s absolute proprietary power over the account and its contents.
500
  
1.2.3.2 The European agreement includes almost unedited the content of the 
US EULA section, to the point that it submits partially copyright regulation 
to responding US laws; of course, the important difference to the ―original‖ 
text emerges by omitting references to traditional ―title‖ and ―ownership‖  
                                                 
496
 WoW US EULA 4(A). 
497
 WoW US ToU 11, Ownership/Selling of the Account or Virtual Items. 
498
 Chat is accordingly defined as ‗[c]ommunicating in-game with other Users and Blizzard 
representatives, whether by text, voice or any other method;‘ WoW US ToU 9(B). 
499
 WoW US ToU 4, (Ownership). 
500
 WoW US ToU 7, (No Ownership Rights in Account): ‗NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING 
TO THE CONTRARY HEREIN, YOU ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT YOU SHALL 
HAVE NO OWNERSHIP OR OTHER PROPERTY INTEREST IN THE ACCOUNT, AND 
YOU FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT ALL RIGHTS IN AND TO THE 




rights: the ownership statements of the European EULA falls solely under the 
intellectual property mode. 
 The European ToU, from their first section, detach legally the user 
from the account, using shorter phrasing
501
 compared to the ―no ownership‖ 
claim in the US version. Account transfers violate the agreement and, in any 
case are not recognised;
502
 the inclusive ownership statement is transferred 
from the US to the European ToU.
503
 
1.2.4 Law - In response to provisions of its ownership regime, the EULA 
places the game under the protection of ‗the copyright laws of the United 
States, international treaties and conventions, and other laws,‘
504
 without 
indicating further details on the as treated content of law. The License 
Agreement itself is in general governed by the law of the State of Delaware 
and ‗without regard to choice of law principles;‘
505
 expressly excluded is the 




If informal negotiations over controversy or claims related to the 





 The terms of arbitration place only individuals 
against the OSP; thus, neither joined, class-action based or representative of 
other persons nor of the general public action is allowed into the resolution 
process.
509
 Further clauses build up the legitimacy of the arbitration 
proceedings, in view of the nature of the disputed issues, of the validity of 
the arbitration award and, mainly, of the broader compliance with US federal 
                                                 
501
 WoW Europe ToU I(1), Accessing the Service: ‗Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
herein, you acknowledge and agree that you shall have no ownership or other property 
interest in the Account.‘ 
502
 WoW Europe ToU I(5). 
503
 WoW Europe ToU XV, (Ownership). 
504
 WoW US EULA 4(A). 
505
 WoW US EULA 15(F), (Governing Law). 
506
 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 11 
April 1980, S.Treaty Document Number 98-9 (1984), UN Document Number A/CONF 97/19, 
1489 UNTS 3; see next Chapter. 
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 From the overall negotiations/arbitration framework are excluded 
disputes that seek ‗to enforce or protect, or concerning the validity of‘ either 
the user‘s or the OSP‘s intellectual property rights, disputes that are ‗related 
to, or arising from, allegations of theft, piracy, invasion of privacy or 
unauthorized use‘ and claims for injunctive relief.
511
  
The arbitration locus is left at the discretion of US residents; for non-
US residents, it is set at the County of Los Angeles, California. Nevertheless, 
any dispute ‗not subject to arbitration (other than claims proceeding in any 
small claims court) […] shall be decided by a court‘ within the above 
mentioned jurisdiction.
512
 Additionally, local laws apply to consumers from 
the other jurisdictions that are covered by the US game-servers, if they do 
not opt for the prescribed arbitration scheme; in that case, domestic courts 




  Apart from a few scattered references (e.g. in its ‗liabilities‘ section), 
the main European agreement does not go to any special lengths for 
appointing an exclusive legal framework or a specific legal forum. Only the 




1.2.5 Warranties and Liabilities - In the US format of the WoW EULA, the 
publisher‘s responsibility over the software product‘s condition and 
performance is almost totally abolished,
515
 offering OSPs margin for dealing 
with dissatisfied consumers, under the commercial principle of good faith 
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 WoW US EULA 15(B). 
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 WoW US EULA 15(D)(1-3), Exceptions to Informal Negotiations and Arbitration. 
512
 WoW US EULA 15(E), Location. 
513
 WoW US EULA 15(F): ‗(For) customers who purchased a license to the Game in, and are 
a resident of, Canada, Australia, Singapore, or New Zealand, other laws may apply if you 
choose not to agree to arbitrate as set forth above; provided, however, that such laws shall 
affect this Agreement only to the extent required by such jurisdiction. In such a case, this 
Agreement shall be interpreted to give maximum effect to the terms and conditions hereof.‘ 
514
 WoW Europe ToU XIX (Miscelaneous). 
515
 WoW US EULA 11 (Limited Warranty): ‗THE GAME (INLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION 
THE GAME CLIENT AND MANUAL(S)) IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF 
ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY 
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF CONDITION, UNINTERRUPTED USE, MERCHANTABILITY, 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NONINFRINGEMENT. The entire risk 
arising out of use or performance of the Game (including without limitation the Game Client 
and Manual(s)) remains with the user.‘ 
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and practices of market self-regulation and rectification. A supplementary 
clause functions, however, as a legal failsafe mechanism, covering 
jurisdictions where such ‗exclusion or limitation of implied warranties‘ does 
not apply.  
 The European version exhibits a similar attempt to exonerate the game 
owner,
516
 albeit with several differences in the use of language. Hence, the 
responding section of the EULA
517
 bears the title ‗Additional Manufacturer's 
Guarantee for the Game Client,‘ instead of the ―Limited Warranty‖ which 
presides over its US counterpart; additionally, most limitations appear toned 
down or even removed. In this part, the European EULA abstains in spirit 
from actually contesting exclusivity of legal effects.  
Moreover, whilst the US text breathes intensively with persisting OSP 
concerns, the European EULA appears more user-centric by picking a rather 
descriptive perspective over the commercial transaction to replace condensed 
concentrations of liability exclusions with – arguably simplified – step-by-
step elaborations of the user‘s rights. In other words, the former reaches 
great extends while covering against any possible grounds on which the OSP 
would be considered liable, whereas the latter states the furthest limits which 
should apply to users‘ contact with the product and the service. The 
difference acquires more meaning as the agreements move structurally 
deeper into service-related liabilities. 
There, the US version disclaims emphatically any derivative form of OSP 
liability, placing, at the same time, the user in the position of renouncing (by 
agreeing with the license) any derivative legal claim that may emerge from 
association with the game.
518
 Damages to virtual objects or substantial losses 
                                                 
516
 WoW Europe EULA 12: ‗Blizzard Entertainment will, […] at its sole discretion 1) correct 




 WoW US EULA 12 (Limitation of Liability, Indemnity): ‗NEITHER BLIZZARD NOR ITS 
PARENT, SUBSIDIARIES OR AFFILIATES SHALL BE LIABLE IN ANY WAY FOR ANY 
LOSS OR DAMAGE OF ANY KIND ARISING OUT OF THE GAME OR ANY USE OF THE 
GAME, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION LOSS OF DATA, LOSS OF GOODWILL, 
WORK STOPPAGE, COMPUTER FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION, OR ANY AND ALL 
OTHER DAMAGES OR LOSSES BLIZZARD SHALL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY 
INTERRUPTIONS OF SERVICE, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ISP DISRUPTIONS, 
SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE FAILURES, OR ANY OTHER EVENT WHICH MAY RESULT 
IN A LOSS OF DATA OR DISRUPTION OF SERVICE.‘ 
[176] 
 
from personal game accounts can under no circumstances be restored or 
retrieved.
519
 The OSP is expressively set outside any technically, 
economically or socially accruing responsibilities
520
 that lie beyond its 
providing of the original game software and service in accordance with the 
technically limited and certified operational standards; and even then, the 
free of defects operation of the service is, expressly, not warranted.
521
 
Such exhaustive exclusions are missing from the European agreement. On 
the contrary, although a certain limitation is agreed against applying to 
claims of tort, liability emerges as an issue of degree that refers to either 
intention or negligence from the part of the OSP, hence, proportionally 
inescapable.
522
 Further on, the text views a further possibility of considering 
the OSP liable, as far as ‗in case of death or personal or physical injury 
according to statutory law‘ and where reasoned in a court of law;
523
 another 




1.2.6 Monitoring and Access to Users‘ Systems  - In several parts of the 
agreement, the user is required to abstain from infringing activities  that can 
be realised only with the running of circumventing programs (‗unauthorised 
third party program‘). In order to preserve the running of the game intact, the 
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523
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EULA lays out terms of monitoring users‘ computer systems, hardware and 
personal data.
525
 The ToU amplify considerably the applied meaning of 
monitoring: users‘ chat sessions may be monitored, recorded, reviewed or 
even modified;
526
 the OSP may also disclose any personal and affiliated 
technical information to state agencies without prior notice.
527
 The 
user/consumer grants her consent with regards to all mentioned instances. 
 The European EULA approaches more cautiously the delicate issue of 
clandestine invading of home systems. For example, in discussing patches 
and software updates, it underscores extensively the importance of utility and 
need in the contested activity for the benefit of both the user and the game, 
before stating that such operations will take place without the users‘ 
knowledge.
528
 At first, the ToU copy overtly from the US clauses the 
technical extent of monitoring of user‘s systems,
529
 but stating different 
reasons: ―non-personal‖ data are retrieved ‗in order to make certain 
demographic assumptions regarding‘ WoW users;
530
 extensive system 
components are being accessed ‗[i]n order to assist Blizzard‘,
531
 only ‗for the 
purpose of identifying ―cheaters‖ and for no other reason.‘ Subtly, the 
complete agreement framework prescribes deeper and detailed identification 
monitoring.
532
 Finally, disclosure of such information to governmental 
authorities and to third parties is provided in explicit abidance by EU law s.
533
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529
 WoW Europe ToU XVII,1 (Acknowledgements). 
530
 WoW Europe ToU XVII, 4. 
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 WoW Europe ToU XVII, 5. 
532
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 WoW Europe ToU XIX: ‗[I]n the event that Blizzard Entertainment is contacted by 
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1.2.7 Derivative Works – EULA texts prohibit users to develop  derivative 
works within the software context.
534
 The European ToU include an 
additional paragraph prescribing that the OSP ‗expressly reserves the 
exclusive right to create derivative works‘ based on the game, without 
providing further definitions.
535
 The user ‗may not create derivative works‘ 
without the prior express, written permission of Blizzard. It can be argued 
that this clause covers not only software derivative works, but also e.g. 
machinima. This changed to some extent when Blizzard adopted a new 
machinima policy in 2007, allowing appropriations of WoW properties under 
the condition that they will be limited to non-commercial purposes.
536
 
 Nevertheless, the ownership statement
537
 feels competently set for 
covering further cultural appropriations of game material. It actually warns 
against unauthorised misappropriations in e.g. fan-art, without though 
looking into particular measures against users.
538
 
 Indications of the OSP‘s perspectives are found on Blizzard‘s legal 
department webpage.
539
 These are mere guidelines for using copyrighted 
material on fan-sites or for the purposes of producing remixes, machinima 
etc. Some lines about material that is not used for commercial purposes are 
not drawn particularly clear.
540
 In general, though, the approach appears 
                                                                                                                                          
information that relates to you and your use of World of Warcraft, including but not limited to 
user Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, associated personal information and all other user 
information on file.‘ 
534
 While fan-fiction poses the characteristic instance of derivatives as works based on 
previous creations, in computer games derivative works include ‗mods‘ (modifications by 
users that have games either fully transformed or structurally changed, e.g. new maps, 
characters etc.) or versions of an online game ran on other to the publishing company‘s 
servers.  
535
 WoW Europe ToU III, 1. 
536
 Hayes (2008). 
537
 Supra 564. 
538
 However, there hovers ambivalence over how ‗licensors may protect their rights in the 
event of any violation‘ of the EULA and in respect of material, listed as owned by the OSP. 
The ToU texts imply that the OSP may (legitimately) sue for copyright infringement, but may 
as well at the same time, by considering the farfetched example of fanart to be a breach of 
contract, terminate the game account.  
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 <http://us.blizzard.com/en-gb/company/about/legal-faq.html> and 
<http://eu.blizzard.com/en-gb/company/about/legal-faq.html>. 
540
 The response to writing novels based on Blizzard games is negative, commenting that 
Blizzard ‗reserves the right […] to ensure that only […] officially licensed and approved 
material is created.‘ 
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community conscious and friendly.
541
 Nevertheless, these guidelines have not 
been incorporated in either the EULA or the ToU texts.  
1.2.8 - The complete agreements set contains scattered descriptions of 
unwelcome user action, which, by picturing experiences familiar to the 
setting, indicate characteristically instances of breach; for example, power-
levelling services paid in real world money. There is nothing wrong, neither 
in principle or in function, with that; the problem emerges from the 
intentionally over-general terms, which aim at pre-empting similar instances. 
Interpretative misapplication of EULA clauses may hit users while the 
agreement does not come down overwhelmingly powerful on the OSP 
decision maker, who also drafts the text and changes it at will at any time . 
1.3 Within this normative framework, Blizzard develops an ongoing 
relationship with the community. The EULA and ToU analysed so far do not 
give the complete picture of the internal regulatory narrative, and thus could 
understate the power of other determinative narratives of the OSP and 
community connection. As explained, community does not simply refer to 
individual functional ―kernels‖ (e.g. the populace of the Blackrock realm on  
WoW‘s American servers) but to the broader social and cultural reach of 
involvement with WoW. For instance, the game‘s official website provides 
for a good starting point for engaging with the diversity of works which are 
developed within the online intellectual communities. Blizzard host links to 
fansites and user created content, like fanfic and fanart. Additionally they 
offer game material that can be appropriated by fans e.g. WoW-themed 
website construction kits; they retain and keep alive the communit y bond. 
Virtual world literature frequently (and consistently) invokes an 
insider‘s distinction in the OSP entity between publisher and game 
developer.
542
 Developers as a rule come from gamer and online user 
backgrounds; they are the intellectual community‘s  members that are 
acquiring actual knowledge of both sides of the story, coming into the 
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position to realise firsthand how activities which individual players consider 
to be misdemeanours can cumulatively harm the continuation of the VW. 
However, developers and designers are not administrators. The necessary 
allocation of problem solving tasks between departments of different 
expertise ends often in practice with the OSP, as a whole, appearing static 
when dealing with users.
543
 Thus OSPs switch occasionally between 
addressing either the ―community‖ or their ―customers‖, each different 
disposition allowing the roles of managers, lawyers and game designers to 
surface alternatively. Let us not, though, create a false image of internal 
struggles where these do not exist: the whole entity of the OSP abides by 
overlapping ideologies that mobilise its actions simultaneously within 
multiple contexts. 
  On the other hand, WoW constitutes a privileged case of a second 
generation VW. The game service is rather a latecomer that benefited much 
from the experience of its predecessors, the likes of the already mentioned 
Ultima Online and EverQuest MMORPGs. By the time of its market release, 
the Information Society had made the passage from the WWW to the Web 
2.0 era, a great deal of reflection into online services‘ policies had taken 
place. The bulk of chronic problems in relationships between OSPs and 
gamers had been re-evaluated from multiple angles. WoW has to a large 
extent stood up to the challenge; its enormous success and its smooth 
integration of the community give sufficient evidence.  
 These are the positive qualities and background, which, juxtaposed 
with the scattered cacophony of (unexpectedly) ambivalent EULA clauses 
and controversial OSP decisions make WoW an ideal  example for this 
research, by fleshing out the instance for the persistent paradigm of private 
administration‘s arguable shortcomings. And what a private administration 
this is, one which has managed to retain effective communications lines with 
its virtual citizens. 
1.3.1 – Now, reports of disputes have been circulated across the community 
and the various online news agencies. While we might not be in position to 
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 Gomulkiewicz (2004) 692 – 694. 
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fully scrutinise the facts in the following accounts of events for their validity 
or to guarantee the reporters‘ bona fide impartiality, we are dealing with 
stories that have been around for a while, prominently placed on websites of 
high traffic, and, yet, not publicly discredited or refuted by Blizzard/Vivendi.  
1.3.1.1 – Early in 2006, Blizzard banned over 5,400 accounts and suspended 
10,700 more for using third-party programs (―bots‖) to farm gold and 
items.
544
 Blizzard had apparently received a large amount of incoming 
reports and allegedly had investigated in response. The community‘s reaction 
was largely positive as announcements of more bans were being released.
545
  
1.3.1.11 Online commentary, however, questioned the problem of ―gold -
farming‖ itself and that it should have been more effectively dealt with by 
going after the ―big players‖ in the online market, the thousands of websites 
that practice selling virtual gold.
546
 Sales of gold and power-levelling 
services thrive online and, apparently, gold-farming means professional 
business in countries like China.
547
 However, as the next Chapter explains, 
particular limits are posed on companies like Blizzard against chasing legally 
gold-farmers;  these constraints, though, did not apply to a WoW player, who 
raised a class action lawsuit against one of the largest virtual property 
sellers
548
 that ended in a settlement in his favour.
549
  
1.3.1.12 - Following the strong stance against in-game cheating,
550
 the game 
software would scan users‘ computers for discovering use of unauthorised 
background programs.
551
 Users disputed not being provided with details on 
the obtained system information or the channelling of that information by 
                                                 
544
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 The Anti-Cheat Policy of WoW, apart from being scattered throughout the EULA and the 
ToU, it is also available on one single webpage for consulting it in advance, 
<http://www.wow-europe.com/en/policy/anticheat.html>; interestingly, separate compact 
explanation of the anti-cheating utility‘s operation is available only on WoW Europe. 
551
 <CNET, 12/8/05>. 
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and beyond the OSP.
552
 In the past, SOE had done the same with their 
EverQuest game, without alerting gamers; after angry reactions they were 
forced to deactivate their scanning software.
553
 Blizzard‘s representatives 
have argued that their scanning differs to SOE‘s in being spelled out in the 
EULA; as users are bound by their agreeing, consumer‘s privacy rights are 
not circumvented but consciously relinquished.  
1.3.1.13 - Blizzard/Vivendi would later move extra-judicially against a 
maker of such bot software;
554
 in response, MDY Industries filed a lawsuit 
seeking a declaratory judgment that they do not violate Blizzard‘s 
intellectual property rights by selling the contested programme.
555
 The 
district court decided in favour of the OSP.
556
 The decision was appealed; the 
Ninth Circuit agreed partly with MDY but, more importantly, it ruled that 
players using bot software, while breaching the EULA they do not commit 
copyright infringement just because the OSP‘s terms have prescribed so. The 
case was remanded to the district court.
557
   
1.3.1.2 - In another case,
558
 Vivendi/Blizzard and the Entertainment Software 
Association (ESA) were repeatedly sending notice and takedown requests to 
eBay,
559
 ordering the termination of auctions of an unofficial gaming guide to 
WoW.
560
 Allegedly, they were claiming intellectual property rights 
infringements of copyright and trademark. Responding to subsequent 
suspensions of his eBay accounts, the eBay seller - and author of the 
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disputed book - filed a court complaint in the California federal court.
561
 
Eventually, the parties settled, with the companies withdrawing their claims 
and allowing re-listing of the guide on eBay.
562
 
1.3.1.3 – Another interesting story
563
 has been debated by a WoW user in 
Europe. According to the exhaustively detailed account of events on his 
webpage,
564
 he had purchased a gaming keyboard,
565
 released by international 
peripheral-devices manufacturer Logitech. Such keyboards automate short 
combinations of keystrokes (―macros‖) and for technological compatibility 
reasons they preinstall a system software component on users‘ computers. 
WoW‘s scanning application detected that interoperation of software 
instigated the user as using unauthorised hacking software to engage in 
―botting‖ (i.e. automated playing for the purpose of goldfarming). 
Blizzard/Vivendi immediately suspended the account indefinitely. Thus was 
initiated an exchange of communications: the user would send long emails 
asking details and explaining his alleged circumstances; the OSP‘s 
addressees would reply with frugal adamant and impersonalised statements - 
that is, neither answering to the points raised, nor revealing any actual 
insights into the personal case nor showing any sign of having actually 
investigated it (in those emails there was not a single reference to the 
keyboard matter). Thus, the game account was apparently high-handedly 
banned without prior warning and, moreover, without sufficient reasoning 
given.  
1.3.1.31 – This shows the largely negative understanding of the management 
of massive normative coordination systems and the bureaucratic demeanours 
which are practiced therein. Capturing in essence a paradigm/metaphor of 
bad government,
566
 the user‘s general complaint revolved around the 
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 Gaming keyboards differ to traditional keyboards in design, being modified to support 
ergonomically the hand co-ordination of gamers. 
566
 There is a difference between defining the circumstances of ―bad government‖ to ―bad 
administration‖. For one thing, administration is logistically assessed on the basis of 
managing resources and presented productivity; government refers to political relationships 
of control over a public.  
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application of such demeanours to a nominally horizontal relationship, which 
transforms into a persistent power inequality module. The main point here is 
not the analogy between the OSP‘s privileged position with a state 
government, but rather the infusion of rules in the community as instances of 
bureaucracy (which confirm the alleged simulation). From the personal 
experience I described further above, my first communication with the OSP 
gave similarly the chillingly familiar impression of dealing with any real -
world state administration department.  Relating to the current example, 
electronic correspondence felt more like attempting to keep a conversation 
with a pre-programmed cola-vendor - i.e. a limited answering module, 
delineated by ticking boxes.  
Contemporary policies of common procedure appear more and more 
reductionist, where certain levels of automation and generalisation are 
pursued expediently. Despite encouraged by promises of democracy in state 
administration and guarantees of high quality customer care in business-to-
consumer relationships, the growing influx of demandingly personalised 
communications are met by outsourced problem-solving agencies with 
reluctance to dig deeper into individual circumstances. Moreover, decision -
making mechanisms turn inaccessible in practice. Such themes in procedural 
modalities give pragmatic form to Kafkian bureaucracy, regardless of their 
placement within state government or private sector settings. In this sense, 
we need to perceive bureaucracy as the disposition of the organised system 
of administration towards the individual.  
1.3.1.32 - One of the main principles of systemic efficiency requires dealing 
with the public without ―wasting‖ valuable time and human resources. 
Bureaucracy realises the furthest end of that mantra, where effectiveness is 
idealised by strict attainment to procedure; it denies broader interference of 
case by case considerations, preferring to narrow down several isolated 
incidents and fit them within one, be it tried, mode of procedural 
resolution.
567
 While not necessarily negative in itself, bureaucracy 
institutionalises deterrents in social action. Citizens of a state ―x‖ will hardly 
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accept enthusiastically a new government measure; in fact, they are expected 
to protest against governmental decisions with loud complaints. Struggling, 
however, with bureaucratic operations in the legitimate means of political 
resistance,
568
 the scattered, demoralised individuals submit, in the end, to the 
initial will of their government.
569
  
1.3.1.33 - Looking back at the narrated account, the EULA posits a fairly 
general rule; the OSP received automated feedback, suspected breach and 
applied without concessions that general rule to very specific circumstances. 
According to the user, the application of the rule by the OSP lacked 
transparency and evaded his particular requests for explanatory reasoning . 
Nevertheless, the decision passed without further debates.  
The utilisation of wooden language and the actual exclusion of the individual 
from discussions over his future standing in the community create genuine 
instances of the bureaucracy effect. Thus, the user claimed on his website 
unwillingness to take further action, simply because he was utterly convinced 
that in the aftermath there was little hope – if any at all - to penetrate the 
one-sided procedural set-up. Accordingly, members of the expanded WoW 
community that were alerted to the incident commented heavily against,
570
 
had even similar stories to share, yet at the end of the day they admitted 
dishearteningly  the futility of trying to contest the applied closed decision 
modules. 
1.3.1.4 – In 2006, a US player started advertising her gay-friendly guild, 
looking for new recruits.
571
 An in-game administrator issued a warning that 
posting of such content violates the ToU and she (the player) and her guild 
were facing banning. The user challenged Blizzard‘s claims and publicised 
her case on several WoW online discussion forums. In-game gay pride 
marches took place on various servers, while two guilds that were also 
known as ―gay friendly‖ wrote open letters, criticising the OSP.  
                                                 
568
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Eventually Blizzard apologised to the player and reviewed some relevant 
aspects of their policy, including a promise to train employees, who monitor 
play and forums, for addressing such matters with sensitivity.
572
 Initially, 
they had responded that talking about e.g. religious, sexual or political 
affiliations in the game
573
 invites, actually, verbal abuse by less disciplined 
users.
574
 The player‘s attorney counter-claimed that, although the OSP‘s 
awareness is laudable, they ‗cannot issue a blanket ban on any mention of 
sexual orientation or gender identity.‘
575
 
1.3.1.41 - The substantial weight, which the incident exhibits, lies in the 
infiltration of the functional by the intellectual communities, rather th an in 
the actual storytelling of how another LGBT rights challenge was fought and 
won: a participant, who had felt wronged, spread her assertion across the 
intellectual community, i.e. WoW-related discussion forums, possibly social 
networking websites etc; players were bestirred outside the functional 
community, within the expanded cluster of communications circles that grow 
outside the MMORPG but, yet, keep WoW in their heart of interests; The 
combined external and internal activities procured change in the VW: 
normativity changed its ―orientation‖.    
 One could argue that the OSP had been merely annoyed. VWs are one 
of the latest hypes in tech-news coverage; the whole incident might have 
partly escalated to receiving negative advertising. Indeed, there would be no 
harm done for Blizzard if they conceded in principle - as they eventually did 
- to greater flexibility of perspective. Even under this model scope, though, 
such a decision is again political; it examines the sum of exercised pressures, 
foresees evolving clusters of implications and measures everything together 
towards forming the least unwelcome solution. 
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There is no need to remark the self-evident: in VWs politics is inevitable. 
One coding authority affects with its decisions large communities of  
interests.
576
 Here surfaces an unspoken dynamic, where the political 
paradigm inside the contained virtuality is redrawn closer to the complex 
dimensions it acquires in actuality.  
2. Living a Second Life - ‗Second Life is a free online virtual world 
imagined and created by its Residents. From the moment you enter Second 
Life, you'll discover a fast-growing digital world filled with people, 
entertainment, experiences and opportunity.‘ This is how Linden Lab, the 
original creators and facilitators of SL, describe the VW on the official SL 
website, while elsewhere as a ‗form of shared experience, where individuals 
jointly inhabit a 3D landscape and build the world around them.‘
577
 More or 
less, these statements provide a rounded summary of the case at hand. 
However, SL early adopted and advertised one feature that radically 
differentiated it from preceding free VWs and to commonly exercised 
policies in the relevant industry: users are allowed to ‗retain real -world 
intellectual property rights to their virtual creat ions.‘
578
 
2.1 SL‘s function as a social environment connotes the absence of a main 
script or storylines. Naturally, this does not strike off the other narratives and 
meanings which underlie thematically participation in the VW as functional 
community or may resurface through the processes of the latter.  
2.1.1 Technical Infrastructure - In its technical essence, SL constitutes a 
gathering of subsequently arranged chat-rooms (thus the VW is also referred 
to as the ―grid‖),
579
 which, with the decisive help of immersive visual 
representations, melded into a pseudo-spatial continuity: from ―above‖ the 
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virtual world looks like a mosaic of blocks of land (each one, in terms of the 
simulation, equal to 512m²), a ‗cluster of clusters.‘
580
  
 Participants may roam the endless scenery which is actually created 
by other users: well over ninety nine percent of SL content is created by 
users.
581
 Interactive tools that have been embedded into the software 
application allow the shaping and manipulation of 3D items; additionally, 
users have access to an easy to comprehend scripting language with which 
they may interfere with the computer code. Therefore, SL residents are 
offered the freedom to re-create their allocated spaces: they decide over the 
landscape‘s morphology; raise buildings; design avatar appearances and 
clothes; programme routines that allow avatars to further naturalise their 
behavioural representations on the screen; they may even insert ideas which 
would have otherwise been profitable even outside the virtual setting.  
2.1.2 Socio-economic Superstructure - With the absence of game scripts and 
the constitutive role played by creativity, the item-based social space 
character of SL has pushed its development towards distinctively inclusive 
modules of social association and to economic structures of genuine internal 
production and redistribution. 
2.1.21 - SL has transformed into a large experimentation ground where 
various aspects of the social and personal identity concepts are being 
explored. Community formation is realised in either communication channels 
(called ‗groups‘) or events/gatherings within the pseudo-spatial 
representation.
582
 Groups focus on a broad spectrum of interests that may 
refer to either in-world or ‗real-world‘ themes, identity perspectives and 
likes or dislikes. Events are not exclusively defined by the interests and 
activities of groups; they are driven by SL‘s inherent socialising modalities 
that permit easy browsing of the VW, and are attached to the  each time 
signified – in representational terms – performance of the virtual land; for 
example, a nightclub, an interplanetary station, Amsterdam‘s red -light 
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district, ancient Rome, an actual replica of the twin towers
583
: the community 
is attracted by and follows the landscape‘s symbolic function, that being  a 
music venue, a make-believe entertainment capsule, a cyber-sex bazaar, a 
learning platform or a memorial.  
2.1.22 - Within such richness of stimuli and impressions to be received, 
participants are encouraged not only to experiment with their appearances 
and the offered multiplicity of socio-cultural potentials, but also to bring 





 race and other socially disqualifying factors in the real world. At 
the end of the day, in this imitation of life they may project inner natures 
with far less fear of stigmatisation. This is nothing new to VW contexts, 
having always been the most self-evident selling point of virtual settings of 
pseudonymity; here, though, it is expressed in tighter social narratives and 
through more convincing onscreen representations.  
2.1.23 – User-generated content (UGC) creativity lies in the centre of SL‘s 
lively socio-cultural pluralism, but most notably forms the object of an 
intensively active economy (thus termed ap tly by Boellstorff ‗creationist 
capitalism‘
586
). This characteristic SL economy moves officially (with the 
permission and active promotion of the OSP)
587
 along the previously 
explained two axes of internal and external development. Therefore, 
internally, UGC and in-world services are traded for the VW‘s micro-
currency, the Linden dollar (L$); externally, the OSP has authorised and runs 
a continuing exchange flow between real-world money and Lindens. 
2.1.3 - Sociability and wealth interweave, much like in real life. In SL, 
though, this coupling occupies central part in the involvement process, since 
virtuality can reach only that far: to capture impressions of the living 
                                                 
583
 Ibid. 200. 
584
Boellstorff  deploys numerous examples of virtual involvement broadening social networks 
for people with physical disabilities, where 'online embodiment could act as a means to 
regain agency', ibid. 135 – 137. 
585
 Ibid. 138 – 144. 
586
 ‗[I]t is a social order constituting relationships between persons through what are held to 
be prior acts of individual creativity—in the case of Second Life, through building,‘ ibid. 100. 
587
 ‗[T]he Second Life world resides and offers the tools for business, educators, nonprofits, 




experience and fragments of an intellectualised appreciation of it. In this 
sense, virtual life highlights the meanings which one discovers while 
zooming in sub-systemic connections and procedures of the actual life.  
2.2 - A first look at SL‘s website gives the impression that Linden promises 
virtual tourism in an open-ended version of Disneyland. That is not the case. 
Firstly, unlike Disneyland, Linden distributes land in their ―theme 
park‖ through selling-like operations;
588
 second, SL features as its main 
attraction participation in massive redistributions of intertwining market and 





 The economic statistics data show high levels of 
hosted commercial consumption, implying directly an equally high volume of 
supporting virtual production of artefacts and, thus, in analogy suggesting 
the existence of an overactive social structure that preconditions this lively 
market. However, in a world like SL, traded consumables do not respond to 
satisfying basic human needs – simply, there is no one to starve due to lack 
of virtual food; neither are commodities targeted at implementing individual 
development along a backbone narrative (as in the case of WoW, where new 
equipments help characters to progress and complete tasks). Therefore, SL 
commerce serves primarily itself, in parallel, of course, reference to settings 
of creativity and intense social exchange.  
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Overall, SL users are invited to community-shaped processes of 
creativity, socialising and economy, rather than to experience predetermined 
presets.  
2.2.1 - Having wandered for a while within SL, the first striking image that a 
visitor will have received is the (often disproportionate) diversity in 
imaginative, frequently surreal, landscapes. The item-creating interface of 
the application allows users to build, twist and combine 3-D shapes towards 
altering the face of the virtual environment and composing architectural 
constructions. The theme is creativity, which is further channelled into 
providing on one hand the already mentioned symbolic function of the 
landscape, on the other into creating the moveable tokens upon which social 
and commercial exchange can be symbolically structured.  
2.2.11 – Land ―ownership‖ essentially equips the resident with creative 
flexibility; that is the capacity to set up and preserve landscape changes and, 
further on, to host social events by altering the surroundings in a suitable and 
supportive manner. The virtual environment turns into a stage setting; yet, 
within a symbolic space the stage setting itself achieves the status of 
instrumental expression background, as the invested imagination and 
creativity in erecting setups, determine the shape, character and development 
of socio-economic communications conduits. Therefore, we are openly 
acknowledging means of expression that convey more of the will and true 
nature of the individual self that conventional text-based languages fail to 
either project or expand upon. The act of reshaping the virtual environment 
definitely constitutes expressional empowerment, where such privileges in 
the ―true‖, physical plane are granted only to the few powerful and to state 
actors.  
2.2.12 – There is no reason here to describe in detail the extent to which SL 
residents re-imagine the VW: flying islands, hallucinogenic houses, 
steampunk theme parks, vintage nightclubs – the list can go on indefinitely. 
The same can be said for ―movable‖ virtual property, the props which users 
create for enhancing to the furthest their virtual interactions: ―skins‖, 
hairstyles, clothes, accessories, vehicles, ―magic‖ items,  common items like 
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cutlery, virtual appliances; they are all items being distributed across SL and 
used by residents for enriching their virtual existence. More importantly, 
items perform as signifiers, reflecting the individual participant‘s desired 
state of being and also transmitting likes and dislikes as a communications 
proposal and statement.  
2.2.13 – These effects are manifested even more strongly in the second 
branch of UGC – that is poses, animations and ―gestures‖: animations add 
movement to immovable shapes; poses grand avatar body with behavioural 
postures; gestures combine multiple of these elements (and even sounds) to 
animate avatars with body language. In essence, users fill the gap between 
the virtual raw material and the ideal illustration of a realistic world: one of a 
world defined by the multiplicity of ―living‖ artefacts.  
2.2.2 – We need to concentrate on how deeply creativity affects social 
contact. In a VW that, unlike WoW, is taking shape exclusively through the 
work of users, virtual ornaments claim complex social utility, not a mere 
decorative part. Virtual artefacts put in effect functions that openly indicate 
personal or group moods, viewpoints and identities. The key presence they 
assert is built upon an act of instrumental determinism, whether unconscious 
or planned: their existence in a space of symbols filters ideals of social 
interaction, realises these latter as a factual consequence and thus models 
accordingly virtual life. 
 A few examples will clarify aspects of this process: an exhibition of 
digital paintings by avant-garde musician and artist Brian Eno; exhibitions of 
photography; live performances by grassroots, unsigned or even famous 
musicians; real time lectures and speeches by academics and politicians; 
competitive gaming spaces; education venues and playgrounds; gatherings of 
religion diasporas;
591
 islands designated for LGBT communities, where they 
can meet and discuss; and there is sex, SL hosting adult playgrounds for 
experimenting with romance, pairing and relationships.
592
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Such expressions and events could not have been possible if residents 
had not secured on a permanent basis appropriately designated (and 
transformed) virtual spaces; or if they lacked the capacity to recreate a 
convincing interactive experience with props that instrumentally incorporate 
computer code processes into emulating any possible property and 
phenomenon (e.g. mass, movement, plasticity, gravity, refraction, to mention 
a few only) encountered in physical reality.  Furthermore, virtual ―skins‖, 
clothes, poses and gestures are combined together in resemblances of 
humanity and sexuality to reproduce at a meta-level of communication the 
rules of attraction, themes of cultural multiplicity and socio -political 
statements.
593
 SL constitutes a global environment which like Web 2.0 is 
inclusive and based on dynamic tools,
594
 yet transcends the static character of 
the latter with real-time (―synchronous‖) animated projections of the self. To 
that extent, the experience itself becomes truly liberating, in a fa shion that 
balances between game play (i.e. a make-believe representation without 
serious consequences in real life) and actuality (i.e. emotional immersion).  
2.2.3 – The blending of creativity and sociability is further channelled onto 
public display in the countless virtual shopping malls and nightclubs of SL.  
2.2.31 – The plenitude of virtual products is dizzying. Users create clothes, 
accessories and gimmicks and distribute them through stores. In some cases 
we are talking of creator-owned shops, which are rented by land owners; in 
other cases, the land owner resells items which creators provide; it is not 
rare, though, for virtual companies to hire creators on a permanent basis or 
freelancers to complete a creative task on their behalf and from there to  take 
care of product redistribution to virtual outlets.  
The incentive of popularity in contexts of socialising motivates 
consumption of the most dazzling, convincing and imaginative virtual 
products. At the same time, the best advertisement for purchasing improved 
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virtual items over outdated products can be traced in daily socialising 
activities: in the largest of SL venues, avatars wearing the best and rarest  
items (i.e. expensive due to intended scarcity) draw most of the other 
residents‘ attention; socialising is after all what users seek in a VW like SL.  
2.2.32 – We have already defined the aims and importance of SL land 
acquisition. Thus, the mechanisms of land distribution outline a formidably 
lucrative business. Real estate operations, selling, rent ing and auctioning 
land are found in the heart of the virtual economy. Moreover, retaining 
territories provides Linden Lab with necessary revenues.
595
  
2.2.33 – Paid services set up the last aspect of the SL economy worth 
pointing out here. In-world employment may include not only the creation of 
standard content but also agency. Like the real counterparts after which they 
are modelled, virtual representations of business rely on agency for, mainly, 
practical reasons.
596
 In all cases, employed residents develop those skills that 
will assist them in succeeding in their positions; the difference to MMORGs 
like WoW lies in skills not derived from elements in software, reflective of a 
game character‘s progress, but from the actual user‘s capabilities to 
communicate with the social setting and to use the tools which the VW‘s 
application interface provides.
597
   
2.2.4 - The SL experience interconnects sociality, economy and creativity
598
 
in circular movement. Each axis supports the other two and, mutually, it 
acquires substance and meaning through their as ongoing practised 
intervention. This triptych context allows us a vantage point from where 
reports and research data from SL are not read as separate instances of the 
economic aspect or the social and so on, but as impressions from the 
projected functional systemic whole. 
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Of main interest is not why the dominant logics and systems of the 
real world are being reproduced so vividly by the virtual society; that is, 
attention is not drawn to the process through which the virtual society is 
preconditioned by e.g. modernity‘s political and consumerist experience; this 
should indeed be an extremely valuable discussion, though not within the 
present research focus. What comes forward here is how the virtual society 
perceives, in parallel to the physical existence experience, the reproduced 
symbols in the constructed instrumentality and ethics domain; how it 
evaluates these symbols and alters them socially.  
2.3 – On this basis, the intersection of in-world developments with the real 
world is seen with a different eye. Certainly there are no surprises reserved 
for the reader who is now familiar with e.g. online auctions and OSPs 
banning gamers‘ circulation of knowledge across the web; yet, SL claims 
there its own idiosyncrasies, due to the distinctive operational character of 
its societal dynamics and production. The nods where the virtual and the 
actual cross paths, stretch out particularly the pragmatic value of economy 
(the last branch in the above triptych), in its revitalising the other two axes, 
i.e. of creativity and active sociability.  
2.3.1 - Engaging actively with the virtual market can turn up quite rewarding 
in real terms.
599
 Making a living by selling virtual items was the issue which 
initially kindled academic scholarship interest in VWs. With SL the topic has 
taken a different direction, since the legitimacy of selling items is not in 
general disputed; moreover, the OSP facilitates online currency exchange 
gateways
600
 – not all of them ran by Linden.
601
 Hence, the terms are different, 
in principle, to the debated MMORPG-related practices.  
2.3.11 - Profits from taking up professionally creating and selling SL content 
have reached outstanding heights, e.g. $1000 - $1900 USD per week, 
according to reports.
602
 There always exist the exceptional individuals, like 
the SL resident/virtual estate entrepreneur whose in-world holdings had 
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reached, only back in 2006, an estimated of $1 million USD;
603
 today her 
business has expanded in both SL and other VWs, occupying significant 
numbers of real-world workforce.
604
 Comparing, though, those whose virtual 
incomes exceed the real-world minimum monthly salary against the total 
number of active SL participants, it becomes more than obvious that 
expectations of virtual-into-real profits do not make up for the rule. 
Nevertheless, even in occupying the lower percentage, those cases confirm 
the fact that the potentials we are discussing are not hypothetical but real. 
2.3.12 - Off-world opportunities may also emerge from effectively utilising 
VW creativity. For example, an individual designed, scripted and distributed 
in SL a game which innovatively combined Bingo and the arcade puzzle 
Tetris. In the VW the game turned into such a craze that a real -world 
publisher signed a licensing contract with the original developer for releasing 
the application on game consoles, personal computers and mobile phones.
605
 
2.3.2 - Discussing economy raises questions over the real-world commerce‘s 
reaction to VWs. Off-world advertising in VWs has already been mentioned. 
The growing media-buzz in technology-affiliated circles led several real-
world business giants to enter SL.
606
 The subsequent impacts of this flow on 
the VW and on the off-line existences of its residents, as well as the gained 
benefits, are yet to be assessed. Apart from where utilising SL facilities as 
personnel training sandboxes or as extravagant cyber-conference settings,
607
 
commercial stakeholders‘ participation sounds rather like a publicity stunt
608
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for ‗visibility and profit‘
609
: neither direct analogy nor financial reflection 
appears between these actors‘ off-world professed activities and their virtual 
presence and products. On the other hand, the market recognises particular 
value in advertising and the circulation of branding; as an online 
commentator observed, having a VW presence ‗will soon be as normal as 
having a web address.‘
610
  
Even where companies do not explicitly maintain virtual outlets, 
designs of their original works and media make it into SL in digitised form 
through the assistance of in-world specialist creators and promoters.
611
 At the 
sides, though, misappropriations of real-world brands - i.e. creating and 




2.3.2.1 – Other similar projects include actual states opening virtual 
embassies in SL that operated as information portals for culture and 
tourism;
613
 politicians promoting their campaigns on SL
614
 or holding press 
conferences;
615
 residents transferring unofficially on the VW existing 
political campaigns.
616
 These are signifiers of actual political exchange in 
virtual terms. Their importance is measured only upon the impression that 
the community ―conflates‖, which the participant internalises and 
communicates, rather than on their materialising of any actual or virtual 
political dynamic.  
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613
 To mention few, Maldives, Sweden and Estonia were the first three countries to open 
official ‗embassies‘ in 2007 <Times, 24/05/07>; <BBC, 29/01/07>; <Estonian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 06/12/07>. 
614
 French far-right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen‘s decision to open offices in SL, during his 
presidential campaign in 2007, raised, at first, eyebrows and then virtual protests; <The 
Alphaville Herald, 09/12/06>; <guardian.co.uk, 20/01/07>. 
615
 <Second Life Insider, 10/07/07>; <The Alphaville Herald, 10/07/07>. 
616
 Boellstorff (2008) 224 – 225. 
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2.3.3 – The VW is placed in a position where residents perceive constant 
porosity between the closed setting and the actual reality, including the SL-
related ‗nebula of online content‘ (intellectual communities‘ activities on 
forums and blogs) and noted migrations and exchanges between SL and other 
VWs.
617
 For some, these factors contribute in delineating virtuality as the 
starting point for re-advancing actuality, not only in terms of financial 
opportunity and success, but also by mirroring in-world reputations. 
Moreover, SL occasionally performs as the test-ground where the online 
public‘s reactions to alternative ideas , introduced in virtual forms of conduct 
(i.e. mainly sociality), are first sampled. 
 For the majority of residents, the prospect of real-world profiting 
through their SL activities looks remote. Their attachment to the functional 
community is built on their acknowledging of SL‘s performance as a multi -
levelled expression playground, wherein forming consistent and lasting 
relationships and associations is possible. Thus, the common resident 
experiences SL‘s ‗creationist capitalism‘  not in actual commercial terms but 
as a key element in producing and retaining societal coherence. Trust in 
these mechanisms of networking gives shape to identities, and aspects of 
these identities, in turn, escape into the actual world via the previously 
mentioned online communications channels.  
Virtual life gives birth to entities and proceedings which operate on 
SL and determine the resident‘s societal perspective of identity, as this latter 
floats between physicality, actuality and virtuality. To an extent we have to 
consider virtual institutions, for example the performance of a notary public 
in SL.
618
 These affect the circulation of social and cultural capitals in SL but 
they also offer a built-in promise of possibly interacting with the off-game 
legal actuality, if need arises. We may acknowledge their role as institutions 
properly in the same manner that we can take seriously virtual currency, 
when it takes a step further away from functioning as ―Monopoly money‖ 
(i.e. for the purposes of a ―game‖).  
                                                 
617
 Ibid. 242.  
618
 Malaby (2006) 157 – 158. 
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 The other nodal point where the virtual and the actual are crossing 
paths is, obviously, the EULA of SL.  
2.4 Due to the unusual nature of the service and its comparatively relaxed 
disposition towards software properties, SL retains only a ToS text, which 
can be found on the official website. For the same reasons, licensing of 
software does not come along with excessive weight of prohibitive  
conditions as e.g. in the case of WoW.
619
 The text‘s presence is more 
discreet; only rarely - when its terms change (and not every time updates are 
installed) - it will appear onscreen before the user launches a SL session. Of 
course, this overall attitude should not be mistaken for relinquishment of 
ownership over the software. 
2.4.1 General – ToS in parts rely on possibly changing policies and values, 
which are found scattered on SL‘s website
620
 rather than in the actual text. 
Linden Lab is free to proceed with amendments to terms at any time, in its 
sole discretion and without prior notification – although bearing the 
obligation to inform timely.  
SL is described as a ‗multi-user online service,‘ comprising of 
technical elements and applications that are carefully defined in their 
combined effort to bring together the SL experience. Interestingly, the 
websites are officially part of the VW-defined service: website use falls 
under the same terms that regulate in-world behaviour.
621
 Users are allowed 




In overall, Linden Lab holds the role of a service provider only and 
accepts that as such it does retain to very limited control over the VW; thus, 
the OSP ‗may allow people to interact online regarding topics and content 
                                                 
619
 Although, restrictions apply in compliance with market standards against overtly deviant 
uses of software; SL ToS 3.1 and 4.2. 
620
 SL ToS, Opening: ‗This offer is conditioned on your agreement to all of the terms and 
conditions contained in the Terms of Service, including your compliance with the policies and 
terms linked to (by way of the provided URLs) from this Agreement‘; also, SL ToS 1.7, 4.1 
and 6.1 respectively, in reference to pricing lists, community standards regarding 
participants‘ age and privacy policy. 
621
 SL ToS 1.1. 
622
 SL ToS 1.3 par 1; usually, separate terms of service apply to a website that forms a 
communications nod with the Web and may develop different to the in-world service uses, 
Jankowich (2006) 31. 
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chosen by users of the service‘ and ‗does not regulate the content of 
communications between users or users' interactions with the Service.‘ 
Linden Lab claims little interference with ‗quality, safety, morali ty, legality, 
truthfulness or accuracy‘ of such aspects.
623
 
2.4.2 Property and Ownership – Therefore, users ‗can alter the service 
environment on a real-time basis‘
624
 and ‗can create Content on Linden Lab's 
servers in various forms.‘
625
 They ‗retain any and all applicable copyright 
and other intellectual property rights with respect to‘ content they create 
when using the service, whereas under law they have such rights.  
 However, Linden Lab is automatically granted by the user ‗a royalty -
free, worldwide, fully paid-up, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive right 
and license‘ to circulate UGC. This means, apart from the evident 
representations of virtual items that client software operations materialise 
across the VW to users, an additional right to ‗use and reproduce (and to 
authorize third parties to use and reproduce)‘ UGC ‗in any or all media for 
marketing and/or promotional purposes in connection with SL. ‘
626
 This is 
content which Linden Lab uses to advertise SL by circulating depictions of 
user creativity. Nevertheless, the user may in writing ask discontinuation of 
such distributions, although compliance is not fully guaranteed.
627
 Also, 
Linden Lab may delete ‗any or all‘ of the user‘s content from the SL servers, 
for ‗any reason or no reason.‘
628
 
 The user relinquishes all patent rights over UGC within the service in 
favour of other users interacting with it but also agrees that he will not make 
claims against Linden Lab or other users when his patents are allegedly 
infringed.
629
 This clause should be referring to UGC in the algorithmic form 
of computer code, as residents scribe by use of SL‘s simple in -world 
                                                 
623
 SL ToS 1.2. 
624
 SL ToS 1.2. 
625
 SL ToS 3.2, par. 2. 
626
 SL ToS 3.2 par. 2 (a). 
627
 Ibid.  
628
 SL ToS 3.2 par. 2 (b). 
629





 if patentability of software arrangements per se was 
therein endorsed, users could theoretically weaken Linden Lab‘s exclusivity 
over their software, and hinder other users from replicating particular 
programme routines. However, this necessary specification on the nature of 
patents is missing and the provision may easily misfire by e.g. preventing 
protection of business-method patents
631
 or of invention models and 
processes first designed in prototype form on SL; thus the clause may 
contradict the broader statement over UGC protection. 
An additional section lays down rules of compliance with the US 




2.4.21 - At the same time, personal accounts are explicitly excluded from the 
protected sphere of users‘ intellectual property. Even though accounts, 
considered in their personae dimensions, are implied to be creations of users, 
they do not fall under the category of UGC.
633
 Apparently Linden Lab fears 
ownership claims over their servers; therefore,  users do not own any data 
stored there, ‗including without limitation any data representing or 
embodying any or all‘ of UGC.
634
 The concern against this latter clause 
argues to what extent the digital data are constitutive of the UGC as its only 
available expressions.  
 Furthermore, Linden Lab may delete from their servers ‗in whole or in 
part at any time for any reason or no reason, with or without notice‘ user 
accounts and their content data, including UGC and accumulated currency, 
‗in Linden Lab‘s sole discretion.‘
635
 
                                                 
630
 Francis, T. ‗IP Rights and Licenses Within Virtual Worlds: Second Life‘, New York State 
Bar Association, Intellectual Property Law Section newsletter (Bright Ideas), Vol. 16, No. 3, 




 SL ToS 4.3. 
633




 SL ToS 5.3. 
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2.4.3 Currency – The ToS clarify the status of Linden dollars as ‗in-world 
fictional currency‘, ‗a limited licence  right‘ which is not redeemable for 
monetary value by Linden Lab.
636
 
 Then, though, the text comes across particular difficulties. LindeX 
(the ―currency exchange‖ aspect of SL, which performs as a SL webpage) is 
described as administration of ‗transactions among users for the purchase 
and sale of the licensed right to use Currency.‘ The terms ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ 
are defined as transferring and receiving for the consideration of users to use 
the licensed right, while another set of terminology is further built upon 
these descriptions, like ―buyer‖, ―purchase‖, ―sell order‖.
637
 The OSP appears 
struggling with clustering over-detailed provisions, trying mainly to maintain 
the fictional character of the Linden dollar. Thus, no mentioning is made of 
―real-world‖ money, and the ToS are further securing full control of SL‘s 
currency exchange mechanisms,
638
 although references to law violations like 
fraud
639
 pinpoint to the inevitable linking between game and actual money.  
2.4.4 Law – The OSP may resolve disputes between users,  only if requested 
to, but ‗will not make judgements regarding legal issues or claims.‘
640
  
The relationship between user and Linden Lab is governed by the laws 
of the State of California and ‗without regard to conflict of law principles‘ or 
the CISG.
641
 Exclusive jurisdiction for disputes is appointed to ‗courts 
                                                 
636
 SL ToS 1.4. 
637
 SL ToS 1.5 par 1: ‗Notwithstanding any other language or context to the contrary, as used 
in this Agreement and throughout the Service in the context of Currency transfer: (a) the 
term "sell" means "to transfer for consideration to another user the licensed right to use 
Currency in accordance with the Terms of Service," (b) the term "buy" means "to receive for 
consideration from another user the licensed right to use Currency in accordance with the 
Terms of Service," (c) the terms "buyer," "seller", "sale" and "purchase" and similar terms 
have corresponding meanings to the root terms "buy" and "sell," (d) "sell order" and similar 
terms mean a request from a user to Linden Lab to list Currency for sale on the Currency 
Exchange at a requested sale price, and (e) "buy order" and similar terms mean a request 
from a user for Linden Lab to match open sale listings with a requested purchase price and 
facilitate completion of the sale of Currency.‘ 
638
 SL ToS 1.5 par 2: ‗You agree and acknowledge that Linden Lab may deny any sell order 
or buy order individually or with respect to general volume or price limitations set by Linden 
Lab for any reason. Linden Lab may limit sellers or buyers to any group of users at any time. 
Linden Lab may halt, suspend, discontinue, or reverse any Currency Exchange transaction 
(whether proposed, pending or past) in cases of actual or suspected fraud, violations of other 
laws or regulations, or deliberate disruptions to or interference with the Service.‘ 
639
 E.g. SL ToS 6.1; see below under ―Law‖. 
640
 SL ToS 5.1. 
641
 SL ToS 7.1. 
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located in the City and County of San Francisco, California .‘ For such 
purposes, Linden Lab is still ‗allowed to apply for injunctive or other 
equitable relief in any court of competent jurisdiction.‘  
 An optional arbitration section is included in the ToS, ‗for injunctive 
or other equitable relief, where the total amount of the award sought is less 
than ten thousand US dollars.‘ Note that resolution via arbitration had been 
binding, until recently when US courts ruled the agreement 
unconscionable.
642
  Nevertheless, ‗any judgment on the award rendered by 
the arbitrator may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction.‘
643
  
2.4.4.1 The text makes exact references to local jurisdictions only with 
regards to defining majority age for registration with the service
644
 and ruling 
void liability limitations that are set by the ToS.
645
 The cross border 
operation of SL is addressed cautiously in the closing provisions:  
‗Linden Lab makes no representation that any aspect of the Service 
is appropriate or available for use in jurisdictions outside of the 
United States. Those who choose to access the Service from other 
locations are responsible for compliance with applicable local laws. 
The Linden Software is subject to all applicable export restrictions. 
You must comply with all export and import laws and restrictions 
and regulations of any United States or foreign agency or authority 
relating to the Linden Software and its use.‘  
2.4.4.2 Apart from that, there are scattered references to applicable laws with 
regards to financial exploitation of SL (e.g. fraud);
646
 entitlements to 
intellectual property rights;
647
 the use of service;
648
 reverse engineering of the 
                                                 
642
 Infra 4(II)[2.6.1]. 
643
 SL ToS 7.3. 
644
 SL ToS 2.2. 
645
 SL ToS 5.4 par 2 and General Provisions par 3: ‗If any provision of this Agreement shall 
be held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unlawful, void, or for any reason 
unenforceable, then in such jurisdiction that provision shall be deemed severable from these 
terms and shall not affect the validity and enforceability of the remaining provisions.‘ 
646
 SL ToS 1.5. 
647
 SL ToS 3.2 par 1: ‗You retain copyright and other intellectual property rights with respect 
[…] to the extent that you have such rights under applicable law;‘ SL ToS 3.2 par 4: ‗[Y]ou 
are solely responsible for understanding all copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret and 
other intellectual property or other laws that may apply to your Content hereunder;‘ 
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software (it may be permitted);
649
 disclosing personal information to tax 
authorities and law enforcement agencies.
650
 
2.4.5 Warranties and Liabilities – Consciously Linden Lab broadens its 
liability limitations, since its commercially adventurous spirit pays back with 
exposure to a variety of risks, most notably those liberties which users take 
for granted and may excessively abuse.  
 Thus, users should not expect compensation in relation to UGC,
651
 
scheduled or unscheduled service interruptions,
652
  account termination
653
 or 
to digital parallels to force majeure (external errors, viruses etc).
654
 Linden 





 and other users‘ failure to comply with intellectual 
property laws.
657
 The OSP is released from any dispute between users, 
retaining only a right (not an obligation) to resolve disputes.
658
 Linden Lab 
disclaims any guarantees of value, ‗cash or otherwise‘ attributed to VW 
data
659
 and ‗provides the Service […] on an ―as is‖ basis.‘
660
 Finally, the OSP 
lays down expressively an overarching liability disclaimer
661
 and users agree, 
                                                                                                                                          
648
 SL ToS 4.1 par 2: ‗[Y]ou agree that you shall not […] take any action or upload, post, e-
mail or otherwise transmit Content that violates any law or regulation‘ or ‗that would violate 
any right or duty under any law.‘ 
649
 SL ToS 4.2. 
650
 SL ToS 6.1: ‗Linden Lab will not give any of your personal information to any third party 
without your express approval except […] to comply with tax and other applicable law‘ and 
‗to law enforcement […] in connection with criminal investigations and other investigations of 
fraud‘ […] ‗as required by law.‘ 
651
 SL ToS 1.3 par 2. 
652
 SL ToS 1.6. 
653
 SL ToS 2.6. 
654
 SL ToS 5.4 par 2. 
655
 SL ToS 1.4 and 1.5 par 2. 
656
 SL ToS 3.2 par 2 (b). 
657
 SL ToS 3.2 par 3 (ii). 
658
 SL ToS 5.1. 
659
 SL ToS 5.3 par 2. 
660
 SL ToS 5.4: ‗Linden Lab […] disclaims all warranties or conditions of any kind, written or 
oral, express, implied or statutory, including without limitation any implied warranty of title, 
non-infringement, merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.‘ 
661
 SL ToS 5.5: ‗IN NO EVENT SHALL LINDEN LAB OR ANY OF ITS SHAREHOLDERS, 
PARTNERS, AFFILIATES, DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, SUBSIDIARIES, EMPLOYEES, 
AGENTS, SUPPLIERS, LICENSEES OR DISTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE TO YOU OR TO 
ANY THIRD PARTY FOR ANY SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR 
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY DAMAGES FOR 
LOST PROFITS, ARISING (WHETHER IN CONTRACT, TORT, STRICT LIABILITY OR 
OTHERWISE) OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SERVICE (INCLUDING ITS 
MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION), THE LINDEN SOFTWARE, YOUR ACCOUNT 
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in case they have breached the agreement, to hold harmless Linden Lab, its 
affiliates and other users from damages, liabilities, claims and expenses.
662
 
Despite some self-evident virtues, like the indemnification of other 
community participants, this latter provision overlooks the possibility of 
having ‗alleged breaches‘ decisions being disputed by users over the OSP‘s 
impartial or not interpretation of implicated facts. 
2.4.6 – This unconditioned decision making freedom of the OSP is  repeated 
several times across the text. At vital points, as already observed, this 
acquires excessive weight, e.g. account suspension or termination ‗for any or 
no reason.‘
663
 The authority of Linden Lab to make judgements over 
unwelcome user behaviour reaches in-world and off-world actions alike, as 
personal email communications are being indirectly regulated like they had 
been conducted through and on SL.
664
 
 As often noted, ToS that deny users‘ rights in data on SL servers or 
place virtual currency under licensing and Linden Lab‘s right to fully 
manage, regulate or eliminate currency ‗in its sole discretion‘,
665
 are sending 
confusing messages to the public.
666
 For one thing, clauses that license use 
only, sit next to terms granting intellectual property rights; furthermore, the 
                                                                                                                                          
(INCLUDING ITS TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION) OR THIS AGREEMENT, WHETHER 
OR NOT LINDEN LAB MAY HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT ANY SUCH DAMAGES MIGHT 
OR COULD OCCUR AND NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF ESSENTIAL 
PURPOSE OF ANY REMEDY. IN ADDITION, IN NO EVENT WILL LINDEN LAB'S 
CUMULATIVE LIABILITY TO YOU FOR DIRECT DAMAGES OF ANY KIND OR NATURE 
EXCEED FIFTY DOLLARS (US $50.00).‘ 
662
 SL ToS 5.6. 
663
 SL ToS 2.6. 
664
 SL ToS 4.1 par 2: ‗[Y]ou agree that you shall not: (i) take any action or upload, post, e-
mail or otherwise transmit Content that infringes or violates any third party rights […] that 
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that is harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, causes tort, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, 
libelous, invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise 
objectionable […] Content that contains any viruses, Trojan horses, worms, spyware, time 
bombs, cancelbots or other computer programming routines that are intended to damage, 
detrimentally interfere with, surreptitiously intercept or expropriate any system, data or 
personal information […] that would violate any right or duty under any law or under 
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information learned or disclosed as part of employment relationships or under nondisclosure 
agreements)‘ and ‗any unsolicited or unauthorized advertising, or promotional materials, that 
are in the nature of "junk mail," "spam," "chain letters," "pyramid schemes," or any other form 
of solicitation that Linden Lab considers in its sole discretion to be of such nature;‘ 
(emphases added). 
665
 SL ToS 1.4. 
666
 Moringiello (2008) 5 – 6. 
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SL website and the OSP‘s advertising communications
667
 have loudly 
represented residents as if ―owning‖ virtual land and assets.
668
  
2.5 – In relation, a change of wording on SL‘s website was noted in late 
2007:
669
 where SL had been a ‗3D online digital world imagined, created and 
owned‘ it was now only ‗imagined and created by its residents.‘ At the time 
of the change, SL was at the peak of its popularity, which had been gradually 
escalating, with Linden Lab consistently communicating an image of a VW, 
where technical definitions like ―user‘s access‖ and ―participation‖ acquire, 
more than one, parallel meanings, ever since 2003 and their celebrated 
rupturing from dominant motifs in the VW industry.
670
  
 According to online commentary this change of words responded to a 
judicial conflict between Linden Lab and a user.
671
 Several similar alterations 
in the OSP‘s policies and the ToS text have been adopted, in view of law, 
agencies attached to it, online practices and public opinion.  
2.5.1 - In July 2007 Linden introduced a new policy
672
 halting all virtual 
casinos and gambling joints in SL (a thriving activity in the VW).
673
 
According to news reports this change was a result of alleged investigations 
of law enforcement authorities into SL,
674
 especially since according to US 
law gambling is illegal. The community‘s reactions were mixed,
675
  mostly 
remarking that legislation of one jurisdiction was enforced across a setting 
that otherwise advertises its international demographics.
676
  
2.5.2 - Linden Lab intervened again with resident activity by ‗removing any 
virtual ATMs or other objects that facilitate the operation or facilitation of 
in-world ―banking,‖ i.e., the offering of interest or a rate of return on L$ 
                                                 
667
 ‗We started selling land free and clear, and we sold the title, and we made it extremely 
clear that we were not the owner of the virtual property,‘ (CEO and founder of SL): <The 
Guardian: Games Blog, 14/06/05>. 
668
 Supra 666. 
669
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 The incident which pre-empted drastic OSP 
interference involved the declared insolvency of an unregulated virtual 
bank,
678
 which had been promising inflated interest rates; eventually, its 
investors lost a total equivalent of $750,000 US dollars.
679
 Linden forced 
regulation into finance of SL, presumably predicting real-world 
governmental intervention.
680
 Following the ban on gambling, SL residents 
claimed that the VW increasingly resembled the real world.
681
 
2.5.3 – The most recent development in policy changing has seen the 
introduction of age verification in SL.
682
 Being debated for years as a point 
of ongoing opinion polarity (circulated also as ―identity verification‖)
683
 this 
course of action isolates
684
 content ‗that is sexually explicit or intensely 
violent or depicts illicit drug use.‘
685
 If we should look for a main underlying 
objective, that is definitely not the protection of minors, since SL servers 
were always categorised as either PG (―Teen Areas‖) or Mature.  Certainly, 
doubts over the real age of a mature account holder can be justified.  The 
policy aimed at receiving expressed consent of adult residents to be exposed 
to explicit content.   
However, the account verification process is requiring users to 
relinquish partly anonymity by providing their real names and copies of 
documents like passport, driver‘s license and national ID card. The other 
alternative sees setting up a ‗payment relationship with Linden Lab‘ via 
either a certified credit card or a verified paypal account.
686
 Questions over 
reliable data protection have been raised or over the alleged equalising of 
                                                 
677
<Second Life blogs, 08/01/08>. 
678
 <Wired, 15/08/07>. 
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680
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681
 Supra 677 (in the comments section). 
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Blogs, 12/03/09>. 
683
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 Linden Lab proceeded additionally with the ―geographical‖ separation of adult content 
from the virtual ―mainland‖ of mature and PG regions, supra 682. 
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personal financial credentials to personal identification as indirectly forcing 
users to create a payment relationship with the OSP (whereas simple SL 
participation is otherwise free). Similar concerns have been pointed out in 
view of WoW and commercial MMORPGs that before allowing the 
installation of trial game versions they require from users credit card 
numbers as confirmation. Linden Lab has consistently supported the 
viewpoint that identity verification helps building trust  in the VW.
687
 Again, 
however, these processes do not prevent fraudulent use of personal 
identification documents by e.g. minors.   
2.5.4 – Finally, in April 2010 Linden Lab redrafted completely the ToS text, 
granting users, in the process, with permission to take snapshots and make 
machinima for fair use. The licence to capture and use in-world displays of 
UGC falls under plausible restrictions, where permissions are required from 
virtual ―land owners‖ and ―captured‖ avatars; moreover, reproduced works 
should not violate general intellectual property and other in-world policies.
688
  
2.6 - SL litigation has so far arrived in small numbers, despite the conflation 
of virtuality with actual entitlements to virtual properties promising 
numerous possibilities for emerging legal disputes. Nevertheless, these 
conflicts shape significant precedents, in both legal and virtual community 
terms.   
2.6.1 - Linden Lab terminated the account of a SL resident, who had 
allegedly violated the ToS (by using an exploit in the computer code) to 
make an advantageous purchase of land. The user sued the OSP, claiming 
that by cancelling his online account they denied him access to virtual assets 
associated with it.
689
 Eventually the dispute was confidentially settled, but 
not before the District Court, dealing with the litigants‘ claims, had decided 
that a mandatory arbitration clause in the ToS was unenforceable and the 
agreement a contract of adhesion. Moreover, the Federal judge looked into 
                                                 
687
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688
 Linden Lab Official: Snapshot and machinima policy 
<http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/Linden_Lab_Official:Snapshot_and_machinima_policy>. 
689
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[209] 
 




2.6.2 - SL has its very own adult entertainment mogul, a Florida-based 
businessman who had created and been selling a virtual bed that allows 
avatar-animation to recreate sex positions; the item was the first of its kind 
and immensely popular. Another resident started selling a closely similar 
product for 1/3 price of the original. The first user raised a copyright action, 
also requesting the real identity of his in-world - allegedly unfair - 
competitor to be revealed.
691
 The plaintiff‘s company, Eros LLC, subpoenaed 
the OSP, online payment intermediate PayPal and AT&T, as the fictitious 
defendant‘s ISP.
692
 The individual in question, who was eventually named, 
did not respond to the copyright infringement claim, as prescribed by Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and a default judgement was thus entered.
693
 The 
case concluded in settlement between the parties.
694
 A lawsuit of similar 
object, co-filed by Eros LLC and other five SL creators and retailers, reached 
also a settled judgement by consent;
695
 the defendant consented to 
compensate for profits he received from unauthorised infringement and, also, 
to reveal to the plaintiffs his SL and PayPal transactional records, plus to 
inform plaintiffs on any future alternative accounts he may create in the 
VW.
696
 Only recently, Eros LLC sued Linden Lab for direct and secondary 
intellectual property infringement;
697
 according to their claims, Linden 
knowingly facilitates and provides tools that allow in-world merchants to 
copy and sell Eros creations. 
                                                 
690
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695
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III. Worlds Beyond 
Although there are more than a hundred diverse VWs running online, 
the WoW and SL cases summarise adequately the case on two basic axes: the 
first is marked by the grading between hard and soft commercial setups; the 
contrasting MMOG and socialising venue operations delineate the second. In 
this last part of the chapter, mentioning to other VWs is made only in passing 
and in order to round up the paradigm. A few generalisations upon the 
regulatory approximation of online virtual environments will form a bridge 
with the coming up analysis of law in Internet contexts.  
1. Worlds Apart – It is not long until with ubiquitous computing we are 
being surrounded by the presence of the Internet and the Map will engulf the 
Empire. For example, GPS car navigators already direct our real -world 
movements according to instructions displayed on their screens. As virtual 
environments evolve along these patterns with tremendous ingenuity and 
migrate to mobile technology platforms, we may also soon expect the 
merging of simulations: of those recreating reality with those reimagining it.   
1.1 - The virtual universe of Entropia constitutes a sui generis example of 
VW in combining the entertainment instrumentality of MMORPGs with the 
actual economic incentives that SL most prominently facilitates. While by 
virtue of the EULA users relinquish their rights to the OSP, they receive 
direct entitlements to exploiting their in-game acquisitions for real-world 
money.
698
 Entropia allows users to retrieve virtual earnings from real-world 
cash machines;
699
 only on the surface of facilitated trade practices, sales of 
virtual artefacts or areas have been featured on news reports for their high 
figures in equivalent earthly currencies.
700
 Entropia Universe has also been 
granted a license by the supervising Swedish Financial Authority to operate 
as a real-world bank.
701
 In that sense, Entropia has moved steps forward into 
becoming a setting that enhances the coming together of the virtual with the 
actual. 
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699
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1.2 - In spring 2005, SOE introduced their own platform to facilitate 
legitimate exchanges of virtual items from their MMORPGs for real money. 
The decision received mixed reactions; some saw ‗a ploy to turn the tables‘ 
in a losing battle against WoW;
702
 others heralded for its promise of an 
officially sanctioned market.
703
 Independent of the undertaking‘s success or 
not, the specific move suggested a new perspective of operations, where the 
focus is transferred from individual VWs to platforms run by one company 
and which allow users to transfer properties between different settings; in 
addition, it conceptualised the possibility of summoning similar settlements 
in relationships between other sectors of the entertainment industry and 
consumers/public.  
1.2.1 - Expanding the same logic, enterprises the likes of currency exchange 
stations that trade virtual cash
704
 between unrelated VWs, hint that the 
economic incentive reserves inherent dynamics for promoting functional 
interconnectivity of platforms. 
2. Under the Text – Concluding the empirical presentation of the EULA 
culture, we find the latter deeply embedded across online contexts, in a 
manner where it propagates normative uniformity and regulatory unity 
through the standardisation of terms. A particular illustration or idea of 
customary behaviour transforms into widespread law that each VW unit 
realises with little only divergences from the general rule. Hence, the 
phenomenon of ‗EULAw‘ transcends individual instances of VWs, as 
separate digitised contractual normativities create in unison a consistent 
secondary legal order. This regime draws juridico-political prowess from the 
socio-economic pervasiveness that VWs contest broadly across and beyond 
intellectual communities.  
2.1 - EULAs and ToS are aligned with the dominant grammars of online 
contractual governance, which in turn reproduce structurally shuffles in the 
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contemporary political reality that follow the ascension and needs of 
commercial liberalism. Contractual freedom delivers conceptually the 
platform where commercial enterprises submit the will to protect 
uninhibitedly their interests, through clear and direct expressions. The 
practice of VW EULAs represents best a philosophy that promotes contracts 
into becoming ―entrance tickets‖ to isolated zones of perfect private control 
over relationships between business and customers; the creation of virtual 
geographies enhance the internal reception of this template  for users.  
2.1.1 – Therefore, rights waivers constitute a fixed point in EULA 
phraseologies. Even since first generation VWs, they have been consistently 
reaching out to pre-empt all possible associations of users with content 




2.1.2 - Moreover, OSPs may take more decisive steps against online 
circulation of VW-related communications than their typically excessive IPR 
claims, like in employing explicit restrictions against off-world disclosing 
discussions between users and VW representatives.
706
 
2.1.3 - While ToS describe undesirable behaviours in reference to 
conventional criminalities, they ignore any form of fiscal or virtual 
compensation for attacked user accounts and data that have been damaged or 
lost.
707
 The only available remedies are those prescribed by the EULA as in 




2.11 – Overall, it could be argued that because of a few salient incidents, 
OSPs might worry too much about protecting themselves and thus 
overestimate the likelihood of rather rare events.
709
 
2.2 - Surprisingly, clauses of OSP exclusivity over fan-fiction and UGC seem 
less ambiguous in VW contexts than when applied by traditional content 
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hosting websites. The terms of such services, which are otherwise widely 
heralded for supporting and investing in independent user culture, 
occasionally suggest even more direct commercial appropriation of uploaded 
user content by the service operator and for his own financial benefit.
710
     
2.2.1 - Note that Blizzard‘s adopting of a community-friendly machnima 
policy had actually been predated by Microsoft, who under the capacity of 
game publisher had issued new ‗Game Content Usage Rules‘.
711
 Microsoft 
was already allowing independent productions without requiring licensing 
fees payments. Under the new rules, though, licensees were permitted to 
store their machinima on third-party websites, like YouTube, and even post 
their works on ‗web pages with advertising.‘
712
 Original content owners in 
general oppose strongly such circulating of derivative works, considering 
that website owners are indirectly exploiting commercially their creations, as 
competitors. 
2.3 – Finally, the SL analysis highlighted another feature, which is inherent 
in the browse-wrap mode for presenting terms and formulates further the 
breadth of the discussed commercial intent. On many occasions the 
regulations-pool is not simply limited to the EULA and ToS texts, but may 
stretch across clusters of interconnected documents. As these extended rules 
cover also peripheral to in-world activity areas, they build up additional 
levels of normative complexity. For example, the EVE Online VW features 
separate rules tables for Forum and Chat, website use, Ban Policy etc., 
totalling nine documents.
713
 This type of complexity generates sophisticated 
regulatory structures, yet increasingly multilayered and more difficult for 
users to get in touch with as a whole. Structures of rules become dense, 
bringing closer the simulation of bureaucratic governance, accompanied by 
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the considerable expansion of the OSP rule over user behaviour outside the 
VW. 
3. Above the Game - In reference to VWs, facts about online participatory 
psychology are encased within two widely manifested strands. As pointed 
out,
714
 actual and virtual lives conflate: the immersion factor and, mainly, 
users‘ personal involvement with the social setting lead to identity 
(con)fusion.
715
 Secondly, continuous association to the VW through 
attachment to virtual items fosters ‗endowment effects‘,
716
 as users become 




3.1 - User communities have argued that participants deserve rights to VP, in 
possible purposive connection to either engaging with sales practices or 
strengthening their personal ties with game accounts. The most commonly 
used justification draws from the Lockean labour-desert theory, proposing 




3.1.1 – Phenomena of cropping profit from participation have developed the 
idea that VWs are real, blurring significantly the lines between virtuality and 
actuality.
719
 One way of looking into that, develops with the ‗creationist 
capitalism‘
720
 logic of SL and with Entropia‘s commercial activities;
721
 that is 
where OSPs forge ‗understandings of money and labour‘ in collaboration 
with users.
722
 The other viewpoint follows, of course, the as professed 
unauthorised out-of-game sales and the proliferation on the off-game market 
of such business (external economies). 
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3.1.2 - In the relevant literature the profiting of some residents has been 
over-emphasised, to the point of pronouncing inaccurate generalisations 
about the prospects and socio-economic functionality, which are promised to 
VW users as a category. Economic potentialities carry along a peculiar 
historical and political charm, which could not escape the obsession of some 
authors and the media: claims on the distribution of wealth that manage to 
succeed under the same terms that the each time ruling class governs society, 
reserve further potentialities for significant political changes. This position 
in respect of VWs is not wholesale rejected here, since it partly supports one 
of the main arguments in the thesis‘ conclusion. However, common 
presentations of the virtual society and the opportunities it offers acquire 
almost fetishist relationship with the conditioning of societal development 
upon proprietary understandings. Of all denizens of VWs it is only a small 




3.1.3 – Claims of connection with virtual items have been counter-argued 
with the limited ―life-span‖ of VWs. This line of reasoning holds in principle 
true. Note, though, that VWs fall within a consumer-services model, where 
the legitimacy of account-holders‘ interests is neither preconditioned by nor 
assumed on permanency.
724
 Moreover, while less successful VWs come and 
go, many settings have persisted,
725
 due mainly to the support of their long-
lasting participants. 
3.2 – In addition, the premise of reputational capital maximises attachment to 
a specific virtual functionality. This is one more piece of evidence for 
discussing how VWs transform into local monopolies: like clubs, once 
members join them is difficult then to leave, due loss of achieved network 
values and also to switching costs.
726
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4. Beyond the Virtual - The real power of OSPs lies in their control over 
computer code, where they can factually embed their rules of the VW.
727
 This 
internal ‗freedom to evolve the VW‘ cannot be held back by any contractual 
stipulation or out-of-game regulation. The infrastructure keeps the functional 
community alive (and the spawning intellectual communities together); in 
that sense the relationship between participants and network administrators 
resembles the relationship between citizens and government.
728
 
4.1 - Players may influence OSPs to change policies (as already seen) or 
technical elements of the VW.
729
 These power and counter-power 
relationships are difficult to comprehend clearly in direct reference to offline 
political terms due to lack of equivalent modalities. The impact of one 
player‘s threatening to terminate her relationship with the OSP is almost 
insignificant; on the contrary, the user will think twice before relinquishing 
her temporally built up in-game wealth and reputation.
730
 If a group of 
players put pressure and publicise their protests on online fora the OSP will 
more likely think the commercial reputation of the VW and appear 
approachable. However, the results of such conflicts also depend on the each 
time VW, its commercial and geographical scattering on the market, and on 
whether its administration sits closer to the publisher or to the designer end 
of the OSP entity. Largely, the greater the extent that debates or  decisions 
made with regards to functional community activities expand over 
intellectual communities, their range stretching to groups even less affiliated 
with the VW, the more the practised virtual politics turn into actual, their 
effects experienced outside VW lives; this marks out another shibboleth for 




4.2 - On these terms has been discussed the spillover effects of VWs: how 
their outwards spreading through communities creates macro-level impacts 
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of social, cultural and even economic character,
732
 even affecting the ‗daily 
lives of people who have no idea what the Internet is.‘
733
 Hence, discussing 
impacts here involves far more substantial, widespread and temporal 




5. Inside the Actual - VWs are not games; at least, no more than the 
Wembley Arena is in itself a game. The specific argument contests that the 
conflation of online sociality with entertainment, obviates ‗the consequential 
forms of intimacy, community, and political economy in virtual worlds.‘
735
 In 
this sense, even where a VW is written to be a game, its socially constructive 
function ought not to be diminished. 
Assume, though, that gaming constitutes the sole determinant towards 
participation; regulatory interest in VWs is valid as in any games of 
outreaching social and economic significance. Sports constitute the most 
obvious example. Outside interventions with the internal norms (game play, 
foul) appear awkward
736
 if not ridiculous; sports associations assume charge 
of organising the closed system of leagues and such competitions. However, 
when a goalkeeper throws a match at a penalty shot, minutes before the end 
of a football game and because a gambling syndicate has paid him, the 
intervention of state authorities is plausibly inevitable.
737
 
Claims that VWs generally enjoy regulatory isolation downplay the 
position of the virtual within the legal actual. As it has been acutely 
observed, VWs are not immune to state regulation since it is by the power of 
law (contracts) that their modes of governance are made up.
738
 One may 
consider the hypothesis that avatars in a VW discuss their plans for a 
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terrorist attack, or other kinds of real-world criminal activity; EULA and ToS 
clauses already provide for surrendering user information if requested to 
state authorities, without receiving the user‘s approval.
739
  
Therefore, laws of the actual can flow into the virtual as comfortably 
as the virtual is in position to exchange various forms of capital with the 
actual. The few so far examples of VW-related litigation have indicated so 
much. 
 Thus opens an entirely new question: how will the law of the now 
covered Empire perceive and treat its discovery of the simulation of life on 
the overlapping Map. 
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5. Online Relationships under the Scope of Law 
 
„Where a man‘s word goes, and where his power of perception 

















Humanity‘s exploratory endeavours will always end up in legal 
settlements of legal character. Historical common sense attests to the truth of 
the statement, which is repetitively confirmed by the practices of empires 
and nations, of past and present indifferently: wherever humankind may 
reach or whatever it may touch - oceanic depths, mountain tops, polar 
desolations or the coldness of space - it does not take long for regulatory 
frameworks to emerge.  
The need to control stands between the event of discovery and law‘s 
application, motivating conceptually the latter and in consequential relation 
to the former. This need seeks empowerment over newly found territories. In 
analogy, the notion of empowerment may take different forms, becoming 
more palpable when discussed in physical terms, and – especially - in view 
of colonial and imperialist contexts: access to natural resources, exploitation 
                                                 
740
 Wiener (1954) 97. 
[220] 
 
of market opportunities, establishment of strategic positions over macro or 
micro-relations and so on. All manifestations underlie the socio-economic 
potentials which discovered real or figurative geographies may spurt. The 
ensuing political clashes and violent conflicts between competing actors are 
eventually resolved through bilateral, regional or global agreements.
741
  
1.1 Three twists – Albeit invented, and thus resembling neither lands, 
physical laws nor mathematical domains, which already exist in nature and 
simply wait to be discovered or rationalised, the Internet simulated the 
problem of discovery—with a few twists. First, in form it encompasses 
unaccountable communications channels and paths that could have been 
claimed, had they not been remaining undetectable and largely unknown. The 
Net exhibits inter-changeability and randomness in both size and the forming 
of data transfer routes, which are determined mainly by how the bulk of 
interconnected computers are arranged on each given moment of 
communication. 
Second, information comprises the Internet‘s elusive substance matter. 
The twofold meaning of information indicates technically electronic data 
transmissions and, simultaneously, communicated knowledge as such. 
Therefore, online contexts, which are practically made of information in its 
dualistic nature, call for mixed appropriations.  
Third – and plausibly most frequently brought into juridical attention 
– Internet operations can reach at their minimum other conventional media‘s 
maximum number of communicated jurisdictions. In a way, the digital non -
land does not wait to be discovered: rather, it can cross nationa l borders 
uninvited. The additional question of who governs the Net under such 
circumstances was raised over similar parameters.  
1.1.2 – Nevertheless, a major part of the issue concerning Internet‘s inter -
changeability is resolved by focusing on fixed network nods (e.g. service 
providing gateways) instead of attempting to trace unstable information 
paths. Then, the cross-border character bears nothing frighteningly new, 
when compared with legal issues of preceding telecommunications modes 
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(telephony, radio, television etc.). As for the noted information ―dilemma‖, it 
can be positively pre-empted by a ―compound‖ scope that acknowledges on 
the single transmission the actual unity of interests in the infrastructure and 
in the communicated content respectively, methodically treating each 
separately. 
In the long run, problems in this nature of discovery and the 
application of law are becoming trivial. This is a lesson that the evolving 
Internet is frantically trying to teach us: problematic regulation stems but 
from the furthest ―geographical‖ extents, which the need to control claims 
necessary, in an act of self-affirmation. In the end, territories are, indeed, not 
found, they are made.
742
  
1.2 - The entire problematic of Internet-related legal initiatives sits 
uncomfortably with the principal concerns of this thesis. Firstly, with regard 
to the human rights question, the doctrine has several major issues to resolve 
with waves of progressive changes within the dominant legal 
instrumentalities, so much for moving on confidently with specialised 
regulatory ―newcomers‖ that are constantly surfacing from virtual contexts. 
On the other, the thematic detachments of VWs from reality (i.e. the creation 
of game playing realms) usually surround them like membranes, within 
isolated ―bubbled‖, but porous, existences.
743
 
Then, ‗Internet law‘ has evolved and developed unevenly, not only 
due to the three ―twists‖ it involves, but also to the intertwining regulatory 
perspectives that each of the Net‘s structural components has brought into 
the final mix. Computers, software, telecommunications, technical 
infrastructures, text, images and audio reproduction, all qualify as such 
staple components that, by contributing to the experiential construction of 
the Internet, opened doors to diverse legal perspectives. 
1.2.1 - Reviewing the Net‘s legal narrative from the 1980s until today, we 
may break it down into successive stages.  
1.2.1.1 - In the beginning there were cautious attempts to establish links 
between digital networking and computer/software law. Communications 
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perspectives (particularly that of telephony) played initially a minor role, 
coming, however, gradually to the fore as networks grew larger and exceeded 
national borders.  
1.2.1.2 - The Web‘s inception changed terminally the rules, implementing 
novel understandings over interpersonal dealings, and thus introduced an 
entirely new methodology for handling and circulating information artefacts 
and explosively expanded the horizons for commercial conduct.  
At the time, fascination and mystification, as well as overenthusiastic 
futurology which alternated with grim doomsaying closer to the end of the 
millennium, created a hype which saw to the emergence of an almost 
separate branch of law: ―cyberlaw‖. Legislation would be drafted in the  
names of ‗new technologies‘ and the ‗information society‘, focusing 
exclusively on the Internet. A new wave of technophile lawyers in academia 
and scholarship embraced and supported the trend. The e-commerce boom 
took the lead during that period, followed by freedom of expression 
challenges, as posed in the new medium, and the first court battles over 
intellectual property rights. 
1.2.1.3 - Recently, as time has passed since the initial impact and the dust 
has silently settled, the web revolution has almos t been ―regularised‖. Talk 
of cyberlaw is downplayed in view of conventional - yet enduring and stable 
in the dominant systemic conscience – branches of law, which are now 
methodically taking over, each dividing and absorbing cyberlaw into their 
legal production lines.  
1.2.2 – Seen next to the similar experience of the cyberspace ideal‘s 
progressive ―dissolution‖, the rise and fall of cyberlaw speaks of a coming of 
age tale for the alternative cyborg metaphor about the symbiotic form of law 
and the Net user, without necessarily reaching a definite conclusion. 
Arguably, if we take onboard notions of political determinism, the gradual 
shifting from upstart, Internet-centred legislative motifs to the heavy 
grammar of bulky traditional flows in law seems now inevitable. However, 
the collective socio-legal memories are still fresh: the experience of the 
―cyberspace years‖ was embedded in the expanded communities of 
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networking ―cyborgs‖ and the rhetoric of its desiderata is still inhabited. 
More accurately, major part of that rhetoric was injected at the time in the 
letter of laws and has been retained there.  
 In juridico-social terms, VWs evolved within and in parallel to this 
legal reality (or should we say ‗virtuality‘?), riding the Net speedboat down 
the development lane. The legal understandings of participation, over which 
OSPs and users will either agree or disagree, simply certify the recent past‘s 
narrative of law, reflecting it in the reasoning they display.  
Getting familiar with all contextually implied terms of connection, 
interaction, and conflict (and even aggression), presupposes a good grasp of 
the legal dimensions of the Web 2.0 era. Relationships between online 
stakeholders have transformed radically under the pressure of market, 
political and cultural forces; in this respect, the idiosyncrasies of Web 2.0 
societies promote very specific legal meta-texts, which in turn become 
dominant formulas. Thus, those overarching narratives need to be reviewed, 
before turning to the legal preoccupations of VWs that the previous Chapter 
indicated. And in the meantime, the human rights phantom observes silently 
from a distance. 
I. Law for the Real 
1. What, Who, How, Where and Why - The effect which the cyberspace 
fallacy delivered upon legal queries over the Internet was to slant their focus 
towards first asking ―where‖: ‗is cyberspace a different space?‘ ‗Does the 
Internet exist outside our world?‘ On top of such bewilderment, one can only 
imagine how far the illusions of VWs would have taken us, were we to 
succumb to them in a similar way.
744
 
1.1 Questions - Rather, it is more appropriate to first establish contact with 
online environments through questions about ―what‖ and ―who‖, i.e. by 
identifying entities and how these interrelate. Hence, we may start by asking 
‗what is the Internet‘ and, then, ‗who is there‘ – with the question of where 
arriving later, deriving from the initial diagnostics over the examined setting. 
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In a similar fashion, legal investigations move down from general to specific 
online matters and interests.  
1.2 Answers - Answers can be equally powerful to questions: it was the early 
definitions of the Internet in court decisions and statutes that predetermined 
the angle, from which later legal activity was set to approach the online 
setting. Lawyers, as dutiful crafters of language, pay excessive attention to 
wording; to what ―is‖ and to what ―is not‖ in the text.  
In the same vein, legally instrumental responses to the nature and 
operation of the Net, as well as to the terms of participation in it, established 
dominant themes in the meanings of the information society, which the law 
was to take in and nurture from there and on.  
1.3 – It is becoming clear that, similar to any other continuing legislative 
project, the production of online-aware laws is systemically patterned upon 
gradually outgrowing causalities. One way to understand how the latter 
commonly perform is found in the regular checks of internal coherence and 
consistency, upon which the endurance of legal systems is procedurally tried 
and kept within operational line.
745
 This process, in its forward movement, 
relies on the succession of questions of law upon answers upon previous 
questions of law and so on.  
Placing US initiatives opposite the European legal perspective 
provides for the plausible comparative scope, those parallel developments in 
legislative responses to information networks problems presented as an 
opportunity to counterweigh the juxtaposed regulatory proliferations, even to 
observe them colliding. Proceeding with this kind of pure systemic 
comparison, one will without doubt conclude over the merits of neighbouring 
logics of law, through the form and reasoning of deployed rules.  
However, it has become common sense that law, in its posited 
purposive artificiality as a superstructural tool, is anything but a closed 
system and its guiding causalities are asynchronous rather than mechanically 
sequential. Enter the question of why, when observing the various systemic 
operations of law in their processing of the online interactions rea lity: 
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qualitative subservience to political, economic and ideological choices 
determines the articulation of questions and answers over ―who‖ and ―what‖. 
Thus, legal causalities stop working in exclusively internal systemic terms 
and perform as conduits for preferred external intents. 
 Thus, the evaluation of the national and international legal 
frameworks, which dealt with advancing online interactivities, needs to be 
alert enough to discern competently the extent and - most importantly - the 
character of the anticipated socio-political interferences with decision 
making.  
1.3 – Legal publications, especially handbooks, circulate a particular mindset 
for categorising developments in Net-related legislative practices. Without a 
doubt, popularising the use of certain taxonomies plays an instrumental role 
in establishing consistent study of law across scholarship. However, 
determinism and predisposed methodological divisions in the established 
Internet Law research
746
 could drift the following retrospective of laws down 
a stream that could entail a disrupting effect upon the continuity of law‘s 
political reading. In contrast, my approach attempts to a mere 
chronologically linear enumeration of laws, accompanied by summarised 
comments. 
2. The Internet in US Law – The process of law-making in the United States 
exhibited ordinary legal systemic development: civil court disputes or public reaction 
to Internet life necessitates or provokes (depending on the occurring circumstances) 
the intervention of legislative mechanisms, towards settling apparent irregularities in 
the text of law. Individual US states have shown different degrees of reflexivity to 
socio-economic change, whereas the Federal perspective usually, but not always, 
recapitulates the scattered trends. Rather, judicial dialogue between state, district and 
federal courts provides a more concise and complete picture. 
2.1 Foundations - State monopoly in networked information had persistently 
cultivated public fears of misuse for concealed governmental agendas. That theme 
was meant to be consistently recycled through time, fired up by the Western liberal 
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democracy‘s concerns about state control and intrusion. Not surprisingly, one of the 
first pieces of Internet-conscious legislation was the Electronic Communication 
Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986,
747
 which, addressing privacy concerns, protected 
providers of electronic communications services against unauthorised government 
access to emails and stored data.
748
  Incidentally, nationwide raids by the US secret 
services that investigated data piracy, switched on active cyber-libertarianism in the 
discussion of law.
749
 Nevertheless, the truest early conceptions of computer networks 
appeared in relation to criminal activities,
750
 an area mainly covered by the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) of the same year.
751
  
Predictions of massive social integration in a digital world, or of 
computer threats that might be spreading online, appealed more to 
futurology.
752
 And again, those one-dimensional appreciations of technology 
and innovation, largely cultivated in the printed media, slowly prepared the 
ground for actual online challenges. However, the revolution never occurred 
the way in which it was imagined: even where alert, legislators and lawyers 
were caught unsuspicious of the sudden and contextually scattered 
manifestations of the galloping online problematic.  
Moreover, there had been early attempts to establish that ‗information, 
and perhaps even ideas, are property for the purpose of general criminal law 
provisions,‘
753
 within contexts of intense commercial antagonism.  
2.1.1 - Cyber-law literature would frequently refer to the Cubby v. 
Compuserve
754
 and Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Services
755
 cases, as 
early and fairly publicised litigation that had addressed the problematic of 
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communicating online content. Both cases involved the dissemination of 
information, tying in trends of reaction to online interactivity with juridico -
social understandings: messages that had been posted on online discussion 
forums, created controversy as allegedly defamatory and led to taking court 
action against ISPs. Arguably, the grounds for suing determined the 
treatment which both cases received by the respective court decisions, i.e. 
the crucially instrumental matter of whether ISPs should be considered liabl e 
for hosted content. Although reaching contrasting conclusions,
756
 the two 
court decisions shared the idea of filtering offline-reserved realities for 
publishing in the multi-participatory Internet setting.   
The legal dimensions of the Internet, according to those early 
approaches, were formed upon the structural conception of the freely flowing 
information, the recognition of its responding facilitators within the 
information industry
757
 and, finally, estimations of the socio-economic risks 
which surrounded such enterprises.
758
 At the federal level, a clear procedural 
standard for liability needed to be agreed upon.  
In parallel, a plausible qualitative question mark was following the 
now omnipresent transmissions of onscreen material, which not only did not 
appeal to the likings of every accessing person, but, moreover, untrue 
information might be distributed, harm inflicted more easily to the 
reputations of referred to individuals and, further on, transmitted content 
could be generally found offensive or obscene. Of course, no universal 
consensus exists on what constitutes indecent content. In the US, although 
obscenity was limited to sexual material, each State applied through its laws 
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 That was demonstrated in the United States 
v. Thomas
760
 case, which evolved into a jurisdictional issue (is the quality of 
material to be judged according to where this is stored or according to where 
it is viewed?) whilst disputing, in essence, conflicting ethical standards 
between the states of California and Tennessee. 
2.1.2 - The Communications Decency Act (CDA), as part of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act surfaced from such litigation background.
761
 Two 
sections underlined the Act‘s intended function. One aimed at immunising 
ISPs against civil and general liabilities in tort emerging from offensive 
content posted by users.
762
 The other section, which still receives mention as 
an example of a clumsy and thus failed attempt to legislate morals on the 
Net, prohibited the knowing transmission of obscene or  indecent messages to 
recipients under the age of 18.
763
 In a monumental court battle, which found 
private sector giants and free speech campaigners fighting side by side, the 
US Supreme Court struck down the controversial s223.
764
 
Attempts to resurrect CDA‘a ethical grammar were resisted. For 
example, a Children‘s Online Protection Act (COPA)
765
 was ruled too broad 
in its using of community standards for defining what harmful material is
766
 
and, remaining unenforced, it gradually withered.
767
 Interestingly, the 
settlement proposed by the COPA pursued to measure protection of minors 
by Web‘s standard commercial life.
768
 Thereafter, further federal legislative 
takes, such as the Children‘s Internet Protection Act (CIPA)
769
 have been 
more indirect: the CIPA conditioned federal funding for libraries and schools 
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for providing Internet access upon having installed filtering software, and thus 
passed the constitutionality test.
770
 
Nevertheless, the general topic of minors and the Internet has attracted 
diverse legislative attention. The Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) 
had been enacted as early as the CDA, aiming to extend ‗the federal 
prohibition against child pornography to sexually explicit images‘
771
 that, 
although not using minors, were produced using computer-generated images 
appearing to be children (e.g. via morphing technologies). The main target 
intent of the CPPA was online circulation of images. The US Supreme Court 
examined several aspects involved, for example the possible impact of the 
CPPA on arts and movies,
772
 before, eventually, striking down sections of the 
Act as overbroad and unconstitutional.
773
 On a completely different vein, the 
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
774
 applied to commercial 
websites collecting online personal information from children under 13. 
According to the COPPA, websites need to provide notices of their policies, 
relevant information to parents and are also required to obtain  "verifiable 
parental consent" before collecting, using or disclosing personal information 
from children.  
2.1.3 - Those provisions of the CDA, which remained in effect and immunise 
site owners from „defamation (libel) suits for user-supplied content in 
posting such as blogs and chat,‘
775
 have been consistently upheld.
776
 
Additionally, a standing judicial reasoning apparatus for assessing liabilities 
in other areas beyond defamation was built around them. Thus, the protection 
has been raised in view of state cause of action against a broad range of 
claims, varying from negligence to contracts and even to crimina l matters, 
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while on the federal level it has even been applied to civil rights claims.
777
 
Yet, notable exclusions were prescribed opposite to federal criminal law, 
electronic communications privacy laws and intellectual property law.
778
  
2.1.4 - Along the same lines of content distribution, the next big issue 
involved proprietary conflicts over online material. The ―WWW‖ era meant 
large influxes of interconnected users and radical interface advances in user -
friendly audio-visual transmissions. Original texts would be massively 
copied as easily as being intact, without requiring their authors‘ permission, 
while images and audio files were turning into a shared possession for Net 
participants.  
Whereas technology had taken the lead, lawyers and courts took years 
to understand prior cries of computer and software industries for protection 
against hackers.
779
 Now, however, those newer areas were converging with 
the music and other entertainment consumer markets, allowing meanings to 
meld easily and regulatory attempts to comprehend how, behind the digital 
smoke screen, interests were being simply reproduced. The music and the 
film industries were lobbying vigorously against the incoming waves of 
copying technologies.
780
 Still, we may observe that when traditional media 
conglomerates started expanding their services online, their interests 
suddenly became self-contradictory.  The US side of the Internet grew within 
and at the same time contributed to fomenting this generating of the new 
regulatory regimes.  
2.1.4.1 – A No Electronic Theft (NET) Act,
781
 in 1997, first adapted 
obligations to the TRIPS agreements and criminalised non-commercial 
distribution of copyrighted works on the Internet. The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998
782
 updated further US copyright law to new 
technologies and online contexts and implemented the WIPO Copyright and 
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Performances and Phonograms Treaties, plus other international 
conventions.
783
 The main reformations it invoked was the prohibition of 
circumventing technological means, which have been installed for blocking 
violations of copyrighted works, and the distinguishing ‗between direct 
infringement and secondary liability of ISPs.‘
784
  
On the notice and takedown provisions of s512, which were added 
with the DMCA to Title 17 of the US Code, the commercial politics of the 
Net are being exemplified, not only with regard to their initial enactment, 
but, mainly, in view of the manner and frequency in which they are realised 
in practice. 
2.1.4.11 - Content hosting OSPs were being held liable for copyright breach 
due to material displayed by users.
785
 Codifying the judicial decision in 
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications 
Services,
786
 the DMCA was heralded by OSPs for providing a reasonable 
‗Safe Harbor‘ for ‗passive‘ and ‗automatic‘ storage actions of which service 
providers have no actual knowledge. Exclusion from liability requires 
demonstration of the latter, understanding that the OSP does not receive 
direct financial benefit due to the infringement and, finally, that once 




2.1.4.12 - The ―notice-and-take-down‖ procedures of the DMCA were 
planned to operate as a liability neutraliser: an intellectual property holder 
that feels her rights to be infringed may send a notice to a content-hosting 
website that user material infringes copyright and is not licensed; the 
contacted company is expected to communicate with the user and if no 
response comes back they may take offline the disputed content. If the user 
provides a ―counter-notice‖, asserting that the material does not infringe, the 
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website notifies the right holder and is required, fourteen days later, to 
upload the debated content – unless the alleged copyright holder sues the 
user.
788
 Note that where these rules apply to OSPs that do ‗not receive a 
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,‘
789
 the online service 
should not have been charging access to the allegedly infringing content. 
2.1.4.2 - At the same time, the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA)
790
 
extended copyright duration to 70 years after the death of an author, or if 
work-made for-hire for a company, 120 years from creation or 95 years from 
publication. The Disney Corporation and the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA) had heavily lobbied for the successful extension, including 
―campaign contributions‖ to members of Congress.
791
 Notably, flagship 
Disney characters were about to enter the public domain only just after 
2003.
792
 The constitutionality of the Act was challenged, especially in view 
of the public domain, though unsuccessfully.
793
 Similar attempts were 
mobilised against the CTEA and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
(URAA) that were retroactively reclassifying as ―copyrighted‖, works that 
had already fallen into the public domain.
794
 Although these claims were 
initially dismissed,
795
 the constitutionality challenge against URAA's 
restorations was upheld recently.
796
 These developments, of course, are not 
directly related to Internet law, but several of the major key points over Net 
participation defer to the involved argumentation and will be discussed later 
on. 
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2.1.4.3 Litigation - The Napster case constitutes a judicial landmark of 
global juridico-political importance. From the legal point of view, it initiated 
internationally a long lasting snowball effect in the reasoning and practices 
of domestic laws, essentially marginalising appropriations of the exchange 
culture that the Internet interface signified. In effect, its social ramifications 
are interpreted in view of the rise of today‘s IP empires, in how they are 
casting their shadow over the circulation and collaborative development of 
information. The Napster case delivered a first official statement of 
outlawing P2P networks in a manner which predetermined in social 
conscience the stigma of their function as tools primarily intended for piracy.  
With Napster it was made apparent that the DMCA safe harbour 
provisions would not apply to P2P platforms.
797
 Further litigation continued 
with methodically taking apart all socio-technological defences that had pre-
empted legal relationships between copyright holders and technological 
interface facilitators. Such a defence was mainly provided by the Sony 
Betamax case,
798
 which was decided in the early 80s, after debating whether 
manufacturers of video recorders were encouraging copyright infringements 
of televised broadcasts. Back then, the Court had held that no evidence of 
such encouragement existed by the offer of the VCR machine on the market 
alone, and, moreover, the ‗machines were capable of significant non-
infringing uses.‘
799
 In the post-Napster era, providers of P2P technology were 




In contrast, the US Supreme Court in MGM v. Grokster
801
 adopted the 
view that not only P2P software did not constitute neutral technological 
means, but also it had no other purpose than ―inducing‖ infringing acts in 
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relation to copyrighted sound recordings, whereas the developer knew that 
illegal file exchanging would be the software‘s aim.
802
 The Court in Grokster 
added inducement to US copyright law as the final category of infringement. 
It is argued that while the ―inducement‖ doctrine‘s ‗application and limits 




The Grokster case, together with the subsequent Australian Federal 
Court‘s ruling over Kazaa,
804
 sent a message to P2P software developers 
worldwide. The passage from detecting liabilities across the various online 
social manifestations to investigating the actual technology‘s self-evident 
capacities to potentially circumvent marked a teleological jump, a significant 
change in regulatory decision-making. In this respect, as a commentator 
observed, despite the domestic differences in the definitions and applications 
of law, both the Grokster and Kazaa cases clearly turned the focus ‗from the 
characteristics of the product to the conduct and intention of the maker and 
supplier.‘
805
 The impact and trend which the legal event proliferated is 
explained further below in its global juridico-political dimensions; here, it 
suffices first to add that Grokster completed the circle which had opened 
with Napster and, second, to suggest that legal developments over P2P 
networks do not refer to their isolated casuistry, but to broader socio-legally 
systematised sensibilities.  
2.1.5 - Website links not leading from one site to the original content host‘s 
homepage (―deep-linking‖) and thus bypassing advertising and multi-
purposing logging-in processes
806
 on the destined site‘s main page also 
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stirred up legal activity.
807
 Similar issues emerged in respect of ―framing‖, 
that is when pages are designed to link to another website but include their 
own page display over or around the destination page (e.g. the resulting 
representations on Google Image Search).
808
 Owners of linked websites 
raised court action, seeking, in essence, to prevent bypassing of advertising 
headers. Whereas law‘s normative rationality would not have Net traffic 
forced to register with the narrow teleology of commercial websites, the 
latter resorted to distorting the reasoning of copyright
809




2.1.6 - Semi-technical appropriations of Web traffic posit a different 
regulatory problematic, which was arguably contained with success within 
the legal discussion over domain names. The structural development of the 
Web under a very distinctive representational logic (as systematically 
popularised in the shape and operations of web-browsing applications) 
narrowed down the common perception of online socio-economic 
interactivity and utility into the familiar name-based taxonomies of website 
addresses. The legal treatment, which such an indexing module invites, relies 
on the external symbolic order than dealing with the actual technical 
infrastructure and the complex algorithmic syntax of Internet protocols. 
Understandably, the weight of interest for law moved from managing 
information trafficking mechanisms to proprietary comprehensions.  
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Thus, a domain name is ‗an alias which facilitates the human use of 
computers,‘
811
 consisting ‗of a second-level domain‘ (the host, e.g. 
―facebook‖) ‗followed by a top-level domain‘
812
 which describes the nature 
of the enterprise (the domain, e.g. ―.org‖, ―.com‖ etc). For businesses, 
domain names become ‗critical to brand identity‘
813
 drawing their market 
value from their representational function on the web. The term 
―cybersquatting‖ described bad faith registrations of domains by individuals 
or companies, who held famous names for ransom and aimed at selling them 
to legitimate trademark owners for large sums.
814
 Since domain names 
appealed to resembling trademarks, cybersquatting instances were initially 
dealt with under trademark laws. The Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act (ACPA)
815
 amended the Trademark Act, making illegal 
‗abusive registration and use of the distinctive trademarks of others as 
Internet domain names, with the intent to profit‘ from associated goodwill.
816
 
The defence of fair use, again, counterweights the Act‘s  bad faith 
requirement.  
2.1.7 - Producing effective legislation against unsolicited email (―spam‖) had 
been a thorny issue for a long time, since certain lines needed to be drawn 
between free expression and privacy concerns
817
 and, obviously, spammers 
are not easy to locate and identify. The 2003 Controlling the Assault of Non-
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM Act) set standard 
rules for commercial emails, although with no particular success.
818
 The Act 
broadly penalised spam and provided for coordinated action between federal 
bodies and the private sector. Additionally, it outlawed harvesting of email 
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addresses, address generators and automated email account registration 
techniques.  
However, the CAN-SPAM Act has been ever since its enactment 
under fire for being, among other reasons, unrealistically formalistic, for 
‗pre-empting state legislation‘ where that could prescribe stronger 
protection, and for disempowering citizens from suing ‗spammers directly or 
through class action lawsuits.‘
819
 More significantly, from the Act‘s focus on 
commercial practices were excluded other forms of spam that are ‗designed 
to harm the recipient‘
820
 (―malware‖). 
  Regardless of the effectiveness of the CAN-SPAM Act, the 
combined actions of users, ISPs and OSPs under state or federal laws have 
brought forward through the years significant in numbers and substance court 
activity against spamming practices.
821
 
2.1.8 – Lastly, mention should be made to what we may call the ongoing 
battle for anonymity. The structure of online services allows for commenting 
anonymously and pseudonymously on forums, websites etc. CyberSLAPP
822
 
and so called ‗John Doe‘ lawsuits aim at lifting the anonymity veil of authors 




2.1.8.1 - In the absence of federal law, several states have already introduced 
anti-SLAPP statutes, discerning strategic abuse of legal procedures. 
Protected speech content includes controversial political statements but also 
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2.1.8.2 - In ‗John Doe‘ lawsuits, aggrieved parties direct subpoenas against 
ISPs, requesting to reveal the anonymous speakers‘ identities.
825
 ISPs may 
comply but may also side with their customers and alert them to quash the 
subpoena.
826
 The cases of Dendrite v. John Does 
827
 set the rules for 
protecting the identities of online posters, yet without establishing absolute 
protection, since competing values (and courts have on occasions determined 




2.1.8.3 – As Froomkin bitterly notes, however, ‗the greatest threat to 
communicative anonymity‘ could arrive with the legal campaigns to strike 
down digital piracy, since these (e.g. the DMCA notice-and-takedown 
process) provide the means to bypass standard ISP immunities of content -
sharing services and render the latter ‗contributory copyright violators‘.
829
 
3. The Internet in European Law - In Europe the factors which mostly 
determined the formation of laws are the general liberalisation position, 
which the EU carried out and applied to telecommunications,
830
 and the 
influential impact of US Internet laws.
831
 This section will, again, focus on 
general EU laws, rather than on solutions adopted by Member States (even 
though these frequently respond to Internet challenges way ahead of the 
regional framework and equally - or even more- effectively). 
3.1 – Chronologically, the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC
832
 was the 
first seemingly Net-conscious legislative act of the EU to be adopted, in the 
sense that it addressed the reality of processing and filing of personal 
                                                 
825




 Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Does 1 through 14, 342 NJ Super. 134, 775 A. 2d 756 
(2001). 
828
 Froomkin, supra 825, 28. 
829
 Ibid. 42. 
830
 García (2009) 43, recognising the inevitability of gradually abandoning public monopolies 
and in accordance with the EC Treaty. 
831
 Thus we may consider the combination of legislation and ensuing jurisprudence. See 
also, Tambini et al. (2008) 28. 
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 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
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information through electronic systems and networks.
833
 The Directive, in 
conjunction with the Council‘s 1981 Convention on Data Protection,
834
 set 
the foundations of data collection, principles which automatic processing of 
information relating to individuals should follow, crystallising the 
conceptualisation of the right to privacy as in the ECHR. Judicial 
development
835




3.1.1 - A well-known advancement, which derived from the Directive,
837
 was 
the ‗Safe Harbor Agreement‘
838
 between the EU and the US,
839
 with a view to 
connecting the comprehensive legislative approach of the former and the 
self-regulatory approach in the latter
840
 and regarding the gathering of data 
from transatlantic commercial transactions. The main precept, underlying 
‗Safe Harbor‘, was to prevent the unauthorised leaking of European 
consumers‘ information across the US market nexus. Organisations that 
comply with the ‗Safe Harbor‘ privacy requirements do not face regulatory 
hindrances from EU jurisdictions when dealing with European customers. 
Note that ‗Safe Harbor‘ obligations of US organisations include placing a 
dispute resolution system for investigating and resolving individual 
complaints to verify compliance; Blizzard, who run WoW, have declared 
their adhering to the ‗Safe Harbor‘ principles.
841
 
3.1.11 – Recent reviews and studies have pointed to several ‗Safe Harbor‘ 
compliance problems,
842
 notably the lower number of participants than the 
one presented in public and, crucially, the selection of independent dispute 
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3.1.2 - Quite early, the data protection framework was supplemented by 
Directive 97/66/EC,
845
 which aimed at setting rules and placing the user of 
electronic networks in the picture for said purposes.
846
 By adapting this latter 
law, Directives 2002/58/EC
847
 (ePrivacy Directive) and 2006/24/EC
848
 
enriched the protection perspective for electronic communications, pinning it 
down within the online context.  
 Generally, though, the overall framework, even from the days of the 
1981 Convention, includes exceptions, which with the latest legislative 
additions tend to expand proportionately. Thus, exceptions are allowed if 
necessary in a democratic society
849
 on grounds of national security, defence, 
public security,
850
 national or EU economic interests,
851
 public safety and 
suppression of criminal offences.
852
  
3.2 – Officially, EU law incorporated rules with regard to digital signatures 





the result of negotiations between the broader commercial sector and 
                                                 
843
 As in ‗Safe Harbor‘ Principle 7 – Enforcement and Dispute Resolution. 
844
 Supra 842, 14. 
845
 Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
telecommunications sector. 
846
 Rowe (1998). 
847
 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications); replaced 
Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the processing of personal data and 
the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector. 
848
 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on 
the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC. 
849
 Convention no. 108 Art 9 (2). 
850
 95/46/EC Art 13 1(a)-(c). 
851
 95/46/EC Art 13 1(e). 
852
 Convention no. 108 Art 9 (2)(a). 
853
 The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN), Pub.L. 106-
229, 14 Stat. 464, 15 U.S.C. ch.96, was enacted on June 30, 2000. 
854
 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 





 in pursuit of establishing a reliable standard (as first 
established in the US Uniform Electronic Transactions Act of 1999). All 
these laws contained general statements as to the validity of electronic 
signatures
856
 as a functionality factor. 
3.3 – The main legislative tool for online conduct was drafted in the 
provisions of Directive 2000/31/EC.
857
 The Directive sought ‗to contribute to 
the proper functioning of the internal market‘
858
 regarding information 
society services. Thus, it approximated provisions relating to ‗the 
establishment of service providers, commercial communications, electronic 
contracts, the liability of intermediaries, codes of conduct, out -of-court 
dispute settlements‘
859
 and court actions. 
 Intermediaries are excluded from liability when services perform as 
mere information conduits, such as in cases of caching, and, when users‘ 
content is being hosted, while all in good faith necessary measures have been 
taken.
860
 ‗[I]nformation society service providers‘ are not obliged ‗to monitor 
the information which they transmit or store‘
861
 thus achieving distance from 
the sphere where involvement with online content becomes qualitatively 
direct. Those provisions appear heavily informed on similar exceptions in the 
US CDA and the DMCA. The broader use of standard Codes of Conduct (as 
in ‗ToS‘) by online enterprises is, in overall, necessitated; incidentally, these 
should adhere to the protection of minors and human dignity.
862
  
3.4 – Materialising in its turn the then recently developed WIPO regime and 
its focus on digital settings, Directive 2001/29/EC (Copyright Directive)
863
 
aimed primarily at maximising harmonisation amongst member States in 
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view of the Internet‘s impact.
864
 First, a right of making available to the 
public
865





and communicating to the public.
868
 Relevant exceptions and limitations to 
copyright are presented exhaustively, as narrowed down in specific 
categories,
869
 and even then, they apply only in ‗certain special cases‘.
870
 
 The Directive also takes a broad approach against the act and means 
of technological circumvention,
871
 embracing all direct and indirect 
infringement potentials.
872
 It does not specify whether measures that states 
will take in view of its implementation
873
 should be of civil, administrative or 
criminal nature.
874
 That gap was halfway covered by Directive 2004/48/EC
875
 
which includes civil measures and remedies.
876
 The last created a ‗Right to 
Information‘ for right-holders to force judicially service providers to disclose 
to them personal information of allegedly infringing users.
877
 Moreover, 
empowerment of right-holders to seize private equipment and assets by 
virtue of potential risk only without the other party having to be heard,
878
 as 
well the apparent widening of the Direct ive‘s breadth to include non-
commercial violations,
879
 have raised controversy. In most of those cases, 
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3.5 – In 2001 the Council of Europe
881
 produced a mechanism of 
international co-operation and standardisation through its Convention on 
Cybercrime.
882
 The Convention provided against a spectrum of offences, 







); content (child 
pornography);
886
 and ‗offences related to infringements of copyright and 
related rights.‘
887
 Moreover, the issue of corporate liability was addressed.
888
 
 An ‗Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning 
the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed 
through Computer Systems‘ saw the light shortly after.
889
 Note that, non-
European states became signatory members of the Convention, the majority 
of which (like the US) did not endorse the Protocol.
890
 
3.6 – Yet, infrastructure is the area, which has been worked out the most via 
the extensive striving to realise policies of liberalised telecommunications. 
As a result, the Internet had been for long caught in a complex web of 
Regulations and Decisions, where unaccountable pieces of legislation 
deliberated topics such as ‗interoperability‘ and ‗networks‘.  
A wave of laws, led by the 2002 Framework Directive,
891
 entered 
simultaneously the scene with the intent to regulate exclusively electronic 
communications networks and services.
892
 With the 2002 Directives, EU law 
                                                 
881
 Within the actual EU framework supplements the Convention with secondary legislation. 
Decisions 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems and 
2000/375/JHA of 29 May 2000 to combat child pornography on the Internet, were drafted 
with an exclusive Internet-focusing scope on mind. 
882
 Convention no. 185 of the Council of Europe, of November 23, 2001. 
883
 Ibid. Articles 2 – 6. 
884
 Ibid. Art 7. 
885
 Ibid. Art 8. 
886
 Ibid. Art 9. 
887
 Ibid. Art 10. 
888
 Ibid. Art 12. 
889
 ETS no. 189 of the Council of Europe, of January 28, 2003. 
890
 Vic, D.  ‗Regulating Hatred‘, in Klang & Murray [eds.] (2005) 45. 
891
 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
Official Journal L 108 , 24/04/2002 P. 0033 – 0050. 
892
 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated 
facilities (Access Directive); Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and 
services (Authorisation Directive); Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of 
[244] 
 
settled down a specific reference field, where objectives of crude 
infrastructural liberalisation overlap with cognition of the Internet‘s societal 
power: a principle of ‗universal service‘
893
 that sets a minimum of 
availability on the market to all European users without discrimination,
894
 
‗interconnection‘ and ‗access‘ for all market undertakings in the market as 
the means of healthy competition for the benefit of users,
895
 and, finally yet 
not directly, Net neutrality.
896
 
3.7 Of Things to Come – The EU legislative perspective remains consistent in 
furthering the project of liberalising the access services front as in amending 
the framework rules.
897
 The latest ‗Telecoms Reform Package‘ of 
infrastructure regulations had sought out in addition to address substantive 
matters. Thus, the legislative proceedings were considerably stalled as the 
drafting was brought under fire for sanctioning users with Internet 
disconnection on the basis of copyright infringements.  
3.71 – The latter openly followed the moderately ascending ‗three -strikes-
down‘ approach. France was the first to introduce a controversial law that 
enforces long-term disconnection from the Internet, without legal recourse, 
after a user has been warned twice for allegedly illegal file-sharing.
898
 The 
law had been found unconstitutional for violating civil liberties and 
fundamental principles of judicial presumption of innocence. Eventually, the 
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Constitutional Council validated the statute, on condition that disconnections 
would require judges to sign them off.
899
 
 The UK moved towards the same direction with the recent Digital 
Economy Act (2010), although the featured provisions of ‗technical 
measures‘ for suspending accounts appear milder in comparison. In the 
aftermath of the Enactment, two of the U.K.‘s largest ISPs have asked the 
High Court to review the Act, to that extent this might be violating users‘ 
privacy rights and online communications stability.
900
 
3.72 – After lengthy negotiations over the Telecoms Package, the amended 
Framework Directive included a paragraph that requires Member States to 
respect fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons when taking 
measures regarding access to and use of electronic communications.
901
 The 
insertion was hailed as a victory for user rights. However, as pointed out in 
commentaries, the general statement of principles provides for a 
deontological rather than a pragmatic regulatory prospect. In essence, the 
door to ‗three-strikes‘ measures is still open and the text does not concern 
restrictions by private actors.
902
 
3.7.1 - Notably, few jurisdictions have attempted the entrenchment of 
Internet access as part of their domestic fundamental rights orders. Of these 
approaches others operate again on abstract deontological levels,
903
 others 
objectify circumstantially technological instances to the degree that they 
abandon the universalisability of basic rights statements.
904
  
4. Facing the Answers of Law – Returning to the inquiries that opened this 
part‘s analysis, we may place the consequential significance of the above 
legislative expressions within perspective, that is, to comprehend the 
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structural mandates for reshaping online participation narratives that law has 
imparted.  
Arguably the key instances in the development of Internet -related law 
were the CDA and the DMCA. This is not an axiom, drawing from the US 
origins of the Net or from the apparent global exporting of US rules: rather, 
the CDA and its judicial adventures marked the first legal episode to reach 
directly into the substance of Internet communications. The DMCA, on the 
other hand, apart from being one of the first legislations to incorporate the 
WIPO Treaties, was deeply influenced by the intense lobbying of the US-
based international music and movie industry giants. To that point, the Act 
contributed in pre-emptying appreciations of the Internet experience under IP 
meanings and it formed the pretext upon which an entire normative culture 
was developed to govern controversially online interactions.  
4.1 - The CDA, as much as the reasoning which struck it down, submitted to 
the one-dimensional schema of perceiving the Internet as a traditional 
information conduit. This understanding gave little space for developing 
breadth of legal imagination for informing conceptually freedom of 
expression (crucially summoned during the CDA and all thereafter relevant 
litigation) with alternative meanings of the interactive, transforming, and 
interchanging human existence. Thus, the playfield for interpreting legally 
the emerging means was downright limited to an apparent opposition 
between the citizens‘ right to participate in commerce and state -enforced 
morals and ethics. This juridical initiative constructed connotations of the 
online public interest that functioned well at the time in court but, 
simultaneously, might have barred the legal discourse from envisaging socio -
technologically precise articulations.  
4.1.1 - Law questioned whether onscreen material was offensive or not: it 
bypassed subtly the true ―what‖, i.e. whether onscreen act ivity was now 
outdating and revolutionising common understandings of how information 
was to be used and experienced. Actually, ―information‖ , in the opted for 
legal terminology, denoted the (marginally distortive) typecasting of 
transferable, exchangeable and, ultimately, consumable data as the uniform 
[247] 
 
expression for communicating onscreen material. Identity parameters which 
the online public might be deriving from interacting with online content were 
plainly overlooked, surprisingly, even by those defenders of civil liberties 
that reconsider freedom of speech in search of fresh perspectives and 
phraseologies. Within these lines, the battle for online content was lost 
before it had even begun, the vigorous copyright claims coming later on to 




4.1.2 - The law struggled to perceive and reason with online contextualities. 
Instead of using as a starting point for analysis the community sensibility 
which Internet denizens had developed and been practising (i.e. the 
cyberspace ideal), it relied on the vocabulary and competitive subtext of 
legal procedures for extracting a normative response: one systemically (and 
systematically) preoccupied with how the newly discovered ―virtual lands‖ 
were to be distributed amongst all interested parties. We need to examine 
this disposition.  
4.1.21 - We may draw parallels that appear anything but coincidental, by 
being reminded of how systemised humanity has treated nature. Forests, for 
example, seen as resource of raw material and land opportunity schemes, 
were heavily exploited, until humans realised impending dangers in the 
process and started declaring national parks or protected natural areas.  
4.1.22 - Despite artificial, the Internet poses a similar setting, a social 
communication ecology where the dryly entrenched ―information‖ stands out 
as the raw material metaphor. Motivations for exploiting it are blinding us 
from fully appreciating the larger societal eco-system. Only when 
knowledge, social implementation of identity, and other, less visible to us 
now, values, which lie within the global online connectivity, will be barred 
destructively to the survival of the hoi polloi, only then will it finally 
become clear how our initial choice of a legal mindset was largely mistaken. 
4.1.23 - Policy makers, including legislators, fail to realise the impacts. They 
cannot see the forest for the tree when they systemically reproduce 
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proprietary regulatory logics. The vastness of the forest is reduced the 
moment one makes the start by declaring that the any tree can belong – 
indifferent to whom. This marks a radical transformation in our approach to 
the given landscape, the ontological presence of property now dominating 
our engaging with physical experience. Property methodises human contact 
according to its inherent logical preset and is thus imposing limits to 
imagining alternative approaches to interaction. Therefore, proprietary 
understanding crucially monopolises and undercuts comprehension, even 
more when considering the central role it attains in the traditions and 
institutions that have undertaken the task of societal development.  
4.1.3 - Even though inspired by democratic insights, no matter how strongly 
submitting to the ideal and principles of liberty, the question of how the 
Internet should be distributed, which the CDA case posed in its heart, 
ascribed directly to possessory rationales. Distribution predicates proprietary 
appreciation towards the given interaction space, the participation experience 
and its constituents. Thus, subsequent developments in Internet laws were 
ontologically determined by this take on the online society, namely, a 
consistent systemic reproduction of a very specific attitude, which prescribes 
that entities can be possessed and thus manipulated, landscapes and nods 
should be owned, or else none should exist outside the only comprehension 
module that law can utter. From that point law production and practice have 
shown that Net access and participation became matter of discussion and 
decision in exclusively proprietary terms of possession and ownership.   
4.2 - This leads directly to the DMCA. The Act made apparent the general 
direction which the will of law intended politically the implementation of IP 
legislation to follow. 
4.2.1 - As an online commentator observed, despite representing a ‗balance 
between the rights of copyright holders, the needs of ISPs, and the ability of 
people to make fair use of copyrighted materials,‘ the measures which the 
DMCA introduced, especially the ‗notice-and-takedown‘ system, are working 
in favour of copyright holders.
906
 The case of the unofficial gaming guide to 
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 <Security Focus, 03/04/06>. 
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WoW alludes to a dense web of mechanisms that, combined, impose 
hindrances to experiencing the Internet as a genuine conduit to social and 
personal development via the exchange of information.  
4.2.11 - Online life is established upon the circulation of copies of 
information, hosted in the form of links, text, images and audio works; this 
is, precisely, the foundation upon which the operation of Web 2.0 has been 
conceived as a multimedia experience. The majority of DMCA ‗cease and 
desist‘ complaints are actually targeting content hosting services the likes of 
weblogs or YouTube, where users communicate via appropriating cultural 
artefacts. Being reminded of the chilling effects which the ‗takedown‘ 
notices procedure initiates, as well as of the legal and financial inequalities 
between those parties usually involved in these scenarios, is crucial in 
developing an understanding of the law as it stands and its purposive focus. 
The mechanisms themselves smile on actors with superior legal and financial 
resources. They are drafted in such a manner that they simply marginalise the 
individual user. On the other hand, content hosts intermediaries are usually 
in the unpleasant position of being bombarded by bulks of complaints and 
law suits and thus they are de facto opting for adopting a neutral stance and 
are complying with the DMCA process. Furthermore, as it was contested in 
courts,
907
 the requirement of a ‗good faith belief‘
908
 from copyright owners 
when complaining about hosted material is not accompanied by an objective 
standard. Thus, a complaint may overlook lawful use and yet no liability be 
applied for improper infringement notification, where the copyright holder 
does not ‗knowingly materially‘ misrepresent that ‗material or activity is 
infringing,‘
909
 even though his assessment was unreasonable, based on mere 
suspicion or rushed.
910
 In the meantime, the host intermediary who relies on 
the apparent good faith of the complaining party must comply, while alleged 
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4.3 - The EU legislative project shows even less aspirations towards building 
up a comprehensive insider‘s treatment of the Internet, preferring to pursue 
consistently its constructing of trans-state market trafficking. The more, 
however, the outside perspectives engulf exclusively Internet activity the 
more they lock down the latter in pre-emptive normative modules, which 
may not come adequately into compliance with online operational logics. EU 
law has ventured with little legal imagination and thus less daringly into 
analysing the premises of online participation. That is arguably shown in 
legislative delays over technical issues surrounding online behaviours that 
end up in adopting US solutions (e.g. liability models, e-commerce etc).  
4.3.1 - For example, three elements have underpinned network regulation, 
‗the guarantee of free competition, the management of limited resources and 
the protection of users.‘
912
 As it will be explained in the last part of this 
Chapter, protection of users aligns with familiar ethical standards in EU 
policies rather than proceeding with a politically informed account of access 
to online information. Hence, the plans for revising the 1989 Television 
without Frontiers legislation in view of Web TV aimed at regulating product 
placement where children might be affected, tobacco products were promoted 
or consumers were directly encouraged to purchase or rent goods or 
services.
913
 Directive 2003/33/EC bans advertising and sponsorship of 
tobacco products in cross-border media, including websites etc.  
The lack of substantial insights into actual online civility from such 
approaches has opened gaps in the body of laws, exposing the integrity of the 
information society to several unexpected attacks. It is one thing to admit 
that e.g. the scope of the E-commerce Directive did not include liabilities for 
linking
914
 - an easily rectifiable regulatory shortage - and quite another to 
realise that cumulative legislative efforts have eventually left users without 




 García  (2009) 32. 
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(January 2005). 
914
 German Federal Supreme Court BGH, Decision of 1 April, 2004, I ZR 317/01. 
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substantial guarantees for their unhindered access to the Internet. These 
circumstances present an interpretation of the controversy over the latest 
Telecoms Reform Package. At the same time, as occasional national policies 
are not adequately counterweighed, domestic laws produce socially stalling 
results regarding access to and use of the online setting.
915
  
4.4 – On the other hand, the rise of IP law has become integral within the 
overall legislative development. Itemisation of information and thus its 
propertisation has been probably inevitable, as commercial exploitation of 
communicated content entered the stage. IP signals a popularised 
understanding pretext for appropriating onscreen representations and the 
kind of regulatory aesthetics that frames (and, in reverse, was framed by) the 
exchanges of creative investments between the online and the offline settings 
(in unaccounted forms including music, news, data, games etc). At the same 
time, in resetting objects as rivalrous goods, it represents a conscious 
decision to create scarcity.
916
  
4.4.1 - Domestic and international IP laws follow a stream installed by the 
TRIPS agreements and later reaffirmed in the WIPO treaties, and one that 
has been much criticised for shifting away from the public interest and 
‗towards the monopolistic privileges of IPR holders.‘
917
 Those international 
instruments synchronised the concept of intellectual property with the needs 
of systematic intellectual production in the global market, and with the 
demands of increased mass media distribution to protect enormous 
investments in branded entertainment.
918
 Therefore, TRIPS first obliged 
member states to provide for criminal procedures in cases of trademark 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy, requiring imprisonment penalties and 
sufficient fines for providing a deterrent.
919
 
4.4.2 - The ensuing globalised rewriting of IP laws brought closer together 
the US and the European civil law notions of copyright.  
                                                 
915
 For example, Greek Law N.3037/02 had awkwardly banned all online games in an 
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916
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4.4.21 - The former nurtures the Anglo-American common law conceptions 
of copyright and pursues utilitarian considerations in the Constitution:
920
 the 
exclusivity of the property right provides creators with incentives to produce 
for promoting science ‗and useful Arts.‘
921
 
4.4.22 – Europe has long subscribed copyright to author‘s rights as founded 
in the Berne Convention, that is, the right to safeguard such aspects of the 
work as its integrity, and to control its copies - in the economic sense.
922
 
Direct constitutional protection is provided only for a fundamental right to IP 
in general,
923




4.4.3 – However, the recent wave of EU copyright Directives shows 
straightforward concern with ‗the strengthening of the European copyright 
industry in a competitive global market.‘
925
 For example, in the preamble of 
Directive 2004/48/EC the legislator asserts at length how strong IPR 
enforcement is ‗of paramount importance  for the success of the Internal 
Market‘ and urgently necessitated, for otherwise ‗innovation and creativity 
are discouraged and investment diminished.‘
926
 Eventually, in scope and 




4.4.4 - Such protection of IP online has been subject to continuing 
disagreement, since its aggressive facilitation of exclusivities collides openly 
with the needs of ‗broad distribution and sharing of knowledge,‘ and over the 
very same value strands of creativity and progress.
928
 These matters are 
explained in the following parts and in the next Chapter.  
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II. Laws for the Virtual 
Several legal dynamics come together to shape the character of the 
regulation of VWs. Some of them derive naturally from the overarching 
context, i.e. the broader Internet-related legislations. Others come into play 
due to VW setups being directly committed to commercial practices - hence 
the prominence of  contract and commercial laws; some, finally, are conjured 
contractually, whereas their influence would have otherwise been far lesser 
(notably, the intellectual property rhetoric).  
Participation in VWs practically ―lands‖ in law. Like with computer 
games before and even with computer technologies in general,
929
 law applies 
in a piecemeal fashion, and that is wherever links between participation and 
existing regulation can be first comprehended then identified as suitable.  
 The general problematic of how law reaches participation in VWs 
was explained in previous Chapters. The following sections illustrate the 
building of an idiosyncratic legal regime: ―idiosyncratic‖ not exactly because 
of the noted originalities in the regulated subject matter, but rather due to its 
developmental trajectory and the potential it holds within the specific 
juridico-political conjuncture in time.   
1. The Rule of Contract –The familiar practical and normative perplexities 
that Internet communications yield, initiated quickly widespread reliance on 
contracts for regulating the use of web services and participation in online 
application platforms. Law-making institutions faced the challenge of 
accommodating the utility of contracts to the increasing demands of 
procedural e-commerce realities, their responses revolving around (i) the 
compliance of online agreement formalities with the traditional triplet offer-
acceptance-consideration, and (ii) dispute resolution. Local juridical 
perspectives, however, were unprepared for the frequency and diversity of 
legal counter-solutions, which in its entirety the over-active globalised 
setting would generously introduce on every occasion of cross-border 
engagements.  
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 Tunney (2001) reflects upon similar past debates over the possibility of sui generis 
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Despite the shortcomings of this arrangement, standard ToS and 
EULAs still make for the plausible regulatory tools, offering the flexibility 
to overcome imposed dysfunctions with privately decided settlements. Yet 
the same advantageous trait can easily transform into a subversive factor: the 
case studies indicated possible lapses, which some would argue that they are 
persistently haunting the application of contract law to online settings. 
1.1 “Dissecting” the EULA – By name, the End-User Licence Agreement 
reveals the specific contractual disposition‘s gravity points.  
1.1.1 Licensing - Software licensing assigns a limited use right over a 
copyrighted software work,
930
 which, in the case of VWs, is restricted within 
the intended entertainment function that the software‘s operation principally 
facilitates. Therefore, the game software supports the persisting illusion of a 
very particularly imagined and thus represented interactive setting: the 
licensee agrees to run this software, solely for gaining access to the 
interactive experience of the online service as decided by the OSP. The 
second leg of this scheme is contractually realised by agreement with the 
required ToS/ToU. Understandably, if one wants to interpret the boundaries 
of licensing in relation to a particular software operation, the ToS that 
expressively determine the limited use by reference to presiding service 
performance must also be considered. 
The ―non-exclusive‖ licence differentiates substantially the licensee to 
the owner. Whereas EULAs insist on their non-exclusive character, the 
purchasing user is neither considered nor treated in terms of rights as an 
owner.
931
 Moreover, licensing legitimises the customer in using software, an 
activity which it further shapes at the actual owner‘s will by setting a 
structure of imposed restrictions. 
1.1.2 Agreement - EULAs adhere basically to the ―click-wrap‖ licensing 
model. Its enforceability was first contested in US courts, adjudicating on 
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 In the following paragraphs, generally on software licenses from Reed & Angel [eds.] 
(2003) 46-55 and 200. 
931
 The distinction of licensing from selling software conditions proper use of the client 






 on software purchases.
933
 Later, when online 
―click-wrap‖ agreements came into judicial focus, successive US  decisions 
approved of their validity.
934
 The principles of commercial and contractual 
freedom in US legal doctrine allow parties to include in their agreements and 
put into force between them any terms or conditions that adhere to legitimate 
private law restrictions.
935
 Thus, appropriate limitations of liability may 
come in as acceptable. 
―Click-wrap‖ licences consist of extensive collections of terms with 
content that is non-negotiable by individual customers. In favour of 
consumer protection, the 1993 EC Directive on the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts
936
 prescribes scrutiny of such agreements in view of 
'significant imbalance in the parties‘ rights and obligations' and under the 




1.1.3 End-User – In essence, the licensing statement intensifies limits, which 
first sets implicitly the ‗End-User‘ identifier. The term does not simply 
indicate ‗the ultimate purchaser‘
938
 of the software product; it aptly 
dissociates common users from the application on the market -reflecting 
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criterion of consumption. This logic considers all users to be consumers and 
all consumers vice versa users, locking the meaning of ―user‖ in a tautology 
that excludes all works made with or through the use of the marketed 
software from being classified on a similar level of ―creations‖.  The end -
user only consumes and never produces.  
1.2 Laws of the EULA - Contracts of ‗uniform and inflexible‘
939
 terms fulfil 
a key function in contemporary B2C mass markets,
940
 accounting for more 
than ninety-nine percent of contracts that govern routine and important 
transactions alike, from bus tickets, package receipts and electric toasters to 
automobile purchases, consumer credit and insurance.
941
 By function, 
standard-form contracts offer practical
942
 and ethical advantages in such 
business models
943




1.2.1 - In EULAs the conflict between the US and EU jurisprudential 
perspectives over online transactions is amplified, where either contexts 
reserve different scrutiny of fairness regarding standard-form contracts and, 
secondly, they expose diametrically opposite attitudes to consumer 
protection.  
1.2.11 – The European approach is directly set upon consumer electronic 
contracting, with the E-Commerce Directive excluding the particular trend 
from its general ‗coordinated field‘
945
 to transfer it intentionally into ad hoc 
regulatory spheres. In agreement with a previous Distance Selling 
Directive,
946
 the protective measures of ‗the consumer‘s member state of 
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residence‘ always take priority.
947
 From there, framework control is mainly 
assumed by the Unfair Contract Terms Directive as dealing with non-
negotiated terms of standard-form consumer contracts.  
1.2.12 - On the contrary, US law lacks of a similar systematisation over 
unfair terms,
948
 and, not differentiating between B2B and B2C contracts,
949
 
its mandatory minimum level of consumer protection is much lower.
950
 
Courts generally enforce standard-form contracts, except when they believe 
that ‗businesses have gone too far‘,
951
 in which case they bar those terms that 
offend public norms.
952
 It has been observed that current treatments tend to 
investigate unfairness in contract formation defects rather than in the 
unbalanced allocations of liabilities and rights.
953
  
Potential abuses are reviewed under the doctrines of 
unconscionability, restatement, and reasonable expectations.
954
 
1.2.12.1 - Uncoscionability examines ‗oppression and unfair surprise‘ ‗as a 
matter of law‘ mainly in sales of goods contracts
955
 – without other types of 
contractual agreements being necessarily excluded.
956
 A dichotomy has been 
recognised between procedural (i.e. unconscionable conduct in the contract -
making process
957
) and substantive unconscionability (i.e. deficient 





 tests the state of mind of the term-drafting party, 
whether they were expecting that the taker of the contract would not have 
assented if she knew that the writing ‗contained a particular term‘.
960
 In fact, 
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under the restatement provisions vendors do not expect customers to either 
read or understand standard-forms.
961
  
1.2.12.3 - Finally, the reasonable expectations doctrine suggests that terms 
lying ‗outside what a party might reasonably expect‘ should not be 
enforced.
962
 Such expectations measure with the consumers‘ experience, 
objective interpretation of the contract‘s contextual aims and operation
963
 and 
the policy it lays down.
964
 
1.2.13 – In principle, EULA enforceability should also check with the 
oversimplified click-wrap format‘s compatibility with traditional conceptions 
of acceptance - in other words, does clicking the ―I Agree‖ onscreen button 
legitimise the process? But this shibboleth has long time now been bypassed, 
with the auspices of successive court decisions and the tacit approval of 
Internet legislation,
965
 becoming of no particular concern here.
966
 
1.2.2 – The typical EULA and ToS contractual narrative, which the majority 
of VWs replicates, is summarised upon the following principal points:
967
 (i) 
full OSP ownership of VW content and derivative user-created content;
968
 (ii) 
full OSP discretion in deciding over user activity and account issues; (iii) in 
disjunction submission of legal disputes to either the OSP‘s locale or to 
arbitration; and (iv) maximum limitation of OSP liabilities. The uniformity 
of terms - in disposition within the agreement and, further on, in form across 
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the industry - follows the mass consumer market‘s practised alertness to 
uncalculated risks, particularly to juridical risks.
969
 
1.2.21 – For law, contractual validity reflects fairness. Broadly speaking, a 
definition of ―fairness‖ can reach levels of ambivalence and elusiveness 
similar to delineating ―justice‖. Unfairness describes modes of conduct in the 
preparation and presentation of standard-form contracts that may disrupt the 
ethics, operability and credibility of market relationships. The juridico-
political understanding of the potentially affected sphere perceives in the 
foreground the need for procedural balance and stability and, further on, the 
preservation of those greater social values which the rule of law ultimately 
guards. 
 The overall premise posits that the bargaining process should not be 
‗unduly one-sided‘ and that contractual terms ought not to produce 
ostensibly oppressive results.
970
 In this sense, contractual validity tests 
examine whether standard-form terms are presented clearly and 
comprehensively, in a manner that gives the receiving party the opportunity 
to read them in advance. In addition, the general rules apply, i.e. contracts 
made under duress,
971
 contrary to public policy or involving sales of basic 
rights should not be enforced.
972
  
1.2.21.1 – US uncoscionability deploys a higher threshold,
973
 where courts 
require proof of both its substantial and procedural components.
974
 While it 
allows flexibility in considering fairness, it does not provide for a certain 
standard upon which a solid policy regarding contracts can be consistently 
followed. In contrast, the EU Directive achieves this, albeit with rigid 
formalisation limiting its own reflexes against unpredicted future 
developments.  
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1.2.22 – EULAs and ToS reproduce the non-negotiable, ―take-it-or-leave-it‖ 
fashion of their paper-world counterparts, with standardised, long and 
detailed legal jargon.
975
 Addressing the demands of mass consumer markets, 
they are drafted to ‗meet the needs of many people‘ – not of individuals – but 
in a manner reflecting the ‗interests of the party with the superior bargaining 
power‘, which happens to be the one drafting of terms.
976
 As previously with 
shrink-wrap licences,
977
 this contractual attitude hits close to be seen as 
imposing a contract of adhesion,
978
 i.e. a contract that manifests such 
inequality that it will likely attract scrutiny for unfairness.
979
  
1.2.22.1 – Specific mentioning should be made to the ―browse -wrap‖ 
contract. Here the licence includes hyperlinks to terms outside the main 
agreement text, which the OSP considers of equal binding effect 
nevertheless. One could argue that the latest instalment of the SL ToS 
surfaces as a browse-wrap contract, since it presupposes agreeing to several 
scattered service policies
980




1.3 Standard-Terms in Digital - Faced with their limited comprehension of 
digitised environments, courts have eagerly relied on the assumption that 




1.3.1 - Where the status of standard-forms as genuine contracts has been 
reasonably contested for not conforming to traditional consent -giving, it has 
been counter-suggested that such terms perform actually as warnings, and as 
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such they provide contract issuers with a subsequent legal advantage:
983
 out 
of court, they pre-emptively project a presumption of legitimacy which 
deters raising of legal action; in litigation, they formulate the starting point 
for judicial interpretation of the contract‘s content.  
1.3.11 - Generally, that consumers comprehend the nature and force of 
standard terms within common commercial contexts to thus trust reasonably 
to be bound by them
984
 constitutes the strongest presumption of implied 
consent. With click-wrap agreements assent is broadly indicated, especially 
where scroll-to-bottom technical solutions (as in the case of the WoW 
EULA) advocate that the user had the opportunity to review the text.
985
 




1.3.2 - In early EULAs, localising jurisdiction in favour of the game 
company was zealously pursued, while, at the same time, the gaming services 
were inviting in users from foreign settings that are less than inclined to 
accept such territorial narrowing down and by mere virtue of commercial 
contracts. Apparently, such tensions culminated between the US online 
gaming industry and the increasing numbers of EU-based consumers. With 
the improvement of Internet connections and the growth of gaming markets, 
OSPs have either conceded that certain legal concessions on their part are 
unavoidable, guaranteeing the service‘s cross-border legal compatibility, or 
have sliced regionally the offered service, as in the case of WoW.  
Thus, the agreement‘s inter partes effect, structured upon almost total 
exclusion for the OSP from any possibly arising obligations,
987
 allows for 
partial compromises in clauses like 'some states do not allow the foregoing 
limitations of liability, so they may not apply to you‘ (conciliating directly 
markets governed by state protectionism).  
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Nevertheless, EULAs (as well as online ToS) naturally localise jurisdiction 
rather than subscribe to the 'forum-shopping' option, which potentially 
exposes service operators to scattered legal attacks and would drag them 
through tremendous court expenses. This is why OSPs have attempted to 




1.3.3 - Rule ‗elaboration and clarification‘ falls within the apparently 
arbitrary discretion of OSPs;
989
 the threat of account termination being 
present, few OSPs provide ‗a clear sense of the judicial or punitive process 
involved‘;
990
 user content may be deleted by the OSP at any time, without 
notice and even without given reason.
991
 
1.3.4 - The general argument in favour of one-sided contracts holds that they 
offer protection against consumers‘ opportunistic behaviours,
992
 a point that 
on several instances makes sense with regard to users‘ exploiting their 
relationships with VWs. However, whereas deeming the EULA valid as an 
adhesion contract requires investigating its market context,
993
 this latter is 
being written in more complex terms than conventional economic 
perspectives are prepared to address. 
1.4 – Regarding EULAs outside the VW context, the adhesive character of 
the format has been judicially confirmed, upon basic grounds of both 
procedural and substantive unfairness.
994
 An agreement was not binding, 
where the full text was not viewable but ‗a reference to the existence of 
license terms on a submerged screen.‘
995
 Choices of forum clauses have also 
been invalidated for either submitting consumers who have suffered only 
minimal damages to remote jurisdictions
996
 or for violating public policy.
997
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Finally, the substantially superior bargaining power of the drafting party may 
have brought the agreement closer to unenforceability.
998
   
1.4.1 – Such instances would have assisted in framing a clearer US 
unfairness paradigm, if not for the lack of uniformity of standards across 
states, preventing generalised approximations.
999
 The baselines for fleshing 
out the overall perspective as it applies in practice are nevertheless 
adequately drawn along the following points:  
1.4.11 – waivers of fundamental rights are in principle not considered 
sufficiently valid if imposed by a EULA since the latter lacks the negotiation 
requirement that such serious relinquishments necessitate;
1000
  
1.4.12 – conversely, it is doubtful whether strong federal laws like the 
Copyright Act can pre-empt EULAs;
1001
 on the contrary, courts seem 
favourable towards clauses that force users into abandoning rights of fair 
use
1002
 or their under law rights to various forms of UGC;
1003
 
1.4.13 – however, states do not share consensus over the enforceability of 
exculpatory clauses
1004
 and to that degree neither over the furthest ends that 
one-sided terms may stretch beyond limits made plausible by federal statutes.  
1.4.2 – Though not comparable in numbers, European litigation over EULAs 
has presented more consistent responses under the Unfair Terms Directive 
regime. In France 36 different terms of the transferred standard US 
licence
1005
 were held to be violating domestic consumer unfairness laws
1006
 as 
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did terms of the same EULA that ‗related to contract  acceptance by virtue of 
visiting a website,‘ to ‗modifications of the contract‘
1007
 and to liability 
disclaimers were invalidated.
1008
 In Germany, major server and software 
providers were judicially bound to cease-and-desist declarations and to pay 




1.5 – The few VW EULA cases that have reached the courts can indicate 
only prospective decision paths and interpretations of law.  
1.5.1 – In Bragg v. Linden the mandatory arbitration clause of SL was found 
to be substantively unconscionable for subjecting average consumers to 
unreasonably burdensome dispute resolution processes,
1010
 combined with the 
excessive powers that ToS grant Linden Lab with over deciding contractual 
breach and terminating accounts. The law requiring both substantive and 
procedural unconscionability, the court held the latter in the OSPs superior 
bargaining power, where no alternative VWs to SL where participants can 
acquire property rights existed on the market.
1011
 Hence, the court reasoning 
over unfairness derived from appreciating an illustration of the current VWs 
market. 
1.5.2 – The findings of the Chinese Arctic Ice decision extracted from the 
contractual relationship the OSP‘s obligation towards the subscriber: 
commercial contracts as juridical tools confer good faith expectations in 
market contexts that operate both ways. Indirectly the court recognised the 
user‘s right to the account being kept intact, at least to that part where the 
OSP is reasonably expected to guarantee and provide this.
1012
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1007
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1008
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1.5.3 – The MDY v. Blizzard case
1013
 deliberated the significant matter of the 
EULA‘s reach in overriding federal copyright law. According to law, owners 
of software copies are permitted to make other copies for personal use
1014
 and 
either resell or lend their copy (‗first sale‘ doctrine).
1015
 The appeal struck 
down the first ruling, which by agreeing that players do not own the 
purchased copy and are merely licensed to use it, had indirectly simulated 
EULA breach to copyright infringement.  
1.6 – The developmental trajectory of individual and community 
consciousness in the Internet-mediated society is determined by the 
experiential interaction with online platforms, entities and artefacts and by 
the imparting of the Internet‘s practical ethics. Chapter 3 discussed such 
processes amounting to the formation, broader circulation and, finally, 
establishment of meanings and values.  
 We may reasonably assume that where legal systems are not yet well -
integrated with net-based societal values, functional and intellectual 
overtones of VW participation lie way beyond the comprehension of 
conventional judiciaries. Thus, the vocabulary of the examined relevant laws 
is formed around economic relationships and subjectivity notions like the 
‗consumer‘ and conceptions of social justice and public policy that reflect at 
best basic understandings of the offline systemic civility.  
 However, the intersection of our insights into online life with 
knowledge of VWs, allows specific concerns to be ident ified: interests in 
virtual personae, avatars and assets; integrity of online accounts in terms of 
content and continuity of communications; association with the social and 
cultural capitals that are circulated amongst functional and intellectual online 
communities; restrictions and terminations of all involved activities at the 
absolute discretion of OSPs. These are issues to which users relate directly, 
yet fail to come into ontological compatibility with our current legal reality 
and are thus plausibly excluded from evaluations of EULAs and ToS. 
                                                 
1013
 Supra 4(II)[1.3.1.13]. 
1014
 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
1015
 17 U.S.C. § 109. 
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1.6.1 - Deciding over their legal significance presupposes being in position 
to trace the links connecting the virtual with the actual values rhetoric. This 
particular undertaking identifies with exploring the premise of online human 
subjectivity to its furthest ends and is openly addressed in the second and 
third parts of the next Chapter. 
2. Virtual Property – The question of online virtual property (VP) does not 
draw meaning from the semantics of topological metaphors, which assist our 
daily visualising of Internet involvement and which even law has reproduced 
en mass.
1016
 Instead, as it has been suggested, a consistent treatment of 
virtual property envisages the palpability of online types of computer code 
that manage to perform as persistent, rivalrous and ‗interconnected‘
1017
 data 




Regarding VWs, VP refers either to onscreen representations turning 
into tangibility signifiers for users to complete their melding into virtual 
societies or to the range of MMORPGs artefacts that have spawned 
secondary online markets.
1019
 Neither perspective is incompatible with the 
above conceptualisation of VP: beyond the illusion of onscreen images,  
virtual items are nevertheless computer code,
1020
 at the discretion of users to 
interact with, appropriate or transfer.  
2.1 - The idea of VP has appealed to many as becoming the key factor in 
penetrating the barriers of absolute control which OSPs have placed around 
VWs, in the sense that it could justify users‘ possessing of virtual items and 
ownership of UGC. Actually, the claim of VP has often been seen as 
recourse against contractual alienation.
1021
 Several suggestions have been 
made. For example, the relation of the user with the VW may be seen as 
leasehold, where virtual items become usufructs. By drawing parallels to 
                                                 
1016
 Hunter (2003) 472, argues of courts‘ spatial treatment of Cyberspace in the extensive 
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1017
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actual-world usufructs, the issue of impermanency, with which one might 




 The commonly reported user claims to VP have been refuted on the 
same Lockean treatise they have relied on. Therefore, following Locke‘s 
thesis that one makes property of what ‗he removes out of the state that 
nature hath provided, and [...] hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it 
something that is his own‘,
1023
 counterarguments address two main 
contradictions in the VP-related assertions: (i) privately-owned VWs hardly 
present a commons where unclaimed properties exist in ‗a state of natur e‘; 
and (ii) the meaning of ‗labour‘ as an act of appropriating goods from the 
common does not comply with facilitated as intended VW contexts.
1024
     
 Nevertheless, the above problematic introduces another dimension to 
the issue, differentiating between VP as such (game items, virtual lands etc) 
and as ―malleable‖ raw material for creating genuine UGC.
1025
 This 
distinction involves more of those settings performing in the vein of SL and 
leads directly to the discussion further below, in the section about IP.  
2.2 - From a juridical viewpoint, notions of cyberproperty have merged on 
the Internet with traditional legal schemas to recreate electronic equals to 
trespasses to chattels. According to such accounts, web and email service 
owners ‗have absolute rights to exclude others from electronic interaction 
with their equipment.‘
1026
 Such references made to ‗access‘ and ‗interaction‘ 
connote interference with both material and semi-material properties (i.e. 
servers and stored data respectively). Such substantive degree o f physicality 
allows property laws from actuality to invade virtuality. In other words, even 
where the assets in legal discussion are indicated via symbolic terms of 
virtual weapons and land.  
                                                 
1022
 Lastowka & Hunter (2004) 42 – 43. 
1023
 Locke (1988) 288. 
1024
 Horowitz (2007) 451 – 452. 
1025
 Ibid. 453 – 454. 
1026
 Carrier & Lastowka (2007) 1484. 
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2.2.1 – In the VW and law scholarship the question of criminali ty was raised 
and dismissed with regard to stealing items within game contexts.
1027
 
However, where misconduct reaches beyond virtuality and triggers actual 
criminal liabilities,
1028
 involved losses and damages to virtual items may lead 
directly to judicial remedy. Regulatory responses of this calibre and of 
explicit proprietary accent have developed in south-eastern Asian 
jurisdictions. 
2.2.11 - In South Korea where video games are extremely popular, 
authorities make frequent arrests on grounds of hacked or fraudulently 
acquired virtual property. The intense judicial activity is not backed by 
specific property rules but zigzags between antitrust and consumer protection 
laws. In overall, practices of sales have been held to be legitimate, yet OSP 
ownership has never been doubted in this framework.
1029
  
2.2.11.1 – South Korea‘s Supreme Court has ruled that VW currencies are on 
par with ―real-world‖ money, acquitting gamers charged of selling virtual 
assets – earned in the normal course of playing - for money.
1030
 The decision 
indirectly decriminalises game service enterprises associated with out -of-




2.2.12 - The rapidly growing MMORPG market, but also the development of 
profitable gold-farming operations, has analogously contributed in China 
towards forming serious appreciations over virtual property values. These 
jurisprudential inclinations became clearer in the light of the Arctic Ice case.  
Eventually, virtual theft is on many accounts considered punishable.
1032
 
                                                 
1027
 Lastowka & Hunter ‗Virtual Crime‘ in Balkin & Noveck [eds.] (2006) 121 – 135. 
1028
 Kerr (2008) 11, narrates the case of a teenager who was arrested for tricking users of 
the Habbo Hotel VW into giving away their login details to steal virtual items from their 
accounts. 
1029
 Fairfield (2005) 1087 – 1089. 
1030
 <CNet News 19/01/10>. 
1031
 <Korea Intelligent Technology Times 12/01/10>  
1032
 Supra 1029, 1084 – 1086. 
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2.2.13 - Among Asian jurisdictions, Taiwanese legislation has more actively 
encompassed virtual property by objectifying it and protecting it against 
fraud, in view of both its personal user account and monetary values.
1033
 
2.2.2 – These perspectives are not foreign to western legal grammars in their 
philosophy and pursued practical disposition. The premises of objectification 
in legal actualisations of MMORPG data and accounts converge with the 
noted judicial utilisations of trespass metaphors. The truly instrumental 
meeting point, however, lies in normative frameworks subsuming shared 
commercial principles of service integrity and of trust between business and 
customers and rearranging these into basic regulatory reasoning. Therefore, 
reinstating the content of an account to its former status in cases of evident 
negligence of service operators, or recognising damaging interference of 
third parties with data that constitute online accounts, may form reasonable 
expectations for one to hold onto in markets operating under the Rule of 
Law. 
 However, this latter presupposition is exposed to further juridico-
political checks with shuffles that commercial forces regularly sponsor. For 
example, the broad liability disclaimers and clauses that force users to 
relinquish potential rights in EULAs attempt to antagonise social 
expectations;
1034
 they are thereupon assessed over the counter-standard of 
socio-commercial rationality that they nurture. 
2.3 – Property per se receives little regulatory attention in mainstream 
analyses of the legal implications of VWs, for it was quickly superseded by 
the sophisticated rhetoric of the IP approach (coming up next). The tendency 
holds true even more for instances of general legal production that reverted 
to IP in order to delineate appreciations of data.
1035
 Instead, the Asian 
―traditionalistic‖ focus on VW accounts simplifies aspects of the general 
legal treatment that might be in need of being partly levelled down, 




 Vacca (2008) 50 – 51. 
1035
 Intentionally left out from the presentation of laws in Part I, the commonly adopted 
juridical scope addresses data as content, while collections of data fall generally under 
copyright protection rationales. The creation of separate database rights in Europe (with 
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
legal protection of databases) took this perspective one step further.  
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especially when considering the heavy outset of contractual rules and the 
complexities raised by forcing in IP law interpretations of virtuality.  
3. Intellectual Property - Checking with the expanded commercial and 
technical settings, application of IP laws is straightforward. The various 
elements that communicate VWs towards the market are safeguarded by 
trademark laws. Furthermore, several patents have been issued as relevant to 
virtual spaces (in the US),
1036
 covering from operational apparatuses that are 
used for constructing virtuality‘s illusion
1037
 to modules embedded within it, 
e.g. ghost object for a VW,
1038
 advice-tracking in VWs,
1039
 financial 
institutions and instruments in a virtual environment,
1040
 securing contracts in 
VWs.
1041




 The long-developing relationship between computer games and 
copyright has featured, first, articulations of games as computer programs 
and, second, classifications of audio and visual elements under a broader 
view where games become works more or less similar to films.
1043
 The 
principles of copyright law are summarised in the owners‘ exclusive rights to 
perform in public a work, adapt it, make copies of it and issue them to the 
public. Such creations range in expression from books and poems to 
mundane cooking recipes.
1044
 The virtual setup of visual, textual and sound 
sequences and the source code, which serves as its backbone, meet 
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copyright‘s requirements of originality and creativity in such fixed forms,
1045
 
rendering unquestionable the protection that VW developers enjoy under law 
and from this contextual viewpoint.  
3.1 – Conversely, the margins for justifying assertions of users‘ contributory 
authorship remain questionable. Fixed game items (VW ‗chattels‘ as ‗items 
put in place by game designers‘
1046
) lie evidently outside the reach of users‘ 
claims.
1047
 Contesting the connection between the user and his avatar in 
relation to virtual acquisitions and components fails also to present a valid 
legal position:
1048
 within either loosely or tightly predetermined game scripts, 
arguments of co-authorship lack in legal validity.
1049
 The prospect of IP 
protection for users‘ avatars is not eventually unfeasible but it is certainly 
restricted by the premises of current ownership regimes as well by the 




3.2 - However, OSPs tend to overstretch the legitimacy of their IP 
entitlements. Therefore, despite the strong objections of the industry and its 
representatives,
1051
 out-of-game sales of game properties do not constitute 
copyright infringement;
1052
 they might be attacked on different rationales, 
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but, certainly, copyright does not offer the legally precise solution to the 
problem.   
3.2.1 - Most expressions of such arbitrary interpretations have found their 
way in EULAs, mainly misplacing the fear of VW copyright protection being 




3.2.11 – It has been argued that UGC may be granted copyright protection 
‗with no requirement of formality.‘
1054
 In parallel, law provides for plausible 
general exceptions to the original author‘s (i.e. VW designers) exclusive 
right to a creative work, like in fair use defences which serve the public 
interest.
1055
 In this respect, users are allowed to claim ownership of 
independent works they produce outside the developers‘ ‗prefabricated tools 
and images‘
1056
 and, as long as they abide by law‘s prescribed limits, to 
appropriate creatively copyrighted works from virtual spaces. Thus 
derivative works, like machinima, that incorporate existing copyrighted 
assets, even where they would otherwise require permission from the original 
work‘s owner, are not found in violation of copyright as long as they can 
exhibit one form of fair use or the other.
1057
 
3.2.2 – Controversially expansive interpretations are characteristically 
exhibited in EULA clauses preventing users‘ ownership of e.g. typed 
dialogue (chat) in the VW or on the service‘s forums, or requiring their full 




3.2.3 – As previously noted, whilst shrink-wrap licenses in the US have been 
found not to be pre-empted by the U.C.C.
1059
 it has been argued for the 
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potential of overarching legislation to neutralise EULA clauses prescribing 
limitations to the users‘ IP rights.
1060
 
3.3 – Conclusively, the present investigation should have opened by 
enquiring the reasons for the expanded IP discourse becoming an overarching 
theme when discussing VWs. Arguing in proper terms of IP reserves in the 
long run contingencies in the most formal aspects of law, that promise 
undermining effects for the market and the public‘s participation in online 
platforms alike.
1061
 As in any general property argument, the IP viewpoint 
opens the door to commodification by transforming constituent elements of 
an interaction mode into tradable and eventually exploitable assets. Contrary 
to a general expectation that in any social setting item exchanges will 
inevitably occur, IP facilitates an additional layer of reasoning that  
manipulates access to ownership on a deeper level than mere physical 
possession. The argument of ―ownership by origin‖ contests a penetrating 
moral hold over social relationships that IP rationalities realise in palpable 
normative constructions. Where OSPs used first IP in combating the 
commodification of out-of-game sales,
1062
 their weapon backfired by 
introducing users to over-encompassing understandings of creativity and thus 
related proprietary ethics.   
4. – The analogy with sports teases with the possibility of formally 
institutionalised gaming activities. For a fact, video-gaming ―Olympics‖ and 
such competition tournaments are being held worldwide.
1063
 Winners are 
usually awarded large sums of money;
1064
 the involved socio-economic 
implications find instances of game-fixing triggering legal proceedings.
1065
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The example of Korea shows that professional ―e-sports‖ associations are not 
far from becoming represented and incorporated within official institutional 
orders.
1066
 From there, professional sports litigation indicates the allowed 
extents that external regulation may reach and alter in-game order.
1067
 These 
structures foreshadow the judicial intervention not being precluded by 
gaming contexts once the socio-economic conditions are met.  
The second regulatory possibility involves taxation over virtual 
acquisitions. Again, the prospect has been openly contested
1068
 in view of 
online gambling activating in many jurisdictions income revenue 
mechanisms. Most probably accountable would be found currency exchanges 
from virtual to actual cash that VWs like Entropia facilitate; or even earnings 
from out-of-game sales.
1069
 Such potentialities may be simply weathered 
through the application of levies to cashing out mediated by OSPs, as already 
applying to online marketplaces (e.g. amazon, eBay etc). Nevertheless, 
taxation prospects remain currently open;
1070
 the argument has gained 
popularity with those questioning, or at least testing the regulatory isolation 
of VWs.  
5. - Arguably, the online omnipresence of contracts has deterred alternative 
treatments of VWs,
1071
 to the extent of having taken onboard a selected few 
normative appreciations. Furthermore, the internationalisation of agreement 
models across sectors and their approval by laws creates a customary 
secondary law and makes permanent specific regulatory expectations.
1072
  
A source of issues which current structures of laws have not been 
prepared to address lies in the creation and circulation of online social 
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meanings. These dimensions of virtuality evolve around existing application 
platforms - including VWs, but most commonly network infrastructures like 
facebook, twitter etc; yet, as explained regarding intellectual communities, 
they cannot be blueprinted in advance and thus directed by the owners of 
online services. They demonstrate the tendency of expanding in largely 
unpredictable patterns, depending on the (at the time) circulated 
appropriations of communications modules (i.e. what use and what social, 
cultural, political or economical significance different communities attach to 
applications like content host services). Law might be in position to put 
restraints into place, intercepting such practices; IP legislation responses to 
online behaviours exemplify best this premise but also its limitations – 
ontological and practical alike. 
The narratives of identity formation suggest a probable field for 
regulation, taking also into account the online circulation of involved 
capitals between the various community configurations. The term ‗capital‘ 
here is again used in the sense of a market metaphor, whereas social 
participants exchange and use resources towards their development within 
given spaces. However, an economical understanding of capital might assist 
in speeding up acceptance of disputed properties by thus predisposed legal 
structures. The examples of out-of-game sales of virtual items speak of 
necessitated regulatory interventions or shifts in judicial interpretations 
where law valued online activity on economic grounds.  
That as far as we consider law following the economic trajectory; 
otherwise, legal systems are prepared to deliberate issues of online identity 
and related political, cultural and essentially human capitals, if they were to 
activate scopes already embedded within the regulatory systemic hierarchies 
of contemporary democracies. There, judicial evaluation gives priority to 
serving ultimately different ends and the capacities of the recent wave of 
Net-related legislation to facilitate Justice are put to the test.  
III. The Riddle of Human Rights 
A truly puzzling faculty of Internet laws lies within their capacity to 
be interpreted dualistically, as either products or not of human rights 
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conscious systemisations. This is a logical problem in modernity, since 
human rights ideals were historically filtered into democracy and 
constitutional citizenships. Thus, it is difficult to certify over a particular 
legislative instance if the rule of law is subscribing directly to a human rights 
ideal, where otherwise conscious choices have been made in the applied 
language of law that downplay across the legal systemic entity the impacts of 
such an over-reaching rhetoric. 
 Modern constitutionality has replaced human rights with civil 
liberties, a term which, divested of the broader philosophical breadth, 
responds to the needs of the systemic structure of law, i.e. the relationships 
between state and citizen(s) within a particular jurisdiction. In doing so, law 
frequently confuses the two, sometimes rejecting the existence of a human 
right if the constitutional apparatus does not provide for civil rights action, 
others opting out of the connection. 
 From this angle, assessing almost two decades of Internet legislative 
production upon its compliance with the imperatives of human rights that 
democratic states emphatically advertise in their  domestic and international 
dealings, signals the relevant affordances which law as a deliberate means 
carries along.  
1. US Federal legislation is strategically aimed at uniting states over those 
matters requiring common course; otherwise, each state may differentiate its 
applied legal scope (we addressed the example of consumer protection in 
contract laws).  
1.1 - The CDA and its descendant laws pursued protection of children from 
harmful material. The scope of these approaches could be seen as equally 
aligned to both an expanded human rights rationale
1073
 and to conservative 
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1.2 - Far less ambivalence surrounds IP-related laws, since their problematic 
failed to come to par with the human rights concerns which are expressed in 
common property laws. The DMCA built up judicial mechanisms that are 
affordable to few: the provided copyright protection setup was planned to 
benefit industrial production. Furthermore liability limitations exist mainly 
for defending the economic activity of Internet services against the influxes 
of litigation opposite to copyright owners who allege online violations of 
copyright. In short, the law arguably supports preferentially a version of 
copyright more contained and targeted than in the Copyright Clause or as 
envisaged in e.g. the generic term ‗moral rights‘ (which, in any case wanes in 
popularity in the US legal tradition).  
1.2.1 – The present criticism is not aimed at condemning ―evil corporations‖ 
but at alerting worriedly to legal presets that treat unequally unequal social 
forces and classes (i.e. not simply ―actors‖ anymore); that transform the law 
into a classification tool. The DMCA, like all similarly minded legislations, 
reconstructed the legal framework for material property in intellectual terms, 
where misappropriation of property in general is considered to be a crime. 
The major difference to property, however, lies in the distribution and 
commodification of IP: whereas in realistic terms the acquisition and 
protection of material property refers to all citizens, we need to contemplate 
on how much of a socially universal value, one that deems such protection to 
justify rigid criminalisation, we can pragmatically appoint IP with.  
1.2.11 – Whereas everyone can have a property such as a table, a wallet or 
personal valuables, criminalisation answers directly to public law concerns, 
serving to settle social disorder. If we were, though, to enquire how many 
social participants, in a given Western society, would benefit from the 
capacity to raise and pragmatically utilise an IP claim against others, we 
would have to look outside the masses of common citizens.  
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1.2.12 - In protecting exclusivity in commercial exploitation, such legal 
systematisations are sui generis specialised in supporting identified sectors 
of economic life and are thus not responding to the needs and values of the 
broader human citizenship.  
1.2.13 - However, they are neither effectively set up on a separate level of 
business or competition law, since they are actively posed against the public 
and infiltrate the public law sphere: IP laws prescribe criminalisation and 
excessively increased fines that equalise the individual user with the 
incorporated business competitor. This constitutes a unique and at the same 
time distinguishing trend of modern law, which is in consequence 
transformed first into ―post-modern‖ and, eventually, in ―post-human‖ law. 
Despite modernity‘s declarations of serving humankind, priorities are being 
redrawn and aggravated criminalities are established to vindicate the 
economic interests of leading conglomerates, which precisely due to their 
dominance in media and entertainment markets are perceived to be those 
mostly exposed to multiple IP attacks. Systematisations are erected to 
criminalise in favour of the few who are not defined socially by their 
humanity but by their economic function; those criminal laws prescribe more 
onerous penalties than e.g. in regards to common theft or even to serious 
bodily injury: we are discussing legal regimes that not only turn protection 
into punishment
1075
 but also construct societal classification through the 
operation of law upon the sanctification of capital. Stealing a poor man‘s 
savings and leaving him to die of starvation seems less severe than ―illegally 
downloading‖ a few dozens of songs from the Internet.
1076
  
1.2.2 - Such laws that criminalise on a preferential scale that oversteps the 
values of humanity become openly and aggressively inhuman.  
1.3 - The focus of the 1999 ACPA lies within protecting online consumers 
from misleading websites. Consumer protection appeals to regulation acting 
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in the interests of citizenship when participating in economic and 
commercial settings, and only as such it may summon the human rights 
discourse; thus, it depends on the each time utilised perspective of consumer 
protection to recognise or not a genuine expression of human rights. The 
ACPA, however, is preoccupied with unfair registrations of domain names, 
chasing them up in the name of the confused consumer; in essence, though, 
the protection scope serves the online commercial activities of famous 
brands and people. On the contrary, surfacing as a kind of ―trademark law 
simulation‖ the ACPA does not address instances where e.g. the names of 
common individuals are claimed by others as domain names, maintaining a 
commercial scope as exclusively reserved for business.  
1.4 - Within the 2003 CAN-SPAM Act, however, the take on consumer 
protection materialised human rights considerations. The consumer was 
acknowledged in his human dimensions; any potential harm he might have 
suffered was assessed outside the definitional spectrum of market terms.  
At the same time, though, where the Act has been persistently 
criticised over its shortcomings outnumbering the apparent benefits,
1077
 the 
prospect of proceeding with the necessary amendments has not been met with 
equal interest and thus remains uncertain.  
2. - As informed by economic concerns, the EU legal framework has always 
primarily been set upon regulating the internal market, yet conflict and 
interference with the juridical sphere of citizenship becomes inevitable: in 
essence, fundamental freedoms and rights are exposed to the operations of 
the market. Human rights always constrained EC action in its legal teleology, 
without, though, posing a direct rights source under Community law.
1078
  
Nevertheless, the EC Treaty and the bulk of Directives in their preambles 
declare earnestly their attachment to the general requirements of the 
ECHR
1079
 (which the ECJ has also been enforcing for some time);
1080
 the 
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Treaty of Lisbon strengthened this connection in pursuing binding effects for 
the ChFR. 
2.1 The Consumer as a Structural Imperative - Several EU Directives, 
including most Net-related statutes, capture the individual person within the 
instrumental term ‗consumer‘,
1081
 to invite positive and negative alike 
appreciations of their dynamic to promote human rights.  
2.1.1 - The approach that one would take in good faith picks for point of 
departure the previous discussion on human rights within the European 
framework. There, the notion of consumer cannot be conceived outside the 
premises of citizenship, which reserves a circle of powers and rights for 
enabling the persons‘ functioning within society and economy. Therefore , 
human rights scrutiny of as such prescribed commercial performance does 
not lie outside proportion. The EU appears to be projecting protections of the 




2.1.2 - Conversely, the consumer is a construction valued under rules for a 
harmonised market and invests in the rule of law for making valid 
judgements first within the commercial context
1083
 before being able to 
extract from there the benefit of the human user. Where internal market law 
has monopolised the parameters of social activity, the extensive replacing of 
the ‗individual‘ or the ‗user‘ in legal texts by a straightforward economic 
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representation, neutralises other meanings of participatory identity, that 
being political or cultural.
1084
 
2.1.3 – A middle solution between these two streams seems less likely, 
unless we consider legislation realising the second, negative approach and 
courts materialisng the first at the same time. This perspective seems 
paradoxical: a legal systemisation is being constructed in order to regulate 
external conflicts, while taking onboard the presupposition of an ongoing 
internal institutional conflict! Of course, one might perceive this as a 
variation on the theme of the separation of powers: is it not paradoxical the 
hybridism of the state, where the judiciary keeps in check the executive 
while the latter appoints the members of the former? Here, however, is 
suggested a fundamental confusion of principles in the legal praxis; an ab 
origine schizoid and wasteful arrangement of legal resources and actions, 
where laws are being enacted with the expectation to be struck  down for 
being incompatible with humane Justice.  
2.1.3.1 – The other way around this logic, which probably hits close to the 
current framework reality, condones the negative approach by relying on 
courts to blunt the severity of its social impacts. Thus, in practice the 
consumer identifies with the juridical means for discussing human rights 
within the economically reasoned setting. 
2.1.4 – Even within this last conciliatory outline, which takes the furthest 
possible distance from the negative disposition towards the use of the term 
‗consumer‘, one cannot escape being overwhelmed by a pessimistic 
realisation about the underlying structures. EU legislative production over 
the Internet remains fixed in the economic objective which it further imposes 
on national laws. The terms of entry to and exit from online contexts are 
primarily determined in accordance with the market regulation mentality.  
2.2 European Commodification - Regardless the guarantees for judicial 
reviews under the recently expanded socio-political scope for fundamental 
rights application, social online participation, for a fact, acquires its 
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existence and palpability in EU legislation singularly, as a matter of 
commerce. 
2.2.1 – Of the instances of law, the infrastructure Directives of 2002 
exemplify affluently the noted ideological metamorphosis of the information 
society.  Where in previous years the semantics of ‗universal access‘ would 
effortlessly be perceived to be signifying a right to information for everyone, 
the term ‗universal‘ is conceived upon the omnipresence of the principle of 
free competition across framework legislations; ‗access‘ is defined upon 
participation in market mechanisms. In particular, under the Framework 
Directive‘s notions of users‘ access, a right to enter online settings is locked 
in the consumer template, to thus mark distinctively the juridical absorbing 
of political, social and cultural subjectivities by the functional economic 
module. 
2.2.2 – On the other hand, Directive 2000/31/EC reaches great lengths in 
constructing a competent representation of Internet participation that leaves 
no real margins for discussing the parameters of online life outside its 
commercial dimensions. All possible discourses, developing around the 
relationships of groups and individuals with information artefacts, are pre -
empted in the regulatory process by its over-encompassing perspective over 
the deployment and distribution of online content.  
2.2.3 – A relevant example of pre-emptive effects poses the mechanism of 
the Copyright Directive. It prohibits the adoption of copyright exceptions 
others than those it includes, thus interfering with Member States‘ 
developing of their cultural policies.
1085
 States lack the flexibility to rewrite 
the domestic terms of engagement with information where such action would 
possibly interfere with economic understandings of copyright, which are now 
presiding. Note that alternatively the Copyright Directive is known as the 
‗Information Society Directive‘, an acceded signifier to the circulated hold 
of commodification over society‘s dealings with information and knowledge.  
2.2.4 – The argument being expounded here is that the Internet-related 
aspects of EU legislation do not promote human rights as a matter of 
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underlying principle of community law and they neither comply with it 
ontologically. Their effects might overlap with the aspirations of Justice; yet 
they subscribe the definition of social relations to a different language and 
treatment framework that detracts the litigation reasoning and practice. 
Under conceptions of citizenship, the social participant is ‗empowered‘ and 
reserves ‗duties‘ from other entities; here, instead, the person acquires 
‗privileges‘ and others bear ‗obligations‘ towards him in a direct 
contractualisation of civic life. In this notion of commodification, if one 
cannot afford the market of basic privileges he will suffer degradation and 
indignation. The human rights doctrine had drawn the lines against turning 
fundamental social values into tradeable goods; now laws seem to have the 
growing tendency of crossing them. 
2.3 – There are other lines of humanist considerations emerging with regards 
to the same sets of laws. For example, liberalisation under the 2002 
Directives was empty of social concerns, entrusting entirely the market‘s 
discretion with such issues as online access in remote areas or to 
disadvantaged populations.
1086
 The existing systemic manifestations of the 
Justice argument meet there substantive obstacles in entering judicially such 
privatised contexts. 
2.3.1 - Even more strikingly, enquiries into the administration of human 
rights are frequently deflected by dominant streams of risk assessment and 
management that have entered legislation – or, arguably, they have in turn 
incorporated it.  
2.3.1.1 - The effects of commercial risk in the forms and attitudes of laws 
were addressed in Part I. EU law has matched the US stance in stretching out 
copyright criminalities - which flatly means placing barriers over the 
common modes of online interaction, as precipitated by the capacity to 
manipulate information artefacts. The Copyright Directive has been criticis ed 
for going further than the DMCA e.g. in criminalising directly even mere 
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possession of anti-circumvention means, irrespective of mitigating 
circumstances or exceptions in the fashion of fair use.
1087
   
2.3.1.2 - The Data Retention Directive of 2006 attempted to strike politically 
a balance between freedoms and effective crime investigation
1088
 – incited 
mostly by fresh memories of terrorist attacks.
1089
 Even under the legal regime 
which preceded Directives 2002/58/EC and 2006/24/EC, ECtHR case law 
had already indicated loopholes and weaknesses in the mandatory retention 
of traffic data
1090
 and ‗detrimental effects on the respect of privacy.‘
1091
 The 
package of specific law enforcement practices in the new laws has arguably 
amplified existing problems;
1092
 according to others, it legitimately and 
‗adequately protects‘ the right to privacy.
1093
  
2.4 – These concluding evaluations do not charge on EU legislation, alleging 
oppression of human rights; and there is neither issue discussed of human 
rights values having been excluded from the European priorities. The 
contested point here is the structural inability of Internet laws to facilitate 
the discourse in question: online life is found juridically enclosed within a 
meanings structure where countering the application of human rights as 
unreasonable has become possible.  
3. - The limitations of the US and EU legislative schemata perform 
preventively in conjunction with the key parameters of the constitutional 
problematic, seen in Chapter 2. The human rights argument is omnipresent 
within the context of injustice, where the demand for Justice is consequently 
invoked. Yet, its grasp on the practice of law is waning. Amongst the main 
reasons we may point to is the transformation in law of injustice itself, its 
meaning perceived in the mistreating of rules that subverts the legal 
procedure and not in analysing the manifestations and sources of suffering.  
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 In law, these are phenomena accompanied by a prefix ―post -‖, 
although we cannot identify for sure the suffix that will label them 
continuants of one of the familiar legal narratives. Not that it makes any 
difference: the important feature is the step into this void that lies beyond 
our social and ethical trust in law. The ongoing fetishist stripping off of this 
apparatus‘ interpretative prowess of all human and social concerns, allows us 
to settle with acknowledging post-human law. 
3.1 – At the same time we discuss ―post-‖ human subjectivities. The post-
modern subject is presented as a set of data, in both senses of content and 
transferable or stored information. It thus arrives, si tting next to modernity‘s 
subjects, i.e. the emancipated man and the legal person. This constitutes the 
next challenge for humanity: we may see the latter either transforming or 
being eliminated; persevering in the glyphs of symbolic space or dissolving 
into the currents of electronic information.  
3.11 - Anonymity/pseudonmity has been recognised as a signifier for this 
new subject, politically and factually alike: factually, like a buoy on the 
surface of the sea of information, it indicates the human existence in the 
depths. Politically, it realises modernity‘s aspirations for human 
emancipation into the organised society‘s processes. However, the striving to 
protect anonymity has been undermined by criminalities taking advantage of 
it and thus attacked on such grounds.
1094
 
3.2 – Which leads to contesting the condemnation of the risk management 
discourse in the previous sections as unfair; for many of the previous 
arguments detached values pursued under risk assessment from the human 
rights sphere. One of the pathologies of risk society is the marketing of 
threats, the overexposure of hazards as the justification for implementing 
specific policies. There is no question of whether safety and security 
constitute values under the human rights scope. We need to place , however, 
risk management within proportion in the political dimensions it seizes.  
3.2.1 - First of all there is a qualitative difference between talking about the 
value and protection of life and the manner in which EU laws, for example, 
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pursue to eliminate commercial communication about smoking and alcohol 
from mass media; or between speaking of children‘s rights and the CDA as 
an expression of moral imperatives. Human rights utilise human rights as a 
concept to promote a relevant value; in the above examples, the value itself 
is being utilised in order to promote a political belief.  
3.2.2 - Risk representations involve an intended socio-political act of 
promotion; that is the reason they attract negative criticism, for it is not 
always clear whether risks have intensified or simply the given view of them. 
The issue of security consists one of the most attacked strands of the digital 
age, since the consistent argument of threats has legitimised invasions to 
personal spaces and information. Risk implies the constant and aggressive 
prioritisation of one value as part of a political agenda; human rights adopt a 
passive, holistic theorisation over the relevant set of values.  
3.2.3 – Therefore, from the perspective of human rights the intensification of 
a selected few values undermines the unity of humanity. That is why a risk 
policy, while serving perhaps a human value, contradicts at the same time 
human rights in principle.
1095
 We need to differentiate negative notions of 
risk management to genuine crisis situations (e.g. natural disasters, war 
victims etc), especially where the former are openly aligned to identified 
political and economical agendas. 
3.3 – Under this assumption, the crisis of copyright is also artificial, an area 
of risk that necessitated subsequent interventions of law. In principle IP 
rights are necessary for innovation and consistent with the norms of 
justice.
1096
 Boyle remarks that most copyright policies perceive almost 
axiomatically the Internet as a threat and have realised responding laws.
1097
 
This mindset perceives technological freedoms as risks for the industry and 
turns them into a controlled infrastructure of communications channels.
1098
 
Moreover, such are the cultural and technological circumstances which 
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condition society‘s daily dealings with information that the shaping of these 
new laws breads litigation where individuals face multinational entities.
1099
 
4. – Within this setting we return to our initial question, the resolution of the 
human rights argument in privately operated online setups and VWs in 
specific. Apart from human rights two other discourses have dominated the 
legal outline of this investigation, namely intellectual property and 
contractual unfairness. Their unity in the regulatory tool of the EULA carries 
along a powerful political and economical charge that permeates the 
suggested discussions over legal application. As noted, Justice faces 
considerable obstacles in reaching out through the posited structures of laws; 
the riddle of human rights objectifies further the capacity to negotiate with 
the dynamics that the end-users licence agreement represents, taking also 
into account the cultural and political backgrounds.  
4.1 - To an extent, licensing refers to times when neither software nor 
copyright protections existed for acts of end-usage.
1100
 The updating of 
copyright laws supposedly settles exclusivities and fair uses within generally 
agreeable limits; in fact, copyright laws have undergone impressively 
frequent updates in the past fifteen years. Nevertheless, EULAs persist on 
pushing the copyright owners‘ agendas beyond the standard outline of 
constraints, to the degree the principle of contractual freedom permits them 
to do so and judicial precedents concede. As the case may be, unilateral 
contractual obligations leave virtually no impacts on law. From there, the 
question is whether standardisation within a sector superimposes contractual 
normativity over existing regulation and prohibits the public from exercising 
otherwise legitimate uses of copyrighted material; or, similarly, whether the 
standard terms of an online service in a dominant position do not create erga 
omnes effects beyond the allowances of the law. 
 On the other hand, for a long time courts have been reluctant in face 
of standard-form terms to sacrifice principles of contract law and freedom of 
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contract to ‗dictates of justice or social desirability.‘
1101
 The intellectual 
property perspective and the apparent lightness of virtual life might push 
them even further away from feeling burdened to restrain contractual 
regimes, where they perceive incoming impacts as even less relevant or 
threatening to the dominant static conceptions of societal order. The next 
Chapter confronts at length the plausibility of such viewpoints.  
4.11 – (Privacy seems to be the HR stronghold in EU law, proving capable in 
courts of prevailing over IP rights and over private interest in closed settings, 
like employment relationships.
1102
 It is objected, though, that private codes of 
conduct could deflect interference of the human rights regime in the latter 
relationships,
1103
 which brings us back to the degree that EULAs could be 
penetrable).  
4.2 – Beyond the surface layer of discrepancies in legal practice, the riddle 
confronts the deeper ideological impacts on the capacities of social 
perception and critique. The absence of other usable values vantage point 
apart from the market sterilises our considerations of law, and the future of 
the civil discourse is pre-empted towards one direction. For example, such 
impacts of US laws on courts lead to market-centred interpretations of fair 
use; that is, fair use is being measured primarily upon whether the industry 
suffers any harms and not on what actual user‘s rights it serves.
1104
 
Discussion not conditioned at all by humanity towards decision making, 
discards humanity from its conclusions. 
In juridico-political consequence, the contemporary democracy project 
is structured upon protecting economic activity rather than humanity directly, 
and this is the point raised with regards to the values depletion in juridica l 
tools. Continuing the same example, Boyle keenly observes that practice has 
both intentionally and unconsciously transformed US fair use from limitation 
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‗on the exclusive rights of the copyright holder‘ to affirmative defence in 
copyright infringement cases.
1105
 The gap between the rule of law 
acknowledging the industry as primary restrained by the social, cultural, 
moral etc needs of the public and requiring individual members of the public 
to prove that their actions do not subvert the interests of the industry is huge; 
for it transforms proportionately the content of public interest: in the second 
case it is identified to the interests of the industry, while in the first it checks 
with broader societal principles. Attention to serving economic prosperity, 
even though it now looks like benefiting only few corporations, may in the 
(very) long run pursue and deliver genuinely ―happiness‖ for everyone; in 
the meantime though it more likely proliferates suffering, by depriving the  
justice process of socially sound criteria, and thus civil society of humanity.  
5. – The opening of the Chapter alluded to the enclosure and exploitation of 
territorial discoveries. Regarding the Internet, the meaning of discovery 
denotes not the invented network but the online human communications: the 
Net has materialised our manipulation of knowledge in our daily social, 
cultural and political processes! 
Ascribing palpable dimensions to online participation opened the door 
to measuring the parameters of interaction through physical analogies. The 
virtual construction of space and territoriality, constituting in essence the act 
of discovery, was followed by the conquest perspective, that including the 
stage of exploration, the development of proprietary impressions and, finally, 
enclosure – privatisation.
1106
 Internet-related laws undertake this last task, IP 
law substantiating the rhetoric for seizing symbolic space, electronic 
contracts established in power to secure the inviolability of private regimes 
on a one-to-one basis. 
The need to control on this occasion, though, is internally directed. 
The system is not seeking out its expansion, like in the case of the colonial 
powers of the old, but makes an introspective move. This is hardly a self -
disciplinary exercise, though: as explained in Chapter 3, the online land 
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stretches across abstract geographies of social relationships, identity 
meanings and knowledge exchanges; exploitation of natural resources in the 
fashion of imperial management leads to depletion, ecological damage and 
suffering; the harvesting of social and cultural spaces under the newly 
entrenched notions of commodification may easily recreate the unwelcome 
aspects of the paradigm. Therefore, the challenge of resisting juridically the 
incoming streams of laws in seeking symmetry between social effects and 
economic intent runs down into the same reasoning channels with the riddle 






















The case studies illustrated characteristically under which terms OSPs 
confront virtual communities by deploying the formality exterior of law as a 
pre-emptive mechanism: the grammar of IPR and the contractual device form 
its main supporting pillars. It is questionable whether the contained argument 
of law is adequately or even appropriately represented. This Chapter 
considers the associated intellectual property claims, their roots and position 
within the broader systematisation of laws. It then examines the general legal 
implications that EULAs impose on virtual interactions and beyond.  
In contrast to the current legal ethos of intellectual property and 
contracts, we may raise questions of ―humanised‖ assertions. These are not 
necessarily coming into sheer conflict with the former. Rather, they 
constitute constructive counter-arguments in an attempt to realign the terms 
of regulatory balance with the actual philosophical and ideological backdrop 
that generated contemporary laws. Corporate lawyers, in their pursuit of 
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expedient and striking results, tend either knowingly or not to distort the 
inherent ethos, and EULAs often testify to shortcomings manifested in this 
fashion. 
1. Virtual Persons in Law & the “Notorious” Human Rights Position – It 
should now be clearer how a human rights problematic contrasts the above 
stance. The former translates online personae into personality projections of 
users, the latter understands personae on proprietary grounds.  
1.1 Two Approaches – Frequently, users on VW-focussed online forums tend 
to extract personae ownership from the invested time and effort in 
developing online identities.
1107 
The alternative that we might propose to this 
prominently ―user-friendly‖ conception sees virtual entities that reside in 
online settings claiming partial autonomy, as a consequence of their strong 
manifesting of independent personality. These two ―ownership‖ and 
―personality‖ positions convey broader interdisciplinary perspectives that 
one needs to address carefully, before entering the narrower and more 
pragmatic language of law.  
Despite notably diverging in their use of theoretical foundations - 
semi-pragmatic (labour) the one, metaphysical (autonomous existence) the 
other respectively - their argumentative developments intertwine upon 
challenging critically the same online establishments and power s tructures 
that have been fire-walled behind expressions of (intellectual) property and 
contractual formalities.  
With this in mind, it is plausible to test the two approaches as 
contestants, within the framework of rival legal ideologies that have 
dominated the regulatory treatment of the Internet. Priority is given here to a 
critical evaluation of existing laws, wherein virtual persons are founded in 
property and personality potentials. These potentials are then investigated in 
connection with the ongoing discussion over the proprietary entitlements of 
OSPs and the normative orders, which EULAs install.  
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1.2 One Origin - Where does the human rights argument fit within these 
juxtapositions? First of all, I have already pointed to widespread formalistic 
understandings that are strategically reducing its application in the practices 
of justice.  
Today‘s regulatory forms have been and are being built with the 
human rights normative schema embedded deep inside their constitutional 
foundations: that is a tight core of principles that structurally abide by a 
particular hierarchy. Neither the glorified contractual freedom nor the 
advanced proprietary entitlements‘ models discussed here would have ever 
been granted without the politically effective correlation between  the human 
rights doctrine and modernity‘s democratic legalisation. The minimum 
underlying logic of the human rights normative conceptualisation is thus 
being constantly replicated both within and through all subsequent additions 
of laws, where the origins of civil liberalism lie in human rights reasoning.  
1.3 Talking Human Rights - Under this light, I am drawing the human rights 
discourse from the conceptual breadth it claims across the continuity of the 
broader phenomenon of applied law, rather than from typologies, which 
tagged as ―human rights law,‖ perform exiled in a distant sphere of limited 
interaction with the common legal dialectics of everyday life, as if playing 
the part of the legal system‘s ―compassion alibi‖.  
Yet, let there be no misunderstanding that by convenience of abstract 
humanitarian dicta, e.g. the universal reach of the human being‘s sacredness, 
regulatory realism should be manipulated into sanctioning any imaginable 
novelties, like deconstructing Internet laws to accommodate user 
presumptions over their virtual modes of existence. My treatment of human 
rights highlights that vigorous institutionalised reasoning, which has 
predetermined (and rationalised) vertical and horizontal relationships within 
the liberal, democratic legal orders of our era. I am sided with the belief that 
the human rights ideological revolution conditioned the modern legal 
establishment; the latter - as it stands - cannot be perceived or conceived 
without affirming the former as its bedrock, as the source wherein  the legal 
[294] 
 
empowerments that social and economic actors enjoy today were born and 
justified in principle. 
Therefore, while the arguments in the following part reflect most of 
the examples of debated OSPs power from the previous chapters, they do not 
dispute the VW owners‘ actual entitlements over virtual properties. The 
lines, then, should be drawn clearly: the issue is not the rightful dominium 
which OSPs may exercise over their creations, but the imperium they 
impetuously confer when dealing with users , that is, the pseudo-regulatory 
attitudes they have been allowed to lay on with the tolerance – if not 
―encouragement‖ – of the supervising global legal establishment.  
1.3.1 Risk vs. Legal Objectivity - On many accounts, the contextual relevance 
with heated risk discourses appears strong: as mentioned elsewhere,
1108
 the 
latter pressingly suggest - and succeed in imposing - limits to civil liberties, 
in view of broader social and economic concerns over security. Here, the 
circumstances reveal a new variation of commercial risk, which pleads 
highly probable damages to narrow commercial interests. The surfacing form 
of risk management moves steps beyond the generally observed pathologies 
of the risk society experience, since not only it downsizes freedoms, but it 
also grants respective right-holders with entitlements to expanded 
empowerment. Thus forwarded readjustments to the priorities of law and the 
order in which principles should be pursued, crucially affect the objectivity 
of law. In this very specific respect, considering that modernity has been 
loudly attesting the source and content of its representative values and legal 
identity within the concept of human Justice, the task at hand lies in pointing 
out where socially blind commercial aspirations of mere accommodation and 
opportunity cross the lines with their attempts to get the best of legal 
formalities and to subvert regulatory technicalities.  
1.3.2 - Before proceeding to the main analysis, it is appropriate to indicate a 
number of important themes that will become visible shortly. 
1.3.21 - First, while empowerment of individuality had initially been 
envisioned as the main condition of reaching general prosperity, now it is 
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turning against the development of individuals (and forms of socialising 
between individuals).  
1.3.22 - Second, the terms of market competition have advanced towards 
appointing non-commercial actors (consumers) with equal to industry 
competitors‘ duties; the broader regulation of human contact is now also 
being gradually reconfigured under modalities of analogous orientation. 
1.3.23 - Finally, the presence of the political should be appreciated 
moderately and in proportion: the political is not the ultimate legal 
determinant, yet its powerfulness should not be underestimated.  
I. The Virtual and the Law 
1. A Brief Look at the Legal Outset of Virtual Worlds - VWs appear 
difficult to capture under definitive regulatory approximations. They digest 
multiple contexts that, in conjointly animating these very structures, become 
inseparable from each other: they are online services. The ones examined 
here have, moreover, a commercial focus: they exploit unique, recognisable 
fictional themes and participation is privately ruled by contracts. Therefore, 
relationships between participants and owners belong ex definitione to the 
private law sphere, and any VW object is in essence data on (and of) 
privately owned servers. At the same time, several VW objects may be 
―enriched‖ (in virtual value or content) with the (subscribing) participants‘ 
initiative and effort. VW entities/items abide by their respective underlying 
fictional theme, which in turn is the materialisation of an original idea. 
Similarly, the original ideas of participating users are crafted on VW 
entities/items.  
All these are features of direct legal interest that one may extract from 
standard VW settings. Some of them, however, are to a certain extent fluid, 
as explained below. 
1.1 Appointed Law - Behind the diversity of interwoven comprehensions of 
VWs, a legal backbone of three main organising components - (i) property 
rights, (ii) intellectual property rights and (iii) contract law (specifically 
consumer contract relationships) - represents the VW premise according to 
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those regulatory mechanisms that allowed it to formally be installed and 
function in the procedural legal reality.  
1.1.1 - At the same time, though, this makes sharply visible a structural 
imperative. Even outside legal analysis, the full range of circumstances, 
attributes and agency relationships which are being created as  both internally 
and externally linked to VWs, are directly modelled on an ontological, 
conceptual order that is originally found in law, indeed a western 
universalised regulatory model. This structural imperative dictates that in a 
world normatively orchestrated by instructing concepts such as ―legal 
subjects‖, ―rights‖, ―private relationships‖ and ―property‖, little space is left 
for erecting and indeed imagining alternative man-made architectures. In this 
sense, independent of jurisdiction and independent from the diversity of 
underlying VW themes, all activities relevant to VWs have inevitably 
reproduced the above triptych in both substance and form. Wherever you go, 
and no matter how different, all VWs repeat one ―syntax of law‖.  
1.2 Negotiated Law - A second level of reading, extracts legal findings from 
the dialogue between virtual society and law. In contrast to the previous 
understanding, which acknowledges instances of structural determinism, this 
offers a different angle from which law is seen as negotiable content in 
future legislation and judicial decisions. User-invested labour in VW 
accounts, the online participants‘ alleged production of intellectual property 
and, further on, the contested official recognition and entrenchment of a 
virtual public, all are issues that emerge in response to social realities. As 
their impact becomes more widespread and generates economic tensions, 
these conflicts are growing in juridico-political significance. 
 The prospect of negotiating does not look into exposing legal process 
to radical ―external‖ critiques of what the next generation of law ought to be. 
It is not informed on techno-naturalist moral tenets. It rather takes an internal 
perspective of what the law ―ought to become‖, when actual and present 
conflicts of interests in society search for a balanced resolution, within the 
existing and posited regulatory forms. Hence, negotiation exhibits an equally 
practical problematic to the previously defined triptych.  
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1.21 ―Fluidity‖ - However, the ideal conditions towards an effective legal 
negotiation require clear and stable initial understanding parameters. The 
novel concept of virtual identity, claiming a central position in discussions 
over virtual involvements, shows social infancy and elusive offline presence  
that generate uncertainty over its properties and value. Hence, it does not 
inspire confidence to start with seeking out derivative legal 
conceptualisations. 
 This negative impression of fluidity, however, is far less complex than 
it may appear, as it speaks nothing new about how emerging identity 
schemata operate within given social systems and challenge the status quo of 
meanings. For the purposes of law, the virtual identity challenges existing 
juridico-political modules for rationalising society, since it opens new doors 
towards readjusting the procedural reasoning and ethos. Acceptance of the 
immigrant or of the racially different and even the economic conception of 
consumer potentially upset law‘s traditional perceptions over society, 
interaction and citizenship. Hence, facing virtual identity, the law is being 
requested to build connections with a new form of otherness, one developing 
deeper at the structural level of meaning.  
2. Socio-Political Effects of Private Law - VW owners enter the stage 
having secured specific legal privileges, like commercial integrity, 
proprietary protection and contractual freedom in the course of their 
businesses. Little, though, has been predicted within legal formalities for the 
kind of social interpretations, which common online practices challenge. 
Therefore, owners feel justifiably uncomfortable with gaps that emerge with 
increasing frequency contextually and law fails to capture. They answer by 
enforcing legal interpretations, i.e. they take measures which ownership 
allows them to (e.g. exclusion from VW) on the presumption of full 
legitimacy. For example, the case studies revealed that intellectual property 
is being nominally utilised and its legally prescribed content is conveniently 
readjusted. Here we may speak of expressions of vigilantism in the meta-use 
of legal language, in the interpretational activity which VW owners realise in 
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order to swiftly and - as they perceive this - legitimately address the 
problems at hand.
1109
   
2.1 The Power of the Desires of Power - Within the given ontological reality of 
laws we perceive the transubstantiation of the desires of two camps (owners 
and users) into forces of equal judicial calibre that are being contested 
against each other as potential legitimate assertions to existing r ights 
concepts. Only one of the duelling assertions will be awarded with validity 
through the law-making process. At the same time, both of them are 
demanding to redesign the order of rights at the convenience of the particular 
hierarchy of values that each represents. Hence, the resulting law will be 
ideologically positioned closer to one of the initially competing sides, 
appointing a shift in the socio-political balance with becoming the next 
regulatory standard. In other words, a law that designates in further detail the 
distribution of rights but is, also, rooted in a decision that favours one out of 
two antagonising private groups, is also inserting into the system of rules a 
procedural element that will ideologically perform partially and at the 
expense of fairness. 
Plausibly this is, in general, the chief societal purpose of 
contemporary law, to reflect continuously and genuinely the shuffling in 
social dynamics. Such viewpoints, however, are surrendering the law-making 
present and future of humanly aware societies to pure market fatalism, while 
they crucially understate the extreme factual vulnerability of legislative 
preferences vis-à-vis the political influences and pressures that business and 
commercial lobbies exert.
1110
 The spreading popularity across the globalised 
political context of the idea that the means of securing any palpable form of 
progress are (or even ―must be‖) defined in compliance with the ―neoliberal 
vision,‖ has lead to prioritising economic instrumentality and commercial 
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functionality, when seeking to establish within regulatory technicalities the 
guarantees of an effective societal organisation plan.  
In this game of battling desires, where transformation into legal rights 
is the trophy, the desires of the powerful not only find it easier to claim 
victory but also the law distils their political importance into entrenchments 
of the highest degree of protection within the legal systematisation of 
principles. Therefore, desires of profit are emerging as equals to 
human/social needs, such as life or dignity. Through law, the desires of the 
capitalist minority are being established as ultimate global needs.  
2.2 Power through democratic law-making - The above implies the advance of a 
contemporary ―de jure‖ dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Strong as this 
assertion may appear, the practices of modern democracy seem to lack 
convincing synchronisation between political visions and juridical ideals. 
The democratic promise entails for law an all-inclusive, participatory 
legislative schema that is being developed within correspondingly designated 
institutional frameworks. The conceptual identity of this schema is outlined 
with the use of such notions as ―procedural transparency‖, ―open social 
dialogue‖ and so on. Our experience of democratic reality, however, speaks 
of decisions that are being planned and frequently reached behind closed 
doors, rarely discussed with all the mainly affected parties. Of course, the 
democratic project may be genuinely activated at a later than the legislative 
stage: society will politically challenge legislative prospects or the 
competent judicial authorities will scrutinise a new law‘s fidelity to 
constitutionalised principles of democracy. Yet, the mere possibility that 
such interventions, deemed characteristic to the conceptual order of 
democracy, should operate does not by itself suffice for outweighing 
standing, politically real facts: mainly that the originally drafted content of 
already enacted laws reflects more of the occurring desires/needs of those 
that have easier (i.e. more or less personal - due to their economic power) 
access to lawmakers. 
2.21 - The same power inequalities may also be considered as affecting, 
albeit indirectly, with the alternative law-making module, i.e. when the 
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social decision is institutionally formulated for the first time by the Common 
Law judiciary. An antagonistic instance between groups of private standing 
will rise from a previously unregulated dispute area to entrust its resolution, 
and thus the introduction of a new law, to the impartial judgements of civil 
courts. Under the pretext of the courts absolute neutrality, socio -economic 
inequality is set to culminate in judicial inequality.
1111
 More resources lay at 
the discretion of the economically privileged party for building over -efficient 
court strategies on a one-on-one basis.  
2.2.1 - Either scenario mirrors in our VW examples the inexorable certainty 
that inside law the OSPs‘ proprietary positions are surfacing stronger, while 
the counter-matched values that users call to their aid will de facto wane in 
potency and impact. 
2.3 – Hence, the modern law-making framework cannot evade notions of 
political fatalism in the vein of ―the law is a directed tool‖. Let us assume, 
however, that no further involvement of the political needs to be taken into 
account and a purely legalistic perspective would suffice for providing from 
there on a realistic look into the development of the discussed subject matter. 
From this viewpoint, the circumstances of conflict are being represented as 
disputes between equals that submit to private law reasoning and action: both 
sides claim their legitimate interests and bring forward arguments and 
counterarguments, in expressions that qualify for performing and are being 
cross-examined under the standard modalities of law. The standard-form 
contract constitutes the characteristic example of such a ―qualified 
expression‖.  
2.3.1 - Even in respect of this strictly rationalised depiction of reality, 
power-related course of action may undermine the perception of fairness. For 
instance, commercial online services, like VW ownership and management, 
stand only for one amongst the youngest and thus (for now) smaller sectors 
of the broader immaterial property production industry. The latter, in 
general, is systematically championing the idea of exclusivity in production 
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and distribution, presuming it upon de jure authorisations.
1112
 When not 
having succeeded in satisfactorily influencing law-drafting proceedings, the 
industry actively demands posterior readings of law to be in total agreement 
with that particular conviction of exclusivity, using its de facto acquired 
position to exercise power over communities (who in the meantime have 
connected deeply their activities with the commercial product) for 
proliferating its wants. 
2.3.11 - In the society of legality, power takes advantage of transparent 
formal mechanisms to heavy-handedly establish its one-sided impressions of 
legitimacy as undisputable conditions. This is best demonstrated in reference 
to contracts, the core legal tool in commercial practice.  
2.3.1.11 - Within contracts the human will is transformed into formal reality: 
first, this is where free and democratic inter-personal development is 
legitimised and, second, legality in (trans)actions is guaranteed. Backed by 
the plausibility of their massively commercial character, however, EULAs 
and all standard-form contracts excuse themselves out of the most complex 
stages of the contractual module to shrink down the latter into ―take it or 
leave it‖ offer-packages. Hence all sense of dialogue over the shared legal 
experience with customers, users, the masses and, eventually, a society that 
has been globally pushed towards adopting commercial over-dependence is 
effaced. Differentiating approaches to alternative legal ―can dos‖ are strictly 
rejected. Additionally, organised and co-ordinated action by an entire 
commercial sector could produce sets of terms and conditions that 
universally simulate incompliant normative webs. Thus, practice is allowed 
by law to contradict modernity‘s original master plan for democratic, 
humanitarian societies, an aim entrusted to the same laws backing it! Power 
is being allowed to infiltrate impartial systematisations of rules. Inequalities 
are becoming sharper as law is steered by purposive micro-economic scopes. 
2.3.2 - The private law claims of one side acquire increased weight through 
essentially political processes: either they climb up to more advanced 
positions for influencing law-making discussions or, in fear of control loss, 
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they are projected in stern expressions of power over communities, thus 
affecting directly the meanings of the common legal experience. By 
connecting any partial attack on their integrity to threats against the 
prevalent economic structure‘s stability (i.e. crying out commercial risks), 
they convey an argument that works convincingly across the international 
political stage, where the spirit of rules gets analogously compromised.  
2.3.21 - This tendency, in its broader dimensions, engenders two conditions: 
(i) values and claims that originate to societal dimensions lying outside the 
economic perspective are gradually becoming more vulnerable; and (ii) the 
phenomenon of law escapes its traditional institutional domains or even 
excludes them. 
2.4 - Conventional discussion of the desires of parties in power, builds on an 
image of an aggressive beast that encroaches on humanist morality‘s 
conquests across the spectrum of law. Meta-developments of rights, however, 
which emerge from the opposite side (such as post -modern expressions of 
―free avatars‖) can equally stir up disquiet about the admissible boundaries 
to desire. Where is eventually drawn the dividing line between actual needs 
and mere desires?  
 On the one hand, the desires of the powerful are being prioritised as 
needs inside contemporary juridical systems of principles. On the other, 
when looking at demands that are based on the human rights call, desire in 
the guise of need creates more desire. It evolves in self-reflecting hunger for 
desire: when establishing a right, our rights culture tends to turn 
progressively anything possible into a legal claim.
1113
  
 Therefore, where we discover rich soil for scrutinising indicated legal 
dispositions for their profound association with power, we should, at the 
same time, keep the barrier high against profane intrusions of insatiable 
proliferations of rights. These may stretch too far the ethical stigma of 
humanity, pushing it over to its limits and towards its possible degradation. 
This specific aspect should be constantly kept in mind when addressing VW-
related rights talks. 
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3. On Intellectual Property - Users tamper with online artefacts in search of 
distinguishing their virtual identities, in manners that are not always 
welcome by VW owners, e.g. the selling of virtual items constitutes allegedly 
―copyright infringement‖ and fan-fiction ―IP violation‖. Whereas terminating 
or suspending online accounts expresses the owners‘ actually naturalised 
privilege, decisions of exclusion are regularly justified on the pretext of IP. 
Corporate ownership has invested much in the IP rhetoric for maintaining 
control, when other lines of reasoning have fallen short of building the 
necessary defensive connection with law. Regardless their in-game-held 
superiority position, the owners‘ decision to resolve any contractual 
relationship with the user requires incontestable legitimacy; hence the 
frequent use of IP justifications. However, this practice is exclusively 
reflecting corporate wants, and is cultivating distorted understandings of IP: 
as explained, negative impacts are first felt socially and then across the 
progressively transforming legal discourse.  
The task of pointing out one by one apparent controversies in the 
projections of IP, which the case studies highlighted, involves, from the legal  
perspective, the obvious danger of getting distracted by the scattered 
instances of domestic IP regulations.
1114
 The actual focus of legal interest 
looks beyond how the corporate commercial culture, through the use of the 
global market, is systemising actively the reproduction of IP‘s importance 
across societal orders.  
 VWs show only an aspect of the broader IP protection interference 
with the public‘s appreciation of mass culture. The phenomenon itself 
preceded long enough Internets‘ inception. However, the  manner, in which 
online communications are being forwarded and manifested, has initiated 
more robust activity from the owners of intellectual property side. As 
reasons, we may highlight the turning of IP violations into popular cultural 
trends (for example, large communities, like file-sharing networks, are 
formed in pursuit of systematic copyright infringing) but also how the 
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Internet has made easier to observe infringement methods in action and 
objectify them (i.e. locate them) for the purposes of taking legal action. 
 Excesses that big corporations justify in the name of IP have created 
disliking towards it:
1115
 it is easy to demonise an abstract idea for its 
shortcomings in practice.
1116
 Yet, it should not be forgotten that the 
introduction of IP protection marked a crucial turning point towards the 
social and economic proliferation of creativity and invention.
1117
 Regardless 
what legal formalisations corporate interests have so far managed to 
standardise internationally, the field is still fertile, and social di alogue has 
not yet reached a dead end. In this sense, much has yet to be contested in 
litigation and future legislation, since the original supporting theoretical 
foundation of IP in its core has lost neither its clarity nor potency. The 
problem with contemporary IP law is that it has vigorously pushed forward 
axiomatic acceptances of those purposes that it now gives the impression of 
solely existing for serving across markets and society relationships. The 
short range of options prescribed in such acceptances has framed 
implementation of IP law within extremely narrow and limited functional 
orientations. Eventually, prevailing policies of the moment drive the IP 
protection experience, rather than our societal faith to creativity and its 
responding collective values. 
 These are matters that should not be taken lightly: can we make, at 
this point, such collective values claims, as if they constituted a universal 
absolute that defies boldly the dual obstacle of relativism in cultures and 
societies? Are the one-sidedly promoted instances of IP protection lying 
necessarily outside the scope of those values? Such questions are the guiding 
thread for the complex undertaking of putting these values in context, 
starting immediately with a brief examination of the nature and 
externalisation of IP in thematic proportion.  
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3.1 - While the term ―intellectual property‖ could be criticised as being 
flawed in imagining equal ownership parameters to those applying to 
physical objects, an intellectual property right describes essentially a relation 
between individual subjects regarding an object. Understandably, then, which 
objects constitute property is a matter of convention: the idea of 
―intellectual‖ property and the circumstances that gave birth to it, show 
plainly that property is a phenomenon of system
1118
 and a product of the 
subjective. 
 3.1.1 - Intellectual property rights are ‗rights which are created for and exist 
within market contexts.‘
1119
 Divisions in copyright, trademarks, 
patents, trade secrets and publicity rights
1120
 respond to such continuous 
expansions that spawn more detailed and thorough legal treatments.
1121
 IP 
law has covered a long distance since the earlier ―romantic‖ author 
meanings,
1122
 which, after all, were initially entrenched for disallowing 
others from using commercially one‘s work without expressed approval.  
3.1.11 - Even where forms of IPR are seemingly credited to or inspired by 
calls for active preservation of non-commercially experienced local or 
national cultures, the need for protection in most instances addresses the 
exploitation of cultural elements by organised profit making.
1123
 Despite 
having incarnations in many jurisdictions with stronger interests in the 
integrity of ‗creations and expressions of the intellect‘, the institutional 
exercises of IP protection aim eventually at regulating distribution – a notion 
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that, at least when referring to relationships between private actors,
1124
 
acquires meaning only within markets.
1125
  
3.1.12 – In this respect, we might be alerted to the possibility of market logic 
monopolising our regulatory appreciation of the human intellect‘s creations; 
delivering cultural and aesthetic values to commodification.  
3.1.2 – The suggestion by Marx that the institution of property originates to 
the ‗productivity of labour‘
1126
 finds quickly an apt reflection in intellectual 
property, particularly in view of sectors like the film industry, software 
development and game designing. Contemporary IP draws little from the 
earlier moral rights of the author basis: creators submit the product of thei r 
intellect to giant corporations, boosting the latter‘s profits. Thus, intellectual 
property laws protect the rights of owners, not of original creators, who often 
transfer ownership to their corporate employers by virtue of the ‗operation of 
doctrines of employment law.‘
1127
 
 A core theme in Marxian theory surfaces here, since creative labourers 
in the information and entertainment industries are being alienated from the 
product of their intellectual work.
1128
 We are further invited to understand 
creative labour in two different dimensions: labour that poses the obvious 
metaphor to handwork (i.e. utilising the intellect in modes of systematic 
production) and creative work that improves with innovation the means of 
production for capital‘s (the industry) interests.
1129
 
3.1.21 - One may observe in recent IP laws (especially those realising the 
dictates of global harmonisation schemes, like TRIPS) the increasing 
transition from in strictu sensu authorship to corporate ownership. The 
economic and legal complexities of mass-markets, especially with regards to 
producing composite multi-levelled works, seem to require so. This 
legitimate alienation of creators, combined with the social expanding of 
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creative labour, marks a change of direction from the natural right reasonin g, 
which justified protection of IP in the first place.  
3.1.22 - Moreover, the IPR discourse appears frequently trapped in confusion 
and self-contradiction, its initial moral justification embodied prominently in 
the laws of several jurisdictions (particularly in Europe) and the transforming 
corporative incentive getting at the same time more and more ground across 
the juridico-political institutional experience.   
3.1.3 - Intellectual property is not about the idea but about its expressions. 
The identity of the intangible object becomes known for the purposes of the 
law through physical objects. Physical property has boundaries, even 
conventional; in IP we do not have that. Many physical items may constitute 
variable expressions of the same idea, which, in the end, is not clearly 
defined. Drahos explains that ‗very different physical objects […] can be 
said to share the same identity in intellectual property law because they all 
imitate the same abstract object.‘
1130
 Such connoted richness in the 




3.2 Power in IP - The power, which property contests over others, equals, in 
essence, to sovereignty, where ‗dominion over things is also imperium over 
our fellow human beings.‘
1132
 The intellectual property parallel may simulate 
the power effect – or even rearticulate it more radically.  
3.2.1 - First of all, the basic appreciation of ―property‖, as referring to legal 
relationships between entities, applies to all modalities wherein the original 
conception is further reconstructed. As a consequence, the inherent, in the 
property concept, power inequalities will also be thereafter replicated. Power 
is founded upon the capacity to exclude others from the object of property, 
and is exercised either through active deterrence (as in graphical depictions 
of ―no trespassing‖ signs) or by negative promises of social and financial 
reductions. The degree of exercised power depends largely on the each time 
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property object‘s value, a schema that concentrates more meanings than the 
monetary market value. In fact, the latter projects at the last instance the 
overall societal value of the object in question and its capacity to turn 
commercially into a necessity. From there, dependence on objects transcends 
to person-dependence relationships.  
3.2.2 - The performance of IP rights entails that an original idea can expand 
its legal protection across the multiplicity of the physical manifestations it 
may acquire
1133
 and accordingly broaden the initially set field of ―protection 
relevance‖. Increasing proportionately, both in numbers and in sectorial 
breadth and depth, the opportunities for exercising power turn into command 
platforms that extend beyond the single, originally developed material 
(re)production of the idea, which now appears rather circumstantial and 
comparatively finite in its prospects for financial profit.  
3.2.3 - Once we have correlated the fictional incorporeal objects of IP with 
their intrinsic nature of being information, the influence of IP in daily life is 
revealed omnipresent in full splendour, since information is nothing less than 
‗the daily lifeblood of human agents as communicating beings.‘
1134
 
Information is the multifaceted capital that both responds to and represents 
best post-modernity: it constitutes the resource of knowledge, which, in turn, 
is seen as the key to the accumulation of know-how, to planning and 
realising action and to finding solutions. Permeating society, economy and 
culture, information becomes the uncontested currency of power.
1135
  
3.2.31 - Judicially, access to the informational capital (and thus to all other 
forms of capital linked to it) is decided through identity judgements over 
written, painted, sculpted or even hummed indications of possible IP 
infringements.
1136
 Drahos remarks that these judgements are ‗pragmatic and 
based on conventions‘ and, lacking of an undisputed ―intellectualised‖ metric 
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of evaluation, they use abstract objects. Hence, in legal practice, decisions on 
the circulation margins of information are crucially built on fictitiousness.  
3.2.32 - Moreover, this object-based understanding of the appropriation of 
power implies that, through the as such shaping of identities of objects, are 
affected indirectly the identities of individual persons, as well as the broader 
classes of those permitted to receive and transmit information.
1137
 
3.2.4 - The importance of information is maximised on an electronic network 
made exclusively of information, where information is the means and the 
ends of personality manifestation and development. In every single onscreen 
representation or audio sequence coming out of the users' computer speakers 
is realised an abstract idea, which originally belongs to someone. Network 
content comprises exclusively of created objects. With a notable exception 
being where initial content creators voluntarily denounce their proprietary 
rights in favour of the online public, Internet life performs in its entirety 
under private ownership. Hence, our discussion on the interference of 
property with public life and the power structures that evolve in relation, 
emerges definitional for the online setting, including further both an 
examination of the affiliated socio-legal superstructure and a retelling of the 
traditional Marxist infrastructure thesis. 
3.3 IP and Culture - The burdens that contemporary IP law places on our 
access to the public sphere, come into sharper focus with regards to culture, 
which involves much more than the earlier cyberspace cultural 
appropriations. In fact, laments over the apparent loss of the cyberspace ideal 
mark only the failure to realise the initial techno-cultural promises. The 
ongoing Internet developments have signified the actual transfer of culture 
and identity formation into zones of private management, along with their 
gradual separation from traditional public spaces.  
3.3.1 - The EverQuest fan-fiction incident, while not having formed any kind 
of precedent,
1138
 hinted possible future conflicts between functional and 
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intellectual online communities. Any such conflict would naturally evolve on 
the premises of cultural life, the latter standing as a phenomenon of societal 
bonding. The general conceptualisation of the intellectual community 
performs in the online world as a personality development matrix. It 
represents the equivalent of a societal circle, which acquires shape with the 
passing of time, as individuals go through the various stages of their personal 
and professional lives. People gather experiences and information and form 
groups of contacts with whom they feel to be best associated. Personality 
development is indissolubly attached to unhindered participation in cultural 
life. 
3.3.2 - Culture, as a phenomenon of dissemination and establishment of 
knowledge, performs on a referential basis. Consider folklore: legends of the 
old, songs, painting and sculpting methods, have been for ages crossing 
territorial borders and travelling from one generation to the other through 
processes of retelling, redevelopment and derivation. This is how peoples 
inherit their fairy tales, their King Arthurs, their local music traditions, their 
unique ecclesiastical iconography styles: the elements that constitute 
distinctive cultural identities from which individual personalities will stem.  
Today‘s mythologies are built and proliferate by means of mass 
communication: television and cinematic fictions, pop music ―classics‖ and 
the iconisation of film and sports stars, are the most common examples.
1139
 In 
the old communal tradition, social participants communicate with each other 
via the continuing use of references to a shared knowledge bank that includes 
a wide range of cultural properties, these belonging either to the sphere of 
the political, of religion, of entertainment and so on. Until the 20
th
 century 
this was the dominant model for participating in the shaping of the popular, 
the folks‘ culture. The change arrived with the massive commercialisation of 
culture. This shift invited, inevitably, regulatory interventions that repeated 
the logic of market contexts. Thus shaped, the body of IP law is under 
constant attack for its negative interference with offline cultural life,
1140
 
precisely because it acts prohibitively against the circulation of culture. The 
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online setting increases the potential for interference with cultural 
development: as web communications are realised via object-based 
interfaces, any exchange of information – meant as either form of content – 
is bound to violate to a lesser or greater degree a third party‘s proprietary 
sphere. 
3.3.3 – It is on the premises of culture where identities take shape. 
Anthropological understandings of heritage present the most characteristic 
examples of such processes, where community life is explained in terms of 
its developmental dependence on national and cultural heritages. Within 
these contexts groups and individuals search for, discover and pick up 
defining elements for building up their distinctive intellectual associations 
(connections and differences) with the experienced societal totality. We are 
talking about a culture pool (simply known as ―shared tradition‖, ―shared 
cultural background‖ etc) from where personal and interpersonal 
developments retrieve their starting points and further utilisable intellectual 
materials; at the same time, it provides group semantics with distinctive 
vocabularies. Today‘s culture pools, thanks to the pervasive effect of mass 
communications, are rather composite and rounded in bringing together ―the 
culture of the people‖ in its past and present forms,
1141
 i.e. folklore and the 
popular culture: the (post)modern human individual receives her cultural 
heritage both vertically (tradition) and horizontally (contemporary social 
life). 
3.3.4 - In this sense, communities utilise systems of references
1142
 for their 
developmental purposes that perform on the level of an intellectual 
commons.
1143
 These essentially evolutionary societal operations depend on 
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the richness of the culture pool, guaranteed by the uninhibited access to a 
fertile public domain. Yet, management of popular culture is being 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of IP holders, whose power is 
growing through their self-evident capacity to monopolise control over 
means of mass culture. The part which rigid IP laws play there is crucial, 
since (i) public domain knowledge material is increasingly becoming branded 
and (ii) socialising and information sharing do not proliferate anymore 
exclusively on the basis of verbal but of advanced, synthetic communications 
forms that expand across symbolic spaces (i.e. conventional media and the 
Internet).  
3.3.4.1 - The domination of branded culture across referential public 
knowledge can conjure up legitimate exercises of censorship. The effect, 
however, appears ironically self-negating. Brands, having ascended to icon 
status, reach to the ultimate signifier‘s perfo rmance, to becoming 
synonymous with their marketed product‘s category. They then order silence, 
demanding all references to the celebrated icon to cease and desist – unless 
the brand permits so. For instance, the expression ―Barbie doll‖ has evolved 
into a widespread connotation that, reflecting the popular doll as both a 
symbol object and a social phenomenon, conveys particular meanings.
1144
 
This is a viewpoint which Mattel (the manufacturers of Barbie doll) did not 
share when suing against references to their best-selling product, blurring 
instances of social commentary with enunciations of strict IP law.
1145
 
                                                                                                                                          
capacity to appropriate the abstract object); an entity that the collective human labours ‗over 
all time‘ construct. He also makes a connection with English law‘s commons as ‗rights of 
common held by persons in relation to another‘s land.‘  
1144
 ‗Barbie has been labeled both the ideal American woman and a bimbo. […] She remains 
a symbol of American girlhood, a public figure who graces the aisles of toy stores throughout 
the country and beyond. With Barbie, Mattel created not just a toy but a cultural icon‘ – 
Judge Kozinski in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); ‗Barbie: 
 1. a proprietary name for: a (type of) plastic doll in the form of a slim, shapely, young 
blonde-haired woman. 2. A woman who is likened to a Barbie doll, esp. in being pretty or 
shapely but passive, characterless, or unintelligent‘ – The Oxford English Dictionary; 
discussed also in Coombe (1998) 66 – 67 and Dreyfuss (1990) 397.  
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3.3.4.2 - The flow of information that gives form to humanity‘s shared 
cultural wealth, can be even more preventively controlled. News and media 
conglomerates have the discretion to block unique audio-visual footage of 
significant historical events from being used in public domain, independent 
or competition-made documentary feature works.
1146
 Especially in view of 
recent copyright extensions in US and EU laws, rights to withhold can last a 
long period of time. Furthermore, unprecedented phenomena of damnatio 
memoriae started making sporadic appearances in the circulation of 
information, where, for example, blurred images in televised broadcastings 
remove branded material from the viewers‘ sight. While, on the one hand, 
authorised uses and licence fees apply to deliver the realism of fair market 
competition, the thought, on the other, that appreciation of knowledge, 
information and history by the masses depends largely on trade willingness 
and practice is uncomforting.
1147
 State-imposed censorships are being 
replaced with commercial exclusivities.  
3.4 Expanding Protection Over Off-Game Interaction - Similarly, the 
study of VW caught up with multiple references to IP rights in EULA texts 
that are attempting to control off-game patterns of player behaviour (that is, 
other than the selling of virtual items). It is important to stretch out such uses 
of the term ―off-game‖, where targeted individual actions bear no substan tial 
impact on the VW‘s integrity to be considered as violating participation 
within the virtual setting. ―Off-game‖ are those activities, which take place 
outside both the functional boundaries of the VW software application and 
any of the undertaken pretences in fictional settings (i.e. in-game roles in 
MMORPGs). This is why fan-fiction and most appropriations of UCC 
provide for a powerful dialectics, as widespread and socially functional 
meanings of culture intersect with IP law applications heavily promoted by 
the industry. 
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3.4.1 – As seen, the EverQuest incident did not announce any ascending 
trend of high-handed OSP ―enforcement‖. On the contrary, together with 
reports of other similar incidents, it apparently shook the industry (as it had 
shaken users) into re-evaluating their online cultural consciousness and 
becoming more tolerant towards fan-made creations and UGC. These 
gradually readjusted policies may now not necessarily indicate the OSPs‘ 
actual understanding of cultural phenomena, but imply, at  least, their slow 
realising that beyond the fully commercially tuned information market exists 
also the information market‘s social awareness and cultural deployment in 
the intellectual online communities‘ incarnating digitally the political and 
juridical ―public‖. 
3.4.2 - Expressions in the vein of online fan-fiction convey an intimate 
creative passion, which is born within the cultural superstructure, is 
recreating the personalised effect of entertainment and shares the latter 
informally with same-minded users. Under the combined scope of human 
rights, such activity can be interpreted both as developing one‘s personality 
and as participating in 'the cultural life of the community'.
1148
 Although of 
frequently debatable quality, such amateur textual or graphic  material and 
the nature of its dissemination pose negligible harm to the credibility of 
marketed services and brands. Primarily, it bears little relevance – if not at 
all – with the called in rationales for applying hard-core IP protection. At the 
end of the day, it does not even fulfil the requirement of commercial threat 
for activating particular IP protection. Yet rights holders summon IP laws for 
converting expressions of commercial regulatory intent (like ―reputation 
damage‖ which acquires meaning in market competition) into metaphors of 
personal defamation. 
3.4.21 - The incentive behind this disposition of protected value affirms the 
online dimensions of the private sector‘s general tendency to overrate brand 
ownership. Hence, references by the public to copyrighted material or 
registered trademarks without prior authorisation are expressly prohibited. 
However, the free distribution of commercial symbols, like trademarks or 
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slogans, through the media and towards the masses, has constituted an 
important factor in the development of post-modern culture, from Warhol‘s 
illustrations of Campbell soup cans and iconic celebrities, to commonly 
shared cultural references (like the ―Barbie Girl‖) which breed within 
communities and thus nurture the latter‘s continuing evolution.
1149
 
3.4.22 - Drahos believes that in all IP laws robust proprietarian beliefs are 
exemplified in action. Trademark law, specifically, moves a step further with 
over-inclusive approaches to branding and trademarks.  Whereas categories 
of trademark signs have been expanded to cover everything perceivable by 
the basic human senses, ‗Harley Davidson can seek registration for the sound 
of their motorbikes and BP for their colour green,‘ he addresses bitterly the 
consequence that ‗trademarks become tradeable entities in their own right‘ 




3.4.23 - The increased exclusiveness, which corporations contest over the 
ownership of culture, places considerable barriers over the access to culture 
by the commons. This is at least how Taylor perceives the online setting, 
questioning at the same time whether public space exists within virtual 
environments.
1151
 Her concerns reflect Klein‘s view that ‗the extension of 
multinational branded space and the commodification of culture‘ precede the 
collision of consumerism with citizenship,
1152
 as well as Coombe, who, in her 
analysis of corporate cultural ownership in symbolic spaces, observes that 
‗increasingly, holders of intellectual property rights are socially and 
juridically endowed with monopolies over public meanings and the ability to 
control the cultural connotations of their corporate insignias (trademarks 
being the most visible signs of their presence in consumer culture). ‘
1153
 
3.4.3 - If anything else, our participation in the online public sphere is 
primarily depended on using the protected creations of others, in either 
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communicating through the circulation and manipulation of branded and 
copyrighted works (images, names, icons, text extracts etc.) or in utilising 
owned communication platforms and interfaces.  
4. On End User Licence Agreements – Regarding EULAs, the issue of what 
constitutes technically a valid or invalid contractual term is decided in 
accordance with local or regional legal standards, and there are no universal 
rules, unless of course we bring into the equation ad hoc drafted international 
treaties. Understandably, the Internet has maximised the parameters of legal 
ambiguity in international conflict of laws, since greater numbers of people 
across the globe engage with the big online services that are based in the few 
notable commercially developed jurisdictions. From this perspective, judicial 
resolutions face the common difficulties of online disputes in general. Few 
solutions may be anticipated from the – helpfully - much narrower VW 
context or have even been already offered, like in the regional slicing up of 
VW services. However, such contextually particular suggestions leave the 
core of the actual Justice problem intact. 
4.1 The juridico-political problem repeated – The neo-liberal experience of 
market evolution is being delivered through the strengthening of private 
agreements, which should cunningly outmanoeuvre certain trade-hindering 
effects in pre-existing – mainly protectionist - legal settings. Whereas one 
jurisdiction or the other might had attached humanist values to the now 




The unrestricted rise of EULAs – and mass-consumer contracts in 
general – marks the same intensified conflation of the political and legal 
realms, which the previous section explained in respect of IP law 
systematisations. Commercial competition and economic power-struggles 
determine popular directions in the (re)formation of laws and, eventually, 
what societal affordances the resulting bodies of laws will foster.  
The weakness of this capitalist justice is openly exhibited with the 
forced compromising of the underlying ideal of human Justice. While the 
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latter is not a direct prerequisite of capitalist justice, it stands out 
symbolically as the foundation of the modern liberal society: in the 
conscience of liberal democracies, human Justice pre-conditions historically 
and morally our capitalist modus operandi. Hence, we may consider as 
―weakness‖ the ideological confusion which noted juridico -political 
expressions procure due to their in principle self-contradicting dispositions, a 
confusion that in the face of greater discrepancy between what law 
‗supposedly is‘ and ‗what actually is‘, could escalate into deeper institutional 
crises. 
4.11 - Moving back into EULA territory, these theorisations propose a 
starting point for reconstructing the legal discourse of contracts. Hence, the 
goal is set at probing the limits of contractual freedom within context, where 
normative performance and function remain realistically of primary concern, 
yet a considerable degree of socio-political awareness and sensibility ought 
to be retained. Crucially persistent debates over the attitudes and impacts of 
standard-form consumer contracts remain relevant, and so do research and 
scholarship insights into the social and legal implications which emerge from 
general involvement with online community modules and VWs in specific.   
4.2 Unfairness in general - EULAs make undoubtedly an easy target, being 
commonly accused of unfairness, of vitiating any plausible sense of 
commercial liability and of misrepresenting the law with false assumptions 
of copyright. For their critics, they reinstate online a particular contractual 
model that might have outgrown its intended commercial purpose. While 
agreeably functional, the practices of mass market contracts form socially 
counter-productive normative conditions, since, under the present 
circumstances, consuming masses and social formations are one and the 
same: where products and services constitute decisive elements towards 
individuals‘ integration into public life, terms of agreement turn, in reality, 
into terms towards social inclusion. Public life itself is a complex schema, 
organised upon intertwining political, cultural and commercial systemic 
structures, developing further its existing offline meanings while expanding 
into online modes of engagement. 
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 Even without invoking the considerations that a levelled conception of 
online public life entails,
1155
 the position into which EULAs bring the 
participant/consumer opposite to the spectrum of extenuatory circumstances 
that are reserved for the VW owner, reflect in overall the latter party‘s 
concerns and intended interests. Along these lines, though, notions like 
―unfairness‖ and ―liability‖, which emerge as important criteria, appear 
impedingly nebulous.
1156
 Especially unfairness, seems to be inviting overt 
moral evaluations of its legal standing, whereas its applied standards vary 
from one jurisdiction to the other.  
4.2.1 - Understandably, ―contractual unfairness‖ appears flexible enough to 
accommodate any subjectively adopted social viewpoint in looking at or 
experiencing law. The dominant appreciation of unfairness in the common 
grammar of contract laws
1157
 appeals to measuring inequalities between the 
bargaining powers of contracting parties. In the majority of its incarnations, 
this unfairness criterion flags instances of expressed coercion and of 
fraudulent or deceptive practices. Thus, the broad discussion about 
unfairness is grounded at safeguarding the market‘s internal operational 
integrity. Fairness becomes synonym to contractual formalism, which in turn 
guarantees peace of mind by fostering efficiency.
1158
 
 In this respect, however, ‗bargaining inequality‘ undercuts the 
evaluation of contractual unfairness, as commercial efficiency does not 
suffice for wrapping up the entire problematic in question. Truly, the 
objective of maintaining market order may ultimately serve fundamental 
principles and social values. The inequality criterion, however, pre-empts in 
practice the unfairness discussion by enclosing it within limited commercial 
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meanings. The Bragg v. Linden Research case showed such an example,
1159
 
where the court‘s reasoning for affirming adhesion of the EULA was based 
on the existence or not of a competitive market rather than on relationships 
and ties which the user had actually built within the specific VW.  
4.2.11 - In other words, the utility found in the criterion‘s pragmatic 
assessments towards restraining ambiguity and over-expansive 
interpretations, fences out equally legitimate and technically valid 
evaluations of unfairness. 
4.2.2 – Of course, the extent to which fairness comes closer to being 
identified with market efficiency differs among jurisdictions. But even where 
the strongest manifestations of that connection have prevailed for the long 
term, the resident legal structures might render their weakening easier t han 
what other regimes are widely seen to be delivering. In this sense, 
assumptions that under consumer protection the bargaining inequality 
criterion performs with greater elasticity for taking onboard social 
considerations, first of all overlook the economic reconfiguration of society 
and human relationships, which is otherwise imparted in consumer protection 
laws.
1160
 Importantly, they disregard existing legal mechanisms, where the 
exclusivity with which over-reaching efficiency doctrines review the entire 
contractual relationship and its social consequences can be counterweighed: 
at the end of the day, the rules of contractual formation constitute neither a 
closed nor a complete and harmonised system.
1161
 
 4.2.3 – The point here is not to dismiss the ―mainstream‖ connotations of 
contractual unfairness, but to reassert that their administration is not 
necessarily informed or honest. Facing the online contractual reality of 
EULAs, as these turn into de facto law for online participation, a balanced 
account of unfairness should serve adequately the systemic requirements of 
general coherence and consistency. That means, where modern legal 
structures have been (politically) rationalised upon human rights values, the 
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protection of private investment and market stabili ty, fairness should be in 
position to realise and tie together all such considerations.  
4.2.31 – Seemingly, though, the prospect threats to drag current unfairness 
standards back to a state of indeterminacy. It will be seen shortly how 
criteria of unfairness that are now aligned to commercial efficiency need not 
to be rewritten or to shift far away from their insofar professed foci, but 
simply to be more open to tuning in to the ‗justice of the community.‘
1162
 
Hence, reasonable inferences of supplemental unfairness parameters, made 
under the light of social circumstances that have been standardised within 
their prescribed contexts, are at least attainable.  
4.2.32 – Still, with regard to EULAs that ―regulate‖ participation in VWs, 
this develops further into a two-fold problematic, which courts can be 
expected to face in the future. Hence, next to discussing contractual terms 
that contravene already set out rules, unfairness may be called forth in view 
of potential legal recognitions of users‘ virtual identities,  and to be possibly 
measured opposite to their ties to personality, online social and economic 
instrumentalities, even their marketed value - if that would, one way or the 
other, ever come into play.  
4.3 Unfairness in Reference to Existing Legal Settings  – Checking with 
various national laws, the EULA, as an imposed contract of adhesion, is 
arguably ‗lacking in voluntariness for purposes of the waiver of 
constitutional rights.‘
1163
 This means that terms/rules might not be accessible 
before purchasing the actual software
1164
 or paying entrance fees for online 
participation, terms/rules may change without user notification,
1165
 liability 
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exemptions can be extreme and onerous for the consumer/user, and so on. In 
this respect, the general conditions for testing the validity and enforceability 
of EULAs as standard-form software contracts are well-known.  
Particularities emerge in view of the provided online service and the 
VW setting, where the additional lists of broad - and thus ambiguous– ToS 
exercise behaviour control; for example, users can be punished for breaching 
the catch-all clause ―spirit of the game‖.
1166
  The content of these 
participation terms, apart from also being non-negotiable, falls within the 
OSPs‘ exclusive interpretational discretion.  
4.3.1 Liability Limitations & Jurisdiction Issues - EULA clauses that specify 
jurisdiction aim to benefit the OSP by both securing advantageous local laws 
and to disallow the uncontrollable territorial scattering of litigation – thus 
shrinking considerably relevant costs.
1167
 For individual consumers this 
obviously means long distance travelling and disproportional expenses, in 
case a dispute arises between them and the OSP. Let us not forget that in 
pragmatic terms matters involving VW participation fall under small claims 
procedures. Moreover, favourable laws for the OSP suggest probably an 
already tried out court jurisprudence that is less than likely expected to 
undercut the order and temperament of terms that are included in the 
contract. Facing these odds, users/participants are practically prevented from 
challenging OSPs‘ decisions over access to and use of the service.  
4.3.1.1 - Under EU law, ‗standard form contract terms that impede 
consumers‘ rights of redress are invalidated as unfair.‘
1168
 That should cover 
not only binding arbitration clauses and strict jurisdictional exclusivities,
1169
 
but also a wider range of liability exemptions – loss of VW accounts and 
data, in the sense of the Chinese case, appearing as the most likeable 
candidate. 
4.3.1.2 - Across the Atlantic, the shaping of the litigation process in 
accordance with market-oriented policies has consistently called the courts‘ 
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favourable disposition towards mandatory clauses, since these are expected 
to provide incentive for online retail businesses‘ growth.
1170
 Nevertheless, 
binding unilateral selections of forum may be found on occasions 
inappropriate,
1171
 albeit under quite narrow requirements.
1172
  
The lesson learned from the judicial dismissal of SL‘s mandatory 
arbitration clause is that thus endorsed restrictions to dispute resolution do 
not lie outside the perspective of US unconscionability. But then the court‘s 
directly commercial reasoning
1173
 left unpromisingly no margin at all for any 
other line of argument to enter.  
4.3.1.3 – All things considered, neither market efficiency nor consumer 
protection legal scopes offer ground for addressing directly VW interests. 
One weighs relationships and liabilities through understandings pre -mediated 
by the values of healthy and effective competition while the other pursues 
societal balance in the operations of commercial structures. Consumer 
protection cannot expand its social discussion beyond the fixed market setup 
and explore productively on its own further evaluations of social meanings.  
 Thus, a large number of liability exemptions found in EULAs and ToS 
refer exclusively to VW circumstances, which have not yet been assessed in 
social and economic content and importance and, as a result, their legal 
coverage is otherwise pending.  
4.3.2 Account Termination - Account terminations plausibly subscribe to the 
judgement of service operators. Yet more unilaterally submitted terms are 
vividly portrayed in connection. For instance, the Warhammer/DAoC EULAs 
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reserved for the VW owner the authority to simultaneously terminate related 
game accounts.
1174
 According to these terms, Mythic/EA would be 
promiscuously entitled, for example, to ban from the game an Iowa high-
school student, on grounds that his brother‘s account operating in a San 
Diego college has been terminated due to breach, since both game 
registrations are paid through a shared parent‘s credit card.  
Here, unfairness of EULA contractual provisions has not been tested 
exclusively within consumer protection frameworks. The Court in the US 
Hotmail case
1175
 held that termination takes place only when deemed 
necessary. In practice, game companies feel entitled to ban accounts under 
any subjectively apprehended occurrence of breach, an attitude which is 
eloquently mirrored in most EULA texts.
1176
 As Jankowich observes, 
regulations resemble in complexity a thick web, where, in most given cases, 
users are likely to understand neither the reasons for disciplinary action, nor 
the true nature of the dispute.
1177
 Practically, any OSP interpretation suffices 
for reasoning termination.  
Of course, private law empowers excluded users with the right to 
debate in court the circumstances that led the agreement to its end and 
whether the owner acted in a rightful manner or not, as in any other online or 
off-line contractual discharge. Such litigation, however, in conjunction with 
EULA-imposed jurisdictional limitations, can be excessively problematic.  
Where the disposition and effect of unfair terms appear theoretically 
reversible by court authorities, practical inequalities emerging from the 
agreements per se – e.g. mandatory resolution locus - have discouraged users 
so far from pursuing such a precedent.  
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4.3.3 Claims Combining Property and Intellectual Property - IP law 
appropriations in EULA clauses (notably copyright) might as well be flirting 
with the phantom of unfairness.  
4.3.31 - For one thing, they generate informal inter partes enforceability, as 
OSPs, on the basis of what the law allegedly entitles them to, postulate 
breach of the EULA/ToS, which leads to account termination. However, 
these claims of IP rights are not conveying the true picture of posited law: 
arguably, they (i) high-handedly distribute false representations of law, as 
the industry circulates and standardises at will in EULAs specific 
impressions about their rights; (ii) impersonate boldly the letter of IP law; 
and (iii) bring forth a second layer of unfairness, where pretences to IP law 
exclusivities reach  beyond the consumer status  of users‘ to interfere with 
their further participation in the online society.  
4.3.32 - These considerations derive from two different settings for the rule 
of law. The first portrays the insofar assimilation and posited expressions of 
IP by legal institutions. The other theorises the ―anticipated‖ rule of law, as 
legislatures and courts give indications of how they perceive the public‘s 
daily online involvements. In several jurisdictions it has been adjudged that 
public policy concerns reason against agreements, which deliver absolute 
control over IP works.
1178
 Thus perceived policy tests would place EULAs 
under compliance evaluation opposite to society‘s underlying body of 
principles, which the rule of law is eventually charged with materialising.  
Therefore, both of these settings converge for examining contractual 
unfairness in respect of IP representations in EULAs and ToS. The capacity 
of the EULA to neutralise completely all of users‘ IPRs is tested against the 
posited setting. The moulding of a formally valid public policy reasoning, on 
the other hand, articulates the human subject of the information era  and 
weighs the individual‘s and the public‘s rights to information. Largely, these 
contemplations mirror the analysis of the previous section over the socially 
and culturally restraining impacts of IP, and may even complement the 
argument against arbitrary exclusions and bans from online settings.   
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4.3.3.1 – Regarding contractual enforceability, the legitimacy of termination 
is conditioned upon the proper application of law. In other words, the 
question is whether freedoms of contractual and private will can override 
rules that are part of mandatory law. Like all other derivatives of property, IP 
performs socially several key roles and thus its limits in law are carefully 
laid down: in specific, the erga omnes effects of IP law and the boundaries 
between private exclusivity and public use. Hence, EULAs cannot restrict IP 
uses which are enshrined by law for everyone: such contractual terms would 
be found groundless before a court and could constitute copyright misuse.
1179
 
4.3.3.11 - Doctrines of IPR misuse in the US derived from antitrust and 
competition policies,
1180
 and have acquired clearer meaning and applicability 
mostly in patent law.
1181
 Federal case law brought gradually copyright misuse 
doctrines into existence,
1182
 where privately conducts may be found to violate 
the public policy that was originally embedded in copyright.
1183
 Such misuse, 
however, may be judicially exercised only in defence
1184
 rather than perform 
as a pro-active tool. 
4.3.3.12 - No European equivalent of misuse exists at the moment. It has 
been argued that either articles 17 and 54 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights could give rise to limitations, in view of the public interest or of 
abuses and of excessive exercises of granted rights respectively.
1185
 
4.3.3.2 - At the same time, EULAs appear oblivious to the various fair use 
frameworks and defences that copyright and trademark laws feature. They 
also remain silent with regards to non-commercial treatments of VW material 
by users. One interpretation for this stance is that where the letter of law is 
well-implied and commonly known there is no need for the contract to repeat 
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it. The argument is not particularly convincing, since EULA texts repeatedly 
and consistently define all the responding OSP rights in reference to law, 
without leaving any areas uncovered.  
4.3.3.21 - At least, most agreement texts include broad presuppositions of 
invalid or inapplicable EULA terms, if found contradicting local procedural 
and substantive laws; regulations about users‘ IPR ought to be included.   
4.3.3.3 - In the same light, the lack of commercial interest and the implicit 
disclaiming of ownership in material reworked by fans/users, should amply 
deflect the variety of EULA attacks on amateur fan-made works, or on other 
as such classified ―derivative works‖ that are being developed within the 
same circle of intellectual communities‘ activities. In practice, however, 
OSPs scrutinise the widespread blurring of the fair use requirements by 
turning against online hosting services and websites (e.g. social networks, 
video sharing etc).
1186
 EULAs display over-absorbency towards all potential 
forms of UGC, in the same manner that creative labourers are alienated from 
all their IP rights, which are automatically transferred to the software 
publisher. Generally, licensing may legitimatise assertions over UGC in 
favour of the OSP, to the fair extent, however, where it does not realise 
substantial abuse of the IP right and its social function.  
For example, claims over ‗transcripts of the chat rooms‘ bring 
interestingly into question the limits of ownership - which, notably, EULA 
texts expand beyond the mere ―intellectual‖ aspect of property. Under the 
information era regime, consumers
1187
 are also accounted for being 
producers, and that holds true in many different contexts.
1188
 The premise of 
online content does not treat only one-way flowing productions, but also 
interactively shaped information. In other words, the nature of networking 
means that this amalgam of technically and socially interoperating factors 
upsets the waterproofing of VW occurrences, which OSPs attempt to 
accomplish with EULAs. When participants engage in dialogues that produce 
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e.g. a poem or a new joke, ownership of the facilitating virtual venue cannot 
– and should not – extend over users‘ statements or verbal exchanges.  
4.3.3.4 - The issue of commercial potentiality as emerging from the users‘ 
involvement with VWs is slightly more complex to be resolved through 
licensing settlements presented in advance, i.e. before the user understands in 
practice (i) when and how she might experience a creative burst during the 
online socialising process, (ii) what belongs legitimately to her and (most 
importantly) (iii) how and where she might make capital out of it – or, at 
least, associate it publicly with her person. This is exactly where the 
representations in EULAs and ToS are arguably not fully understandable by 
users, where contractually the user is misguided into agreeing exclusion from 
her rights.  
Attempts to regulate self-evidently generated practices of acquisition 
and distribution between players have been marked by feeble wording, 
leading to notional paradoxes, at least from a purely linguistic legal 
perspective.
1189
 Traditionally exercised property rights over game items and 
accounts are presumably conflated with IP claims, while game material, like 
avatars, is alternately acknowledged as either sets of electronic data found on 
the access server or owned ideas that have been transformed into computer 
code.  
In general, when off-site trading practices were exploiting more and 
more the amplitude of online shadow markets, game companies seemed 
hesitant to pick up a decisive position on classifying the diversity of ―game 
content‖ under either the property or the intellectual property domains. 
Instead, ToS have been allowed to move from one legal area to the other, or 
to combine them both in exhaustive legal descriptions. This definitional 
instability materialised a teleological approach in expressing the game 
industry‘s logical aspirations to cover every possible content related dispute 
that might arise. The apparent reason behind importing into EULAs a 
supplementary intellectual property rule next to the all too clear property set -
up for game material, was the fear that players could possibly claim co-
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 In the same sense was also called the expanded deployment of 
ToS in search of legal efficiency beyond the premises of traditional property.  
Newer EULAs discarded the discussed ambiguities with accurate 
writing and balanced transition from property to intellectual property, 
wherever this is deemed as appropriate. However, in its entirety the gaming 
sector, based exactly on these equivocally mixed rationales, refuses to 
appoint even a minimum of moral entitlements to users, apart from what is 
strictly designated for the ‗subscribed customer‘ status. 
4.4 Conclusions on EULAs as they are in law - EULAs are frugal in the 
number of substantive expectations they convey. Releasing an online VW 
implies automatically excessive pressure and numerous risks for developers 
and publishers, most notably issues of commercial survival that prioritise a 
‗duty to maximise shareholder value.‘
1191
 From this viewpoint, one can argue 
that the shaping of actual socio-political power over users occurs, to a 
degree, unbeknownst to OSPs. On a second level, EULA drafting follows 
after particular sequences of commercial development, production and 
distribution, to materialising several persistently common flaws, which 
plague the industry: legal production performs usually detached from the 
actual business implementation,
1192
 being additionally affected by time 




The examination of this ―EULAw‖ model discloses concentrative 
normative dispositions in the converging regulation of ―real‖, ―virtual‖ and 
―post-virtual‖ (i.e. game narratives) circumstances. The over -encompassing 
textual fusion of game behaviours, business and privacy policies with 
appropriations of law
1194
 affects directly the judicial currency of legal 
expression. First, unstable in-game values interfere with the contract outset 
and its compliance with laws that reflect solely real-world standards. Second, 
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ToS dispute extensively the legal identity of game content by mixing 
references to property and intellectual property, without providing though for 
the appropriate references to legal authorities. Finally, game companies 
disproportionately put forward IPRs as a sufficient justification basis for 
regulating further involvement of registered players with Internet 
communities.  
On the other hand, any attack centred on the EULAs‘ massively 
contractual character per se would have more likely fallen into unavailing, 
trivial theoretical labours, had it aspired to displace the most (if not ―the 
only‖) reliable contractual model, through which market realism has sought 
to facilitate the needs of massive commercial production and distribution - 
offline and online alike. After all, the model has widely gained recognition 
for its evident practical and ethical advantages. Instead, thus driven 
motivation should direct its efforts upon deciphering the overall aims and 
functions of contractual fairness institutions, in order to elaborate the 
prospects for optimising the existing criteria.  
II. The Virtual Humanity in Law 
The critique of Justice points to the pretexts of commercial risk, 
which the information and entertainment industries appeal to for justifying 
exploitations of IP and contract laws. The human rights argument faces 
certain difficulties in bringing these observations and conclusions on level 
ground with the procedural requirements of legal practice. VW contexts 
burden the legal discussion with additional intricacies, which primarily relate 
to the legal representation of virtual subjectivity.  
We could expect law to address with hesitancy and, possibly, 
embarrassment the implied merging of human and virtual subjectivities. 
Surprisingly, however, the issue involves less of legal instantiations of the 
cyborg and more of noted problems with delivering the output of the human 
rights discourse in contemporary legal praxis.  
1. – The endeavour to bring out the human subject is, first, bedevilled by the 
overall legal conditioning of online participation and then by the virtual 
settings‘ resident technicalities of subjectivity.  
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1.1 - The human subject needs to be re-synthesised in a manner that it can 
speak the language of formal law and equally confer the nascent idioms of 
VWs. The analyses from previous Chapters now reveal those factors which, 
combined, facilitate its formation: (i) the communicated legal terms of 
participation; (ii) the terms of factual participation; (iii) the factual legal 
terms of participation; (iv) social function and breadth of the online 
application (VW) in use; and, finally, (v) the degree of the user‘s personal 
involvement (identification/tautisis/immersion). 
1.1.1 - Under the first category (i) we find the participation agenda as 
promoted by EULAs: this is a private contractual relationship between 
service provider and consumers, governed by the former and for the du ration 
of which the latter are allowed to run particular software, join the interactive 
online platform and use the service's storage facilities.  
1.1.2 - So far, factual participation has shown that the individual virtual 
entity ―externalises‖ the will of  the anonymous/eponymous user in such a 
manner that it acquires its very own hypostasis, both within and outside the 
virtual world, becoming an autonomous reputation mark across intellectual 
communities. 
1.1.3 - On the broadly recognised utility value that this socially perceived 
itemisation of the personality unit may further claim,
1195
 depends heavily its 
institutional acceptance and legitimisation. Thus take shape the participation 
terms which we may call 'factual-legal'. 
1.2 - Our collective legal tradition presents numerous ―personality‖ devices 
that in time have been qualified as such due to the transactional 
normalisation effects pursued in their crafting. It can be argued that as 
exhibited in practice in most cases, it is initial dysfunctions and gaps within 
the each time legal system that generate the birth of ―another‖, distinctive 
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legal personality category, rather than the pressure of an addressed social 
need. The incapacity to deal legally with persistent socio-economic 
occurrences promotes the inclusion of new legal personalities. 
Personification then is the tool that in the equalisation with the natural 




1.2.1 - It is a double-edged question whether the case at hand contests a 
significant utility value or if judicially we are reaching to one of those dead -
ends that necessitate solutions in personhood.  
1.2.11 - With respect to the second issue, we may here acknowledge the lack 
of precise regulatory mechanisms to deal with the thus increasing 
transformation of private environments into de facto public spaces. The 
platform term, which would describe the discussed human involvement in 
virtual settings and would carry along our inquiries over the reinstatement of 
the human rights argument opposite to noted local interpretational shortages 
in constitutional readings, is missing. Perhaps such invisible nod in the 
language of law could be indicated by defining legally the traits of 
manifested involvement. 
1.2.12 - Therefore, the virtualised re-appropriation of the human subject does 
not need proposing new legal inventions. Since the question is set essentially 
upon confirming the connections between humanity and its online agency - 
and not over constructing the attribution of the former to the latter in new, 
independent forms - conventional approaches (i.e. meanings that could be 
reached by contemporary judiciaries) should come up to the task.  
1.3 - Reviewing, however, the degrees of online immersion, the functional 
evolution of virtual environments and the emergence of real legal 
implications in VW, leads to asking what is exactly, in legal terms, the online 
persona? There is no question of whether someone exists legally there, as it 
has been accepted in the various 'John Doe' cases. The final resolution of this 
technicality, for either punishing wrongdoers or protecting against wrongs 
done, should occur only once the connections between humanity and 
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virtuality will have been firmly clarified in the collective legal 
consciousness. At present, we may consider the online persona as the closest 
identification mark to the combination of the legally capable entity and 
personal human agency. For the remaining discussion, any distinction 
between online accounts and VW characters is intentionally omitted as 
substantially irrelevant to the arguments at hand.  
2. - The existing breadth of legal conceptualisations is offering three basic 
options: 
2.1.1 – (a) Property object:  At first glance, this direction comes into agreement 
with the order of things, which OSPs visualise. Nevertheless, it does not 
endorse the exclusivity that OSPs assert. The account is conceptualised as a 
mixed product, comprising on the one hand of the host‘s software interface 
and original input of ideas and the user‘s un ique contributions on the other. 
These contributions, though, do not extend over predetermined VW elements 
(e.g. character development in accordance with an existing game script); they 
are elements that reflect personal intellectual investment, as explained in 
Chapter 3: social circles and reputation, associations, innovative ideas and 
artistic creations. 
2.1.1.1 - Otherwise, the Chinese court case set an ontologically reasonable 
alternative in attributing items and game character traits to the user in retu rn 
of the amount of insofar paid subscription fees. Hence, within the rules of 
commercial relationships is rationalised an entitlement to possessions, 
defined timely and qualitatively by personal achievements within 
analogously rented spaces.  
2.1.2 – (b) Extension of the self: The online agent is taken for an individual unit, 
which, although defined in relation to its virtual dealings, it is attributed 
straight to the reflected human user. In other words, it is treated as an 
identity alias.
1197
 Thus, the legal system for all its purposes perceives the 
signified human being and builds on this basis its connections with the 
digital signifier. A deeper attachment is constructed, where interference with 
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the persona does not count as involvement with property but with the person 
herself. 
2.1.3 - (c) Autonomous online person: This is a rather far-fetched prospect, yet 
not totally rejected, for the same reasons that ships have been admitted to the 
―personality club‖ or companies have appeared before courts contesting 
human rights. The autonomisation of the virtual unit appeals to the increased 
functional reliance of modern legal superstructures on agency modalities.  
Legal subjectivity is attuned to the entities‘ capability for acting as rational 
subjects, for making decisions and experiencing the consequences.  
2.2 – Concerns about the legal feasibility of these three variations are only 
secondary here,
1198
 as the spotlight is mainly set on investigating the capacity 
to interconnect human rights reasoning with standardised models of legal 
experience. The task unfolds into a two-layered reading. 
2.2.1 - On the first layer are developed the ties that bind together each of the 
three versions with the human subject.  
2.2.1.1 - The least problematic version (b) is simply reversing the already 
applied in practice reasoning of presuming the existence of individual human 
wrongdoers behind online agents  (i.e. 'John Doe' cases); hence, the 
―invisible‖ human is acknowledged as present for the purposes of all 
involved legal matters, and not only regarding criminalisation. This variation 
reserves its own share of ambiguity, since more than one persons could be 
operating under a single online signifier; yet, neither the online nor the legal 
settings fall short of solutions.
1199
 
2.2.1.2 - In the bold terms of version (c), the independence of the online 
entity to pursue rights (and obligations) is recognised on account of the 
mechanisms that attribute legal personhood. A simulation of the natural 
person is established, for the procedural ends which law pursues, having 
access to civil liberties/fundamental rights, wherever this may logically 
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apply to the case at hand. Where does humanity lay in this ―procedural‖ 
artefact? It is implied by all given expressions: Law rationalises humanity 
upon the reverberation of its integral interests as being expressed through 
continuing and consistent social, political and economic activity.
1200
 The 
main objection against version (c) involves the enlargement of the circle of 
human subjects that law permits
1201
 and those major adjustments, which 
follow towards harmonising the existing systemic practice of laws. 
Moreover, one may inquire how this concept of personhood can tackle with 
bots, the online agents that are being reproduced by automated software 
processes. 
2.2.1.3 - The general theoretical background of property suggests logical 
questions in respect of the structural relation between the first and the other 
two appropriations. Personality has been contested as being the reinstatement 
of one‘s ownership over his own body and attributes. From this standpoint, 
both versions (b) and (c) could be considered expansions of version (a). 
However, such rationalising of personality on the basis of property 
compromises severely modern human rights cognition: although histori cally 
fundamental in the development of modern law, it does not respond with 
today‘s ontological appropriations in law. Therefore, we should not submit 
e.g. the right to liberty to a habeas corpus logic, which served well humanity 
and citizenship at times of struggle against absolute despotism, yet itemises 
dully our evolved legal understandings.
1202
 The definition of humanity does 
not need the ground of property anymore. On the contrary, property may now 
be fully articulated and supported as the derivative of  humanity, the latter 
explained through but not by the former. Version (a) is about one human 
being as existing in multiple contexts; version (b) views the virtual setting as 
a parallel sphere, where the inter-connected human actors contest their rights 
over their virtual investments (a form of assets‘ management); finally, in 
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version (c) property becomes autonomous, yet autonomised because of active 
human directing. 
2.2.2 – The first layer performs as a substratum, outlining the parameters of 
integral connection between humanity and virtual involvement as 
ontologically informed by law. On the second (outer) layer is developed the 
human rights logic, which the operation of law should employ.  
2.2.2.1 - It is unclear what area the human rights reasoning may cover in 
version (a) and under which terms it may be activated as surpassing the 
apparent ownership exclusivity condition. An ongoing argument, which the 
Chinese court case set also on the map of practice regarding virtual property, 
suggests that a user acquires particular rights over virtual items in 
recognition of invested time and money, and not 'in return', which subscribes 
strictly to the logic of the private exchange. The user turns to the state (the 
only branded guarantor of human rights) looking not for compensation but 
for assurances that any personal effort or achievement will not be left 
unprotected.
1203
 For that part that he has utilised the interactive software tool 
for developing the onscreen ―raw material‖ into something unique, the user 
ought to receive a minimum of relevant entitlements.  
An additional appreciation of self-development is reflected on the 
itemisation of online accounts as virtual objects. The virtually ―tangible‖ 
content of the account turns into a stable nod, which the user pursues to 
appropriate in order to gain access to the information space. The information 
space here denotes a function performed exclusively under virtuality, and 
beyond the common monistic appropriations of ―knowledge spaces‖: the 
information space is continuously active and interactive; a dialogical form of 
knowledge, not a static library. This argument is rooted in the same 
rationales, which champion human rights to leisure, education and 
association, and it gives priority to gaining hold on the means that objectify 
and lead to such ends within virtual physicalities.  
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2.2.2.2 - Similar interest in the concept of the account surfaces in version 
(b), although here the idea of the virtual nod transforms from an instrumental 
appropriation of property into an abstract tautological arrangement between 
the human entity and the online account.  
 The account becomes integral to the human personality, since through 
the account the individual is allowed to contest her existence as a human 
within the online environment. While we could in general discuss relevant 
notions of e.g. freedom of speech, the user account within well -established 
VWs realises distinguishable expressions of the rights to associate with 
others, to maintain identities, to exchange knowledge and – why not – to 
play.
1204
 However, virtuality is being transcended: association, identity and 
knowledge are all referring to circumstances that construct virtual 
biographies
1205
 inside artificial spaces and, yet, they are all pursuing ends 
that primarily respond to and define the ―real‖ self. Thus emerges a scope for 
personal development, which is determined by the to-and-fro crossing of the 
barriers separating virtuality from reality.  
 Identification of the human with the account promotes the importance 
of access opposite to oligopolies of privately owned VWs, finding in online 
communications platforms an equal to where a town square prescribes the 
local community‘s sole gathering point.  
2.2.2.3 - The autonomous entity of version (c) could be contesting similar 
goals, if not for maintaining closer attachments to the virtual context and 
looking into the limited range of human rights protection that law reserves 
for legal persons. The evidenced assumption that the online account is being 
operated by a human actor, substantiates the entity as an autonomous subject 
and equips it with legal assertions to humanity traits. In this sense, it fully 
simulates the human being in the challenges that it raises. Hence, it may 
contest the right to express its opinion freely, it may even contest ―spatial‖ 
endurance against being terminated partially and light -heartedly. 
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2.3 – All three examined conceptualisations of legitimate access for the 
human subject to virtuality converge in becoming arguments against ex parte 
account terminations; against virtual executions, which are decided by virtue 
of procedural expedience or of legal technicalities (i.e. contract discourse) to 
excuse the relinquishing of human Justice. Justice, on the other hand, appears 
confined in constitutional schemata of 'state vs citizen', following obscurely 
formulated ideas of institutional economy in law. Institutional economy 
normally determines the limits that a developing legal argument is allowed to 
reach in practice; when being informed by severely fractional legal aims and 
understandings, however, it results in generating conceptual confusion and 
formalising regulatory irregularity.  
 
III. Justice and the Virtual Public 
The next step involves the positioning of the virtual human subject in 
contextual relation to both the gradual idealisation of law within the 
development of human Justice and the juridico-political circumstances which 
besiege online participation. 
1. A Treatment of Nature, The Public and The Private – The concept of 
virtuality challenges several key features of the original ―real‖ setting, not 
only in its online manifestations of malleable electronic ecologies, but also 
since reality itself – and anything else we might perceive as part of it – 
confers another artificiality.
1206
 The (social, legal, economic etc) normative 
artificiality of the ―real‖ starts from power-engendered appropriations of 
physicality (i.e. property and sovereignty) and evolves into complex, abstract 
superstructures. As the Justice retrospective in Chapter 2 suggested, the 
crude physical basis and the highest levels of superstructural abstraction are 
connected through fundamental concepts and meanings, which, while being 
of mediating function, act as bottom-up determinants: ―nature‖, ―public 
space‖ and ―private sphere‖ were notably distinguished in the course of that 
discussion. 
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Nature is challenged by virtuality, transformed by technology and its 
conditioned experiencing by users.
1207
 The shape of online geographies and 
pseudo-natural laws are written in software code, yet scribed – i.e. 
structurally determined - by the intersecting multiplicities of real-life 
superstructural elements (markets, politics, legalities etc.) : thus this meta-
nature
1208
 constitutes an environment made of filtered systematisations! 
Virtual life denotes a second level of a complex superstructure, where 
participants are combining their empirical apprehensions of both nature and 
meta-nature into perception of personal capacity to function within the 
setting, i.e. perception of personal identity.  
Reflecting upon this adaptation of nature by virtuality, one may 
rediscover the basic conceptual constituents which formulate ―nature‖ , being 
now more aware of historically impinging influences upon this latter‘s 
juridico-political appreciation. On the same tapestry are also redrawn the 
persisting demands of human Justice, which perceives human existence as a 
multifaceted unity that remains largely unaffected by the particularities of 
meta-natural digitised contexts. 
1.1 Nature - Once I have acquired a book I may then feel and I am free to 
give it away or sell it: the fulfilment of my actions depend on the recipient‘s 
desire for the item in question. The intersection of such possessions, wants 
and transfers weaves the behavioural patterns of everyday functional human 
activity. That is the familiar amalgam of nature‘s physical freedoms and 
built-upon-them normative commonalities that combined all together form a 
single plausibility: the world as we know it and as we empirically expect it to 
work.  
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 The modules which shape users‘ experience of online communications form a kind of 
establishment: email platforms, forums, chat-rooms – this is the nature of online 
communications, and anyone who enters the Internet has his mindset tuned to this 
operational logic. 
1208
 In other words, the artificial nature parallel of the general online setting is created 
(conditioned) upon the off-line superstructure of the material realm: nature is made of 
physical matter; the meta-nature is constructed of rubrics and instrumental apprehensions of 
nature, transformed with the use of computer code into meta-natural laws (e.g. the fluxes of 
data transfers forming an equivalent to the law of gravity). Interestingly, in the virtual 
physicality of the meta-nature our society‘s legal superstructure is being reproduced as a 
―material‖ component.  
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This appreciation is embedded in the shared societal conscience of 
human beings. The evolving ―law of man‖, even during its historically most 
extreme instances, simply could not – and rationally would not - defy self-
evident facts about community life. Indeed, law could punish or normatively 
prevent transfer of possession; but not tackle with the physical transfer itself. 
Hence, beyond discussions over ―natural‖ or ―human rights ,‖ nature signifies 
the simple dimensions of the communal physicality setting. To a certain 
extent, the self-evident character of nature eludes the intellectual setup of 
law. It ridicules the latter‘s attempts to place it within unattainable 
constraints.
1209
   
1.2 Natural Origins of the Public and the Private  – Moreover, the way 
humans perceive the physical world has shaped the conceptual foundations of 
organised society by conditioning heavily its underlying reasoning ethics, 
which were transmuted into law. There we can locate the origins of the 
public and the private spheres; the processing of the two in law articulated 
humanity‘s cognition of something already intimate and palpable, definitely 
not marking any original discovery. The soil on which one stands, the air she 
breathes, the view she has of the sky: these connect the individual‘s 
existence with the here and now and, unless one higher authority does not 
want that person around, they have to be maintained. Thus is perceived the 
individual human entity‘s private sphere. When more human units are 
needed to perform in groups, the idea of shared space is materialised, in 
order for them to both exist individually and interact with each other . When 
transferred into larger social formations which expand beyond single 
lifetimes, shared space turns into developing, public space. 
1.2.1 - The regime in power, regardless how despotic or not, would have also 
offered public space to communities as a prerequisite of social functionality. 
In addition, rulers would grant some form of a private sphere minimum, 
wherein individuals should at least be able to pursue their self -
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 We may observe that the content of the public and private 
spheres has been enriched in time as societies add more institutional 
complexity over the nominal value of the person monad: first, 
individuals/subjects were deemed necessary to exist (thus ―do no t kill 
them‖), then their survival was linked with productivity in the contexts of 
workforce and warfare (―allow them a small piece of land to live on and 
thrive bodily‖). Finally, they turned into active participants in the 
complicated political and economic production (civil liberties).  
1.2.2 - The twofold interpretation of existence being both nature and private 
sphere is bonded with the experiential perception of public space and at the 
same time it equally exercises influence over the latter. Existence as nature 
denotes the pragmatic yardstick that determines what is self -evident in 
relation to our physical self. At the same time, existence as private sphere 
exhibits the results of a long societal process where circumstances that derive 
from ―natural‖ existence are filtered into normative institutions.
1211
 The 
domestic/family environment (the Aristotelian οίκος) was first socially 
sanctified and then legally protected.  
This interference of that which is considered to be self-evident with 
public activity is openly demonstrated in the book example: with regard to 
physicality, the actions as such of possession and transfer of the book are so 
perfectly positioned within spatial and temporal proximity that they would 
have been averted only if natural laws had stopped performing as we know 
them. Within this context we can perceive control over one‘s own self. In all 
similar cases, we are discussing an unsurpassable actuality, which no human-
made device or rule can stop.  
1.2.3 - The intellectualisation of activity (‗virtuality‘) marks the first 
alteration to the seemingly absolute rule that ―no one can stop my thoughts 
from becoming voice.‖ I cannot turn my thoughts into speech if the right 
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words have not been invented yet. Language, here, is the artificial 
foundation, a communicative and simultaneously communicated structural 
process, where words constitute projections of items and events. Language 
sets for a subtle representation of virtuality;
1212
 an implicit setting in 
everyday life that simulates meanings through interacting symbols.  
Moreover, we realise the twisted manner in which language reflects 
this restating of nature: the thinking process is the self (i.e. the private 
sphere), which is utilising words from the language. Language, in turn, 
constitutes the public space metaphor, wherein words exist, are taken by 
individuals, rephrased and then returned to the shared sphere.
1213
  
1.3 Virtual Public - Circumstances become more complex within artificial 
environments, the likes of which are stemming from the Internet. Artificiality 
indicates, for certain, a creation ascribed to someone: in the affirmation of 
virtual creation, the bonds of ownership become stronger. For example, in 
offline privately authorised access (e.g. leasing, trespassing of land), we 
understand activity as taking place in borrowed space and for borrowed time . 
The owner, however, does not have total control over physical matter or 
natural laws. On the contrary, in created settings, spatial and temporal 
controls over virtual nature can be maximised to their fullest desired 
potentials. This is precisely the prospect which VWs (and in a lesser extent 
the Net as a whole) realise.  
1.3.1 – Internet accounts resemble bank accounts. Imagine the virtual body 
as a single safe deposit box in the bank‘s vaults. Indeed, what a person keeps 
in the box are several personal belongings, a family heirloom or an orig inal 
piece of art. As we are zooming out from the one box, thousands of other 
boxes, in the bank building‘s vaults, come into view; then gates of steel, 
making sure that all boxes are secure, isolated; then the entire building. 
Suddenly, one day, imagine that building being destroyed, vanishing into 
thin air. Both materially and commercially, the bank ceases to exist.  
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 Language is a representation. From this point, we may start contesting that law is also a 
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 We may also observe that words have to be invented and also agreed by everyone upon 
their shared semantic. The convention of language marks the transition from an anarchic 
state of nature to reason. 
[342] 
 
When thinking in material terms, it is difficult to imagine any 
judiciary suggesting that, since the bank was built and its services provide d 
by only one person (creator and owner), the decision of that person to 
destroy wilfully his building cancels all obligations of returning therein 
stored personal belongings or of offering compensation.
1214
 It appears equally 
difficult to believe how the same legal order that agonised to simulate 
abstract items to physical properties in IP laws can possibly deny the 
participants‘ personal contribution in the structure of online services; or, how 
personal time and financial investment in VW accounts acquire le sser, close 
to zero importance. Probably, the absence of impending financial benefits 
from the B2B and B2C industries‘ proximal horizons discourages the 
launching of legal parallels between bank and online accounts.  
The paradox in this metaphor of accounts was never an issue for the 
Chinese court. 
1.3.2 Public Space as Public Order – Presumably, in its counterweighing of 
the litigants‘ roles and powers, the court indicated the borderline territory 
between user and OSP: a landscape of legal relationships, shaped by the 
reciprocal unfolding of entitlements and obligations between the two sides. 
Simultaneously, the court defined private spheres, in the sense of 
ascertaining for either party a certain circle of legal protection and the 
minimum and maximum ranges for outreaching action. Therefore, the space 
which develops between the two opposite spheres internalises the important 
regulatory function of keeping them distinguishable and separate. This sense 
of public (as neutral) space transforms instrumentally into public order, 
rather than crystallising commonly digested notions of public availability 
and access. 
1.3.2.1 – This reading into the reasoning behind the reasoning of the Arctic 
Ice case aims at the undetected function of public spaces to contain and order 
the intersubjective breadth of law.   
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1.3.2.11 – For example, a hypothetical Western neoliberal criticism of the 
decision would have naturally attacked the court‘s protectivist attitude and 
interference. Yet, it should have read between the lines similar findings 
about the nature of public order, but expressed under its idiosyncratic 
ideological scope. For the neoliberal, the Chinese state intervened by 
opening the floodgates for scattered litigation to object virtual items, and 
placing particularly heavy burdens on the domestic online gaming industry. 
In addition, the state made apparent its opposition to deregulation and free 
development of B2C relationships, foretelling further oppression against the 
market‘s expansion. Where the state draws lines, beyond which private 
activity is not desirable, private relationships cannot reach the full potential 
of socio-economic production that neoliberals envisage. Public order as such 
prohibits private spheres from expanding their ranges over intermediary 
spaces that are designated as off-limits (i.e. the public space, as granted by 
the state‘s decision-making monopoly) and, thus, from engaging with other 
actors.  
1.3.2.12 – We termed intermediary zones ‗public space‘, whereas other 
conceptualisations might describe more aptly their role, such as Habermas‘s 
public sphere.
1215
 In any case, regardless of summoning the ‗public space‘, 
‗sphere‘, ‗forum‘ or ‗domain‘, we are referring to an area of empowerment 
for all, where exclusivities are neutralised. The trait of spatiality links with 
the virtual space of relationships, rather than with actual physicality. Such 
public space arrangements materialise the conceptual outline of the norms 
which prescribe the smooth performance of public life.  
Institutionally, representations of public space bear the effects of law. 
Their deployment recreates the resident design of law, incorporating liberties 
according to the constitutional foundation of principles and values, and 
instructing boundaries to participation in compliance with the  order of lesser 
legislation. They thus project a static yet objective image of the underlying 
law.  
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1.3.2.13 - The demonstrated transcending of public space into two 
conflicting ideas about public order signifies how polarised ideologies 
perceive antithetically the same intersubjective limitations. Therefore, public 
order (i) (‗protectivist‘) looked into establishing order between social actors, 
by blocking the excessive juridico-social desires of commercial forces; 
respectively, public order (ii) (‗econom ic-liberal‘) reviewed the same tale as 
a narrative of oppression, which is doomed to turn into socio -economical 
deceleration.  
1.3.2.2 – The interpretation of the case appeals also to the public/private 
distinction. Although frequently criticised as dated,  this has been frequently 
summoned in recent years, precisely to advocate horizontal applications of 
human rights. On the other hand, mention of other modular dualities in the 
legal apparatus (i.e. entitlements/obligations) further indicates the parameters  
which frame ontologically the dichotomy. The public/private schema is 
manifested in common practices of law through such binary legal 
contextures, which it inescapably assimilates. The manner in which the 
arrangement between entitlements and obligations shaped our reading of the 
Chinese case, exemplifies this best.  
1.3.3 Public and Private - The distinction between private and public needs 
to be perceived as reasonable, not as justified (excused), offered or inherited. 
That is the mistake lawyers make in reproducing ardently, at the expense of 
Justice, the historically iconic, yet politically deceiving ―state vs. individual‖ 
stereotype. Such decisively divertive treatments trap law into building social 
contingencies. 
1.3.3.1 – The origins of the separation of private from public (and even of 
the creation of public spaces) may be explained as a political reflection on 
the balance of power between societal determinants.  
1.3.3.11 – When states monopolised power, the demands of liberty were 
plausibly directed against the ―sovereign‖ or the ―government‖. The 
distinction became palpable, though, acquired meaning and form, inside the 
realm of human feelings and rationality: experiences of suffering, pain and 
denial of self-development were the circumstances that started the fires of 
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intense social clash, fused political competition and, finally, led to 
recognitions of rights in law. The right to belong to a public and respect to 
the private sphere expressed initially a humanist claim against the par 
excellence forms of authority and oppression. 
1.3.3.12 – The private sphere defined, essentially, the necessary minimum 
space required by the individual person in order to exist under the rule of 
society‘s supervising powers. In the case of humanity, ―existence‖ is far 
more than just a state of being: it denotes connection with the self, and 
rationality becoming the axis on which life is perceived and analysed. Thus, 
for this human, ―existence‖ is synonymous with ―dignity‖ with respect to 
life.  
The public is the wider space wherein such existence can be 
conceived, guaranteed, secured. In this respect, public and private retain a 
symbiotic relationship, where each is included into the other. Once its access 
to the public is totally cut, the private loses its meaning as such – it 
transforms into something different that calls for an alternative description of 
its properties. 




1.3.3.2 – Conceptualisations of access to power hold also the key to 
evaluating the duality upon how it responds to society in practice.  
1.3.3.21 - When Western political consciousness identified state governance 
with threats to liberty,
1217
 modern legal thinking switched aims from 
empowering human beings against despotic exercises of power to pursuing 
passionately the liberal ideal of the ―private individual‖ - to that excess of 
relegating all ‗non-institutional actors to the discursive realm of the 
private.‘
1218
 Informed on economic-liberal understandings, the public/private 
duality was encaged within the state/individual opposition.  
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 centuries‘ perceptions took statist absolutism for the primary threat to individual 
liberty; Horan (1976) 848. 
1218
 Rodgers (2003) 54. 
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1.3.3.22 – An uncritically endorsed state/individual instantiation carries the 
danger of subjecting public spaces and human beings to abusive exercises of 
private power. There, the public/private dialectics are altogether neutralised 
due to the apparent absence of state action. That oppressive power does not 
constitute state exclusivity, is openly dealt with in the Marxian thesis, along 
with its connections to exploitation. Marxists easily detected in the various 
levels of industrialisation and commercial proliferation the next, evolved 
stage of social feudalism.
1219
 Ownership of the means of production entails 
the bottom-up spreading of social domination, from the material structure all 
the way to the superstructure. 
1.3.3.23 – These readings suggest alternative interpretations of the 
information revolution‘s juridico-political development. The propertising of 
the intellect, and the austere protective regimes (private knowledge empires) 
which surround it, rejuvenate feudalism in framing ownership of the means 
of knowledge and social production mainly by controlling information in all 
kinds and shapes,
1220
 that is, ownership of the means to ―everything‖ on 
virtual space, and especially in VW contexts.  
1.3.3.3 – Redistributions of economic power in liberal societies undercut 
profoundly the political tradition of the distinction and expose its misapplied 
praxis as threatening to humanity‘s development. The online analogy 
exhibits even more sharply these circumstances, where the conditions of 
existence are administered, in the form of information, by private actors on 
market rationales. Freedom becomes more virtual than the onscreen artificial 
environments, for it shrinks into the limited consumer options which 
information and entertainment oligopolies create.  
This does not comply with an ideal of public where individual 
personality and group identities may be freely developed. Ironically, even the 
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free-market ideal finds the prerequisites towards its realisation being 
fundamentally and substantially disrupted.
1221
   
1.3.3.4 – Therefore, following the discussion on virtual nature and its ―laws‖ 
and from there the normative communication of information space between 
online participants, a juridico-politically over-encompassing idea of the 
virtual private builds on the rational human being‘s tolerance (i.e. personal 
limits) to his surrounding totality of socially active agents. The virtual 
public, on the other hand, ontologically projects the above spatia l 
understanding of common material, intellectual and social resources and 




Representations of an identity-constructive virtual public promote 
reconfigurations in the social practice, which come into conflict with the 
commercial reality of VWs and of private closed settings in general.  
1.3.4 Participation – Voluntary entrance into a setting expresses the intent to 
expand the private sphere‘s outer boundaries, either towards fusion with 
other spheres or for incorporating more space. In our natural existence, we 
have no choice but to participate in this world and we pursue to secure more 
and more rights: as pain and suffering become inextricable elements of daily 
life, the intensity and decisiveness of political struggle are increased  and 
experienced impasses heighten the fighting spirit‘s sense of immediacy. On 
the contrary, where varieties of participatory space are available, the terms of 
urgency are in reverse analogy downplayed. Manifestations of the 
marketplace speak the language of demand and offer, spark internal 
competition and realise their commercial ethics through ―take -it-or-leave-it‖ 
freedoms. 
1.3.4.1 – We may argue, however, that markets thrive on the circumstances 
of natural existence. To be more accurate, they permeate and exploit social 
interaction, which aims at securing the means for sustaining human needs. 
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Therefore, participation as voluntary action appears ambiguous and thus 
open to interpretations.  
1.3.4.11 - It suffices to consider the differences between the traditional 
countryside pub and a gentlemen‘s club in London. Both venues belong to 
private owners and patrons choose whether to enter or not. In the first case, 
though, how many alternatives exist for the village resident to socialise with 
the local community? The landlord, who - despite pubs being formally 
known as ―public houses‖ - is not the state, acquires substantive hold over 
the local social life.  
1.3.4.12 - The apparent availability of options at the other end of the 
spectrum and the freedom of choice to enter the big city club is countered by 
pressing mixtures of factors which reflect constant readjustments in the 
modus vivendi and goals of social groups – e.g. the ―hottest spot‖, or the club 
whose members get a professional status boost. We could discuss ―demand‖ 
and ―offer‖ performing under ideal conditions of ―healthy competition‖, if 
not for the existence of de facto monopolies. The modern social environment 
is willy-nilly transformed into commodity, since it is deeply embedded 
within the capitalist mode of production.
1223
 
1.3.4.2 – Social space, and for that matter the powerful discourse 
surrounding the concept of sociability,
1224
 is mediated on one hand by 
property and is rooted in economic relationships on the other. 
1.3.4.21 – Following the analysis of ‗affective immaterial labour‘ offered by 
Negri and Hardt and its biopolitical impacts on information economies,
1225
 
Prada reads in the expanding social media ‗the design of forms of human 
relationships‘ forming the  ‗primary instrumental base of the new economic 
production.‘ In his own words, ‗the new industries, increasingly oriented to 
pleasure and entertainment, and to the computerised production of 
―intangible‖ goods and information, are really producing contexts of 
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interpretation and assessment, forms of identification and membership, 
interpersonal behaviour and human interaction .‘ In today‘s context, ‗the 
concept of production‘ aims at ‗the production of sociability itself.‘
1226
 
1.3.4.22 – Any private initiative to produce or host a social process is linked 
to the public, either by function or through invitation to participation. 
Understandably, laws concretising our ethical and practical approaches to the 
private sphere formulate plausible limits. That balance is compromised by 
private spaces that pursue via marketing their performance to dominate 
sociability across the broader context. Hence, different to e.g. a millionaires 
club in Boston, publicly pervasive private platforms such as Facebook or, for 
that matter, over-hyped socio-commercial products like WoW, require 
different criteria for assessing participation and free choice. 
1.3.4.3 – Critique of terms of inclusion and exclusion ought arguably to be 
different in cases of privatising parks, town-squares or public utilities. 
However, if we take into account the present discussion and the social 
omnipresence of branded culture
1227
 there is no issue of ―publicising‖ private 
spaces where the public social space is being privatised.  
2. Virtual Jurisprudence – Reassessing the overarching understandings 
which frame judicial interpretation, and thereafter the practical perspective 
of Justice, allows us to consider anew the treatment of facts within the 
decision-making matrix. The commercial characteristics of spaces, services 
and creations/products are elements difficult to excise from their social 
productiveness and, thus, from their increased public function.  Liberated, 
though, from pre-digital technical understandings of the context, we may 
approach VWs (and online settings) with responsive structural insights. This 
take needs not to be hostile towards the market: on the contrary, it sets more 
realistic appreciations of the online market‘s needs and differentiates 
creatively the latter‘s operations to pre-emptive offline models.  
 The question over applying Justice breaks into confronting traditional 
barriers when applying human rights in private spaces and, alternatively, 
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interpreting understandings of the online cultural and communicated 
(‗virtual‘) public. 
2.1 – The preventive effect of the public/private dichotomy on adjudication 
has been severely criticised where contradicted by reciprocal fluxes between 
the structures and practices of public and private laws,
1228
 and for pulling the 
focus from human rights and the exercises of power on the human.
1229
  
2.1.1 - Discussions about VWs and law frequently summon the US Marsh v. 
Alabama case,
1230
 where a company town had ‗assumed all of the major 
functions of a municipality‘ and was thus simulated to the state for obeyi ng 
constitutional values.
1231
 Note that in 1996 an analogy against AOL‘s 
apparent monopolistic hold on email communications was turned down.
1232
 
US courts have refused state action against privately owned public 
utilities.
1233
 While the Marsh court refused to extend its reasoning to 
shopping malls, lower courts have held these latter to be public spaces.
1234
 
Places of public accommodation (e.g. inns, theatres, transportation hubs, 
even private clubs) may not discriminate against their customers.
1235
 




2.1.2 - Problematically, resolving the public role of a private actor bars 
usually courts from discussing substantive social values matters.
1237
 On the 
other hand, courts have accepted the public functioning of private spaces 
without summoning issues of constitutionality or the rights of involved 
parties, by simply investigating their public-calling nature.
1238
 Such decisions 
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remind us that property is in general restricted by its unique common-calling 
character, a public interest.
1239
 
2.1.3 - Public policy as a private law principle has succeeded in the past to 
deliver the weight of human rights, when these had not been yet ―inscribed‖, 
by resolving conflicts between contractual agreements and freedom of  
expression or human dignity.
1240
 The use of public policy considerations in 
judgements, though, fails arguably in practice to distinguish between 
utilitarian or distributive objectives and the public element.
1241
 
2.1.4 - Conventional civil laws consider self-evident that tenants enjoy the 
fruits of the land, especially if they have laboured towards producing them. 
The similar Lockean conceptualisation does not work very well in 
environments like WoW, since participants do not mix their labour with a 
commons to claim rights over virtual properties.
1242
 SL, on the other hand, 
features an element of commons, yet Linden has not actually released the 
VW to the status of ‗commons‘ and participation takes place under 
contractually granted permission. Several solutions have been suggested in 
literature. For instance, a ‗reasonable right of access‘ to virtual property in 
common law, would perform as a minimal possession of license to enter the 
VW, under conditions similar to entering public venues.
1243
  
Such dilemmas do not question the landowners‘ rights to be 
selective.
1244
 It seems, though, that examples in legal literature involve 
mainly individual proprietors in textbook discrimination cases; the 
problematic of VWs (and of the contemporary information industry in 
general) stretches into complex market relationships and commercial 
oligopolies. To distinguish between the private or not character of a venue 
surfaces as trivial where community values are being threatened.
1245
 
                                                 
1239
 Reichman, A. ‗Property Rights, Public Policy and Limits of Legal Power to Discriminate‘ 
in Friedman & Barak-Erez (2001) 250. 
1240
 Barak in Friedmann & Barak-Erez [eds.] (2001) 36. 
1241
 Reichman, supra 1239, 250. 
1242
 Sheldon (2007) 761. 
1243
 Ibid. 774 – 776. 
1244
 Reichman, supra 1239, 256 – 257 (addresses the stalemate between the public and the 
individual landowner‘s personal development – and dignity). 
1245
 Lastowka & Hunter (2004) 60. 
[352] 
 
2.2. – The alternative public problematic faces the ‗enclosure‘ of symbolic 
space, where corporations increasingly intercept the public‘s access to 
‗community spaces and cultural capital‘ and property-based claims creep into 
social relationships.
1246
 The public space is transferred into private venues – 
as in the parallel of privatised city centres
1247
 - and community relations 
become object of plausible exploitation.  
2.2.1 Public Production - As the concept of the public itself transforms, 
since most public resources are being privatised, Hardt & Negri
1248
 suggest it 
ought to be rejuvenated - perhaps on the basis of the common.
1249
  
The Net facilitates its public space where subjective and objective 
identities are constructed.
1250
 The Internet audience describes people 
accessing and participating in the same information, rather than as passive 
recipients of broadcast outputs.
1251
 From the increasingly privatised Net 
stems a new folk culture.
1252
 
Noting the distinction between ‗mass culture‘ (production category) 
and ‗pop culture‘ (consumption mode), media scholarship insists that as the  
materials of mass culture are widely distributed and consumed, popular 
culture defines ‗what happens as mass culture gets pulled back into folk 
culture‘
1253
 – practically, a different cultural economy. Corporations have 
sought to market branded culture everywhere, mainly to children; when the 
public returns with appropriating the same artefacts at their own choosing, 
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Corporate and grassroots need not be taken into conflict; they may 
converge, reinforce each other and create more rewarding relationships 
between media producers and consumers.
1255
 
2.2.2 Public Goods - Information and culture feature non-rival 
characteristics, leading to understanding them as ‗public goods‘.
1256
 They 
also present cumulative development; new content builds on existing 
material.
1257
 There we can assess the significance of SL not in comparison to 
other VWs but in comparison to projects like Wikipedia. The software 
becomes the tool of group not of individual creativity.
1258
 
Public goods do not fit well in capitalist economy since their 
production does not bring profit.
1259
 On the other hand, knowledge is an 




2.2.3 Public Domain - The public-private distinction has long hidden 
the concept of the common – especially in the Anglo-American legal 
tradition.
1261
 Understandings of the public domain in recent legal 
reformations are still attached to pre-Net truths.
1262
 Arguably, the Net‘s 
economic value as a commons is underestimated, where it could ensure 
‗meritocratic competition among content providers.‘
1263
 
For some the public domain takes shape after IPR exclusivities are 
satisfied; for others, it demands protection as an ‗affirmative entity. ‘
1264
 
Boyle parallelises the public domain to the environment: the latter poses a 
conception that was shaped and defended only once proprietarian practices 
interfered heavily with natural space.
1265
 He calls ‗second enclosure‘ the 
movement of state-backed privatisation ‗of the intangible commons of the 
mind,‘ of ‗things that were formerly thought [...] or outside the market 
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 He contests the erosion of the public domain, as e.g. few 
works have moved from copyright into the public domain for decades, 




2.3. – Looking at the interoperation of functional and intellectual 
communities, this juridical reading reveals,  at last, the disrupting of the 
virtual public by the legal practices which govern VWs.  
2.3.1 IP - Intellectual communities circulate fan-works and other content as 
signifiers of common interest, the same way we communicate offline our 
interest in TV series, musicians or football teams without fear of breaking 
any laws. Information production is by definition a social practice, as 
involving the efforts of more than one person.
1268
 The disarmingly simple 
economic definition of human capital is ‗knowledge embodied in people;‘ 
thus, IP rights to knowledge overlap with humanity.
1269
  
For the purposes of IP law, the range of immaterial labour‘s products 
is wide, including from knowledge and information to relationships and 
emotional responses – ultimately, social life.
1270
 Different to the labour itself 
– which is institutionalised under market or employment relationships – its 
products are immediately social and common, constituting instantly (through 
communication) commonly lived experiences.
1271
   
Immaterial production is created constantly in social organisms, in 
collaboration between the pasts and presents of their members. These 
knowledges, relationships and forms of communication become common to 
society, a ‗kind of raw material‘ which ‗increases with use.‘ Hardt and Negri 
locate there the expropriation of the common, i.e. the private appropriation 
of the commonly produced value.
1272
 Intellectual artefacts are valuable due to 
their easy reproduction and circulation; paradoxically, the same 
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The contemporary institutional ecology fits the needs of the industrial 
info-economy.
1274
 Under the industrial model of production in mass-mediated 
culture, large organisations control large inventories and ‗integrate new 
production with reutilisation and recycling of inventory.‘
1275
 Laws fixated 
with the industrial understandings of producers undervalue the contributions 
of online participants, as much as contributions coming from the public 
domain. Where the new wave of copyright laws has been found consistent 
with constitutional values, it slowly transpires that private censorship via 
copyright enforcement escapes freedom of expression constitutional 
obligations.
1276




In the digital world, where copying is a daily routine and integrated in 
Internet interfaces,
1278
 every use of content constitutes practically copyright 
violation.
1279
 Laws like the DMCA reflect one-sided interests and establish 
litigation inequalities, placing individuals against the major industry 
players.
1280
 Copyright laws pose, at large, the problem that they might be 
interpreted as either aiming at correcting market inefficiencies, and thus 
allowing contractually relinquishments of rights, or being concerned 
primarily about the public good.
1281
 One way of looking into it argues that by 
establishing such OSP exclusivities EULAs decrease public good.
1282
 At the 
end of the day, both policy strands have every good reason to object to 
absolutist EULAs.
1283
    
2.3.2 EULAs/ToS – Therefore, if interference with contractual freedom 
requires a good reason, this is competently provided in this sense and, 
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additionally, in our continuing juridical reading of the virtual public,  where 
privatisation of public life and space takes place. 
Essentially, EULAs/ToS are governance tools. OSPs, however, pertain 
to treating issues associated to VWs exclusively under a customer services 
understanding.
1284
   
Business, in general, know that consumers ‗reliably, predictably, and 
completely‘ fail to read standard terms ,
1285
 seemingly finding that the cost of 




From a viewpoint, breaches of promises are justified opposite to 
oligopolies; enforcement of such contracts constitutes the state guarantor of a 
cartel.
1287
 OSPs are kind of forming an oligopoly, when standardising 
particular terms across the industry; such practices instantiate coercion
1288
 
upon the class of users.
1289
 
The narrow two-party perspective of typical private law case-by-case 
adjudication in consumer contract disputes is not well situated to address the 
kind of coercion that structural monopolies exercise;
1290
 getting rather 




The courts, conscious of their ‗limited ability to distinguish 
exploitation from sensible business practices,‘ consider more  preferable 
solutions of judicial reliance on market discipline, rather than rushing into 
terminally detrimental interference to market relationships.
1292
  
 It has been submitted that contested terms of adhesive contracts are 
valid if justified upon serving the public interest.
1293
 The most controversial 
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interpretation of this difficult criterion proposes measuring the economic 
effects on the public against the benefits to society as a whole.
1294
 Even back 
in the 1940s, Kessler remarked bitterly that, when court examine thus 
adhesive contracts, they ‗prefer to convince themselves and the community 
that legal certainty and "sound principles" of contract law should not be 
sacrificed to dictates of justice or social desirability.‘
1295
 Justice is not 
impossible, especially within the elasticity of common law; however, 
discussions about Justice ‗are hardly profitable.‘
1296
 
2.3.3 Power - The legalistic approach to Justice examines whether private 
entities become institutionally equal to states. Otherwise, in the Weberian 
tradition, monopoly in the use of force is mainly required.
1297
 So far we have 
discussed power oligopolies that seemingly do not match traditional 
enforcement, yet are embedded in politico-economic mechanisms, where 
their enforcement is monopolised. Such understandings of de facto 
monopolies do not satisfy modern lawyers; this incapacity to reconsider law 
pragmatically, demonstrates the nature of legal fetishism and its 
shortcomings. 
2.3.3.1 - Computer code is digital law and structurally powerful.
1298
 Whereas 
‗acquiring more knowledge at our disposal we acquire greater capacity for 
control,‘
1299
 knowledge represented as information artefacts entails IP power 
being exercised across information spaces and possibly annexing public 
domain territories. Participation in converging media expresses a counter -
power to those exerted within commodity capitalism over consumers .
1300
 
The Internet decentralises and allocates power to scattered fields of 
influence. Similar to patterns of global rule that develop across online 
―national‖ and ―global‖ citizenships , functional localities are linked together 
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in interdependence – arguably, closer than ever;
1301
 power is internally 
exercised, communicated through intellectual communities and thus weaving 
webs of intertwining control spheres. 
2.3.3.2 - In view of market settings, from the economic analysis‘ side one-
sided contracts are not that high-handed.
1302
 This changes online as services 
permeate digital existence.  
The use of adhesion contracts is arguably entangled in monopoly 
power.
1303
 Not only EULAs/ToS constitute a format monopoly: the adhesion 
contract is nonetheless a conveyor of power that ‗enables to control 
relationships across a market,‘
1304
 used typically by ‗enterprises with strong 
bargaining power‘
1305
 and not between equals. EULAs impose private feudal 
orders
1306
 that can extent deep into the social space. Especially in information 
space, the contract seals power over the self.  Arguably, standard-forms are 
not contracts: without exchanges of promises, the terms are embedded in the 
product - a one-sided lasting hold
1307
 that ―runs‖ with the product.
1308
 
Privatisation of the social space leaves open the possibility of 
exclusions. Exclusion is posed in the shape of a remotely implied, yet 
constant threat. 
2.3.4 No Exit - Inclusion and access gain in importance over autonomy and 
ownership for delivering personal freedom in the online network 
economy.
1309
 Exclusion generally passes for a punishment form. With regards 
to computer systems, euphemistic wordings such as ‗withdrawing of access 
privileges‘ encapsulate the meaning of exclusion as returning something 
previously ‗granted‘ rather than losing something rightfully available.
1310
  
2.3.4.1 - Online socialising seeks to fill the gaps of the off-line environment. 
In Hobsbawm‘s reading of the late twentieth century, where traditional 
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communities collapse, identity is invented; its choice is ‗predicated on the 
essentialist notion of no choice‘
1311
 in the face of cultural agonies and dead-
ends. The postmodern condition magnifies this sense of loss and the need to 
inclusion. Belonging to online communities is ordained by notions of ‗no 
choice‘, intensified by the absence of offline communal life and by the 
relative cultural weight that virtual spaces emit toward all directions. 
Marginalised groups use the Internet and VWs for establishing self-defined 
and self-determined spaces, in manners unavailable in physical space;
1312
 
race, age, gender, sexual preferences are all considered as such socially 
effective barriers. 
2.3.4.2 - Elimination in VWs can be quite permanent;
1313
 perhaps expanded, 
where VW ownerships overlap.
1314
 The time and subscription fees (and 
additional payments) invested in participation, along with the intangible 
wealth of social capital create attachment and make the insistence that exit is 
the only legal solution to look unfair.
1315
 
On a different level, VWs are monopolies like local clubs:
1316
 buying 
the software client and – mainly - paying subscription fees locks 
membership. Switching to other VWs involves high costs, including non-
transferable networks of associations and reputation.  Original VW creations 
privatise the communication channels of social space, exploiting the social 
capital which users invest in contact with the community locus.  
3. – Overall, this approach seems taking many liberties in mixing together 
different jurisdictional perspectives that as such ought not to be examined 
side by side. One may argue that the standardisation of an over-jurisdictional 
Justice position is thus highly invasive. Neither morality nor standards for 
legal judgement are universal or relative; nonetheless, ‗this does not mean 
we cannot criticise a society‘s practices or judgements.‘
1317
 Here, precisely, 
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the argument of Justice does not look at jurisdictions but examines critically 
an expanded society. The standards for the combined ethical and legal 
judgement are neither random nor lack of broader understanding of social 
practices. In the end, our use of the reading of Justice follows the practices 
of the global rule; where the application of a single regulatory model is 
forced across all nations, without regard to or interest in the local 
fundamental values.  
This is the lesson we learned and now we put it into practice, yet on 
different terms: not for placing humanity under general classifications - such 
as ‗global consumer‘ - that lead to social enclosure, but for liberating it.  
In this case, liberation for humanity means developing as a whole those 
discussion terms that will allow it to be heard.  
[361] 
 
7. And the (Virtual?) Life Goes On… 
 
 


















 In the case of modernity, philosophical, cultural or political principles 
would ‗reinvent and reinvigorate humanity‘ by replacing the failing 
traditions of the old; post-modernity describes the shattering of this project, 
either optimistically or pessimistically.
1319
 In Young‘s words, the movement 
from modernity to late modernity is one from a world of assimilation and  
incorporation to one which separates and excludes; on the other hand, the 
market forces have generated constant rise in our expectations of citizenship 
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For Foucault the passage from Classicism to modernity was given in 
the divorce of language from representations – the autonomisation of 
language from describing objects.
1321
 Post-modernity follows a reverse 
course – the rise of communication through the constant use of intersecting 
representations.  If modernity has indeed been the era of the subject
1322
 what 
does it imply for post-modernity? ‗Inter-subjectivity‘ suggests a possible 
course; the questions about the fate of humanity, though, remain open.   
The Internet, in its pluralistic and decentralised deployments, projects 
postmodernity and, at the same time, offers a kind of redress to its condition. 
Where traditional political and social institutions (citizenship, community, 
identity) experience various stages of crisis, the Net responds to exclusion 
insecurities and the need to reconfigure apparently damaged  contexts.  
The freedom of the information environment holds a greater promise 
towards proliferating democracy as a common practice.
1323
 One way to look 
at that in effect is the widespread access to writing ‗in forms other to 
writing,‘
1324
 like Web 2.0 tools. The other is through connectivity, the actual 
greatest contribution of the Internet from the political, cultural and 
economical viewpoints alike.
1325
 For the younger generations the Internet is 
integral part of their habitats; from escape and facilitating counter -spaces, 




1. - Not losing track of these overarching conditions, the proposed 
(re)solution here intends to keep the logic of the private law relation between 
OSPs and users intact. At the same time, it argues that qualitatively new 
forms of protection for the ―consumer‖ need to be developed.  
Where ‗good faith‘ and other such fairness clauses have been held to 
soften the harshness of the market, the ways that they have been interpreted 
by courts over the years show that they fall short of what is required. In 
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particular, the courts focussed on those situations where unequal bargaining 
power and inefficient markets raised doubts about the "voluntariness" of the 
transaction, thus confirming rather than mitigating, the freedom of contract 
ideology of private law. They also had the undesirable consequence, for a 
global medium like the Internet, to fragment the interpretation of rules due to 
different local understandings of "fairness".  
What is suggested here is to use these widely recognised fairness 
clauses in a much more substantive and indeed aggressive way. As argued 
throughout this thesis, restrictive practices by VW providers have a negative 
impact not just on the individual user, but through limitation of information 
exchange have much wider undesirable causal implications. They potentially 
undermine the existence of a healthy public sphere that is crucial for 
communal self-expression by superimposing the rationality of private law.  
But in our picture, the relation between VW provider and customer has 
sufficient similarities to the relation between state and citizen to allow the 
law to re-frame the relation, not as a public law relation as such, but as one 
with sufficient similarities to permit horizontal application of human rights 
law.   We can thus use, as a heuristic device at least, concepts and notions 
from human rights discourse, currently neutered as defensive mechanisms 
against states only, to give substance to the "good faith" or ―fairness" 
element of contract law.  
As argued in Chapter 2, this does not lead to a parochial and 
inconsistent application of the law, as the underlying concepts are global and 
universal in nature; in the same way, in which political rights  are 
"inalienable" and cannot be fully waived through contracts, however 
"voluntary", this approach also imposes natural boundaries on the ability of 
customers to waive certain rights vis-a-vis the service provider. Radin's idea 
of incomplete commodification and market inalienability gets thus substance 
when applied to intangible and virtual aspects of personality, where she 
speaks only of the most physical aspects of it (body organs and sex).  As 
argued in Chapter 6, over-zealous protection of IP rights has a negative 
impact on the wider production of culture and the public sphere, giving 
[364] 
 
further support for the legitimacy of a substantive good faith interpretation 
informed by human rights as communal goods. 
1.1 - It is important here to stretch out that the VW and gaming industries 
fall under a different to the music and film industries category (maybe until 
now). We need to repeat here that developers and large part of the sec tor‘s 
management are users and gamers coming from the same online 
communities. The major point which the thesis attacked on is the systemic 
structures and their producing of dehumanising governance regimes.  
 Hence, the thesis concludes with two overviews and one insight. The 
first summary looks back at the market context which facilitates the new 
technology but mainly promulgates structural transformations for law and 
society. The second looks briefly at virtual properties and the realisation of 
Justice. The final part prepares the setting for future research by inquiring 
the existing dynamics.    
I. The Virtual and the Law 
1. - In Friedman‘s ideal of free-market (which formed the heart of 
neoliberalism) competitive capitalism promotes political freedom in 
separating economic from political power.
1327
 Political freedom means ‗no 
coercion by fellow man.‘
1328
 Hence, monopolies inhibit effective freedom by 
denying alternatives. Consumers‘ coercion by sellers or employees‘ coercion 
by employers is prevented by the presence of competition and market 
alternatives.  
We may point to failings in the practice of this otherwise seminal 
work, and in contextual relation to the so far addressed issues. First, 
economic power absorbs political power, and markets perform as class 
producing mechanisms. Second, market societies quickly succumbed to 
relative statism (ironically, like Soviet communism, which Friedman 
disdained precisely for that reason). Third, monopolies are replaced by 
oligopolies that operate on the pretext of competi tion. Finally, without 
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limiting voluntary exchanges overexposed social and human values to 
commodification. 
1.1 – The replacing of bureaucratic norms and values with those of the 
market does not imply ‗the disappearance of power, control and 
inequality.‘
1329
 Early objections to the ‗marketplace of ideas‘ pointed that 
real markets ‗always interpose‘ between e.g. writers and readers, skewing the 
‗delivery of viewpoints in an unfair and unequal way.‘
1330
 Moreover, the 
danger is visible, for those who cannot pay to participate in the exchange of 
ideas, to be excluded from the main platforms.
1331
 This may lead from visions 
of ‗digital democracy‘ to reinforcing inequalities and the emergence of 
‗information aristocracies;‘
1332




1.1.1 - Economic systems are always embedded in social relations;
1334
 the 




Economic practices create classes. Social relations consist of class practices; 
the connections forming there can be only of domination and 
subordination.
1336
 Poulantzas designated power as the capacity of a social 
class to realise its objective interests;
1337
 he kind of discredits the Weberian 
problematic that power equals to legitimacy, as narrowly normative.
1338
 Our 
analysis in the previous Chapter pointed to a combination of the two, the 
latter setting the regulatory outline of the former. Legitimacy authorises 
administrative exercises, which develop into managerial bureaucracy. As in 
the case studies, a hard-worked out online identity might be terminated by 
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VW clerks who work in policy compliance departments and pertain to 
different interpretations of values.
1339
 
1.1.2 - OSPs exercise control that states could only dream of.
1340
 For the 
effects of online privatisations we discussed how the market marginalises 
communities with regards to the downtown metaphor
1341
 and the usurpation 
of the virtual public‘s rights – including access to their social space 
production.  
1.1.3 - As discussed in Chapter 3, the multitude is a class concept.
1342
 On the 
premises of class determination through struggle, its online conceptualisation 
takes shape through biopolitical exercises of power (at once economic and 
political) over online participation and resources used in common; opposite 
to disruptions in its accessing productively the latter, which are mainly 
forwarded by exclusivities.  
1.2 – On the second and third failings, when the industry calls upon statist 
monopoly of force for imposing oligopolistic economic interests, it  marks the 
first blow to the free market and the principles of human flourishing it 
supposedly idealises. 
1.2.1 - Private ownership of resources can be beneficial. It definitely offers 
more flexible management than conventional institutional 
administration.
1343
Yet, markets rely on exclusivity systems for the exchange 
processes to perform:
1344
 even from the economic point of view, restrictions 
to information allocate poorly resources in society and lead to inefficient 
market operation.
1345
 The interventions of the information and entertainment 
industries in the formation of laws and the restructuring of the online society 
is deeply political and of hegemonic nature.  
1.2.2 – The belief that private agreements improve the welfare implications 
of exchanges
1346
 is discredited in the majority of standard-form contracts. 
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Structural contractual coercion is the problem that Fried pointed to in the 
standardisation of contracts across industries which follow oligopolistic 
practices.
1347
 Market monopolies/oligopolies sit most frequently behind the 
creation of contemporary subordination relationships.  
1.3 – Generally, subordination as serfdom is embedded in the practical 
ideology of commodification frameworks. Employment relationships are 
usually examined as the areas where the boundaries between contractual 
labour and involuntary servitude are blurred.
1348
 In the centre of such 
analyses are found approximations of slavery as a relation.
1349
  Serfdom itself 
is indirectly tied to a ―master‖ through a connection with land; our 
explanations on spatiality suffice here to expand on this relationship being 
built on alternative forms of ―land‖.     
1.3.1 - The subculture of consumerism operates as inevitable imperialism, 
dominating cultural and social insights of communities.
1350
 It permeates the 
space of choices and in direct combination with the limited availability of 
options locks choices of action. 
1.3.2 – Furthermore, the argument of structural coercion, as well as the 
conflict of commodification with human rights, is exemplified in the French 
‗dwarf tossing‘ cases.
1351
 Local authorities had banned dwarf-throwing in 
local bars as being a practice against public order and disrespectful towards 
human dignity. The dwarfs actually challenged the original decision, 
claiming that they were not being treated as things, and that it was their free 




2. – This review synopsised the major problems which the contemporary 
socio-economic context generates in its attempt to manage new technological 
perceptions with the same ease that it (inadvertently) produces them. Some 
of the weaknesses are inherent; others are residual of imperialist 
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appreciations regarding the use of resources in society. It is difficult within 
this setting for industries to embrace an interest in matters such as 
environmental protection or human rights.
1353
 
 These conditions determine the involvement as much as the 
limitations of law. The market cannot regulate; the input of law is necessary. 
For example, ToS in practice are not legitimised by the mere fact of their 
popularity across the industry. On the other hand, however, it is also doubtful 
whether civil litigation processes can correct the market failures of cartels, 
which such contracts bring to the surface.
1354
 
II. Virtualising Justice 
In a similar manner this Part evaluates briefly the aspect and potentials of 
property in response to the online and virtual l ives respectively. The latter 
are then related to the platform conception of Justice, as used in thi s thesis, 
to impart an example of pursuing human rights under precisely that paradigm 
of economic and technological intersection which Part I summarised.  
1. - Virtual property can be of significant value, considering the medical, 
biological, military, artistic etc advancements that can be developed on 
three-dimensional digital environments.
1355
 On the other hand, the example of 
South Korea, where VWs have climbed to the top of the entertainment 
market
1356
 indicates large scale revaluations of virtual items. The value of 
virtual property as rivalrous, persistent and interconnected code increases on 
the networking market. The example of the unique email account 
demonstrates these traits in action: it can be accessed by its owner from 




The appeal to exclusionary rights (chattels) on physical items (i.e. servers) is 
partly flawed in expanding over hosted information resources that develop 
independent of the original owner‘s control. The values of web-addresses and 
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email accounts increase and decrease according to the network effects of the 
virtual space. Chattel exclusion rights could ‗protect too much or too 
little.‘
1358
   
The original movement from commons to property was a convention aimed at 
social stability in private possession; today, social pressures to a reverse 
course from property to commons regarding certain categories of information 
resources lean on the same justification ground ‗towards a position of 
common benefit and accord.‘
1359
 
1.1 - Maybe property does not signify the right approach to VW 
representations, and it comes along with its own cargo of problems in legal 
practice.
1360
 It was perhaps first used by participants intuitively, to raise 
recognition of entitlements: property understandings frequently intertwine 
with human perceptions of justice.
1361
 OSPs have their share of responsibility 
there, like when SL recognised property rights to users, or when games 
attacked game-account sales by virtue of their IP rights on virtual items. 
Certainly, however, users‘ possession claims to software images cannot 
threaten the OSPs‘ IP rights.
1362
 
Another persistent problem poses the migration between settings. There it 
really becomes apparent that the user has no actual hold on virtual as sets. 
From the combined scopes of law and infrastructure the potentials are 
limited. Perhaps some IP rights could be extracted from SL-like contexts,
1363
 
or some industry standards (e.g. virtual currency exchange) could facilitate 
transfers similar to when switching between phone-providers and retaining 
the same number. 
Essentially, the issue remains personality as related to objects, like avatars, 
virtual swords etc. Avatars are not their users; they certainly support visual 
identification, point that arguably invokes the question of property. However, 
selling avatars on ebay barely involves selling the online personae 
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(nonetheless, it has been supported that players could seek IP protection for 
the personalities of their avatars).
1364
 Confusion is an inevitable element 
when engaging with virtualities.
1365
 
2. – Sociologists have contested that data images and online personae are not 
easily correlated with the socially participating modern self, delivering 
instead postmodern notions cut-off from humanity.
1366
 It is counter-argued 
that ‗the forms of selfhood and sociality characterizing VWs are profoundly 
human;‘ the virtual human reorganises humanity, not in a ―post‖ relationship 
of displacement but as co-constitution.
1367
 VWs rework the virtuality that 
characterises human beings in the actual world.
1368
 At the end of the day, 
most commercial game accounts are attached to real bank or paypal accounts.  
Chapter 6 described three juridical reflections for the human subject to 
access virtuality. Here we are completing this construct ion in reference to 
Radin‘s theory, suggesting the connection between human personality and 
online account that underlies all three conceptualisations.  
2.1 - Radin contests that unique individual identity requires contextual 
continuity, achieved in relation to ‗the environment of things,‘ the social and 
the natural worlds. There she also founds her enmity towards 
commodification, which undermines personal identity by monetising 
personal attributes and relationships as well as moral commitments, 
alienating them eventually from the person.
1369
 
This is how she returns to property – a concept well-known in late modernity 
and thus accessible. Echoing the Hegelian approach, she rather dismisses the 
prospect of propertising personality, acknowledging potential dangers  of 
commodifying it.
1370
 She suggests that personal property can be self-invested 
with particular objects, as persons need contextual embeddedness,
1371
 like 
homes or phone numbers. Self-development requires resources: it is 
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expressed through relationships with discreet units (e.g. the wedding ring, 
family heirlooms), with the existence and availability of public spaces and it 
itemises stable future expectations.
1372
 Finally, in her approach to contract as 
alienation that leads to estrangement, properties that are important to 
personhood and community should not be commodifed on the free market.
1373
  
2.2 - Radin‘s approach allows us to link persons with service accounts 
without losing track of the strands which the thesis has visited so far. 
Therefore, production of common knowledge and social relationships 
reserves for the virtual multitude the production of collective and individual 
subjectivities.
1374
 There, personal development interoperates within and 
simultaneously reflects these communal processes. At the same time, the 
value of the productive virtual public emerges, its relationship with the 
person being built upon continuous interdependence between the participants 
of the online community. 
2.3 – From a point of view, it is irrelevant whether, for the sake of formalit y, 
we are labelling the relationship with the account as possession or rented 
space, instead of more solid forms of ownership. Self-development is 
associated to the ongoing personal investment in the VW account and certain 
content aspects, sufficing the human person having legitimate access.  
3. – Combing the virtual existence with the application of Justice, our 
understanding of the latter elaborated on the unity of the human rights 
argument within posited law, nevertheless public or private. There can be no 
―double-system‖.
1375
 Yet human rights is a complex grammar; through its 
political dimensions it has undergone its share of erosion. It needs to be 
rethought and reinstated realistically in view of noted transformations and 
implications. 
The right to participation claims central role in the contexts we have 
examined; not only in its traditional political sense but, additionally, in the 
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socio-cultural meanings it develops and which, in return, reconfigure the 
dimensions and breadth of the former.
1376
 
3.1 – Regarding the overall question of Justice online, blind technology 
regulation can easily undermine civic freedoms.
1377
 Apart from that, if, as 
Lange and Powell contest, in systems of law that prize freedom of thought 
and speech, exclusive rights in expression are intolerable,
1378
 how should we 
deal with the broader undercutting effects of such exclusivities? The gradual 
rise of attention to property protection to coming on equal, arguably superior, 
terms opposite to safeguarding liberty
1379
 has evolved into the systematic 
proliferation of IPR and their hold over communications and culture.  The 
anti-piracy legislative campaign in the form of statutes like the DMCA 
undermines communicative anonymity.
1380
 Similar impacts, but, obviously, in 
a smaller scale, reserves CyberSLAPP litigation. Strikingly, all instances 
feature judicial confrontations between individuals and powerful 
corporations.  
3.2 - In private law human rights acquire their most authentic regulatory 
incarnation, since conflicting basic rights are brought in proper balance 
‗while taking into consideration the public interest.‘
1381
 State action, on the 
other hand, sets an issue which is not genuinely legal; it poses a legalistic 
formulation, yet it delivers openly an ideological fiction and choice.
1382
 
However, the origins of state action are legal,
1383
 found in the unsettling 
silences of constitutions.
1384
 Its continuing treatment, though, in a 
tautological understanding of the public/private and state/individual 
distinctions, and in a manner arguably persistent, carries along fears of state 
interference with private economic development that represent most 
characteristically the economic-liberal strand.  
                                                 
1376
 Jenkins (2006) 268. 
1377
 Zittrain (2008) 105. 
1378
 (2009) ix. 
1379
 Radin (1993) 14. 
1380
 Froomkin in Nicoll et al [eds.] (2003) 42. 
1381
 Barak, supra 53, 29.  
1382
 Graber & Teubner (1998) 63 (a brief explanatory note, reasoning ‗the narrow view‘). 
1383
 Berman (2000) 1266. 
1384
 Barak, supra 53, 42. 
[373] 
 
There is little to be said where legal circumstances pronounce unashamedly 
conscious political choices. The story is completely different when the same 
circumstances are represented as if delivering a politically objective study 
and analysis of legal facts. The thesis concludes with objecting to most state 
action applications, for their apparent subscribing to this second stream.  
3.4 – Regarding how Justice registers with our entering into virtual domains, 
human dignity paired with contractual freedom carries the capacity to act 
both as empowerment and as constraint; if clarified, its potential can lead the 
online society to less debatable functional structures. By drawing authority 
from established principles (i.e. humanistic, constitutional and religious) 
rights are not assets to be sold; they have value in use but ‗not in 
exchange.‘
1385
 As such they are matters for regulation that cannot be left to 
the market to price.
1386
 
3.4.1 - Security – and we might associate to it generalised strands of risk-
assessment – need not to compete the human rights perspective, whereas it 




3.4.2 - The right to privacy suggests on the one hand a projection of property 
ideology, as above in the relationship with the online account, where the 
home empowers personality and becomes part of self-constitution.
1388
 A 
second reading into privacy comes from the ECtHR, where ‗respect for 
private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and 
develop relationships with other human beings.‘
1389
  
Privacy, however, is double-edged. If enshrined excessively it leads to 
isolation from the defence of freedom – which can only be exercised in 
public.
1390
 Moreover, it stands too close with privatisation for constructing 
exclusionary platforms. The sense of defining humanity through privacy 
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antagonises understandings of human rights based on traditional standards of 
nature; it facilitates an alternative individualistic basis.  
3.4.3 - Where realised, a right to Internet access highlights the fundamental 
role that information society plays in individual and social development. We 
may further extend this basis to a claim to (online) communities, as a 
―resultant‖ entitlement. In relation to this, rhetorical operations of metonymy 
would allow the transfer of presumed human dignity to entities and 
environments contiguously connected to humanity.
1391
 
3.4.4 – This last step takes us closer to our virtual existences.  Whereas 
traditional law might not be in position to protect online identity from e.g. 
perfunctory exclusions,
1392
 recognising its traits would provide for more 
confided online development. Castronova has raised the prospect of a right to 
play.
1393
 Suggestions of rights to participate and create in VWs, find these 
overlapping with freedoms of expression and association.
1394
  
3.5 – Of course, we should be aware of obvious dangers lurking nearby. 
While policies that aim at minimising the potency of human rights 
application in private spheres can be easily criticised for harbouring human 
and social debasement, they confer at the sides a fair point. The importance 
which postmodern humanity invests in rights for authenticating its existence 
carries the danger of turning any individual desire into rights.
1395
 This 
trivialises the value of rights and would devalue the juridically represented 
humanity. 
Nonetheless, the perspective of bringing Justice closer to our virtual lives 
serves best the coherence of our existence. Dignity and knowledge become 
good once we experience them. The same goes for the idea of a public 
domain, which offline surrounds us self-evidently and nurtures our well-
being, then suddenly feeling like being taken away. These are issues that in 
the end cannot be taken lightly. 
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III. Revitalising Justice 
The starting point for our argument claimed the position that institutional 
structures justified on respect to humanity, should not be available for 
enforcing degrading treatments of humanity. In the course of the discussion 
certain concessions in the legal practice of human rights were directly 
attributed to the philosophy and the performance of the free-market. 
It is not necessary to register with the belief that the market is harmful to 
society. However, its rhetoric of alienation is. The treatment of personhood 
in contractual relationships as an indirectly separable property, trivialises the 
conception of personhood and alienates the person,  who is not seen as a 
whole but as the holder of a commodity.
1396
 From there the losses vary in 
degree, climaxing ultimately with the degradation of humanity on the 
personal and the collective, in extension, levels.  
 Plausibly, we should not be speaking of dead-ends. The purpose of 
critique here is not to deliver reasoned expressions of disapproval, distress or 
even outrage, but in its elaborating and proposing of ideological resistance to 
demand radical transformations and alternatives where these are presen ted as 
if they were non-existent.  
 For one thing, in the limited settings that this thesis focussed on, the 
structures are not empty of alternatives; despite appearing locked under 
superimposed norms and practices that exclusively determine their 
development. 
1. – There are certain facts that we can take on board from the overall 
discussion, and the feedback we received from VWs can be valuable. As 
Taylor‘s account of a gamer community being in close contact with 
MMORPG developers testifies,
1397
 these contexts tend to be rather different 
to other sectors of the media and entertainment industries. In addition, we 
examined the case where Blizzard endorsed user-friendly machinima 
policies. Second, online communities can be exemplarily dynamic and take 
advantage of practised market perceptions:  the Net is overflowing with daily 
stories of OSPs that negotiated their practices of absolutism once users had 
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been mobilised to reason as a social body with actions. Consider the story of 
the gay guild in WoW or, in more ―actual‖ terms, how the social network 




 There is greater degree of direct communication but also shared 
understandings of the means. OSPs in the sense of developers are more 
integrated into the experience of users. These observations do not imply that 
a great change is necessarily on the way. Certainly, however, a different 
basis exists on which social – here, online – participation can be drafted in 
pursuing a practical sense of common good.  
As common good we may accept ‗the factor or set of factors‘ which as 
practical considerations give reason for collaboration amongst the 
community‘s members, as individuals and as a whole alike.
1399
 We may 
restructure this meaning in relationships between users and, at the same time, 
between functional and intellectual communities and the OSP. Understanding 
of the common good can reach beyond the MMORPG players‘ enjoyment of 
playing and the OSP‘s commercial activity. It may ac tually encapsulate both 
in pursuing to safeguard healthy mutual relationships, i.e. neither just the 
gaming aspect nor the profiting. 
2. – Of course, another factor which we cannot overlook in this meeting of 
interests is the role of company lawyers. Where solutions are sought towards 
framing a new ‗social contract‘, their input is as much inevitable as 
necessary and technically valuable. 
Unfortunately, practice has taught us that we cannot expect from schemes 
like conventional EULAs to abide by the requirements of Justice, or at least 
of a practical deployment of Justice. The speculations, expectations and 
education of lawyers play a large part in the industry‘s contractual 
shortcomings. It is in the technical dogmas that lawyers are used to profess 
that human users end up being treated as impersonal consuming machines.  
Such predicaments have roots in noted problems within the industry and the 
dysfunctional coordination between developers and legal departments. When 
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the feedback which targets at developers but is received by lower ranks of 
the game management hierarchy is delivered with its clarity of intent and 
meaning intact to lawyers, the prospects for VW regulation are definitely set 
on a more creative path towards deliberation. The point is that these 
structures while resembling states in dealing with large numbers of people 
and in bearing administrative attitude, their bureaucracy – though less 
principled in terms of institutional guarantees – is far more flexible and 
considerably approachable.   
3. - For example EULAs/ToS could be ―rebooted‖ to embrace the realities of 
online interfaces and, at the same time, respond genuinely to the contractual 
reasoning of ‗offer‘, ‗consideration‘ and ‗acceptance‘. Replacing the endless 
lists of incomprehensible jargon, terms could be deployed in arrangements of 
either opt-in or opt-out selection boxes, personalising the agreement 
according to each user‘s preferences.  
The full participation terms in the contractual relationship with a given VW 
would depend on the individual user‘s choices. The negotiated agreement 
could transform the subscription basis, the rights which users can transfer 
between ―virtuality‖ and ―actuality‖ or even the liabilities that each party is 
ready to bring in. The possibilities and benefits which the electronic means 
offer there are endless. 
First of all, users would at least read more of the terms than with the current 
practices. Good faith would be revitalised and fidelity in the reliability of the 
agreement would increase - not to mention, trust in the market. More 
importantly, the rights of users would be negotiated with the ‗virtual rulers‘ 
on a more democratic basis. 
Without saying, such proposals are not without logical and moral traps in the 
detail or infallible. They promise, however, definite improvement, compared 
to the current and discredited click-wrap or browse-wrap standards. This 
prospect presents the opportunity for future research on a rather practical 
basis, informed though on the theoretical findings of this thesis. The 
perspective of Justice aims at instilling the ethics of treating human beings 
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humanly into our daily practices, these either being mundane and humble or 
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This software program, and any files that are delivered to you by Blizzard 
Entertainment, Inc. (via on-line transmission or otherwise) to "patch," update, or 
otherwise modify the software program, as well as any printed materials and any 
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massively multi-player on-line role-playing game service (the "Service"), which is 
subject to a separate Terms of Use agreement (the "Terms of Use") 
incorporated into this Agreement by this reference. The Game is distributed 
solely for use by authorized end users according to the terms of this License 
Agreement. Any use, reproduction, modification or distribution of the Game not 
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expressly authorized by the terms of the License Agreement is expressly 
prohibited.  
1. Grant of a Limited Use License. 
If you agree to this License Agreement, you may install the computer software 
(hereafter referred to as the "Game Client") onto your computer for purposes of 
playing the Game by registering for and accessing an account with the Service 
(the "Account"). Subject to your agreement to and continuing compliance with 
this License Agreement, Blizzard hereby grants, and you hereby accept, a 
limited, non-exclusive license to (a) install the Game Client on one or more 
computers owned by you or under your legitimate control, and (b) use the Game 
Client in conjunction with the Service for your non-commercial entertainment 
purposes only. All use of the Game Client is subject to this License Agreement 
and to the Terms of Use agreement, both of which you must accept before you 
can use your Account to play the Game.  
2. Additional License Limitations. 
The license granted to you in Section 1 is subject to the limitations set forth in 
Sections 1 and 2 (collectively, the "License Limitations"). Any use of the Game in 
violation of the License Limitations will be regarded as an infringement of 
Blizzard's copyrights in and to the Game. You agree that you will not, under any 
circumstances:  
A. in whole or in part, copy, photocopy, reproduce, translate, reverse engineer, 
derive source code from, modify, disassemble, decompile, or create derivative 
works based on the Game; provided, however, that you may make one (1) copy 
of the Game Client and the Manuals for archival purposes only;  
B. use cheats, automation software (bots), hacks, mods or any other 
unauthorized third-party software designed to modify the World of Warcraft 
experience;  
C. exploit the Game or any of its parts, including without limitation the Game 
Client, for any commercial purpose, including without limitation (a) use at a cyber 
cafe, computer gaming center or any other location-based site without the 
express written consent of Blizzard; (b) for gathering in-game currency, items or 
resources for sale outside the Game; or (c) performing in-game services in 
exchange for payment outside the Game, e.g., power-leveling;  
D. use any unauthorized third-party software that intercepts, "mines", or 
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otherwise collects information from or through the Game or the Service, 
including without limitation any software that reads areas of RAM used by the 
Game to store information about a character or the game environment; provided, 
however, that Blizzard may, at its sole and absolute discretion, allow the use of 
certain third party user interfaces; 
 E. modify or cause to be modified any files that are a part of the Game Client in 
any way not expressly authorized by Blizzard;  
F. host, provide or develop matchmaking services for the Game or intercept, 
emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Blizzard in any way, for 
any purpose, including without limitation unauthorized play over the internet, 
network play, or as part of content aggregation networks;  
G. facilitate, create or maintain any unauthorized connection to the Game or the 
Service, including without limitation (a) any connection to any unauthorized 
server that emulates, or attempts to emulate, the Service; and (b) any 
connection using programs or tools not expressly approved by Blizzard; or  
H. sell, grant a security interest in or transfer reproductions of the Game to other 
parties in any way not expressly authorized herein, or rent, lease or license the 
Game to others.  
3. Service and Terms of Use. 
You must accept the Terms of Use in order to access the Service and play the 
Game. The Terms of Use agreement governs all aspects of game play. You may 
view the Terms of Use by visiting the following website: 
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.shtml. If you do not agree with 
the Terms of Use, then (a) you may not register for an Account to play the 
Game, and (b) you may call (800)757-7707 within thirty (30) days after the 
original purchase to arrange to return the Game and to request a full refund of 
the purchase price. Once you accept the License Agreement and the Terms of 
Use, you will no longer be eligible for a refund. 
4. Ownership. 
A. All title, ownership rights and intellectual property rights in and to the Game 
and all copies thereof (including without limitation any titles, computer code, 
themes, objects, characters, character names, stories, dialog, catch phrases, 
locations, concepts, artwork, character inventories, structural or landscape 
designs, animations, sounds, musical compositions and recordings, audio-visual 
[382] 
 
effects, storylines, character likenesses, methods of operation, moral rights, and 
any related documentation) are owned or licensed by Blizzard. The Game is 
protected by the copyright laws of the United States, international treaties and 
conventions, and other laws. The Game may contain materials licensed by third 
parties, and the licensors of those materials may enforce their rights in the event 
of any violation of this License Agreement. 
 B. You may permanently transfer all of your rights and obligations under the 
License Agreement to another only by physically transferring the original media 
(e.g., the CD-ROM or DVD you purchased), all original packaging, and all 
Manuals or other documentation distributed with the Game; provided, however, 
that you permanently delete all copies and installations of the Game in your 
possession or control, and that the recipient agrees to the terms of this License 
Agreement. The transferor (i.e., you), and not Blizzard, agrees to be solely 
responsible for any taxes, fees, charges, duties, withholdings, assessments, and 
the like, together with any interest, penalties, and additions imposed in 
connection with such transfer.  
5. Pre-Loaded Software. 
The media on which the Game Client is distributed may contain additional 
software and/or content for which you do not have a license (the "Locked 
Software"), and you agree that Blizzard may install the Locked Software onto 
your hard drive during the Game Client installation process. You also agree that 
you will not access, use, distribute, copy, display, reverse engineer, derive 
source code from, modify, disassemble, decompile any Locked Software, or 
create any derivative works based on the Locked Software, until and unless you 
receive from Blizzard (a) a license to use that software; and (b) a valid 
alphanumeric key with which to unlock it. If you receive a license and a key from 
Blizzard, you may only unlock those portions of a single copy of the Locked 
Software for which you received a license. The terms of the End User License 
Agreement displayed after the Locked Software is unlocked will replace and 
supersede this Agreement, but only with regard to the Locked Software for 
which you receive a license. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, 
you may make one (1) copy of the Locked Software for archival purposes only.  
6. Consent to Monitor. 
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WHEN RUNNING, THE GAME MAY MONITOR YOUR COMPUTER'S 
RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY (RAM) FOR UNAUTHORIZED THIRD PARTY 
PROGRAMS RUNNING CONCURRENTLY WITH THE GAME. AN 
"UNAUTHORIZED THIRD PARTY PROGRAM" AS USED HEREIN SHALL BE 
DEFINED AS ANY THIRD PARTY SOFTWARE PROHIBITED BY SECTION 2. 
IN THE EVENT THAT THE GAME DETECTS AN UNAUTHORIZED THIRD 
PARTY PROGRAM, THE GAME MAY (a) COMMUNICATE INFORMATION 
BACK TO BLIZZARD, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION YOUR ACCOUNT 
NAME, DETAILS ABOUT THE UNAUTHORIZED THIRD PARTY PROGRAM 
DETECTED, AND THE TIME AND DATE; AND/OR (b) EXERCISE ANY OR 
ALL OF ITS RIGHTS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT PRIOR 
NOTICE TO THE USER.  
7. Termination. 
This License Agreement is effective until terminated. You may terminate the 
License Agreement at any time by (i) permanently destroying all copies of the 
Game in your possession or control; (ii) removing the Game Client from your 
hard drive; and (iii) notifying Blizzard of your intention to terminate this License 
Agreement. Blizzard may terminate this Agreement at any time for any reason or 
no reason. Upon termination for any reason, all licenses granted herein shall 
immediately terminate and you must immediately and permanently destroy all 
copies of the Game in your possession and control and remove the Game Client 
from your hard drive.  
8. Export Controls. 
The Game may not be re-exported, downloaded or otherwise exported into (or to 
a national or resident of) any country to which the U.S. has embargoed goods, 
or to anyone on the U.S. Treasury Department's list of Specially Designated 
Nationals or the U.S. Commerce Department's Table of Denial Orders. You 
represent and warrant that you are not located in, under the control of, or a 
national or resident of any such country or on any such list.  
9. Patches and Updates. 
Blizzard may deploy or provide patches, updates and modifications to the Game 
that must be installed for the user to continue to play the Game. Blizzard may 
update the Game remotely including without limitation the Game Client residing 
on the user's machine, without the knowledge of the user, and you hereby grant 
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to Blizzard your consent to deploy and apply such patches, updates and 
modifications.  
10. Duration of the "On-line" Component of the Game. 
This Game is an 'on-line' game that must be played over the Internet through the 
Service as provided by Blizzard. You understand and agree that the Service is 
provided by Blizzard at its discretion and may be terminated or otherwise 
discontinued by Blizzard pursuant to the Terms of Use.  
11. Limited Warranty. 
THE GAME (INLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION THE GAME CLIENT AND 
MANUAL(S)) IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, 
EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY 
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF CONDITION, UNINTERRUPTED USE, 
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR 
NONINFRINGEMENT. The entire risk arising out of use or performance of the 
Game (including without limitation the Game Client and Manual(s)) remains with 
the user. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Blizzard warrants up to and including 90 
days from the date of your purchase of the Game that the media containing the 
Game Client shall be free from defects in material and workmanship. In the 
event that such media proves to be defective during that time period, and upon 
presentation to Blizzard of proof of purchase of the defective media, Blizzard will 
at its option (a) correct any defect, (b) provide you with a similar product of 
similar value, or (c) refund your money. THE FOREGOING IS YOUR SOLE AND 
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR THE EXPRESS WARRANTY SET FORTH IN THIS 
SECTION. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of implied 
warranties, so the above limitations may not apply to you.  
12. Limitation of Liability, Indemnity. 
NEITHER BLIZZARD NOR ITS PARENT, SUBSIDIARIES OR AFFILIATES 
SHALL BE LIABLE IN ANY WAY FOR ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE OF ANY KIND 
ARISING OUT OF THE GAME OR ANY USE OF THE GAME, INCLUDING 
WITHOUT LIMITATION LOSS OF DATA, LOSS OF GOODWILL, WORK 
STOPPAGE, COMPUTER FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION, OR ANY AND ALL 
OTHER DAMAGES OR LOSSES. FURTHER, NEITHER BLIZZARD NOR ITS 
PARENT, SUBSIDIARIES OR AFFILIATES SHALL BE LIABLE IN ANY WAY 
FOR ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE TO PLAYER CHARACTERS, VIRTUAL GOODS 
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(E.G., ARMOR, POTIONS, WEAPONS, ETC.) OR CURRENCY, ACCOUNTS, 
STATISTICS, OR USER STANDINGS, RANKS, OR PROFILE INFORMATION 
STORED BY THE GAME AND/OR THE SERVICE. BLIZZARD SHALL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY INTERRUPTIONS OF SERVICE, INCLUDING 
WITHOUT LIMITATION ISP DISRUPTIONS, SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE 
FAILURES, OR ANY OTHER EVENT WHICH MAY RESULT IN A LOSS OF 
DATA OR DISRUPTION OF SERVICE. IN NO EVENT WILL BLIZZARD BE 
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ANY INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY 
OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. In no event shall Blizzard's liability, whether 
arising in contract, tort, strict liability or otherwise, exceed (in the aggregate) the 
total fees paid by you to Blizzard during the six (6) months immediately prior to 
the time such claim arose. You hereby agree to defend, indemnify and hold 
Blizzard harmless from and against any claim, liability, loss, injury, damage, cost 
or expense (including reasonable attorneys' fees) incurred by Blizzard arising 
out of or from your use of the Game. Some states do not allow the exclusion or 
limitation of incidental or consequential damages, so the above limitations may 
not apply to you.  
13. Equitable Remedies. 
You hereby agree that Blizzard would be irreparably damaged if the terms of this 
License Agreement were not specifically enforced, and therefore you agree that 
Blizzard shall be entitled, without bond, other security, or proof of damages, to 
appropriate equitable remedies with respect to breaches of this License 
Agreement, in addition to such other remedies as Blizzard may otherwise have 
available to it under applicable laws. In the event any litigation is brought by 
either party in connection with this License Agreement, the prevailing party in 
such litigation shall be entitled to recover from the other party all the costs, 
attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred by such prevailing party in the 
litigation.  
14. Changes to the Agreement. 
Blizzard reserves the right, at its sole discretion, to change, modify, add to, 
supplement or delete any of the terms and conditions of this License Agreement 
when Blizzard upgrades the Game Client, effective upon prior notice as follows: 
Blizzard will post the revised version of this License Agreement on the World of 
Warcraft website, and may provide such other notice as Blizzard may elect in its 
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sole discretion. If any future changes to this License Agreement are 
unacceptable to you or cause you to no longer be in compliance with this 
License Agreement, you may terminate this License Agreement in accordance 
with Section 7 herein. Your installation and use of any of Blizzard‘s updates or 
modifications to the Game or your continued use of the Game following notice of 
changes to this Agreement will demonstrate your acceptance of any and all such 
changes. Blizzard may change, modify, suspend, or discontinue any aspect of 
the Game at any time. Blizzard may also impose limits on certain features or 
restrict your access to parts or all of the Game without notice or liability. You 
have no interest, monetary or otherwise, in any feature or content contained in 
the Game.  
15. Dispute Resolution and Governing Law. 
A. Informal Negotiations. To expedite resolution and control the cost of any 
dispute, controversy or claim related to this License Agreement ("Dispute"), you 
and Blizzard agree to first attempt to negotiate any Dispute (except those 
Disputes expressly provided below) informally for at least 30 days before 
initiating any arbitration or court proceeding. Such informal negotiations 
commence upon written notice from one person to the other. Blizzard will send 
its notice to your billing address and email you a copy to the email address you 
have provided to us. You will send your notice to Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 
P.O. Box 18979, Irvine CA 92623, attn: Legal Department. 
 B. Binding Arbitration. If you and Blizzard are unable to resolve a Dispute 
through informal negotiations, either you or Blizzard may elect to have the 
Dispute (except those Disputes expressly excluded below) finally and 
exclusively resolved by binding arbitration. Any election to arbitrate by one party 
shall be final and binding on the other. YOU UNDERSTAND THAT ABSENT 
THIS PROVISION, YOU WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUE IN COURT AND 
HAVE A JURY TRIAL. The arbitration shall be commenced and conducted 
under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association 
("AAA") and, where appropriate, the AAAs Supplementary Procedures for 
Consumer Related Disputes ("AAA Consumer Rules"), both of which are 
available at the AAA website www.adr.org. The determination of whether a 
Dispute is subject to arbitration shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act 
and determined by a court rather than an arbitrator. Your arbitration fees and 
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your share of arbitrator compensation shall be governed by the AAA Rules and, 
where appropriate, limited by the AAA Consumer Rules. If such costs are 
determined by the arbitrator to be excessive, Blizzard will pay all arbitration fees 
and expenses. The arbitration may be conducted in person, through the 
submission of documents, by phone or online. The arbitrator will make a 
decision in writing, but need not provide a statement of reasons unless 
requested by a party. The arbitrator must follow applicable law, and any award 
may be challenged if the arbitrator fails to do so. Except as otherwise provided in 
this License Agreement, you and Blizzard may litigate in court to compel 
arbitration, stay proceeding pending arbitration, or to confirm, modify, vacate or 
enter judgment on the award entered by the arbitrator.  
C. Restrictions. You and Blizzard agree that any arbitration shall be limited to the 
Dispute between Blizzard and you individually. To the full extent permitted by 
law, (1) no arbitration shall be joined with any other; (2) there is no right or 
authority for any Dispute to be arbitrated on a class-action basis or to utilize 
class action procedures; and (3) there is no right or authority for any Dispute to 
be brought in a purported representative capacity on behalf of the general public 
or any other persons.  
D. Exceptions to Informal Negotiations and Arbitration. You and Blizzard agree 
that the following Disputes are not subject to the above provisions concerning 
informal negotiations and binding arbitration: (1) any Disputes seeking to enforce 
or protect, or concerning the validity of, any of your or Blizzard's intellectual 
property rights; (2) any Dispute related to, or arising from, allegations of theft, 
piracy, invasion of privacy or unauthorized use; and (3) any claim for injunctive 
relief.  
E. Location. If you are a resident of the United States, any arbitration will take 
place at any reasonable location convenient for you. For residents outside the 
United States, any arbitration shall be initiated in the County of Los Angeles, 
State of California, United States of America. Any Dispute not subject to 
arbitration (other than claims proceeding in any small claims court), or where no 
election to arbitrate has been made, shall be decided by a court of competent 
jurisdiction within the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States 




 F. Governing Law. Except as otherwise set forth herein, this License Agreement 
shall be governed by, and will be construed under, the Laws of the United States 
of America and the law of the State of Delaware, without regard to choice of law 
principles. The application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods is expressly excluded. For our customers who 
purchased a license to the Game in, and are a resident of, Canada, Australia, 
Singapore, or New Zealand, other laws may apply if you choose not to agree to 
arbitrate as set forth above; provided, however, that such laws shall affect this 
Agreement only to the extent required by such jurisdiction. In such a case, this 
Agreement shall be interpreted to give maximum effect to the terms and 
conditions hereof. If you purchased your license to the Game in New Zealand, 
and are a resident of New Zealand, The New Zealand Consumer Guarantees 
Act of 1993 ("Act") may apply to the Game and/or the Service as supplied by 
Blizzard to you. If the Act applies, then notwithstanding any other provision in 
this License Agreement, you may have rights or remedies as set out in the Act 
which may apply in addition to, or, to the extent that they are inconsistent, 
instead of, the rights or remedies set out in this License Agreement. Those who 
choose to access the Service from locations outside of the United States, 
Canada, Australia, Singapore, or New Zealand do so on their own initiative and 
are responsible for compliance with local laws if and to the extent local laws are 
applicable.  
G. Severability. You and Blizzard agree that if any portion Section 15 is found 
illegal or unenforceable (except any portion of 15(D)) that portion shall be 
severed and the remainder of the Section shall be given full force and effect. If 
Section 15(D) is found to be illegal or unenforceable then neither you nor 
Blizzard will elect to arbitrate any Dispute falling within that portion of Section 
15(D) found to be illegal or unenforceable and such Dispute shall be decided by 
a court of competent jurisdiction within the County of Los Angeles, State of 
California, United States of America, and you and Blizzard agree to submit to the 
personal jurisdiction of that court.  
16. Miscellaneous. 
This License Agreement constitutes and contains the entire agreement between 
the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes any prior 
oral or written agreements, provided, however, that this Agreement shall coexist 
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with, and shall not supersede, the Terms of Use. To the extent that the 
provisions of this Agreement conflict with the provisions of the Terms of Use, the 
conflicting provisions in the Terms of Use shall govern. The provisions of 
Sections 4(A), 6, 11-13, 15 and 16 shall survive the termination of this 
Agreement for any reason. If any provision of this Agreement is found to be 
unenforceable, that provision shall be severed and the remainder of the 
Agreement shall be given full force and effect.  
I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the foregoing License 
Agreement and agree that by clicking "Accept" or installing the Game Client I am 









YOU SHOULD CAREFULLY READ THE FOLLOWING WORLD OF 
WARCRAFT TERMS OF USE AGREEMENT (THE "TERMS OF USE" OR 
"AGREEMENT"). IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH ALL OF THE TERMS OF 
THIS AGREEMENT, YOU MUST CLICK "REJECT." IF YOU REJECT THIS 
AGREEMENT WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER FIRST PURCHASING A 
LICENSE TO THE WORLD OF WARCRAFT SOFTWARE, YOU MAY CALL 
(800)757-7707 TO REQUEST A FULL REFUND OF THE PURCHASE PRICE. 
ONCE YOU AGREE TO THE TERMS OF USE AND THE END USER LICENSE 
AGREEMENT, YOU WILL NO LONGER BE ELIGIBLE FOR A REFUND. 
Welcome to Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.‘s ("Blizzard") "World of Warcraft
®
" (the 
"Game"). The Game includes two components: (a) the software program along 
with any accompanying materials or documentation (collectively, the "Game 
Client"), and (b) Blizzard‘s proprietary World of Warcraft online service (the 
"Service"). Your use of the Service is subject to the Terms of Use and the End 
User License Agreement (the "EULA"), incorporated herein by this reference, 
both of which you must accept before you can use the Game Client or the 
Service.  
1. Grant of a Limited License to Use the Service 
Subject to your agreement to and continuing compliance with the Terms of Use 
agreement, you may use the Service solely for your own non-commercial 
entertainment purposes by accessing it with an authorized, unmodified Game 
Client. You may not use the Service for any other purpose, or in connection with 
any other software.  
2. Additional License Limitations.  
The license granted to you in Section 1 is subject to the limitations set forth in 
Sections 1 and 2 (collectively, the "License Limitations"). Any use of the Service 
or the Game Client in violation of the License Limitations will be regarded as an 
infringement of Blizzard‘s copyrights in and to the Game. You agree that you will 
not, under any circumstances:  
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A. use cheats, automation software (bots), hacks, mods or any other 
unauthorized third-party software designed to modify the World of Warcraft 
experience;  
B. exploit the Game or any of its parts, including without limitation the Service, 
for any commercial purpose, including without limitation (a) use at a cyber cafe, 
computer gaming center or any other location-based site without the express 
written consent of Blizzard; (b) for gathering in-game currency, items or 
resources for sale outside the Game; or (c) performing in-game services in 
exchange for payment outside the Game, e.g., power-leveling;  
C. use any unauthorized third-party software that intercepts, "mines", or 
otherwise collects information from or through the Game or the Service, 
including without limitation any software that reads areas of RAM used by the 
Game to store information about a character or the game environment; provided, 
however, that Blizzard may, at its sole and absolute discretion, allow the use of 
certain third party user interfaces; 
D. modify or cause to be modified any files that are a part of the Game Client or 
the Service in any way not expressly authorized by Blizzard; 
E. host, provide or develop matchmaking services for the Game or the Service, 
or intercept, emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Blizzard in 
any way, for any purpose, including without limitation unauthorized play over the 
internet, network play, or as part of content aggregation networks; 
 F. facilitate, create or maintain any unauthorized connection to the Game or the 
Service, including without limitation (a) any connection to any unauthorized 
server that emulates, or attempts to emulate, the Service; and (b) any 
connection using programs or tools not expressly approved by Blizzard; or 
 G. disrupt or assist in the disruption of (i) any computer used to support the 
Service (each a "Server"); or (ii) any other player's Game experience. ANY 
ATTEMPT BY YOU TO DISRUPT THE SERVICE OR UNDERMINE THE 
LEGITIMATE OPERATION OF THE GAME CLIENT MAY BE A VIOLATION OF 
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LAWS. You agree that you will not violate any applicable 




You represent that you are an adult in your country of residence. You agree to 
these Terms of Use on behalf of yourself and, at your discretion, for one (1) 
minor child for whom you are a parent or guardian and whom you have 
authorized to use the account you create on the Service.  
4. Ownership. 
All rights and title in and to the Service (including without limitation any user 
accounts, titles, computer code, themes, objects, characters, character names, 
stories, dialogue, catch phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, animations, 
sounds, musical compositions, audio-visual effects, methods of operation, moral 
rights, any related documentation, "applets" incorporated into the Game Client, 
transcripts of the chat rooms, character profile information, recordings of games 
played using the Game Client, and the Game Client and server software) are 
owned by Blizzard or its licensors. The Game and the Service are protected by 
United States and international laws, and may contain certain licensed materials 
in which Blizzard's licensors may enforce their rights in the event of any violation 
of this Agreement.  
5. Establishing an Account. 
Prior to (or in lieu of) creating a user account on the Service (a "WoW Account"), 
or using an existing WoW Account, you may be required to establish a separate 
account (a "Blizzard Account") on Blizzard‘s centralized account system. When 
creating these accounts, you may be required to provide Blizzard with certain 
personal information, financial information and an unused Authentication Key 
provided to you by Blizzard. You agree that you will supply accurate information 
to Blizzard when requested, and that you will update that information promptly 
after it changes.  
6. Username and Password. 
During the registration process, you may be required to select a unique 
username and a password (collectively referred to hereunder as "Login 
Information"). You may not share the Account or the Login Information with 
anyone other than as expressly set forth herein.  
7. No Ownership Rights in Account.  
NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY HEREIN, YOU 
ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT YOU SHALL HAVE NO OWNERSHIP 
OR OTHER PROPERTY INTEREST IN THE ACCOUNT, AND YOU FURTHER 
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ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT ALL RIGHTS IN AND TO THE 
ACCOUNT ARE AND SHALL FOREVER BE OWNED BY AND INURE TO THE 
BENEFIT OF BLIZZARD.  
8. Account Suspension/Deletion. 
BLIZZARD MAY SUSPEND, TERMINATE, MODIFY, OR DELETE ACCOUNTS 
AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON OR FOR NO REASON, WITH OR 
WITHOUT NOTICE TO YOU. For purposes of explanation and not limitation, 
most account suspensions, terminations and/or deletions are the result of 
violations of this Terms of Use or the EULA.  
9. Code of Conduct. 
As with all things, your use of the Game and the Service is governed by certain 
rules. These rules (the "Code of Conduct"), maintained and enforced exclusively 
by Blizzard, must be adhered to by all users. It is your responsibility to know, 
understand and abide by this Code of Conduct. The following rules are not 
meant to be exhaustive, and Blizzard reserves the right to determine which 
conduct it considers to be outside the spirit of the Game and to take such 
disciplinary measures as it sees fit up to and including termination and deletion 
of the Account. Blizzard reserves the right to modify this Code of Conduct at any 
time.  
A. Rules Related to Usernames and Guild Designations.  
Each user will either select a character name or allow the Service to 
automatically select a character name at random. Additionally, users may form 
"guilds" and such guilds will be required to choose a name for the guild. When 
you choose a character name, create a guild, or otherwise create a label that 
can be seen by other players using the Game or the Service, you must abide by 
the following guidelines as well as the rules of common decency. If Blizzard finds 
such a label to be offensive or improper, it may, in its sole and absolute 
discretion, change the name, remove the label and corresponding chat room, 
and/or suspend or terminate your use of the Service. In particular, you may not 
use any name: 
(i) Belonging to another person with the intent to impersonate that person, 




(ii) That incorporates vulgar language or which are otherwise offensive, 
defamatory, obscene, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable; 
(iii) Subject to the rights of any other person or entity without written 
authorization from that person or entity; 
(iv) That belongs to a popular culture figure, celebrity, or media personality; 
(v) That is, contains, or is substantially similar to a trademark or service mark, 
whether registered or not; 
(vi) Belonging to any religious figure or deity; 
(vii) Taken from Blizzard's Warcraft products, including character names from 
the Warcraft series of novels; 
(viii) Related to drugs, sex, alcohol, or criminal activity; 
(ix) Comprised of partial or complete sentence (e.g., "Inyourface", "Welovebeef", 
etc); 
(x) Comprised of gibberish (e.g., "Asdfasdf", "Jjxccm", "Hvlldrm"); 
(xi) Referring to pop culture icons or personas (e.g. " "Britneyspears", 
"Austinpowers", "Batman") 
(xii) That utilizes "Leet" or "Dudespeak" (e.g., "Roflcopter", "xxnewbxx", 
"Roxxoryou") 
(xiii) That incorporates titles. For purposes of this subsection, "titles" shall 
include without limitation 'rank' titles (e.g. , "CorporalTed," or "GeneralVlad"), 
monarchistic or fantasy titles (e.g., "KingMike", "LordSanchez"), and religious 
titles (e.g., "ThePope," or "Reverend Al"). You may not use a misspelling or an 
alternative spelling to circumvent the name restrictions listed above, nor can you 
have a "first" and "last" name that, when combined, violate the above name 
restrictions.  
B. Rules Related to "Chat" and Interaction With Other Users. 
 Communicating in-game with other Users and Blizzard representatives, whether 
by text, voice or any other method, is an integral part of the Game and the 
Service and is referred to here as "Chat." When engaging in Chat, you may not:  
(i) Transmit or post any content or language which, in the sole and absolute 
discretion of Blizzard, is deemed to be offensive, including without limitation 
content or language that is unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, 
defamatory, vulgar, obscene, hateful, sexually explicit, or racially, ethnically or 
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otherwise objectionable, nor may you use a misspelling or an alternative spelling 
to circumvent the content and language restrictions listed above; 
(ii) Carry out any action with a disruptive effect, such as intentionally causing the 
Chat screen to scroll faster than other users are able to read, or setting up 
macros with large amounts of text that, when used, can have a disruptive effect 
on the normal flow of Chat; 
(iii) Disrupt the normal flow of dialogue in Chat or otherwise act in a manner that 
negatively affects other users including without limitation posting commercial 
solicitations and/or advertisements for goods and services available outside of 
the World of Warcraft universe; 
(iv) Sending repeated unsolicited or unwelcome messages to a single user or 
repeatedly posting similar messages in a Chat area, including without limitation 
continuous advertisements to sell goods or services; 
(v) Communicate or post any user's personal information in the Game, or on 
websites or forums related to the Game, except that a user may communicate 
his or her own personal information in a private message directed to a single 
user; 
(vi) Harass, threaten, stalk, embarrass or cause distress, unwanted attention or 
discomfort to any user of the Game; 
(vii) Participate in any action that, in the sole and absolute opinion of Blizzard, 
results or may result in an authorized user of the Game being "scammed" or 
defrauded out of gold, weapons, armor, or any other items that user has earned 
through authorized game play in the Game; 
(viii) Communicate directly with players who are playing characters aligned with 
the opposite faction (e.g. Horde communicating with Alliance or vice versa); or 
(ix) Impersonate any real person, including without limitation any "game master" 
or any other Blizzard agent or employee, nor may you communicate in the 
Game in any way designed to make others believe that your message 
constitutes a server message or was otherwise posted by any Blizzard agent or 
employee.  
C. Rules Related to Game Play.  
Game play is what World of Warcraft is all about, and Blizzard strictly enforces 
the rules that govern game play. Blizzard considers most conduct to be part of 
the Game, and not harassment, so player-killing the enemies of your race and/or 
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alliance, including gravestone and/or corpse camping, is considered a part of the 
Game. Because the Game is a "player vs. player" game, you should always 
remember to protect yourself in areas where the members of hostile races can 
attack you, rather than contacting Blizzard's in-game customer service 
representatives for help when you have been killed by an enemy of your race. 
Nonetheless, certain acts go beyond what is "fair" and are considered serious 
violations of these Terms of Use. Those acts include, but are not necessarily 
limited to, the following:  
(i) Using or exploiting errors in design, features which have not been 
documented, and/or "program bugs" to gain access that is otherwise not 
available, or to obtain a competitive advantage over other players; 
(ii) Conduct prohibited by the EULA or elsewhere in these Terms of Use; and 
(iii) Anything that Blizzard considers contrary to the "essence" of the Game.  
10. Security of Login Information. 
You are responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of the Login Information, 
and you will be responsible for all uses of the Login Information, whether or not 
authorized by you. In the event that you become aware of or reasonably suspect 
any breach of security, including without limitation any loss, theft, or 
unauthorized disclosure of the Login Information, you must immediately notify 
Blizzard by emailing wowaccountadmin@blizzard.com.  
11. Ownership/Selling of the Account or Virtual Items. 
Blizzard does not recognize the transfer of WoW Accounts or Blizzard Accounts 
(each an "Account"). You may not purchase, sell, gift or trade any Account, or 
offer to purchase, sell, gift or trade any Account, and any such attempt shall be 
null and void. Blizzard owns, has licensed, or otherwise has rights to all of the 
content that appears in the Game. You agree that you have no right or title in or 
to any such content, including without limitation the virtual goods or currency 
appearing or originating in the Game, or any other attributes associated with the 
Account or stored on the Service. Blizzard does not recognize any purported 
transfers of virtual property executed outside of the Game, or the purported sale, 
gift or trade in the "real world" of anything that appears or originates in the 
Game. Accordingly, you may not sell in-game items or currency for "real" money, 
or exchange those items or currency for value outside of the Game.  
12. Changes to the Terms of Use Agreement or the Game. 
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Blizzard reserves the right, at its sole and absolute discretion, to change, modify, 
add to, supplement or delete any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement 
at any time, including without limitation access policies, the availability of any 
feature of the Game or the Service, hours of availability, content, data, software 
or equipment needed to access the Game or the Service, effective with or 
without prior notice; provided, however, that material changes (as determined in 
Blizzard‘s sole and absolute discretion) will be disclosed as follows: Blizzard will 
provide you with notification of any such changes through a patch process, or by 
email, postal mail, website posting, pop-up screen, or in-game notice. If any 
future changes to this Agreement are unacceptable to you or cause you to no 
longer be in compliance with this Agreement, you must terminate, and 
immediately stop using, the Game and the Account. Your continued use of the 
Game following any revision to this Agreement constitutes your complete and 
irrevocable acceptance of any and all such changes. Blizzard may change, 
modify, suspend, or discontinue any aspect of the Game at any time. Blizzard 
may also impose limits on certain features or restrict your access to parts or all 
of the Game without notice or liability.  
13. Termination. 
This Agreement is effective until terminated. You may terminate this Agreement 
by terminating the Account and deleting the Game Client. In the event that you 
terminate or breach this Agreement, you will forfeit your right to any and all 
payments you may have made for pre-purchased game access to World of 
Warcraft. You agree and acknowledge that you are not entitled to any refund for 
any amounts which were pre-paid on behalf of the Account prior to any 
termination of this Agreement. Blizzard may terminate this Agreement with or 
without notice by terminating the Account as set forth in Section 8. The 
provisions of Sections 4, 7, 11 and 14-20 shall survive any termination of this 
Agreement.  
14. Warranty Disclaimer. 
THE GAME AND THE SERVICE ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" AND BLIZZARD 
DOES NOT WARRANT THAT THE GAME OR THE SERVICE WILL BE 
UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR-FREE, THAT DEFECTS WILL BE 
CORRECTED, OR THAT THE GAME OR THE SERVICE ARE FREE OF 
VIRUSES OR OTHER HARMFUL COMPONENTS. BLIZZARD EXPRESSLY 
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DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING 
WITHOUT LIMITATION THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR 
FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, AND NON-
INFRINGEMENT.  
15. Limitation of Liability. 
NEITHER BLIZZARD NOR ITS PARENT, SUBSIDIARIES, LICENSORS OR 
AFFILIATES SHALL BE LIABLE IN ANY WAY FOR DAMAGE OR LOSS OF 
ANY KIND RESULTING FROM (A) THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE 
GAME OR SERVICE INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION LOSS OF 
GOODWILL, WORK STOPPAGE, COMPUTER FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION; 
(B) THE LOSS OR DAMAGE TO CHARACTERS, ACCOUNTS, STATISTICS, 
INVENTORIES OR USER PROFILE INFORMATION; OR (C) INTERRUPTIONS 
OF SERVICE INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ISP DISRUPTIONS, 
SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE FAILURES OR ANY OTHER EVENT WHICH 
MAY RESULT IN A LOSS OF DATA OR DISRUPTION OF SERVICE. IN NO 
EVENT WILL BLIZZARD BE LIABLE TO YOU OR ANYONE ELSE FOR ANY 
INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES.  
16. Force Majeure. 
Blizzard shall not be liable for any delay or failure to perform resulting from 
causes outside the reasonable control of Blizzard, including without limitation 
any failure to perform hereunder due to unforeseen circumstances or cause 
beyond Blizzard's control such as acts of God, war, terrorism, riots, embargoes, 
acts of civil or military authorities, fire, floods, accidents, strikes, or shortages of 
transportation facilities, fuel, energy, labor or materials.  
17. Acknowledgments. 
You hereby acknowledge and agree that:  
A. WHEN RUNNING, THE GAME MAY MONITOR YOUR COMPUTER'S 
RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY (RAM) AND/OR CPU PROCESSES FOR 
UNAUTHORIZED THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS RUNNING CONCURRENTLY 
WITH WORLD OF WARCRAFT. AN "UNAUTHORIZED THIRD PARTY 
PROGRAM" AS USED HEREIN SHALL BE DEFINED AS ANY THIRD PARTY 
SOFTWARE THAT, WHEN USED SIMULTANEOUSLY OR IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE GAME, WOULD CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 1, 2 
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OR 9. IN THE EVENT THAT THE GAME DETECTS AN UNAUTHORIZED 
THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, BLIZZARD MAY (a) COMMUNICATE 
INFORMATION BACK TO BLIZZARD, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION 
THE ACCOUNT NAME, DETAILS ABOUT THE UNAUTHORIZED THIRD 
PARTY PROGRAM DETECTED, AND THE TIME AND DATE THE 
UNAUTHORIZED THIRD PARTY PROGRAM WAS DETECTED; AND/OR (b) 
EXERCISE ANY OR ALL OF ITS RIGHTS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT OR 
THE EULA, WITH OR WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THE USER.  
B. WHEN THE GAME IS RUNNING, BLIZZARD MAY OBTAIN CERTAIN 
IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR COMPUTER AND ITS 
OPERATING SYSTEM, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION YOUR HARD 
DRIVES, CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT, IP ADDRESS(ES) AND OPERATING 
SYSTEM(S), FOR PURPOSES OF IMPROVING THE GAME AND/OR THE 
SERVICE, AND TO POLICE AND ENFORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THIS 
AGREEMENT AND THE EULA.  
C. Blizzard may, with or without notice to you, disclose your Internet Protocol 
(IP) address(es), personal information, Chat logs, and other information about 
you and your activities: (a) in response to a request by law enforcement, a court 
order or other legal process; or (b) if Blizzard believes that doing so may protect 
your safety or the safety of others.  
D. BLIZZARD MAY MONITOR, RECORD, REVIEW, MODIFY AND/OR 
DISCLOSE YOUR CHAT SESSIONS, WHETHER VOICE OR TEXT, WITHOUT 
NOTICE TO YOU, AND YOU HEREBY CONSENT TO SUCH MONITORING, 
RECORDING, REVIEW, MODIFICATION AND/OR DISCLOSURE. Additionally, 
you acknowledge that Blizzard is under no obligation to monitor Chat, and you 
engage in Chat at your own risk. 
 E. You are wholly responsible for the cost of all telephone and Internet access 
charges along with all necessary equipment, servicing, repair or correction 
incurred in maintaining connectivity to the Servers.  
18. Equitable Remedies. 
In the event that you breach this Agreement, you hereby agree that Blizzard 
would be irreparably damaged if this Agreement were not specifically enforced, 
and therefore you agree that Blizzard shall be entitled, without bond, other 
security, or proof of damages, to appropriate equitable remedies with respect to 
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breaches of this Agreement, in addition to such other remedies as Blizzard may 
otherwise have available to it under applicable laws. In the event any litigation is 
brought by either party in connection with this Agreement and consistent with 
Section 19, the prevailing party in such litigation shall be entitled to recover from 
the other party all the costs, attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred by such 
prevailing party in the litigation.  
19. Dispute Resolution and Governing Law. 
A. Informal Negotiations. To expedite resolution and control the cost of any 
dispute, controversy or claim related to this Agreement ("Dispute"), you and 
Blizzard agree to first attempt to negotiate any Dispute (except those Disputes 
expressly provided below) informally for at least thirty (30) days before initiating 
any arbitration or court proceeding. Such informal negotiations commence upon 
written notice from one person to the other. Blizzard will send its notice to your 
billing address and email you a copy to the email address you have provided to 
us. You will send your notice to Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., P.O. Box 18979, 
Irvine CA 92623, ATTN: Legal Department. 
 B. Binding Arbitration. If you and Blizzard are unable to resolve a Dispute 
through informal negotiations, either you or Blizzard may elect to have the 
Dispute (except those Disputes expressly excluded below) finally and 
exclusively resolved by binding arbitration. Any election to arbitrate by one party 
shall be final and binding on the other. YOU UNDERSTAND THAT ABSENT 
THIS PROVISION, YOU WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUE IN COURT AND 
HAVE A JURY TRIAL. The arbitration shall be commenced and conducted 
under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association 
("AAA") and, where appropriate, the AAA‘s Supplementary Procedures for 
Consumer Related Disputes ("AAA Consumer Rules"), both of which are 
available that the AAA website www.adr.org. The determination of whether a 
Dispute is subject to arbitration shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act 
and determined by a court rather than an arbitrator. Your arbitration fees and 
your share of arbitrator compensation shall be governed by the AAA Rules and, 
where appropriate, limited by the AAA Consumer Rules. If such costs are 
determined by the arbitrator to be excessive, Blizzard will pay all arbitration fees 
and expenses. The arbitration may be conducted in person, through the 
submission of documents, by phone or online. The arbitrator will make a 
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decision in writing, but need not provide a statement of reasons unless 
requested by a party. The arbitrator must follow applicable law, and any award 
may be challenged if the arbitrator fails to do so. Except as otherwise provided in 
this Agreement, you and Blizzard may litigate in court to compel arbitration, stay 
proceeding pending arbitration, or to confirm, modify, vacate or enter judgment 
on the award entered by the arbitrator.  
C. Restrictions. You and Blizzard agree that any arbitration shall be limited to the 
Dispute between Blizzard and you individually. To the full extent permitted by 
law, (1) no arbitration shall be joined with any other; (2) there is no right or 
authority for any Dispute to be arbitrated on a class-action basis or to utilize 
class action procedures; and (3) there is no right or authority for any Dispute to 
be brought in a purported representative capacity on behalf of the general public 
or any other persons. 
 D. Exceptions to Informal Negotiations and Arbitration. You and Blizzard agree 
that the following Disputes are not subject to the above provisions concerning 
informal negotiations and binding arbitration: (1) any Disputes seeking to enforce 
or protect, or concerning the validity of, any of your or Blizzard‘s intellectual 
property rights; (2) any Dispute related to, or arising from, allegations of theft, 
piracy, invasion of privacy or unauthorized use; and (3) any claim for injunctive 
relief.  
E. Location. If you are a resident of the United States, any arbitration will take 
place at any reasonable location within the United States convenient for you. For 
residents outside the United States, any arbitration shall be initiated in the 
County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States of America. Any 
Dispute not subject to arbitration (other than claims proceeding in any small 
claims court), or where no election to arbitrate has been made, shall be decided 
by a court of competent jurisdiction within the County of Los Angeles, State of 
California, United States of America, and you and Blizzard agree to submit to the 
personal jurisdiction of that court. 
 F. Governing Law. Except as expressly provided otherwise, this Agreement 
shall be governed by, and will be construed under, the Laws of the United States 
of America and the law of the State of Delaware, without regard to choice of law 
principles. The application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods is expressly excluded. For our customers who 
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access the Service from Canada, Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Australia, Singapore, 
Thailand, or New Zealand, other laws may apply if you choose not to agree to 
arbitrate as set forth above, and in such an event, shall affect this Agreement 
only to the extent required by such jurisdiction. In such a case, this Agreement 
shall be interpreted to give maximum effect to the terms and conditions hereof. If 
you access the Service from New Zealand, and are a resident of New Zealand, 
The New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act of 1993 ("Act") may apply to the 
Game and/or the Service as supplied by Blizzard to you. If the Act applies, then 
notwithstanding any other provision in this Agreement, you may have rights or 
remedies as set out in the Act which may apply in addition to, or, to the extent 
that they are inconsistent, instead of, the rights or remedies set out in this 
Agreement. Those who choose to access the Service from locations outside of 
the United States, Canada, Australia, Singapore, or New Zealand do so on their 
own initiative contrary to the terms of this Agreement, and are responsible for 
compliance with local laws if and to the extent local laws are applicable. 
 G. Severability. You and Blizzard agree that if any portion Section 19 is found 
illegal or unenforceable (except any portion of 19(d)), that portion shall be 
severed and the remainder of the Section shall be given full force and effect. If 
Section 19(d) is found to be illegal or unenforceable then neither you nor 
Blizzard will elect to arbitrate any Dispute falling within that portion of Section 
19(d) found to be illegal or unenforceable and such Dispute shall be decided by 
a court of competent jurisdiction within the County of Los Angeles, State of 
California, United States of America, and you and Blizzard agree to submit to the 
personal jurisdiction of that court.  
20. Miscellaneous. 
If any provision of this Agreement shall be unlawful, void, or for any reason 
unenforceable, then that provision shall be deemed severable from this 
Agreement and shall not affect the validity and enforceability of any remaining 
provisions. This Terms of Use Agreement is the complete and exclusive 
statement of the agreement between you and Blizzard concerning the Service, 
and this Agreement supersedes any prior or contemporaneous agreement, 
either oral or written, and any other communications with regard thereto between 
you and Blizzard; provided, however that this Agreement is in addition to, and 
does not replace or supplant, the EULA. This Agreement may only be modified 
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as set forth herein. The section headings used herein are for reference only and 
shall not be read to have any legal effect. 
 
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE 
FOREGOING TERMS OF USE AGREEMENT AND AGREE THAT MY USE OF 
THE GAME AND THE SERVICE IS AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF MY 
AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS 









CAREFULLY READ THE FOLLOWING WORLD OF WARCRAFT END USER 
LICENSE AGREEMENT BEFORE DOWNLOADING OR INSTALLING THIS 
SOFTWARE PROGRAM. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THE TERMS OF 
THIS AGREEMENT, PLEASE DELETE THE SOFTWARE PROGRAM 
IMMEDIATELY AND ARRANGE TO RETURN THE GAME TO YOUR 
RETAILER. 
WORLD OF WARCRAFT™ END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT 
This software program on CD-ROM, and any files that are delivered to you (via 
on-line transmission or otherwise) to "patch," update, or otherwise modify the 
software program, as well as any printed materials and any on-line or electronic 
documentation (the "Manual"), and any and all copies and derivative works of 
such software program and materials (collectively, with the "Game Client" 
defined below, the "Game") are copyrighted works. All use of the Game is 
governed by the terms of this End User License Agreement ("License 
Agreement" or "Agreement"). The Game may only be played by obtaining from 
Blizzard Entertainment access to the World of Warcraft massively multi-player 
on-line role-playing game service (the "Service"), which is subject to a separate 
Terms of Use agreement (the "Terms of Use"). The Service includes the use of a 
voice over Internet protocol technology, which enables you to communicate 
orally with other users and which includes certain features to determine who to 
speak with (the ―Voice Client‖). Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. is your contractual 
partner for the performance of the Service. If your purchase of the Game 
included a period of "free access" to the Service, the Terms of Use agreement 
also governs your access to the Service during the period of "free access." The 
Game is distributed solely for use by authorized end users according to the 
terms of the License Agreement. Any use, reproduction or redistribution of the 
Game not expressly authorized by the terms of the License Agreement is 
expressly prohibited.  
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1. Grant of a Limited Use License. The Game installs computer software 
(hereafter referred to as the ―Game Client‖) onto your hardware to allow you to 
play the Game through your account with the Service (your "Account"). Blizzard 
Entertainment, Inc. (herein referred to as "Blizzard Entertainment") hereby 
grants, and by installing the Game Client you thereby accept, a limited, non-
exclusive license and right to install the Game Client for your personal use on 
one (1) or more computers which you own or which are under your personal 
control. All use of the Game Client is subject to this License Agreement and to 
the Terms of Use agreement, which you must accept before you can use your 
Account to play the Game through access to the Service. Blizzard Entertainment 
reserves the right to update, modify or change the Terms of Use for the reasons 
stated in Section 8 below. Changes to the Terms of Use will be notified and 
enter into force according to Section 13 below.  
2. Service and Terms of Use. As mentioned above, you must accept the Terms 
of Use in order to access the Service to play the Game. The Terms of Use 
agreement governs all aspects of game play. You may view the Terms of Use by 
visiting the following website: http://www.wow-
europe.com/en/legal/termsofuse.html. If you do not agree with the Terms of Use, 
then (i) you should not register for an Account to play the Game, and (ii) you 
should arrange to return the Game to the place where you purchased the Game 
within thirty (30) days of the original purchase.  
3. Ownership. A. All intellectual property rights in and to the Game and all 
copies thereof (including, but not limited to, any user accounts, titles, computer 
code, themes, objects, characters, character names, stories, dialog, catch 
phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, character inventories, structural or 
landscape designs, animations, sounds, musical compositions, audio-visual 
effects, storylines, character likenesses, methods of operation, moral rights, any 
related documentation, and "applets" incorporated into the Game) are owned or 
expressly licensed by Blizzard Entertainment. The Game is protected by the 
copyright laws of the United States, international copyright treaties and 
conventions, and other laws. All rights are reserved. The Game may contain 
certain licensed materials, and licensors of those materials may enforce their 
rights in the event of any violation of this License Agreement.  
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B. In order to play World of Warcraft, you are required to establish a user 
account (the "Account") as described in the Terms of Use that is unique to you 
and non-transferable. To establish the Account, you will be asked to provide 
Blizzard Entertainment with an Authentication Key of the Game that is 
exclusively linked to the Account you have established with the Authentication 
Key. Therefore, Bllizzard Entertainment does not allow you to transfer ownership 
of the Game Client to third parties.  
 
4. Responsibilities of End User.  
A. Subject to the Grant of License hereinabove, you may not, in whole or in part, 
copy, photocopy, reproduce, translate, reverse engineer, derive source code, 
modify, disassemble, decompile, or create derivative works based on the Game, 
or remove any proprietary notices or labels on the Game. Failure to comply with 
the restrictions and limitations contained in this Section 4 shall result in 
immediate, automatic termination of the license granted hereunder and may 
subject you to civil and/or criminal liability. Notwithstanding the foregoing, you 
may make one (1) backup copy of the Game Client and the Manuals.  
B. You agree that you shall not, under any circumstances,  
(i) sell, grant a security interest in or transfer reproductions of the Game to other 
parties in any way not expressly authorized herein, nor shall you rent, lease or 
license the Game to others;  
(ii) exploit the Game or any of its parts, including, but not limited to, the Game 
Client, for any commercial purpose, including, but not limited to, use at a cyber 
café, computer gaming center or any other location-based site without the prior 
express written consent of Blizzard Entertainment;  
(iii) host, provide or develop matchmaking services for the Game or intercept, 
emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Blizzard Entertainment 
in any way, including, without limitation, through protocol emulation, tunneling, 
packet sniffing, modifying or adding components to the Game, use of a utility 
program or any other techniques now known or hereafter developed, for any 
purpose, including, but not limited to, unauthorized network play over the 
Internet, network play utilizing commercial or non-commercial gaming networks 
or as part of content aggregation networks; or  
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(iv) create or maintain, under any circumstance, any unauthorized connections 
to the Game or the Service. All connections to the Game and/or the Service, 
whether created by the Game Client or by other tools and utilities, may only be 
made through methods and means expressly approved by Blizzard 
Entertainment. Under no circumstances may you connect, or create tools that 
allow you or others to connect, to the Game's proprietary interface or interfaces 
other than those expressly provided by Blizzard Entertainment for public use.  
(v) use the Voice Client for any unlawful purposes. In particular you shall not (i) 
eavesdrop, intercept or monitor any communication which is not intended for 
you, (ii) use any type of spider, virus, worm, trojan-horse or any other codes or 
tools that are designed to distort or otherwise interfere with the communication, 
(iii) use the Voice Client for any commercial communication, or (iv) expose any 
other user to communication which is offensive, harmful to minors, indecent or 
otherwise objectionable.  
 
5. Parental Control. Parents can resitrict the restrict the use their child makes of 
the Service by way of a parental control system. For further details please click 
here 
.  
6. Termination. This License Agreement is effective until terminated. You may 
terminate the License Agreement at any time by cumulatively (i) destroying the 
Game; and (ii) removing the Game Client from your hard drive; and (iii) notifying 
Blizzard Entertainment by mail of your intention to terminate this License 
Agreement to the following address: Blizzard Entertainment S.A.S., TSA 60 001, 
78143 Vélizy-Villacoublay Cedex, France. Blizzard Entertainment may, at its 
discretion, terminate this License Agreement in the event of a significant breach 
of the terms and conditions contained herein, or the terms and conditions 
contained in the Terms of Use. In such event, you must immediately destroy the 
Game and remove the Game Client from your hard drive. Upon termination of 
this Agreement for any reason, all licenses granted herein shall immediately 
terminate.  
 
7. Export Controls. The Game may not be re-exported, downloaded or 
otherwise exported into (or to a national or resident of) any country to which the 
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U.S. has embargoed goods, or to anyone on the U.S. Treasury Department's list 
of Specially Designated Nationals or the U.S. Commerce Department's Table of 
Denial Orders. By installing the Game, you are agreeing to the foregoing, and 
you are representing and warranting that you are not located in, under the 
control of, or a national or resident of any such country or on any such list.  
 
8. Patches and Updates. Blizzard Entertainment shall have the right to deploy 
or provide patches, updates and modifications to the Game, as needed or as 
useful to: (i) enhance the gaming experience by adding new content to the 
Game, (ii) incorporating new features to the Game, (iii) enhancing content or 
features already in the Game; (iv) fixing ‗bugs‘ that may be altering the Game; 
and (v) determining how you and other players utilize the Game so that the 
Game can be enhanced for the enjoyment of the Game‘s users; and (vi) protect 
you and other players against cheating; and (iii) make the gaming environment 
safer for you. These patches, updates and modifications to the Game must be 
installed for the user to continue to play the Game. For these purposes, Licensor 
may update the Game remotely, including, without limitation, the Game Client 
residing on the user's machine, without knowledge or consent of the user, and 
you hereby grant to Licensor your consent to deploy and apply such patches, 
updates and modifications to the Game.  
 
9. Duration of the "On-line" Component of the Game and of the Voice 
Client. This Game is an 'on-line' game that must be played over the Internet 
through the Service, as provided by Blizzard Entertainment. It is your entire 
responsibility to secure an Internet connection and all fees related thereto shall 
be at your own charge. Blizzard Entertainment will use reasonable efforts to 
provide the Service all day, every day. However, Blizzard Entertainment 
reserves the right to temporarily suspend the Service for maintenance, testing, 
replacement and repair of the telecommunications equipment related to World of 
Warcraft, as well as for transmission interruption or any other operational needs 
of the system.  
Blizzard Entertainment can neither guarantee that you will always be able to 
communicate with other users, nor that you can communicate without 
disruptions, delays or communication-related flaws. Blizzard Entertainment is not 
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liable for any such disruptions, delays or other omissions in any communication 
during your use of the Voice Client.  
Blizzard Entertainment agrees to provide the servers and software necessary to 
access the Service until such time as World of Warcraft is "Out of Publication." 
World of Warcraft shall be considered "Out of Publication" following the date that 
World of Warcraft is no longer manufactured and/or distributed by Blizzard 
Entertainment, or its affiliates. Thereafter, Blizzard Entertainment may, in its sole 
and absolute discretion, continue to provide the Service or license to third 
parties the right to provide the Service. However, nothing contained herein shall 
be construed so as to place an obligation upon Blizzard Entertainment to provide 
the Service beyond the time that World of Warcraft is Out of Publication. In the 
event that Blizzard determines that it is in its best interest to cease providing the 
Service, or license to a third party the right to provide the Service, Blizzard 
Entertainment shall provide you with no less than three (3) months prior notice. 
Neither the Service nor Blizzard Entertainment's agreement to provide access to 
the Service shall be considered a rental or lease of time on or capacity of 
Blizzard Entertainment's servers or other technology.  
 
10. No Responsibility for Individual Communication. You acknowledge that 
the content of the communication with other users through the Voice Client is 
entirely the responsibility of the user from whom such content originates. You 
may therefore be exposed to content that is offensive, harmful to minors, 
indecent or otherwise objectionable. Blizzard Entertainment is not liable for any 
such sort of communication of other users through the Voice Client.  
 
11. Additional Manufacturer's Guarantee for the Game Client. In the event 
that CD-ROMs containing the Game Client were purchased in the European 
Union and they prove to be defective and provided you inform Blizzard 
Entertainment of such defect within (i) two (2) months from the day you detected 
such defect and (ii) within two (2) years from the date of the purchase of the 
Game, Blizzard Entertainment will, upon presentation to Blizzard Entertainment 
of proof of purchase of the defective media and the media itself, at its option 1) 




This guarantee does not affect or restrict the statutory warranty claims that you 
may have against the retailer of the Game Client.  
 
12. Limitation of Liability. As regards the online service provided by Blizzard 
Entertainment, for damages or compensation of unavailing expenditures, 
whatever the legal basis including tort may be, the following rules apply: Blizzard 
Entertainment may only be liable in cases of where it is adjudged that Blizzard: 
(i) engaged in intentionally damaging conduct; (ii) was grossly negligent; and/or 
(iii) is in breach of the requirements of the Product Liability Act according to 
statutory law. If you acquired the CD-ROMs containing the Game Client in 
Germany or Austria or if you access the WOW servers from the territory of 
Germany or Austria or in such other countries where local laws would apply, 
Blizzard Entertainment may also be liable in case of death or personal or 
physical injury according to statutory law where Blizzard is adjudged to be 
responsible for such death or personal or physical injury.  
 
Blizzard Entertainment shall not be liable for slight negligence. However, if you 
acquired the CD-ROMs containing the Game Client in Germany or Austria or if 
you access the WOW servers from the territory of Germany or Austria, Blizzard 
Entertainment may also be liable for slight negligence if Blizzard Entertainment 
is adjudged to be in breach of a ―material‖ contractual obligation hereunder. In 
such cases, Blizzard Entertainment's liability is limited to typical and foreseeable 
damages. In other cases Blizzard Entertainment shall not be liable for slight 
negligence.  
 
13. Rights on Breach. The Game, Game Client, trademarks and copyrighted 
content contained therein and associated with the Game are the copyrighted 
property of Blizzard Entertainment, and, through the efforts of Blizzard 
Entertainment, has established substantial goodwill and recognition. In the event 
of a significant breach of the terms of this Agreement, Blizzard Entertainment 
reserves its right to take all legal actions which may be available to a licensor of 
intellectual property under the law to protect its rights in its property. In the event 
that Blizzard Entertainment is the prevailing party in any such actions, Blizzard 
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Entertainment shall see any and all rights that may be available to Blizzard 
Entertainment under the law to recover damages, costs of suit and its attorneys 
fees.  
 
14. Changes to the Agreement. Blizzard Entertainment may, from time to time, 
post notification of changes to this License Agreement on the World of Warcraft 
website and will post the revised version of this License Agreement in this 
location, and may provide other notice which may include by email, postal mail 
or pop-up screen. By means of the notification Blizzard Entertainment will inform 
you about the fact that the License Agreement has been amended and shall 
point out that after expiration of one month following the notification your 
installation or use of the Game shall be deemed as consent to the modification 
or amendment. If any future changes to this License Agreement are 
unacceptable to you or cause you to no longer be in compliance with this 
License Agreement, you may terminate this License Agreement in accordance 
with Section 6 herein. The modified version of the License Agreement shall enter 
into force at the beginning of the second month following the notification unless 
Blizzard Entertainment has received a notification of termination from you by that 
time.  
 
15. Miscellaneous. In the event that any provision of this License Agreement 
shall be held by a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction to be 
unenforceable, the remaining portions of this License Agreement shall remain in 
full force and effect. This License Agreement constitutes and contains the entire 
agreement between the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and 
supersedes any prior oral or written agreements; provided however, that this 
agreement shall coexist with, and shall not supersede, the Terms of Use. To the 
extent that the provisions of this Agreement conflict with the provisions of the 
Terms of Use, the conflicting provisions in the Terms of Use shall govern. 
Sections 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 hereof shall survive the termination of this 
Agreement.  
 
I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the foregoing License 
Agreement and agree that the action of installing the Game Client is an 
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acknowledgment of my agreement to be bound by the terms and conditions of 









WORLD OF WARCRAFT® TERMS OF USE AGREEMENT 
 
IMPORTANT! PLEASE READ CAREFULLY! 
 
Welcome to Blizzard Entertainment's massively multi-player on-line role-playing 
game, World of Warcraft® ("World of Warcraft"). World of Warcraft is the 
copyrighted work of Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., a corporation organized under 
the laws of the State of Delaware, its 'affiliates,' specifically including Blizzard 
Entertainment S.A.S., and/or its licensors (collectively, "Blizzard Entertainment"), 
and all use of Blizzard Entertainment's proprietary World of Warcraft on-line 
service (the "Service") is governed by the terms and conditions contained in this 
Agreement, including any future revisions implemented according to the 
procedure described in Section XIV herein (hereafter referred to as the "Terms 
of Use" or "Agreement"). This Agreement is in addition to, and does not replace 
or supplant, the End User License Agreement that accompanied the World of 
Warcraft software (the "EULA ") and to which the World of Warcraft software is 
subject. Any use of World of Warcraft not in accordance with the Terms of Use is 
expressly prohibited. You represent that you are a 'natural person' who is over 
the age of eighteen (18) years old, or over the age of majority in the country 
where you are a citizen, and agree to these Terms of Use on behalf of yourself 
and, at your discretion, for one (1) minor child for whom you are a parent or 
guardian and whom you have authorized to use the account you create on the 
Service.  
 
I. Accessing the Service  
1. To access the Service, you will be required to establish a user account on the 
Service. This may be either an account for the Service only (the ―WoW Account‖) 
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or an account on Blizzard‘s centralized account system for various online games 
(the ―Blizzard Account‖). 
  
If you do not already have a Blizzard Account that may be extended to WoW, 
Blizzard may require you to open such Blizzard Account; if you already have a 
WoW Account the Blizzard Account will then replace the WoW Account (note 
that a ―WoW Account,‖ and a ―Blizzard Account,‖ are collectively referred to 
herein as an ―Account‖). When creating the Blizzard Account, you may be 
required to accept new terms of use in addition to these Terms of Use. You may 
have to provide Blizzard with certain personal information (which will be used in 
accordance with the Blizzard Privacy Policy [LINK]). Such opening of a Blizzard 
Account will not incur any additional costs.  
In either case, note that in order to establish an Account, you must be a ‗Natural 
Person,‘ who is the age of majority in the country where you are a citizen. 
Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, partnerships, or any other form of 
legal entity other than that of a "natural person" may not establish an account, 
and by accepting this Agreement, you hereby represent and warrant that you 
meet these eligibility requirements. In case you establish an Account for your 
child, you understand and accept that, it is your responsibility as the legal 
guardian to determine whether World of Warcraft is appropriate for your child. 
You may not share the Account with anyone, except that if you are a parent or 
guardian, you may permit one (1) minor child to use the Account when not in use 
by you. You are liable for all uses of the Account that has been enabled by you. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, you acknowledge and agree 
that you shall have no ownership or other property interest in the Account.  
2. To register an Account, you will be required to provide Blizzard Entertainment 
with:  
(1) your name, address and phone number;  
(2) the "Authentication Key" from the World of Warcraft Software you purchased;  
(3) the Authentication Keys from any expansions to the World of Warcraft 
Software you purchased, such as ―The Burning Crusade,‖ or ―Wrath of the Lich 
King‖, to activate those expansions to the Account, and ; 
 (4) accurate, complete, and updated billing information for payment of the 
Service subscription fee.  
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Failure to comply with the foregoing or to update the foregoing if your contact 
information or billing information changes shall constitute a breach of this 
Agreement, which may result in the immediate termination and deletion of the 
Account. As such, it is imperative that you provide Blizzard Entertainment with 
accurate, up to date information. In the event that Blizzard Entertainment learns 
that you have provided false or misleading registration information, Blizzard 
Entertainment reserves the right to immediately terminate and disable or delete 
the Account.  
3. You hereby agree to pay all charges incurred by the Account, including 
applicable taxes, in accordance with billing terms for access to the Service that 
are in effect at the time that the fee or charge becomes payable. Your right to 
access to the Service is subject to any limits established by your credit card 
issuer, billing service, 'World of Warcraft Game Card Agreement,' or other 
payment methods authorized by Blizzard Entertainment. Blizzard Entertainment 
may, in its sole and absolute discretion, suspend or terminate your access to the 
Service and disable or delete the Account, if:  
(1) payment cannot be charged to your credit card;  
(2) your charge is returned to Blizzard Entertainment for any reason; or  
(3) you use all of the allotted time that you have purchased to access World of 
Warcraft via a "World of Warcraft Game Card" or similar instrument.  
If you have a balance due on the Account and you have provided Blizzard 
Entertainment with a credit card, you agree that Blizzard Entertainment can 
charge these unpaid fees to your credit card or debit them from your debit card, 
as applicable. You agree to reimburse Blizzard Entertainment for all costs and 
expenses incurred by Blizzard Entertainment in collecting payment due 
hereunder, including without limitation all bank or service charges, and any 
reasonable attorneys' fees.  
4. During the registration process, you will be required to select a user name and 
a password that are specific to the Account (collectively referred to hereunder as 
"Password"). Your Password is to be kept confidential at all times and you are 
solely responsible for the security of your Password. You may not disclose your 
Password to anyone, or allow your Password to be used by anyone other than 
yourself and/or your one (1) minor child. Blizzard Entertainment is not 
responsible for any harm that may result to the Account (including without 
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limitation the deletion or modification of characters in the Account) as a result of 
a lost or shared password. The user name you choose shall be subject to the 
naming guidelines contained in this Terms of Use Agreement.  
5. Blizzard Entertainment does not recognize the transfer of Accounts, and any 
unauthorized transfer of the World of Warcraft software will result in the 
permanent deletion of the Account attached to that software. You may not offer 
any Account for sale or trade, and any such offer:  
(1) is a violation of this Agreement; 
 (2) may result in suspension or termination of the Account at Blizzard 
Entertainment's sole and absolute discretion; and  
(3) will not be opposable to Blizzard Entertainment.  
6. Unless otherwise stated herein, there are no refunds where the Account is 
terminated prior to the end of a subscription period; the Service will be available 
for your use until such time that the then-current subscription period expires.  
 
II. Parental Control. Parents can restrict the use their child makes of the 
Service by way of a parental control system. Further information can be found 
here: https://www.wow-europe.com/account/parental-control-schedule.html  
 
III. Limitations on Your Use of World of Warcraft. Your license to use World 
of Warcraft is limited by this Terms of Use and the World of Warcraft End User 
License Agreement which you were required to accept when you installed World 
of Warcraft. Limitations on your right to use World of Warcraft may include, but 
not necessarily be limited to, the following:  
1. Blizzard Entertainment expressly reserves the exclusive right to create 
derivative works based on World of Warcraft. This means that you may not 
create derivative works based on World of Warcraft, without the prior express, 
written permission of Blizzard Entertainment.  
2. Only Blizzard Entertainment or its licensees have the right to host World of 
Warcraft! Accordingly, you may not host, provide matchmaking services for, or 
intercept, emulate or redirect the communication protocols used by Blizzard 
Entertainment as part of World of Warcraft, regardless of the method used to do 
so. Such prohibited methods may include, but are not limited to, protocol 
emulation, reverse engineering, modifying World of Warcraft, adding 
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components to World of Warcraft, or using a utility program to host World of 
Warcraft.  
3. You agree that you will not  
(1) modify or cause to be modified any files that are a part of a World of Warcraft 
installation;  
(2) create or use cheats, "mods", and/or hacks, or any other third-party software 
designed to modify the World of Warcraft experience; 
 (3) use any third-party software that intercepts, "mines", or otherwise collects 
information from or through World of Warcraft; 
 (4) allow players who are playing characters aligned with the "Alliance" faction 
to chat or otherwise communicate directly with players who are playing 
characters aligned with the "Horde" faction, or vice versa; 
 (5) buy or sell for "real" money or exchange gold, weapons, armor, or any other 
virtual items that may be used in World of Warcraft outside the World of Warcraft 
platform;  
(6) let any third person (except for a minor for whom you opened the Account) 
play on your Account including, but not limited to, using so-called ―power leveling 
services‖, i.e. paying a third person for playing on your Account; or 
 (7) play on the Account of a third person including, but not limited to, providing 
so-called ―power leveling services‖; 
 (8) eavesdrop, intercept or monitor any oral communication which is not 
intended for you or use any tool designed to distort or prevent oral 
communication of the users. 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, you may update World of Warcraft with 
authorized patches and updates distributed by Blizzard, and use authorized 
Third Party User Interfaces as set forth in Section XVII.7. below.  
4. You may not institute, assist, or become involved in an attack upon any World 
of Warcraft server or otherwise attempt to disrupt the World of Warcraft servers. 
You may not institute any such attack which results in the disruption of any other 
player‘s World of Warcraft experience. ANY ATTEMPT BY YOU OR ANY 
OTHER PLAYER ON AN ACCOUNT TRACEABLE TO YOU TO DAMAGE 
WORLD OF WARCRAFT OR UNDERMINE THE LEGITIMATE OPERATION 
OF WORLD OF WARCRAFT IS A VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL 
LAWS AND, SHOULD SUCH AN ATTEMPT BE MADE OR ASSISTANCE FOR 
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SUCH AN ATTACK BE PROVIDED, BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT RESERVES 
THE RIGHT TO SEEK DAMAGES FROM ANY SUCH USER TO THE FULLEST 
EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW. You may not, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, violate any applicable local, state, national or international law or 
regulation in connection with your use of World of Warcraft or the Service.  
 
 
IV. World of Warcraft Rules of Conduct. As with all things, World of Warcraft 
is governed by certain Rules of Conduct ("Rules of Conduct") that must be 
adhered to by all users of World of Warcraft. It is your responsibility to know, 
understand and abide by these Rules of Conduct. The following rules are not 
meant to be exhaustive, and Blizzard Entertainment reserves the right to 
determine which conduct it considers to be outside the spirit of the game and to 
take such disciplinary measures as it sees fit up to and including termination and 
deletion of the Account. Blizzard Entertainment reserves the right to modify 
these Rules of Conduct at any time pursuant to Section XIV of this Agreement.  
 
1. Rules Related to User Names. Each user will either select a character name 
or allow the World of Warcraft software to automatically select a character name 
at random. Additionally, users may form "guilds" and such guilds will be required 
to choose a name for the guild. When you choose a character name, create a 
guild, or otherwise create a label that can be seen by other players of World of 
Warcraft, you must abide by the following guidelines as well as the rules of 
common decency. If Blizzard Entertainment finds such a label to be offensive or 
improper, it may, in its sole and absolute discretion, change the name, remove 
the label and corresponding chat room, and/or suspend or terminate your use of 
World of Warcraft.  
In particular, you may not use any name:  
(1) Belonging to another person with the intent to impersonate that person, 
including without limitation a "Game Master" or any other employee or agent of 
Blizzard Entertainment;  
(2) That incorporates 'swear' words or which are otherwise offensive, 




(3) Subject to the rights of any other person or entity without written 
authorization from that person or entity; 
 (4) That belongs to a popular culture figure, celebrity, or media personality;  
(5) That is, contains, or is substantially similar to a trademark or service mark, 
whether registered or not; 
 (6) Belonging to any religious figure or deity; 
 (7) Taken from Blizzard Entertainment‘s Warcraft products, including character 
names from the Warcraft series of novels; 
 (8) Related to drugs, sex, alcohol, or criminal activity;  
(9) Comprised of partial or complete sentence (e.g., "Inyourface", "Welovebeef", 
etc);  
(10) Comprised of gibberish (e.g., "Asdfasdf", "Jjxccm", "Hvlldrm"); 
 (11) Referring to pop culture icons or personas; 
 (12) That utilizes "Leet" or "Dudespeak" (e.g., "Roflcopter", "xxnewbxx", 
"Roxxoryou")  
(13) That incorporates titles. For purposes of this subsection, "titles" shall include 
without limitation 'rank' titles (e.g., "CorporalTed," or "GeneralVlad"), 
monarchistic or fantasy titles (e.g., "KingMike", "LordSanchez"), and religious 
titles (e.g., "ThePope," or "Reverend Al"). 
 You may not use a misspelling or an alternative spelling to circumvent the name 
restrictions listed above, nor can you have a "first" and "last" name that, when 
combined, violate the above name restrictions.  
 
2. Rules Related to "Chat", Interaction With Other Users or With Blizzard 
Entertainment Representatives. As part of the game, you may communicate with 
other users both in writing and orally. You may communicate orally by using a 
voice over internet protocol technology (the ―Voice Client‖). Communicating with 
other users and with Blizzard Entertainment representatives, in writing or orally, 
is an integral part of World of Warcraft and is referred to in this document 
together as "Chat". Blizzard Entertainment does not eavesdrop or monitor the 
content of your oral communication through the Voice Client. Your written 
communication may be subject to review, modification, and/or deletion by 
Blizzard Entertainment without notice to you. Additionally, you hereby 
acknowledge that Blizzard Entertainment is under no obligation to monitor Chat, 
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and you engage in Chat at your own risk. When engaging in Chat in World of 
Warcraft, or otherwise utilizing World of Warcraft, you may not:  
(1) Transmit or post any content or use any language, in writing or orally, which, 
in the sole and absolute discretion of Blizzard Entertainment, is deemed to be 
offensive, including without limitation content or language that is unlawful, 
harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, hateful, 
sexually explicit, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable, nor may you 
use a misspelling or an alternative spelling to circumvent the content and 
language restrictions listed above;  
(2) Carry out any action with a disruptive effect, such as intentionally causing the 
Chat screen to scroll faster than other users are able to read, or setting up 
macros with large amounts of text that, when used, can have a disruptive effect 
on the normal flow of Chat, or using tools that distort or interfere with oral 
communication of the users; 
 (3) Disrupt the normal flow of dialogue in Chat or otherwise act in a manner that 
negatively affects other users including without limitation posting commercial 
solicitations and/or advertisements for goods and service available outside of the 
World of Warcraft universe;  
(4) Sending repeated unsolicited or unwelcome messages to a single user or 
repeatedly posting similar messages in a Chat area, including but not limited to 
continuous advertisements to sell goods or services;  
(5) Communicate or post any user's personal information in or on the World of 
Warcraft, or websites or forums related to World of Warcraft, except that a World 
of Warcraft user may communicate his or her own personal information in a 
private message directed to a single user;  
(6) Use bots or other automated techniques to collect information from World of 
Warcraft or any forum or website owned or administered by Blizzard 
Entertainment;  
(7) Harass, threaten, stalk, embarrass or cause distress, unwanted attention or 
discomfort to any user of World of Warcraft or to Blizzard Entertainment 
representatives;  
(8) Cheat or utilize World of Warcraft "exploits" in any way, including without 
limitation modification of the game program files; 
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 (9) Participate in any action that, in the sole and absolute opinion of Blizzard 
Entertainment, results or may result in an authorized user of World of Warcraft 
being ―scammed‖ or defrauded out of gold, weapons, armor, or any other items 
that user has earned through authorized game play in World of Warcraft.  
3. Rules Related to Game Play. Game play is what World of Warcraft is all 
about. Accordingly, the rules that govern game play in World of Warcraft are 
taken very seriously by Blizzard Entertainment. Note that Blizzard Entertainment 
considers all valid play styles in World of Warcraft to be part of the game, and 
not harassment, so player-killing the enemies of your race and/or alliance, 
including gravestone and/or corpse camping, is considered a part of the game. 
Because World of Warcraft is a "player vs. player" game, you should always 
remember to protect yourself in areas where the members of hostile races can 
attack you, rather than contacting Blizzard Entertainment‘s in-game customer 
service representatives, referred to herein as "Game Masters," for help when 
you have been killed by an enemy of your race. Nonetheless, certain acts go 
beyond what is "fair" and are considered serious violations of these Terms of 
Use. Those acts include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:  
(1) Using or exploiting errors in design, features which have not been 
documented, and/or "program bugs" to gain access that is otherwise not 
available, or to obtain a competitive advantage over other players.  
(2) Connecting, or creating tools that allow you to connect, to World of Warcraft‘s 
proprietary interface or interfaces, other than those explicitly provided by 
Blizzard Entertainment for your use. 
 (3) Using tools that hack or otherwise alter the World of Warcraft client or server 
software.  
(4) Using software products that "packet sniff" or provide scripting and/or 
macroing to obtain information from World of Warcraft.  
(5) Anything that Blizzard Entertainment considers contrary to the "essence" of 
World of Warcraft. 
  
V. Character Migration. Blizzard Entertainment may, in its sole and absolute 
discretion, offer certain users the opportunity to move characters from a heavily 
populated "Character Migration" server to a server designated by Blizzard 
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Entertainment as a "Target Server." If you are offered the opportunity to migrate 
a character, please note the following:  
1. If your character is a "guild master," it cannot be migrated to a Target Server.  
2. You must have less than ten (10) characters on the Target Server in order to 
migrate a character to the Target Server.  
3. Character migrations can only occur when the account that you utilize to play 
World of Warcraft is not in use.  
4. You cannot migrate a character to a Target Server if the name of the 
character is already in use on the Target Server. If a character of the same 
name already exists on the Target Server, you will be given an opportunity to 
rename character as part of the Character Migration process. As always, the 
name must adhere to the naming conventions stated herein.  
5. In-game mail sent by or in transit to the character that you intend to migrate 
will not be migrated to a Target Server.  
6. All player auctions involving the character that you intend to migrate will be 
cancelled and the item, deposit, and the high bid returned to the bidder upon 
character migration. The item you placed for sale, or your "high bid," will appear 
in that character's mail when it reaches the Target Server. Note that Blizzard will 
not be responsible for the loss of in-game funds or items due to the character 
migration of either a "buyer" or "seller" to an auction house transaction.  
7. A target character's friends list will not transfer to a Target Server.  
8. A target character's guild affiliation will not transfer to a Target Server.  
9. A target character's ignore list will not transfer to a Target Server.  
 
VI. Account/Password Security. You are responsible for maintaining the 
confidentiality of your Password, and you will be responsible for all uses of your 
Password that result from your failure to maintain the confidentiality of your 
Password or from any other activity of you that enables third parties to use your 
Password. Also, note that the security of the Account is your responsibility. 
Blizzard Entertainment is not responsible in the event that the Account is 
"hacked," or if the Account or your computer is damaged by a virus, or for any 
other issues with your computer or the Account. If you think that the Account has 
been compromised, please contact Blizzard Entertainment Billing and Account 
Services, either through our Game Masters or by calling Blizzard 
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Entertainment's Billing and Account Services phone number, and Blizzard 
Entertainment will help you reset your Password, assist with billing issues, and 
offer basic suggestions for improving the Account security. If you report the 
Account stolen, hacked, or in any other way compromised, Blizzard 
Entertainment will suspend the Account while the matter is investigated. 
Following this investigation, Blizzard Entertainment will determine the 
appropriate course of action in its sole and absolute discretion.  
 
VII. Consequences of Violating the Rules of Conduct. Blizzard Entertainment 
may, in its sole and absolute discretion, take whatever action it deems 
necessary to preserve the integrity of World of Warcraft. Violation of any of the 
Rules of Conduct set forth above may result in actions being taken by Blizzard 
Entertainment, effective immediately or at a time determined by Blizzard 
Entertainment, which may include without limitation:  
1. Temporarily suspending your access to World of Warcraft,  
2. Permanently terminating your access to World of Warcraft (see Section XVI.2. 
below, or 
 3. Account or character modification, including without limitation, reducing or 
removing experience points, skills, levels, in-game currency or items.  
Without limiting the foregoing, Blizzard Entertainment retains the right to decline 
service to any user who violates the World of Warcraft Terms of Use or the End 
User License Agreement.  
 
VIII. Experience Reimbursement. First and foremost, nothing in these rules will 
ever place a "duty" upon Blizzard Entertainment to reimburse you by providing 
experience credit for any experience lost for any reason, unless such loss was 
caused by Blizzard Entertainment's negligence. That being said, Blizzard 
Entertainment may, at its sole and absolute option, determine to reimburse 
experience lost by players in certain extreme and unusual situations. For 
instance, Blizzard Entertainment may decide to reimburse experience lost in the 
event of a catastrophic server failure. In no event is Blizzard Entertainment 




IX. Selling of Items. Remember, at the outset of these Terms of Use, where we 
discussed how you were "licensed" the right to use World of Warcraft, and that 
your license was "limited"? Well, here is one of the more important areas where 
these license limitations come into effect. Note that Blizzard Entertainment either 
owns, or has exclusively licensed, all of the content which appears in World of 
Warcraft. Therefore, no one has the right to "sell" Blizzard Entertainment‘s 
content, except Blizzard Entertainment! So Blizzard Entertainment does not 
recognize any property claims outside of World of Warcraft or the purported sale, 
gift or trade in the "real world" of anything related to World of Warcraft. 
Accordingly, you may not sell or purchase virtual items for "real" money or 
exchange items outside of World of Warcraft. Please note that Blizzard is 
entitled to and will prevent any such illegal sales.  
 
X. Online Duration. The Game is an 'on-line' game that must be played over the 
Internet through the Service, as provided by Blizzard Entertainment Europe. It is 
your entire responsibility to secure an Internet connection and all fees related 
thereto shall be at your own charge. Blizzard Entertainment Europe will use 
reasonable efforts to provide the Service all day, every day. However, Blizzard 
Entertainment Europe reserves the right to temporarily suspend the Service for 
maintenance, testing, replacement and repair of the telecommunications 
equipment related to World of Warcraft, as well as for transmission interruption 
or any other operational needs of the system. 
 Blizzard Entertainment agrees to provide the servers and software necessary to 
access the Service until such time as World of Warcraft is "Out of Publication." 
World of Warcraft shall be considered "Out of Publication" following the date that 
World of Warcraft is no longer manufactured and/or distributed by Blizzard 
Entertainment, or its affiliates. Thereafter, Blizzard Entertainment may, in its sole 
and absolute discretion, continue to provide the Service or license to third 
parties the right to provide the Service. However, nothing contained herein shall 
be construed so as to place an obligation upon Blizzard Entertainment to provide 
the Service beyond the time that World of Warcraft is Out of Publication. In the 
event that Blizzard determines that it is in its best interest to cease providing the 
Service, or license to a third party the right to provide the Service, Blizzard 
Entertainment shall provide you with no less than three (3) months prior notice. 
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Neither the Service nor Blizzard Entertainment's agreement to provide access to 
the Service shall be considered a rental or lease of time on or capacity of 
Blizzard Entertainment's servers or other technology.  
 
XI. Protection of User Information.  
1. Blizzard Entertainment takes the protection of its user's personal information 
seriously, and abides by all applicable laws related thereto, including Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data and any other relevant regulations and laws 
promulgated by your country of residence. Accordingly, Blizzard Entertainment 
shall take appropriate steps to prevent the disclosure of its user's personal 
information, including users' Account information, to a third party, except for in 
the following circumstances: 
 (1) The settlement of service charges related to the use of the Service;  
(2) the preparation of statistics, academic research or market surveys in 
anonymous form;  
(3) compliance with specific provisions of any applicable laws and regulations 
expressly authorizing such disclosure or with any judicial decision imposing such 
disclosure; and  
(4) disasters, emergencies, or other Force Majeure events which are out of 
Blizzard Entertainment's control, as more fully discussed hereunder in Section 
XVII.9.  
2. Blizzard Entertainment shall have no obligation to provide information related 
to a specific Account, even if requested from a user, except in cases when the 
procedure for identification of an Account and password is set forth at 
registration, and/or if the request is for the purpose of investigation under the 
relevant laws and regulations.  
3. Blizzard Entertainment shall give notice of, and comply with, the World of 
Warcraft – European Union privacy policy, which shall govern the protection of 





XII. Testing, Maintenance, and Other Potential Interruptions in the Service. 
Blizzard Entertainment shall give users notice on the World of Warcraft "Home 
Page" located at http://www.wow-europe.com/ prior to Blizzard Entertainment 
installing software upgrades, performing testing, or performing maintenance on 
the servers, data transmission lines, and other systems related to World of 
Warcraft, and/or in the manner set forth in Section XIV below whenever 
possible. Note that it is your responsibility to be aware of such notices, and you 
hereby acknowledge and agree that Blizzard Entertainment shall not be 
responsible for any damages which may arise from your failure to read and/or be 
aware of these publicly posted notices. Additionally, Blizzard Entertainment may 
be required to "shut down" one or more servers to repair the hardware, or 
software, related to World of Warcraft. While it is Blizzard Entertainment‘s 
intention to provide the Service all day, every day, you hereby acknowledge that 
Blizzard Entertainment reserves the right to temporarily suspend the Service for 
maintenance, testing, replacement and repair of the telecommunications 
equipment related to World of Warcraft, as well as for transmission interruption 
or any other operational needs of the system.  
 
XIII. Refunds.  
1. In the event that you are a "Standard End User," you will have the right, but 
not the obligation, to terminate the Service, or be provided with a "game time 
adjustment" to your Account in the event that the Service is suspended or 
interrupted for more than three consecutive days (72 hours) without Blizzard 
Entertainment providing prior notice of the suspension of Service as set forth 
above, unless the suspension or interruption in the Service is due to one of the 
following events:  
(1) A "Force Majeure" event, as defined in Section XVII.9. below;  
(2) Any suspension or interruption of the Service that is attributable to you, or to 
any other third party including without limitation, your internet service provider 
and any other user of the Service;  
(3) Any suspension or interruption of the Service in the event that Blizzard 
Entertainment‘s telecommunication providers fail to provide the 
telecommunication service required to host the Service through no fault of 
Blizzard Entertainment; and  
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(4) Scheduled maintenance, replacement, regular examination, and/or 
construction of equipment for the Service where Blizzard Entertainment posts 
prior notice of the pending interruption in the Service.  
2. In the event that you are eligible for a "game time adjustment," Blizzard 
Entertainment shall credit your Account with four (4) times the amount of time 
that the Service was interrupted. Note that only current Accounts that are in 
"good standing" will be eligible for such a "game time adjustment." In the event 
that you choose to terminate the Service, you shall be entitled to a 'refund' 
subject to the following terms and conditions:  
 
3. Only current Accounts that are in "good standing," shall be eligible for a 
refund. Accounts that are "suspended" by Blizzard Entertainment for "non 
payment," or for a violation of these Terms of Use, are not eligible for a refund.  
4. In the event that you are eligible for a refund, and you pay a fee to utilize your 
Account for a fixed period of time ("Fixed Fees"), Blizzard Entertainment shall 
provide you with a "pro rata" refund in the same currency as the currency of 
payment equal to the Fixed Fees for the most recent billing period, less the daily 
charge for the Service multiplied by the number of days that the Service was 
available in that billing period.  
5. If you purchased "game time" under a program that provided you the right to 
utilize the Service for a set period of time at a discounted rate ("Discounted 
Fees"), and you request that Blizzard Entertainment terminate your Account, 
Blizzard Entertainment shall provide a pro rata refund calculated by deducting 
from the Discounted Fees an amount equal to the monthly fee that is in effect at 
as of the date you request termination of your Account divided by 30, and then 
multiply that amount times with the number of days that you have utilized the 
Service in the billing period that you purchased for the Discounted Fees.  
6. You are entirely liable for all activities conducted through the Account, and are 
responsible for ensuring that any other person who uses your World of Warcraft 
account is aware of the terms of and complies with this Agreement. In the event 
that you become aware of or reasonably suspect any breach of security, 
including without limitation any loss, theft, or unauthorized disclosure of your 
Password, you will immediately notify Blizzard Entertainment by calling Blizzard 
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Entertainment's Technical Support number or by e-mailing 
wowtech@blizzard.com to report the actual or suspected breach of security.  
 
XIV. Our Administration of World of Warcraft; Changes to the Terms of This 
Agreement. Blizzard Entertainment may, from time to time change, modify, add 
to, supplement or delete the terms and conditions of this Agreement. If 
necessary or useful to enhance the gaming experience, to protect the players 
against cheaters, or if Blizzard Entertainment provides new services Blizzard 
Entertainment may change or modify access policies, the availability of any 
World of Warcraft feature, hours of availability, content, data, software or 
equipment needed to access World of Warcraft, the amount of, or basis for 
determining, any fees or charges for World of Warcraft, and institute new fees or 
charges for World of Warcraft. Those changes will be effective upon prior notice 
as follows: Blizzard Entertainment will post notification of any such changes to 
World of Warcraft on the World of Warcraft website and will post any revised 
Terms of Use in this location, and may provide other notice which may include 
by email, postal mail, pop-up screen, or in-game notice. If any future changes to 
this Agreement are unacceptable to you or cause you to no longer be in 
compliance with this Agreement, you may cease to use your World of Warcraft 
account and terminate the Account in accordance with Section XVI herein. After 
expiry of one (1) month following the notification the continued use of World of 
Warcraft by you will mean you accept any and all such changes. With the 
notification, Blizzard Entertainment will remind you that your continued use after 
the expiration of one (1) month following the notification means that you accept 
any and all changes. The modified version of the Agreement shall enter into 
force at the beginning of the second month following the notification, unless 
Blizzard Entertainment has received a notification of termination from you by that 
time. Subject to the conditions set forth in this Section XIV, Blizzard 
Entertainment may change, modify, suspend, or discontinue any aspect of World 
of Warcraft at any time or impose limits on certain features or restrict your 
access to parts or all of World of Warcraft.  
 
XV. Ownership. All title, ownership rights and intellectual property rights in and 
to World of Warcraft (including without limitation any user accounts, titles, 
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computer code, themes, objects, characters, character names, stories, dialogue, 
catch phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, animations, sounds, musical 
compositions, audio-visual effects, methods of operation, moral rights, any 
related documentation, "applets" incorporated into World of Warcraft, transcripts 
of the chat rooms, character profile information, recordings of games played on 
World of Warcraft, and the World of Warcraft client and server software) are 
owned by Blizzard Entertainment or its licensors. World of Warcraft is protected 
by the copyright laws of the United States, international copyright treaties and 
conventions, and other laws. All rights are reserved. World of Warcraft may 
contain certain licensed materials, and Blizzard Entertainment‘s licensors may 
protect their rights in the event of any violation of this Agreement.  
 
XVI. Termination. This Agreement is effective until the end of the term it is 
concluded for, unless terminated earlier by either party under the following 
conditions:  
1. You are entitled to terminate this Agreement under the conditions set forth in 
Section XIV and XVI herein, as well as for personal bankruptcy, imprisonment, 
hospitalization for a period exceeding three (3) months, or for any other 
legitimate reason as may be specified by applicable law or relevant court 
decision, subject to prior written notice by mail to the following address: Blizzard 
Entertainment S.A.S. - Support Clients - TSA 60 001, 78143 Vélizy Villacoublay 
Cedex, France  
2. Blizzard Entertainment reserves the right to terminate this Agreement without 
notice, if you fail to comply with any terms contained in these Terms of Use 
and/or the World of Warcraft End User License Agreement. In case of minor 
violations of these rules Blizzard will provide you with a prior warning of your 
non-compliance prior to terminating the Agreement. If, however, your behavior is 
utterly inacceptable, in particular if it endangers the gaming experience of other 
players, Blizzard is not required to provide you with such prior warning. A 
behavior is considered utterly unacceptable in case of a serious violation of the 
Terms of Use and/or the World of Warcraft End User License Agreement. 
Serious Violation would include a violation of Section III above. Also, note that in 
the event that Blizzard Entertainment terminates this Agreement for breach of 
these Terms of Use, any right to any and all payments you may have made for 
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pre-purchased game access to World of Warcraft are forfeit, and you agree and 
acknowledge that you are not entitled to any refund for any amounts which were 
pre-paid on your Account prior to any termination of this Agreement.  
 
XVII. Acknowledgements. You hereby acknowledge that:  
1. WHEN RUNNING, THE WORLD OF WARCRAFT CLIENT MAY MONITOR 
YOUR COMPUTER'S RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY (RAM) AND/OR CPU 
PROCESSES FOR UNAUTHORIZED THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS RUNNING 
CONCURRENTLY WITH WORLD OF WARCRAFT. AN "UNAUTHORIZED 
THIRD PARTY PROGRAM" AS USED HEREIN SHALL BE DEFINED AS ANY 
THIRD PARTY SOFTWARE, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY 
"ADDON" OR "MOD," THAT IN BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT'S SOLE 
DETERMINATION:  
(1) ENABLES OR FACILITATES CHEATING OF ANY TYPE;  
(2) ALLOWS USERS TO MODIFY OR HACK THE WORLD OF WARCRAFT 
INTERFACE, ENVIRONMENT, AND/OR EXPERIENCE IN ANY WAY NOT 
EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT; OR  
(3) INTERCEPTS, "MINES," OR OTHERWISE COLLECTS INFORMATION 
FROM OR THROUGH WORLD OF WARCRAFT.  
(4) IN THE EVENT THAT WORLD OF WARCRAFT DETECTS AN 
UNAUTHORIZED THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT 
MAY  
(a) COMMUNICATE INFORMATION BACK TO BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT, 
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION YOUR ACCOUNT NAME, DETAILS 
ABOUT THE UNAUTHORIZED THIRD PARTY PROGRAM DETECTED, AND 
THE TIME AND DATE THE UNAUTHORIZED THIRD PARTY PROGRAM WAS 
DETECTED; AND/OR  
(b) EXERCISE ANY OR ALL OF ITS RIGHTS UNDER SECTION VII OF THIS 
AGREEMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THE USER.  
2. You assume the cost of all telephone and Internet access charges along with 
all necessary equipment, servicing, repair or correction incurred in maintaining 
connectivity to World of Warcraft‘s servers.  
3. Blizzard Entertainment has the right to obtain certain identification information 
about your computer and its operating system, including the identification 
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numbers of your hard drives, central processing unit, IP addresses and 
operating systems, for identification purposes without any further notice to you.  
 
4. Blizzard Entertainment has the right to obtain "non-personal" data from your 
connection to World of Warcraft in order to make certain demographic 
assumptions regarding the users of World of Warcraft without any further notice 
to you.  
5. In order to assist Blizzard Entertainment to police users who may use "hacks," 
or "cheats" to gain an advantage over other players, you acknowledge that 
Blizzard Entertainment shall have the right to obtain certain information from 
your computer and its component parts, including your computer's random 
access memory, video card, central processing unit, and storage devices. This 
information will only be used for the purpose of identifying "cheaters," and for no 
other reason.  
6. BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT DOES NOT WARRANT THAT WORLD OF 
WARCRAFT WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR-FREE, OR THAT 
WORLD OF WARCRAFT OR THE SERVICE ARE FREE OF VIRUSES OR 
OTHER HARMFUL COMPONENTS. Blizzard Entertainment expressly notifies 
you that it is not possible to develop complex software products that are 
completely free of technical defects. The contractually-specified characteristics 
of the software and the service to be provided by Blizzard Entertainment does 
not require that the software be completely free of programming errors but 
merely that the software be free of programming errors that materially impair its 
use.  
7. The use of any "user interface" other than the user interface that is included in 
the World of Warcraft Software ("Third Party User Interface") is not 
recommended by Blizzard Entertainment, and you hereby agree to indemnify 
and hold harmless Blizzard Entertainment from all claims, damages, and other 
losses which may arise from your use of a Third Party User Interface. At such 
time that Blizzard elects to post a list of approved Third-Party User Interfaces on 
its website, you agree that you will use only those Third-Party User Interfaces 
approved by Blizzard, and that you will use no other Third-Party User Interfaces 
in connection with World of Warcraft.  
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8. You may not be able to access World of Warcraft whenever you want, and 
there may be extended periods of time where you cannot access World of 
Warcraft.  
9. Blizzard Entertainment shall not be held liable for any delay or failure to 
perform under any circumstances resulting from causes outside the reasonable 
control of Blizzard Entertainment; including without limitation any failure to 
perform hereunder due to unforeseen circumstances or cause beyond Blizzard 
Entertainment‘s control such as acts of God, war, terrorism, riots, embargoes, 
acts of civil or military authorities, fire, floods, accidents, strikes, or shortages of 
transportation facilities, fuel, energy, labor or materials.  
10. World of Warcraft requires the creation and retention of electronic files, 
including without limitation player characters, accounts, statistics, user profiles, 
weapons, armor, quests, loot, etc. ("Game Data"), which are stored by Blizzard 
Entertainment (for the avoidance of doubt, data concerning the players‘ use of 
the Voice Client is not stored). Keeping Game Data safe is a priority of Blizzard 
Entertainment. Blizzard Entertainment will use reasonable efforts to restore the 
Game Data, unless you negligently or intentionally caused the loss of the Game 
Data.  
11. If and as far as necessary to operate the Service in accordance with the 
terms contained herein, in particular to keep a balanced and enjoyable gaming 
experience for all players Blizzard Entertainment reserves the right to modify or 
delete Game Data;  
12. You are entirely liable for all activities conducted through the Account for 
which you are responsible, and for ensuring that any other person who uses 
your World of Warcraft account is aware of the terms of and complies with this 
Agreement. In the event that you become aware of or reasonably suspect any 
breach of security, including without limitation any loss, theft, or unauthorized 
disclosure of your Password, you will immediately notify Blizzard Entertainment 
by calling Blizzard Entertainment‘s Billing and Account Services number or by e-
mailing wowtech@blizzard.com to report the actual or suspected breach of 
security.  
 
XVIII. Limitation of Liability. As regards the online service provided by Blizzard 
Entertainment Europe, for damages or compensation of unavailing expenditures, 
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whatever the legal basis including tort may be, the following rules apply: Blizzard 
Entertainment Europe may only be liable in cases of where it is adjudged that 
Blizzard: (i) engaged in intentionally damaging conduct; (ii) was grossly 
negligent; and/or (iii) is in breach of the requirements of the Product Liability Act 
according to statutory law. If you acquired the CD-ROMs containing the Game 
Client in Germany or Austria or if you access the WOW servers from the territory 
of Germany or Austria or in such other countries where local laws would apply, 
Blizzard Entertainment Europe may also be liable in case of death or personal or 
physical injury according to statutory law where Blizzard is adjudged to be 
responsible for such death or personal or physical injury.  
Blizzard Entertainment Europe shall not be liable for slight negligence. However, 
if you acquired the CD-ROMs containing the Game Client in Germany or Austria 
or if you access the WOW servers from the territory of Germany or Austria, 
Blizzard Entertainment Europe may also be liable for slight negligence if Blizzard 
Entertainment Europe is adjudged to be in breach of a ―material‖ contractual 
obligation hereunder. ―Material‖ in this sense are obligations which are 
necessary for the fulfillment of the Agreement, the breach of which would 
jeopardize the purpose of this Agreement and the compliance with which you 
may generally trust in. In such cases, Blizzard Entertainment Europe's liability is 
limited to typical and foreseeable damages. In other cases Blizzard 
Entertainment Europe shall not be liable for slight negligence.  
 
XIX. Miscellaneous. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws applicable in your country of residence. Those who 
choose to access World of Warcraft through the Service from other locations do 
so on their own initiative and are responsible for compliance with local laws, if 
and to the extent local laws are applicable. World of Warcraft, the Service and all 
related software is further subject to applicable export controls. The software 
utilized by World of Warcraft and/or the Service may not be downloaded or 
otherwise exported or re-exported:  
1. Into (or to a national or resident of) Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Syria 
or any other country to which the U.S. has embargoed goods; or  
2. to anyone on the U.S. Treasury Department's list of Specially Designated 
Nationals or the U.S. Commerce Department's Table of Deny Orders.  
[434] 
 
By using the Service, you represent and warrant that you are not located in, 
under the control of, or a national or resident of any such country or on any such 
list. If any provision of this Agreement shall be unlawful, void, or for any reason 
unenforceable, then that provision shall be deemed severable from this 
Agreement and shall not affect the validity and enforceability of any remaining 
provisions. This Terms of Use Agreement is the complete and exclusive 
statement of the agreement between you and Blizzard Entertainment concerning 
the Service, and this Agreement supersedes any prior or contemporaneous 
agreement, either oral or written, and any other communications with regard 
thereto between you and Blizzard Entertainment; provided, however that this 
Agreement is in addition to, and does not replace or supplant, the End User 
License Agreement that accompanied the World of Warcraft software. This 
Agreement may only be modified as set forth in Section XIV. Also, note that in 
the event that Blizzard Entertainment is contacted by governmental authorities 
and/or parties seeking information or legal redress against you for a violation 
committed by you or alleged to have been committed by you involving your use 
of World of Warcraft, Blizzard Entertainment will cooperate fully with all 
governmental authorities ensuring an adequate level of protection as required 
under Article 25 of European Directive 95/46/EC, and any lawful orders of the 
court with regard to the release of information that relates to you and your use of 
World of Warcraft, including but not limited to user Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses, associated personal information and all other user information on 
file. The section headings used herein are for reference only and shall not be 
read to have any legal effect.  
 
I hereby agree that my use of the World of Warcraft service is an 
acknowledgment of my agreement to be bound by the terms and conditions of 
this Agreement.  
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SECOND LIFE – TERMS OF SERVICE 
Welcome to Second Life! The following agreement (this "Agreement" or the 
"Terms of Service") describes the terms on which Linden Research, Inc. 
("Linden Lab") offers you access to its services. This offer is conditioned on your 
agreement to all of the terms and conditions contained in the Terms of Service, 
including your compliance with the policies and terms linked to (by way of the 
provided URLs) from this Agreement. By using Second Life, you agree to these 
Terms of Service. If you do not so agree, you should decline this agreement, in 
which case you are prohibited from accessing or using Second Life. Linden Lab 
may amend this Agreement at any time in its sole discretion, effective upon 
posting the amended Agreement at the domain or subdomains of 
http://secondlife.com where the prior version of this Agreement was posted, or 
by communicating these changes through any written contact method we have 
established with you.  
THE SERVICES AND CONTENT OF SECOND LIFE 
1.1 Basic description of the service: Second Life, a multi-user environment, 
including software and websites. 
"Second Life" is the multi-user online service offered by Linden Lab, including 
the software provided to you by Linden Lab (collectively, the "Linden Software") 
and the online environments that support the service, including without limitation: 
the server computation, software access, messaging and protocols that simulate 
the Second Life environment (the "Servers"), the software that is provided by 
Linden Lab and installed on the local computer or other device you use to 
access the Servers and thereby view or otherwise access the Second Life 
environment (the "Viewer"), application program interfaces provided by Linden 
Lab to you for use with Second Life (the "APIs"), and access to the websites and 
services available from the domain and subdomains of http://secondlife.com (the 
"Websites"). The Servers, Viewer, APIs, Websites and any other Linden 
Software collectively constitute the "Service" as used in this Agreement. 
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1.2 Linden Lab is a service provider, which means, among other things, that 
Linden Lab does not control various aspects of the Service. 
You acknowledge that Linden Lab is a service provider that may allow people to 
interact online regarding topics and content chosen by users of the service, and 
that users can alter the service environment on a real-time basis. Linden Lab 
generally does not regulate the content of communications between users or 
users' interactions with the Service. As a result, Linden Lab has very limited 
control, if any, over the quality, safety, morality, legality, truthfulness or accuracy 
of various aspects of the Service. 
1.3 Content available in the Service may be provided by users of the Service, 
rather than by Linden Lab. Linden Lab and other parties have rights in their 
respective content, which you agree to respect. 
You acknowledge that: (i) by using the Service you may have access to 
graphics, sound effects, music, video, audio, computer programs, animation, text 
and other creative output (collectively, "Content"), and (ii) Content may be 
provided under license by independent content providers, including contributions 
from other users of the Service (all such independent content providers, 
"Content Providers"). Linden Lab does not pre-screen Content. 
You acknowledge that Linden Lab and other Content Providers have rights in 
their respective Content under copyright and other applicable laws and treaty 
provisions, and that except as described in this Agreement, such rights are not 
licensed or otherwise transferred by mere use of the Service. You accept full 
responsibility and liability for your use of any Content in violation of any such 
rights. You agree that your creation of Content is not in any way based upon any 
expectation of compensation from Linden Lab. 
Certain of the fonts in the Meta family of copyrighted typefaces are used in 
Second Life under license from FSI FontShop International. You acknowledge 
that you may not copy any Meta font that is included in the Viewer and that you 
may use any such Meta font solely to the extent necessary to use the Linden 
Software in Second Life and that you will not use such Meta fonts for any other 
purpose whatsoever. 
1.4 Second Life "currency" is a limited license right available for purchase or free 
distribution at Linden Lab's discretion, and is not redeemable for monetary value 
from Linden Lab. 
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You acknowledge that the Service presently includes a component of in-world 
fictional currency ("Currency" or "Linden Dollars" or "L$"), which constitutes a 
limited license right to use a feature of our product when, as, and if allowed by 
Linden Lab. Linden Lab may charge fees for the right to use Linden Dollars, or 
may distribute Linden Dollars without charge, in its sole discretion. Regardless of 
terminology used, Linden Dollars represent a limited license right governed 
solely under the terms of this Agreement, and are not redeemable for any sum 
of money or monetary value from Linden Lab at any time. You agree that Linden 
Lab has the absolute right to manage, regulate, control, modify and/or eliminate 
such Currency as it sees fit in its sole discretion, in any general or specific case, 
and that Linden Lab will have no liability to you based on its exercise of such 
right. 
1.5 Second Life offers an exchange, called LindeX, for the trading of Linden 
Dollars, which uses the terms "buy" and "sell" to indicate the transfer of license 
rights to use Linden Dollars. Use and regulation of LindeX is at Linden Lab's sole 
discretion. 
The Service currently includes a component called "Currency Exchange" or 
"LindeX," which refers to an aspect of the Service through which Linden Lab 
administers transactions among users for the purchase and sale of the licensed 
right to use Currency. Notwithstanding any other language or context to the 
contrary, as used in this Agreement and throughout the Service in the context of 
Currency transfer: (a) the term "sell" means "to transfer for consideration to 
another user the licensed right to use Currency in accordance with the Terms of 
Service," (b) the term "buy" means "to receive for consideration from another 
user the licensed right to use Currency in accordance with the Terms of 
Service," (c) the terms "buyer," "seller", "sale" and "purchase" and similar terms 
have corresponding meanings to the root terms "buy" and "sell," (d) "sell order" 
and similar terms mean a request from a user to Linden Lab to list Currency for 
sale on the Currency Exchange at a requested sale price, and (e) "buy order" 
and similar terms mean a request from a user for Linden Lab to match open sale 
listings with a requested purchase price and facilitate completion of the sale of 
Currency. 
You agree and acknowledge that Linden Lab may deny any sell order or buy 
order individually or with respect to general volume or price limitations set by 
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Linden Lab for any reason. Linden Lab may limit sellers or buyers to any group 
of users at any time. Linden Lab may halt, suspend, discontinue, or reverse any 
Currency Exchange transaction (whether proposed, pending or past) in cases of 
actual or suspected fraud, violations of other laws or regulations, or deliberate 
disruptions to or interference with the Service. 
1.6 Second Life is subject to scheduled and unscheduled service interruptions. 
All aspects of the Service are subject to change or elimination at Linden Lab's 
sole discretion. 
Linden Lab reserves the right to interrupt the Service with or without prior notice 
for any reason or no reason. You agree that Linden Lab will not be liable for any 
interruption of the Service, delay or failure to perform, and you understand that 
except as otherwise specifically provided in Linden Lab's billing policies posted 
here, you shall not be entitled to any refunds of fees for interruption of service or 
failure to perform. Linden Lab has the right at any time for any reason or no 
reason to change and/or eliminate any aspect(s) of the Service as it sees fit in its 
sole discretion. 
1.7 In the event you choose to use paid aspects of the Service, you agree to the 
posted pricing and billing policies on the Websites. 
Certain aspects of the Service are provided for a fee or other charge. These fees 
and charges are described on the Websites, and in the event you elect to use 
paid aspects of the Service, you agree to the pricing, payment and billing 
policies applicable to such fees and charges, posted or linked at 
http://secondlife.com/corporate/billing.php. Linden Lab may add new services for 
additional fees and charges, or proactively amend fees and charges for existing 
services, at any time in its sole discretion. 
ACCOUNT REGISTRATION AND REQUIREMENTS 
2.1 You must establish an account to use Second Life, using true and accurate 
registration information. 
You must establish an account with Linden Lab (your "Account") to use the 
Service, except for those portions of the Websites to which Linden Lab allows 
access without registration. You agree to provide true, accurate, current and 
complete information about yourself as prompted by the registration form 
("Registration Data") and maintain and promptly update the Registration Data to 
keep it true, accurate, current and complete. You may establish an Account with 
[439] 
 
Registration Data provided to Linden Lab by a third party through the use of an 
API, in which case you may have a separate, additional account relationship 
with such third party. You authorize Linden Lab, directly or through third parties, 
to make any inquiries we consider necessary to validate your Registration Data. 
Linden Lab reserves all rights to vigorously pursue legal action against all 
persons who misrepresent personal information or are otherwise untruthful 
about their identity, and to suspend or cancel Accounts registered with 
inaccurate or incomplete information. Notwithstanding the foregoing, you 
acknowledge that Linden Lab cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information 
submitted by any user of the Service, nor any identity information about any 
user. 
2.2 You must be 13 years of age or older to access Second Life; minors over the 
age of 13 are only permitted in a separate area, which adults are generally 
prohibited from using. Linden Lab cannot absolutely control whether minors or 
adults gain unauthorized access to the Service. 
You must be at least 13 years of age to participate in the Service. Users under 
the age of 18 are prohibited from accessing the Service other than in the area 
designated by Linden Lab for use by users from 13 through 17 years of age (the 
"Teen Area"). Users age 18 and older are prohibited from accessing the Teen 
Area. Any user age 18 and older who gains unauthorized access to the Teen 
Area is in breach of this Agreement and may face immediate termination of any 
or all Accounts held by such user for any area of the Service. If you reside in a 
jurisdiction where the age of majority is greater than 18 years old, you are 
prohibited from accessing the Service until you have reached such age of 
majority. 
By accepting this agreement in connection with an Account outside the Teen 
Area, you represent that you are an adult 18 years of age or older. By accepting 
this agreement in connection with an Account for use in the Teen Area, you 
represent that (i) you are at least 13 years of age and less than 18 years of age; 
(ii) you have read and accept this Agreement; (iii) your parent or legal guardian 
has consented to you having an Account for use of the Teen Area and 
participating in the Service, and to providing your personal information for your 




Linden Lab cannot absolutely control whether minors gain access to the Service 
other than the Teen Area, and makes no representation that users outside the 
Teen Area are not minors. Linden Lab cannot absolutely control whether adults 
gain access to the Teen Area of the Service, and makes no representation that 
users inside the Teen Area are not adults. Adult employees, contractors and 
partners of Linden Lab regularly conduct their work in the Teen Area. Linden Lab 
cannot ensure that other users or any non-employee of Linden Lab will not 
provide Content or access to Content that parents or guardians may find 
inappropriate or that any user may find objectionable. 
2.3 You need to use an account name in Second Life which is not misleading, 
offensive or infringing. You must select and keep secure your account password. 
You must choose an account name to identify yourself to Linden Lab staff (your 
"Account Name"), which will also serve as the name for the graphical 
representation of your body in the Service (such representation, an "Avatar"). 
You may not select as your Account Name the name of another person to the 
extent that could cause deception or confusion; a name which violates any 
trademark right, copyright, or other proprietary right; a name which may mislead 
other users to believe you to be an employee of Linden Lab; or a name which 
Linden Lab deems in its discretion to be vulgar or otherwise offensive. Linden 
Lab reserves the right to delete or change any Account Name for any reason or 
no reason. You are fully responsible for all activities conducted through your 
Account or under your Account Name. 
At the time your Account is opened, you must select a password. You are 
responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of your password and are 
responsible for any harm resulting from your disclosure, or authorizing the 
disclosure of, your password or from use by any person of your password to 
gain access to your Account or Account Name. At no time should you respond to 
an online request for a password other than in connection with the log-on 
process to the Service. Your disclosure of your password to any other person is 
entirely at your own risk. 
2.4 Account registrations are limited per unique person. Transfers of accounts 
are generally not permitted. 
Linden Lab may require you to submit an indication of unique identity in the 
account registration process; e.g. credit card or other payment information, or 
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SMS message code or other information requested by Linden Lab. When an 
account is created, the information given for the account must match the 
address, phone number, and/or other unique identifier information associated 
with the identification method. You may register multiple accounts per 
identification method only at Linden Lab's sole discretion. A single account may 
be used by a single legal entity at Linden Lab's sole discretion and subject to 
Linden Lab's requirements. Additional accounts beyond the first account per 
unique user may be subject to fees upon account creation. You may not transfer 
your Account to any third party without the prior written consent of Linden Lab; 
notwithstanding the foregoing, Linden Lab will not unreasonably withhold 
consent to the transfer of an Account in good standing by operation of valid 
written will to a single natural person, provided that proper notice and 
documentation are delivered as requested by Linden Lab. 
2.5 You may cancel your account at any time; however, there are no refunds for 
cancellation. 
Accounts may be cancelled by you at any time. Upon your election to cancel, 
your account will be cancelled within 24 hours, but if you have paid for a period 
in advance you will be allowed to use the remaining time according to these 
Terms of Service unless your account or this Agreement is suspended or 
terminated based on our belief that you have violated this Agreement. There will 
be no refunds for any unused time on a subscription or any prepaid fees for any 
portion of the Service. 
2.6 Linden Lab may suspend or terminate your account at any time, without 
refund or obligation to you. 
Linden Lab has the right at any time for any reason or no reason to suspend or 
terminate your Account, terminate this Agreement, and/or refuse any and all 
current or future use of the Service without notice or liability to you. In the event 
that Linden Lab suspends or terminates your Account or this Agreement, you 
understand and agree that you shall receive no refund or exchange for any 
unused time on a subscription, any license or subscription fees, any content or 
data associated with your Account, or for anything else. 
2.7 Accounts affiliated with delinquent accounts are subject to remedial actions 
related to the delinquent account. 
[442] 
 
In the event an Account is suspended or terminated for your breach of this 
Agreement or your payment delinquency (in each case as determined in Linden 
Lab's sole discretion), Linden Lab may suspend or terminate the Account 
associated with such breach and any or all other Accounts held by you or your 
affiliates, and your breach shall be deemed to apply to all such Accounts. 
2.8 You are responsible for your own Internet access. 
Linden Lab does not provide Internet access, and you are responsible for all 
fees associated with your Internet connection. 
LICENSE TERMS AND OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TERMS 
3.1 You have a nonexclusive, limited, revocable license to use Second Life while 
you are in compliance with the terms of service. 
Subject to the terms of this Agreement, Linden Lab grants to you a non-
exclusive, limited, fully revocable license to use the Linden Software and the rest 
of the Service during the time you are in full compliance with the Terms of 
Service. Additional terms may apply to use of the APIs or other separate 
elements of the Service (i.e. elements that are not required to use the Viewer or 
the Servers); these terms are available where such separate elements are 
available for download from the Websites. Nothing in this Agreement, or on 
Linden Lab's websites, shall be construed as granting you any other rights or 
privileges of any kind with respect to the Service or to any Content. You 
acknowledge that your participation in the Service, including your creation or 
uploading of Content in the Service, does not make you a Linden Lab employee 
and that you do not expect to be, and will not be, compensated by Linden Lab 
for such activities. 
3.2 You retain copyright and other intellectual property rights with respect to 
Content you create in Second Life, to the extent that you have such rights under 
applicable law. However, you must make certain representations and warranties, 
and provide certain license rights, forbearances and indemnification, to Linden 
Lab and to other users of Second Life.  
Users of the Service can create Content on Linden Lab's servers in various 
forms. Linden Lab acknowledges and agrees that, subject to the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement, you will retain any and all applicable copyright and 
other intellectual property rights with respect to any Content you create using the 
Service, to the extent you have such rights under applicable law. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, you understand and agree that by submitting 
your Content to any area of the service, you automatically grant (and you 
represent and warrant that you have the right to grant) to Linden Lab: (a) a 
royalty-free, worldwide, fully paid-up, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive right 
and license to (i) use, reproduce and distribute your Content within the Service 
as permitted by you through your interactions on the Service, and (ii) use and 
reproduce (and to authorize third parties to use and reproduce) any of your 
Content in any or all media for marketing and/or promotional purposes in 
connection with the Service, provided that in the event that your Content 
appears publicly in material under the control of Linden Lab, and you provide 
written notice to Linden Lab of your desire to discontinue the distribution of such 
Content in such material (with sufficient specificity to allow Linden Lab, in its sole 
discretion, to identify the relevant Content and materials), Linden Lab will make 
commercially reasonable efforts to cease its distribution of such Content 
following the receipt of such notice, although Linden Lab cannot provide any 
assurances regarding materials produced or distributed prior to the receipt of 
such notice; (b) the perpetual and irrevocable right to delete any or all of your 
Content from Linden Lab's servers and from the Service, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, and for any reason or no reason, without any liability of any kind 
to you or any other party; and (c) a royalty- free, fully paid-up, perpetual, 
irrevocable, non-exclusive right and license to copy, analyze and use any of your 
Content as Linden Lab may deem necessary or desirable for purposes of 
debugging, testing and/or providing support services in connection with the 
Service. Further, you agree to grant to Linden Lab a royalty-free, worldwide, fully 
paid-up, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive, sublicensable right and license to 
exercise the copyright, publicity, and database rights you have in your account 
information, including any data or other information generated by your account 
activity, in any media now known or not currently known, in accordance with our 
privacy policy as set forth below, including the incorporation by reference of 
terms posted here.  
You also understand and agree that by submitting your Content to any area of 
the Service, you automatically grant (or you warrant that the owner of such 
Content has expressly granted) to Linden Lab and to all other users of the 
Service a non-exclusive, worldwide, fully paid-up, transferable, irrevocable, 
[444] 
 
royalty-free and perpetual License, under any and all patent rights you may have 
or obtain with respect to your Content, to use your Content for all purposes 
within the Service. You further agree that you will not make any claims against 
Linden Lab or against other users of the Service based on any allegations that 
any activities by either of the foregoing within the Service infringe your (or 
anyone else's) patent rights. 
You further understand and agree that: (i) you are solely responsible for 
understanding all copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret and other intellectual 
property or other laws that may apply to your Content hereunder; (ii) you are 
solely responsible for, and Linden Lab will have no liability in connection with, 
the legal consequences of any actions or failures to act on your part while using 
the Service, including without limitation any legal consequences relating to your 
intellectual property rights; and (iii) Linden Lab's acknowledgement hereunder of 
your intellectual property rights in your Content does not constitute a legal 
opinion or legal advice, but is intended solely as an expression of Linden Lab's 
intention not to require users of the Service to forego certain intellectual property 
rights with respect to Content they create using the Service, subject to the terms 
of this Agreement.  
3.3 Linden Lab retains ownership of the account and related data, regardless of 
intellectual property rights you may have in content you create or otherwise own.  
You agree that even though you may retain certain copyright or other intellectual 
property rights with respect to Content you create while using the Service, you 
do not own the account you use to access the Service, nor do you own any data 
Linden Lab stores on Linden Lab servers (including without limitation any data 
representing or embodying any or all of your Content). Your intellectual property 
rights do not confer any rights of access to the Service or any rights to data 
stored by or on behalf of Linden Lab.  
3.4 Linden Lab licenses its textures and environmental content to you for your 
use in creating content in-world.  
During any period in which your Account is active and in good standing, Linden 
Lab gives you permission to create still and/or moving media, for use only within 
the virtual world environment of the Service ("in-world"), which use or include the 
"textures" and/or "environmental content" that are both (a) created or owned by 
Linden Lab and (b) displayed by Linden Lab in-world. 
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CONDUCT BY USERS OF SECOND LIFE 
4.1 You agree to abide by certain rules of conduct, including the Community 
Standards and other rules prohibiting illegal and other practices that Linden Lab 
deems harmful. 
You agree to read and comply with the Community Standards posted on the 
Websites, (for users 18 years of age and older, at 
http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php; and for users of the Teen Area, at 
http://teen.secondlife.com/footer/cs 
In addition to abiding at all times by the Community Standards, you agree that 
you shall not: (i) take any action or upload, post, e-mail or otherwise transmit 
Content that infringes or violates any third party rights; (ii) impersonate any 
person or entity without their consent, including, but not limited to, a Linden Lab 
employee, or falsely state or otherwise misrepresent your affiliation with a 
person or entity; (iii) take any action or upload, post, e-mail or otherwise transmit 
Content that violates any law or regulation; (iv) take any action or upload, post, 
e-mail or otherwise transmit Content as determined by Linden Lab at its sole 
discretion that is harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, causes tort, 
defamatory, vulgar, obscene, libelous, invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or 
racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable; (v) take any actions or upload, 
post, e-mail or otherwise transmit Content that contains any viruses, Trojan 
horses, worms, spyware, time bombs, cancelbots or other computer 
programming routines that are intended to damage, detrimentally interfere with, 
surreptitiously intercept or expropriate any system, data or personal information; 
(vi) take any action or upload, post, email or otherwise transmit any Content that 
would violate any right or duty under any law or under contractual or fiduciary 
relationships (such as inside information, proprietary and confidential information 
learned or disclosed as part of employment relationships or under nondisclosure 
agreements); (vii) upload, post, email or otherwise transmit any unsolicited or 
unauthorized advertising, or promotional materials, that are in the nature of "junk 
mail," "spam," "chain letters," "pyramid schemes," or any other form of 
solicitation that Linden Lab considers in its sole discretion to be of such nature; 
(viii) interfere with or disrupt the Service or servers or networks connected to the 
Service, or disobey any requirements, procedures, policies or regulations of 
networks connected to the Service; (ix) attempt to gain access to any other 
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user's Account or password; or (x) "stalk", abuse or attempt to abuse, or 
otherwise harass another user. Any violation by you of the terms of the foregoing 
sentence may result in immediate and permanent suspension or cancellation of 
your Account. You agree that Linden Lab may take whatever steps it deems 
necessary to abridge, or prevent behavior of any sort on the Service in its sole 
discretion, without notice to you. 
4.2 You agree to use Second Life as provided, without unauthorized software or 
other means of access or use. You will not make unauthorized works from or 
conduct unauthorized distribution of the Linden Software.  
Linden Lab has designed the Service to be experienced only as offered by 
Linden Lab at the Websites or partner websites. Linden Lab is not responsible 
for any aspect of the Service that is accessed or experienced using software or 
other means that are not provided by Linden Lab. You agree not to create or 
provide any server emulators or other software or other means that provide 
access to or use of the Servers without the express written authorization of 
Linden Lab. Notwithstanding the foregoing, you may use and create software 
that provides access to the Servers for substantially similar function (or subset 
thereof) as the Viewer; provided that such software is not used for and does not 
enable any violation of these Terms of Service. Linden Lab is not obligated to 
allow access to the Servers by any software that is not provided by Linden Lab, 
and you agree to cease using, creating, distributing or providing any such 
software at the request of Linden Lab. You are prohibited from taking any action 
that imposes an unreasonable or disproportionately large load on Linden Lab's 
infrastructure. 
You may not charge any third party for using the Linden Software to access 
and/or use the Service, and you may not modify, adapt, reverse engineer 
(except as otherwise permitted by applicable law), decompile or attempt to 
discover the source code of the Linden Software, or create any derivative works 
of the Linden Software or the Service, or otherwise use the Linden Software 
except as expressly provided in this Agreement. You may not copy or distribute 
any of the written materials associated with the Service. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, you may copy the Viewer that Linden Lab provides to you, for backup 
purposes and may give copies of the Viewer to others free of charge. Further, 
you may use and modify the source code for the Viewer as permitted by any 
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open source license agreement under which Linden Lab distributes such Viewer 
source code.  
4.3 You will comply with the processes of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
regarding copyright infringement claims covered under such Act. 
Our policy is to respond to notices of alleged infringement that comply with the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). Copyright-infringing materials found 
within the world of Second Life can be identified and removed via Linden Lab's 
DMCA compliance process listed at http://secondlife.com/corporate/dmca.php, 
and you agree to comply with such process in the event you are involved in any 
claim of copyright infringement to which the DMCA may be applicable. 
4.4 Without a written license agreement, Linden Lab does not authorize you to 
make any use of its trademarks. 
You agree to review and adhere to the guidelines on using "Second Life," "SL," 
"Linden," the Eye-in-Hand logo, and Linden Lab's other trademarks, service 
marks, trade names, logos, domain names, taglines, and trade dress 
(collectively, the "Linden Lab Marks") at http://secondlife.com/corporate/brand 
and its subpages, which may be updated from time to time. Except for the 
licenses expressly granted there or in a separate written agreement signed by 
you and Linden Lab, Linden Lab reserves all right, title, and interest in the 
Linden Lab Marks and does not authorize you to display or use any Linden Lab 
Mark in any manner whatsoever. If you have a written license agreement with 
Linden Lab to use a Linden Lab Mark, your use shall comply strictly with that 
agreement's terms and conditions and use guidelines. 
RELEASES, DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTY, LIMITATION OF LIABILITY, 
AND INDEMNIFICATION 
5.1 You release Linden Lab from your claims relating to other users of Second 
Life. Linden Lab has the right but not the obligation to resolve disputes between 
users of Second Life. 
As a condition of access to the Service, you release Linden Lab (and Linden 
Lab's shareholders, partners, affiliates, directors, officers, subsidiaries, 
employees, agents, suppliers, licensees, distributors) from claims, demands and 
damages (actual and consequential) of every kind and nature, known and 
unknown, suspected and unsuspected, disclosed and undisclosed, arising out of 
or in any way connected with any dispute you have or claim to have with one or 
[448] 
 
more users of the Service. You further understand and agree that: (a) Linden 
Lab will have the right but not the obligation to resolve disputes between users 
relating to the Service, and Linden Lab's resolution of any particular dispute 
does not create an obligation to resolve any other dispute; (b) to the extent 
Linden Lab elects to resolve such disputes, it will do so in good faith based 
solely on the general rules and standards of the Service and will not make 
judgments regarding legal issues or claims; (c) Linden Lab's resolution of such 
disputes will be final with respect to the virtual world of the Service but will have 
no bearing on any real-world legal disputes in which users of the Service may 
become involved; and (d) you hereby release Linden Lab (and Linden Lab's 
shareholders, partners, affiliates, directors, officers, subsidiaries, employees, 
agents, suppliers, licensees, distributors) from claims, demands and damages 
(actual and consequential) of every kind and nature, known and unknown, 
suspected and unsuspected, disclosed and undisclosed, arising out of or in any 
way connected with Linden Lab's resolution of disputes relating to the Service. 
5.2 Other service or product providers may form contractual relationships with 
you. Linden Lab is not a party to your relationship with such other providers.  
Subject to the terms of this Agreement, you may view or use the environment 
simulated by the Servers through viewer software that is not the Viewer provided 
by Linden Lab, and you may register for use of Second Life through websites 
that are not Websites owned and operated by Second Life. Linden Lab is not 
responsible for any software used with or in connection with Second Life other 
than Linden Software developed by Linden Lab. Linden Lab does not control 
and is not responsible for any information you provide to parties other than 
Linden Lab. Linden Lab is not a party to your agreement with any party that 
provides software, products or services to you in connection with Second Life.  
5.3 All data on Linden Lab's servers are subject to deletion, alteration or transfer. 
When using the Service, you may accumulate Content, Currency, objects, items, 
scripts, equipment, or other value or status indicators that reside as data on 
Linden Lab's servers. THESE DATA, AND ANY OTHER DATA, ACCOUNT 
HISTORY AND ACCOUNT NAMES RESIDING ON LINDEN LAB'S SERVERS, 
MAY BE DELETED, ALTERED, MOVED OR TRANSFERRED AT ANY TIME 
FOR ANY REASON IN LINDEN LAB'S SOLE DISCRETION. 
[449] 
 
YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING ANY COPYRIGHT OR 
OTHER RIGHTS YOU MAY HAVE WITH RESPECT TO ITEMS YOU CREATE 
USING THE SERVICE, AND NOTWITHSTANDING ANY VALUE ATTRIBUTED 
TO SUCH CONTENT OR OTHER DATA BY YOU OR ANY THIRD PARTY, 
LINDEN LAB DOES NOT PROVIDE OR GUARANTEE, AND EXPRESSLY 
DISCLAIMS (SUBJECT TO ANY UNDERLYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN THE CONTENT), ANY VALUE, CASH OR OTHERWISE, 
ATTRIBUTED TO ANY DATA RESIDING ON LINDEN LAB'S SERVERS.  
YOU UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT LINDEN LAB HAS THE RIGHT, BUT 
NOT THE OBLIGATION, TO REMOVE ANY CONTENT (INCLUDING YOUR 
CONTENT) IN WHOLE OR IN PART AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON OR NO 
REASON, WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE AND WITH NO LIABILITY OF ANY 
KIND.  
5.4 Linden Lab provides the Service on an "as is" basis, without express or 
implied warranties. 
LINDEN LAB PROVIDES THE SERVICE, THE LINDEN SOFTWARE, YOUR 
ACCOUNT AND ALL OTHER SERVICES STRICTLY ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, 
PROVIDED AT YOUR OWN RISK, AND HEREBY EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS 
ALL WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, WRITTEN OR ORAL, 
EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION 
ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF TITLE, NONINFRINGEMENT, 
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 
Without limiting the foregoing, Linden Lab does not ensure continuous, error-
free, secure or virus-free operation of the Service, the Linden Software or your 
Account, and you understand that you shall not be entitled to refunds for fees 
based on Linden Lab's failure to provide any of the foregoing other than as 
explicitly provided in this Agreement. Some jurisdictions do not allow the 
disclaimer of implied warranties, and to that extent, the foregoing disclaimer may 
not apply to you.  
5.5 Linden Lab's liability to you is expressly limited, to the extent allowable under 
applicable law. 
IN NO EVENT SHALL LINDEN LAB OR ANY OF ITS SHAREHOLDERS, 
PARTNERS, AFFILIATES, DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, SUBSIDIARIES, 
EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, SUPPLIERS, LICENSEES OR DISTRIBUTORS BE 
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LIABLE TO YOU OR TO ANY THIRD PARTY FOR ANY SPECIAL, 
INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, 
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS, 
ARISING (WHETHER IN CONTRACT, TORT, STRICT LIABILITY OR 
OTHERWISE) OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SERVICE 
(INCLUDING ITS MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION), THE LINDEN 
SOFTWARE, YOUR ACCOUNT (INCLUDING ITS TERMINATION OR 
SUSPENSION) OR THIS AGREEMENT, WHETHER OR NOT LINDEN LAB 
MAY HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT ANY SUCH DAMAGES MIGHT OR COULD 
OCCUR AND NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF ESSENTIAL PURPOSE 
OF ANY REMEDY. IN ADDITION, IN NO EVENT WILL LINDEN LAB'S 
CUMULATIVE LIABILITY TO YOU FOR DIRECT DAMAGES OF ANY KIND OR 
NATURE EXCEED FIFTY DOLLARS (U.S. $50.00). Some jurisdictions do not 
allow the foregoing limitations of liability, so to the extent that any such limitation 
is impermissible, such limitation may not apply to you. You agree that Linden 
Lab cannot be held responsible or liable for anything that occurs or results from 
accessing or subscribing to the Service. 
5.6 You will indemnify Linden lab from claims arising from breach of this 
Agreement by you, from your use of Second Life, from loss of Content due to 
your actions, or from alleged infringement by you. 
At Linden Lab's request, you agree to defend, indemnify and hold harmless 
Linden Lab, its shareholders, partners, affiliates, directors, officers, subsidiaries, 
employees, agents, suppliers, licensees, distributors, Content Providers, and 
other users of the Service, from all damages, liabilities, claims and expenses, 
including without limitation attorneys' fees and costs, arising from any breach of 
this Agreement by you, or from your use of the Service. You agree to defend, 
indemnify and hold harmless Linden Lab, its shareholders, partners, affiliates, 
directors, officers, subsidiaries, employees, agents, suppliers, licensees, and 
distributors, from all damages, liabilities, claims and expenses, including without 
limitation attorneys' fees and costs, arising from: (a) any action or inaction by 
you in connection with the deletion, alteration, transfer or other loss of Content, 
status or other data held in connection with your Account, and (b) any claims by 
third parties that your activity or Content in the Service infringes upon, violates or 




6.1 Linden Lab uses your personal information to operate and improve Second 
Life, and will not give your personal information to third parties except to 
operate, improve and protect the Service. 
The personal information you provide to us during registration is used for Linden 
Lab's internal purposes only. Linden Lab uses the information it collects to learn 
what you like and to improve the Service. Linden Lab will not give any of your 
personal information to any third party without your express approval except: as 
reasonably necessary to fulfill your service request, to third- party fulfillment 
houses, customer support, billing and credit verification services, and the like; to 
comply with tax and other applicable law; as otherwise expressly permitted by 
this Agreement or as otherwise authorized by you; to law enforcement or other 
appropriate third parties in connection with criminal investigations and other 
investigations of fraud; or as otherwise necessary to protect Linden Lab, its 
agents and other users of the Service. Linden Lab does not guarantee the 
security of any of your private transmissions against unauthorized or unlawful 
interception or access by third parties. Linden Lab can (and you authorize 
Linden Lab to) disclose any information about you to private entities, law 
enforcement agencies or government officials, as Linden Lab, in its sole 
discretion, believes necessary or appropriate to investigate or resolve possible 
problems or inquiries, or as otherwise required by law. If you request any 
technical support, you consent to Linden Lab's remote accessing and review of 
the computer onto which you load Linden Software for purposes of support and 
debugging. You agree that Linden Lab may communicate with you via email and 
any similar technology for any purpose relating to the Service, the Linden 
Software and any services or software which may in the future be provided by 
Linden Lab or on Linden Lab's behalf. You agree to read the disclosures and be 
bound by the terms of the additional Privacy Policy information posted on our 
website. 
6.2 Linden Lab may observe and record your interaction within the Service, and 
may share aggregated and other general information (not including your 
personal information) with third parties. 
You acknowledge and agree that Linden Lab, in its sole discretion, may track, 
record, observe or follow any and all of your interactions within the Service. 
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Linden Lab may share general, demographic, or aggregated information with 
third parties about our user base and Service usage, but that information will not 
include or be linked to any personal information without your consent. 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
If a dispute arises between you and Linden Lab, our goal is to provide you with a 
neutral and cost-effective means of resolving the dispute quickly. Accordingly, 
you and Linden Lab agree to resolve any claim or controversy at law or in equity 
that arises from or relates to this Agreement or our Service (a "Claim") in 
accordance with one of the subsections below.  
7.1 Governing Law. 
This Agreement and the relationship between you and Linden Lab shall be 
governed in all respects by the laws of the State of California without regard to 
conflict of law principles or the United Nations Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods.  
7.2 Forum for Disputes. 
You and Linden Lab agree to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of 
the courts located in the City and County of San Francisco, California, except as 
provided in Subsection 7.3 below regarding optional arbitration. Notwithstanding 
this, you agree that Linden Lab shall still be allowed to apply for injunctive or 
other equitable relief in any court of competent jurisdiction.  
7.3 Optional Arbitration. 
For any Claim, excluding Claims for injunctive or other equitable relief, where the 
total amount of the award sought is less than ten thousand U.S. Dollars 
($10,000.00 USD), the party requesting relief may elect to resolve the Claim in a 
cost-effective manner through binding non-appearance-based arbitration. A 
party electing arbitration shall initiate it through an established alternative 
dispute resolution ("ADR") provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. The 
ADR provider and the parties must comply with the following rules: (a) the 
arbitration shall be conducted, at the option of the party seeking relief, by 
telephone, online, or based solely on written submissions; (b) the arbitration 
shall not involve any personal appearance by the parties or witnesses unless 
otherwise mutually agreed by the parties; and (c) any judgment on the award 
rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction. 
7.4 Improperly Filed Claims. 
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All Claims you bring against Linden Lab must be resolved in accordance with 
this Dispute Resolution Section. All Claims filed or brought contrary to this 
Dispute Resolution Section shall be considered improperly filed. Should you file 
a Claim contrary to this Dispute Resolution Section, Linden Lab may recover 
attorneys' fees and costs up to one thousand U.S. Dollars ($1,000.00 USD), 
provided that Linden Lab has notified you in writing of the improperly filed Claim, 
and you have failed to promptly withdraw the Claim.  
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
The Service is controlled and operated by Linden Lab from its offices within the 
State of California, United States of America. Linden Lab makes no 
representation that any aspect of the Service is appropriate or available for use 
in jurisdictions outside of the United States. Those who choose to access the 
Service from other locations are responsible for compliance with applicable local 
laws. The Linden Software is subject to all applicable export restrictions. You 
must comply with all export and import laws and restrictions and regulations of 
any United States or foreign agency or authority relating to the Linden Software 
and its use.  
Linden Lab's failure to act with respect to a breach by you or others does not 
waive Linden Lab's right to act with respect to that breach or subsequent or 
similar breaches. No consent or waiver by Linden Lab under this Agreement 
shall be deemed effective unless delivered in a writing signed by a duly 
appointed officer of Linden Lab. All or any of Linden Lab's rights and obligations 
under this Agreement may be assigned to a subsequent owner or operator of 
the Service in a merger, acquisition or sale of all or substantially all of Linden 
Lab's assets. You may not assign or transfer this Agreement or any or all of your 
rights hereunder without the prior written consent of Linden Lab, and any 
attempt to do so is void. Notwithstanding anything else in this Agreement, no 
default, delay or failure to perform on the part of Linden Lab shall be considered 
a breach of this Agreement if such default, delay or failure to perform is shown to 
be due to causes beyond the reasonable control of Linden Lab.  
This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding and agreement between you 
and Linden Lab with respect to the subject matter hereof. The section headings 
used herein, including descriptive summary sentences at the start of each 
section, are for convenience only and shall not affect the interpretation of this 
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Agreement. If any provision of this Agreement shall be held by a court of 
competent jurisdiction to be unlawful, void, or for any reason unenforceable, 
then in such jurisdiction that provision shall be deemed severable from these 
terms and shall not affect the validity and enforceability of the remaining 
provisions.  
Linden Lab may give notice to you by means of a general notice on our website, 
through the Second Life Viewer at or after log-in to your Account, by electronic 
mail to your e-mail address in our records for your Account, or by written 
communication sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, or overnight courier to 
your address on record for your Account. All notices given by you or required 
under this Agreement shall be faxed to Linden Lab Legal Department, Attn: 
Dispute Resolution, at: (415) 243-9045; or mailed to us at: Linden Lab Legal 












Sent: 17/8/2007 3:10:30 PM 




I used my 10 days trial account and then I bought the game in order to  upgrade 
my account. 
 
To my horror the game wouldn't accept the authentication key: my copy is for the 
EU edition while the WoW.com website had me on US servers (though I had 
provided my Scottish home address). If not being able to continue on the same 
server I was, could at least be possible to transfer my characters (for which I 
spent hours and hours of playing) to the EU setting? 
 
  






 Subject: World of Warcraft – Account Administration 
 Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2007 15:18:43 -0700 
 
 Thank you for contacting the Account Administration team regarding this issue. 
This is an automated email to let you know that we have received your inquiry. 
Please do not reply to this email; a response to your message will be sent to you 
as soon as possible. 
 
While we will attempt to address all concerns as promptly as possible, it may be 
several days before we are able to respond depending on the total inquiries we 
receive. We must ask that no additional emails be submitted regarding this 
issue, as additional emails will ultimately result in undue delays in response 
time. 
 
 In the meantime, we offer other forms of support that are immediately available 









Sent: 25/8/2007 6:53:03 PM 




Thank you for contacting us about an account issue for the World of Warcraft 
account you are using. However, the Account Administration Department is 
unable to assist with this matter. Please visit the World of Warcraft Billing 
Support site at http://www.blizzard.com/support/wowbilling/?id=abl01117p for 
suggestions on how to resolve this issue. 
 
Your account issue has been forwarded to the Billing Department and you 
should hear from our Billing personnel regarding your request shortly. For future 
account information changes, please feel free to contact our Billing Department 
directly at billing@blizzard.com or by calling 1-800-***-**** during the hours of 8 
am to 8 pm Pacific Standard Time. Customers in Australia should call 1-800-***-
***. 
  
Thank you in advance for your time and understanding. We appreciate your 
interest in World of Warcraft and your continued support. Please let us know if 








   
Customer satisfaction is a top priority here at Blizzard Entertainment, and we 
would like your feedback on the level of service you have received. Please feel 
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